Special Political Missions Start-up

GUIDE

2012

Overview of the SPM start-up process

Change in the country situation → **Strategic Assessment**

Policy Committee
SG decision to establish an SPM

BEGINNING OF START-UP

I M P P

Mission planning	Budget	Recruitment	Logistics and IT	Security	Public Information
	Identification of start-up funding sources				

Development of mission support concept (Mission planning / Budget / Recruitment) — **Development of mission support concept** (Logistics and IT / Security)

Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)

Policy Committee Decision — Mission concept

SG report

Development of financial implications ← Development of staffing tables → Development of support plan

ToRs of SRSG drafted

Candidates shortlisted

Identification of TDY and candidates for regular posts

Security Assessment and development of a security plan

Development of a public information strategy

Mandate | | | | **Mandate** | |

ISF development

Internal mission workplans

SOMA development

RBB development

Provision of start-up funding

SRSG appointed

SRSG deployed

Staff on TDY deployed

Finalization of international staff and UNVs recruitment

Development of material resourcing plan

Acquisition of premises, conclusion of lease agreements

Development of support contracts

Procurement action

Set up of IT backbone

Internal/external websites

Development of information management system

Implementation of the PI strategy

Regular budget proposal and approval by ACABQ and 5th Committee

Recruitment of national staff

DSS continuous monitoring of the situation

(optional) Official ceremony for the inauguration of the mission

Mandate implementation

SOMA enters into force

Regular budget allotted

[50%] vacancy ratio

MHQ and other buildings refurbished

IT backbone and main communications set up and working

Equipment requisitioned and/or arrived from other missions

Security system set up

Public information strategy designed

Information management systems put in place

END OF START-UP

KEY: ▢ = SUBSTANTIVE ▢ = SUPPORT ▢ = END OF START-UP PHASE

Special Political Missions Start-up

GUIDE

2012

DPA POLICY AND MEDIATION DIVISION
GUIDANCE AND LEARNING UNIT

Special Political Missions Start-Up Guide

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this *Guide* is to provide guidance to DPA staff on the tasks that need to be carried out to establish a field-based special political mission (SPM). The *Guide* is designed to ensure that no critical tasks are omitted in the planning, design and set-up of an SPM.

B. SCOPE

While all DPA staff should be aware of this *Guide*, the primary target is DPA staff tasked to explore the deployment of an SPM or in charge of supporting the start-up of an SPM. The *Guide* also applies to mission managers involved in a start-up phase and, to some extent, to mission personnel responsible for start-up activities.

The *Guide* covers DPA-led field-based SPMs (i.e., United Nations offices, peacebuilding offices, integrated offices and commissions and assistance missions). It can also be of use in the start-up of other types of DPA-led SPMs (e.g., those headed by special envoys/special advisers of the Secretary-General).

The *Guide* addresses all phases of the start-up of an SPM, from the point when a decision is made for the United Nations to consider active involvement in the resolution of a particular situation to the moment when the mission has reached what is commonly called a "steady state".

C. RATIONALE

With the rise in the number of SPMs in the past decade, standardized guidelines and procedures for establishing SPMs will avoid "reinventing the wheel" for each start-up. The *Guide* aims at increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and predictability of the Department support to field-based missions in the critical months of mission start-up.

The *Guide* was developed with the active participation and con-sultation of DPA desk officers backstopping and supporting SPMs, staff based in the field, and all United Nations partners involved in start-up. In particular, it was conceived and drafted in close partner-ship with the Department of Field Support (DFS).

D.   MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

Compliance with the *SPM Start-up Guide* is strongly encouraged. Compliance with the associated policies and SOPs mentioned in the *Guide* is mandatory.

E.   CONTACT

The contact for information on this policy is the DPA Guidance and Learning Unit (dpa-policy@un.org).

F.   DATES

This *Guide* shall be effective on 12 June 2012 and reviewed no later than 30 June 2014.

G.   HISTORY

The *SPM Start-up Guide* was approved on 12 June 2012 and has not been amended.

H.   ANNEXES

- » Sample memorandum from USG/DPA to request DFS support in a start-up;
- » SOP on budget processes for field-based special political missions;
- » 2012 budget proposals for special political missions;
- » Budget timetable 2013 cycle for cluster III missions, UNAMA and UNAMI;
- » Performance reporting template (RBB logical framework);

- » Template mission overview, strategic priorities and planning assumptions;
- » Sample memorandum for delegation of procurement authority under the financial regulations and rules of the United Nations; sample memorandum for sub-delegating procurement authority to CPO and other procurement staff;
- » General procurement principles;
- » UNSMIL mission support concept;
- » Sample letter from the Secretary-General requesting the establishment of an SPM;
- » Sample letter from President of the Security Council in response to the letter of the Secretary-General.

Annexes are available in an electronic format upon request. Please contact dpa-policy@un.org.

Table of Contents

Introduction:
What is the SPM Start-up Guide?

Special political missions (SPMs) is the term commonly used to denote field operations with political mandates funded through the special political mission provision of the regular budget. This *Guide* applies mostly to this type of missions, defined in budgetary terms as cluster III: United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices, assistance missions and commissions. They are usually based directly in the field.

Other missions funded through the SPM budget include:

Cluster I. Special and personal envoys, special advisers, special coordinators and personal representatives of the Secretary-General, which can be field-based or non-field based; and

Cluster II. Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, usually based out of New York with regular travel to the area of their specialization.

> » Some chapters of this *Guide* may apply to the start-up of these other types of SPMs, particularly in regards to planning, mandates, recruitment and budget issues. The *Guide* also applies to field-based political missions/offices included in the DPA general programme budget, such as the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. A current list of these SPMs can be found on the UN DPA website at *http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/field_operations*.

However, SPMs can be divided and grouped in a number of ways depending on the source, nature and scope of their legislative mandates;[1] their staffing, material and budgetary size; the footprint of their deployment; their genesis; or the lead Department to which

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[1] Mandate analysis by the Security Council Affairs Division showing how SPMs have performed a variety of tasks in the field may be found via search engine of the DPA Intranet (*http://dpaintranet.un.org*), key words "Mandate Components".

they are responsible. They may be deployed as the United Nations political presence in a country dealing with an internal conflict; they may assist and oversee a region, or be deployed alongside United Nations or non–United Nations peacekeeping operations and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (AFPs).[2]

The two most recent SPMs established by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) illustrate this diversity:

a. On 30 August 2010, the President of the Security Council responded to a letter from the Secretary-General requesting the approval of the Council for the establishment of the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, for an initial period of two years.[3] The General Assembly approved the budget of the mission in December 2010, and the mission was formally established on 1 January 2011. The Office was officially inaugurated on 2 March 2011 and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Central Africa assumed his functions on 24 May 2011. UNOCA is a small mission, with 26 staff, and a budget of $3.5 million for the initial year. The budget for start-up activities until the end of 2010 was $250,000.

b. On 16 September 2011, Security Council resolution 2009 established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), for a period of three months.[4] The initial staffing of UNSMIL was 196, more than half of whom were administration, mission support and security staff. The initial authorized budget for three months was $10 million.

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[2] For a more detailed description of types of SPMs and their origins, see the Security Council website: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/special_political_complete.shtml; the Secretary-General's report, "Review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions" (A/66/340 of 12 October 2011); the Secretary-General's report on "Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council" (A/64/349 of 27 October 2009), and the Center on International Cooperation's annual "Review of political missions" (http://www.cic.nyu.edu/politicalmissions/index.html).

[3] S/2010/457.

[4] Security Council resolution 2022 extended UNSMIL's mandate until 16 March 2012, and Security Council resolution 2040 subsequently extended UNSMIL's mandate for a further period of 12 months.

A team with limited capacity managed the start-up process of UNOCA, while a dedicated planning and start-up team of more than 20 staff and consultants was put in place to start up UNSMIL. One mission had few security concerns; the other was established in a volatile conflict environment. In the case of UNOCA, it took several months for the SRSG to be appointed, whereas the SRSG of UNSMIL was appointed three days after the mandate was issued and had been involved in the mission planning beforehand. UNSMIL and UNOCA would therefore seem to have little in common, beyond being the two most recent SPMs established by DPA, and being funded through the SPM provision of the regular budget.

> This *Guide* focuses on what field-based SPMs always have in common and, more particularly, what they have in common in a start-up phase. It seeks to spell out what needs to be done, systematically and routinely, in the start-up of any field-based SPM, regardless of its size, mandate or the situation in the host country.

In broad terms, the start-up phase of an SPM covers the period from when a discussion takes place on the possibility of deployment of an SPM to assist in the resolution of a particular political situation, up to the point where an initial team is on the ground and operational issues have been sufficiently addressed to allow the team to begin and sustain its activities. The initial discussion can take different forms, including, among others, internal United Nations meetings or informal discussions with Member States. In this *Guide*, the start-up phase covers pre-mandate and post-mandate planning and deployment.

The main drivers of the planning process are the relevant DPA regional directors, division managers and the desk officer(s) for the respective country/region. As a mission starts deploying personnel and equipment, some of the responsibilities that were undertaken by the desk officer and other Headquarters (HQ) staff progressively shift to the field. In addition, some start-up tasks which could not be carried out from HQ then begin. This *Guide* sets out, in each chapter,

the responsibilities of the United Nations Secretariat in partnership with other United Nations entities—with a focus on DPA—and the required presence on the ground to enable the transfer of these responsibilities and/or to begin necessary start-up tasks once the SPM has started deploying.

The transfer of responsibilities ceases for a DPA regional division when a mission is deemed to have reached the end of its start-up phase and to have adequate capacity to begin and sustain its activities. In budgetary terms, the end of the start-up phase is reached when the annual budget allotment is issued. However, in substantive terms, a mission may sometimes be considered up and running only once the SRSG has been appointed, has officially assumed his/her functions and has formed a management team. In logistical terms, it may be when the mission headquarters (MHQ) is operational, and when minimum required equipment and communication systems are in place. In terms of recruitment, it may be when the mission reaches a vacancy rate of 50 per cent.

As demonstrated, there is no single definition of the end of the start-up phase. It may be different for each component of the SPM. Therefore, and whenever possible, this *Guide* indicates, at the end of each chapter, the main criteria to be considered for determining when a mission has reached the end of its start-up phase. The end of the start-up phase will not be reached at the same time by all components of a mission, and reaching the end of the start-up phase does not mean that planning—for mandate implementation in particular—should cease.

How to use the *SPM Start-up Guide*

There are two ways to read the *SPM Start-up Guide*.

1. This document may be used as a generic guide for all staff. Chapters of the *Guide* have been organized sequentially: first, it describes how the decision to establish an SPM is reached, how an SPM is formally established and what the coordination mechanisms and main actors are. Then, it sets out the substantive tasks (mission planning, public information), support tasks (budget, human resources, logistics, procurement, legal) and the security tasks required for an SPM to reach the end of its start-up phase.

2. However, once in a start-up phase, the *Guide* should be used in a more dynamic fashion, following a modular approach. Most of the activities to be performed in a start-up phase are concomitant and linked to each other. Chapters of the *Guide* may therefore also be read independently. The hyperlinked table of contents takes the reader directly to the relevant chapter, and staff will be able to access specific chapters of the *Guide* from the *DPA Intranet*.

The *Guide* is not intended to be expert technical guidance on all start-up components but rather to provide useful information and relevant guidance for DPA staff at all levels, and in particular those responsible for the start-up process of an SPM. All levels of regional divisions' staff should be involved in SPM start-up efforts, and the overall management of the SPM at a later stage. Many of the tasks seem to fall under the responsibility of desk officers, but desk officers should be able to rely heavily on the support of their team leaders and directors, in particular when higher-level intervention is deemed appropriate. As this depends on each case, the *Guide* does not provide a division of labour between different levels of DPA staff.

The *Guide* does not duplicate any existing guidance on technical matters. Hyperlinked references are made throughout the document to other guidance materials, which may provide further information on specific issues. Most of them are available on the *DPA Intranet*, and useful templates are also annexed to the *Guide*. Annexes are only available in the electronic version of the *Guide*. They may be requested at *dpa-policy@un.org*.

Ongoing United Nations efforts to address SPM funding and backstopping needs and to improve support to field-based SPMs may affect the content of the *Guide*. Among others, these efforts include the report of the Secretary-General on the review of arrangements for funding and backstopping of special political missions (document *A/66/340* of 12 October 2011), the report of the Secretary General on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (document *A/66/311-S/2011/527* of 19 August 2011); the Global Field Support Strategy, and revisions of the Integrated Mission Planning Process guidance package. References to these efforts and their status are made throughout the *Guide*. All DPA staff should keep abreast of any developments regarding these efforts.

DPA: Mission start-up checklist

The tasks below are to be undertaken by the relevant DPA regional division. The relevant DPA desk officer(s) are most likely to carry out these tasks, under the supervision of their divisional manager. Each of these tasks is concomitant and this checklist is therefore not in a chronological order.

Mission start-up checklist	
Key tasks	UN actors involved*
1. MISSION PLANNING AND COORDINATION	
Reach out to all UN partners and establish coordination mechanisms: » Reach out to all United Nations entities » Draft a memo to seek formal support from DFS » Establish the ITF (draft or review ToRs)	UN system
Prepare and convene **ITF meetings**, coordinate with ITF members, draft and circulate minutes of meetings, ensure follow up of decisions	UN system
Contribute to the **strategic assessment and the IMPP process**	UN system
Map **UNCT offices and activities** and consult with UNCT on the ground	UNCT in the host country
Map out and consult with **host authorities**, **civil society organizations**, **NGOs**, **Member States**	UNCT in the host country, Member States
Finalize the Secretary-General's report or prepare a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, on the establishment of the mission and modalities of its mandate	DPA, EOSG, Member States
Communicate with Member States and host authorities, through regular bilateral meetings and phone calls	Member States
Draft necessary code cables and provide guidance, once a communication system and an initial team are in place on the ground	DPA/OUSG
2. FUNDING	
Contact DPA/EO and share relevant information on the mission to explore and identify the **source of start-up funding**	DPA/EO
Assist in preparing **pre-mandate funding proposals**	DPA/EO
Contribute to the development of the **first RBB and the mission start-up budget**	DFS/FBFD
3. SENIOR LEADERSHIP / HUMAN RESOURCES	
Trigger thinking on senior leadership and potential candidates within the United Nations and engage with Member States	DPA/OUSG, DFS/SLAS

Mission start-up checklist	
Key tasks	**UN actors involved***
Senior Leadership / Human Resources (continued)	
Contribute to the **drafting of the ToRs**, and the **shortlist of candidates**	DPA/OUSG, DFS/SLAS, DOCO **
Organize the **in-briefing** of senior officials	IMPP working group, DPA/PMD
Provide **inputs on the capacity requirements** of the substantive components of the mission to DFS/FPD	DFS/FPD
Draft **required substantive job descriptions**	
Participate in interview panels (if necessary)	
4. PUBLIC INFORMATION	
Reach out to DPA Senior Public Information Officer for support in **development of an outreach strategy**	DPA/OUSG, DPI
Include new SPM on **DPA Intranet** (name, other narrative, data, SRSG/ERSG details, DFS map of missions)	DPA/PMD/GLU
Include new SPM on **DPA public website**	DPA/OUSG, DPI/SCD/PSS
5. LEGAL ISSUES	
Reach out to OLA SPM focal points and **provide information requested by OLA on the new mission** for the drafting of the SOMA	OLA, DPA/OUSG
Arrange meetings with OLA and the Permanent Mission of the host country to discuss the SOMA	OLA, DPA/OUSG, host country
6. LOGISTICS AND IT	
Provide DFS with the necessary strategic and political information on the mission in the form of a mission substantive concept	DFS
Be aware of procurement principles, processes and timelines and **follow procurement activities**	DFS/OUSG, DM/PD
7. SECURITY	
Reach out to DSS Director, his/her Deputy and DSS desk officer assigned to the region in question	DSS
Provide DSS with relevant information on the new SPM	DSS
8. GENERAL TASKS	
Convene coordination meetings and **liaise with each entity** on a regular basis	UN system
Backstop initial team on the ground, maintain regular informal communication via emails or phone and, if necessary, convene conference calls to discuss detailed support arrangements	DFS/GSC, OLA, DSS, initial team
Reach out for additional support to SPMs, and **knowledge management activities** (lessons learned, AAR)	DPA/PMD/GLU

* Other than DPA, ITF members should be consulted at all stages.
** In the case of a "multi-hatted" position.

Mission managers: Mission start-up checklist[5]

Mission managers: Mission start-up checklist	
Key tasks	**UN actors involved** *
1. MISSION PLANNING AND COORDINATION	
Reach out to UNCT on the ground and establish field-level coordination mechanisms (e.g., Strategy Policy Group) **and gap analysis of capacities versus mandate**	Initial team, UNCT on the ground
Take part in **ITF meetings**, via VTC or phone	UN system, HQ and field-levels
Develop an **Integrated Strategic Framework** (ISF)	Initial team (SRSG, DSRSG, CoS, strategic planner), UNCT on the ground
Develop an **internal mission work plan, including each unit work plan**	Initial team (SRSG, DSRSG, CoS, strategic planner)
2. SENIOR LEADERSHIP/HUMAN RESOURCES	
Follow up and finalize senior leadership appoint-ment (if the process has not yet been finalized)	Initial team (CoS), DPA/OUSG, DFS/SLAS
Finalize recruitment of international staff and put in place a plan to ensure continuity of service	Initial team (HR officer, CoS, D/CMS), DFS/FPD
Recruitment of national staff	Initial team (HR officer), UNDP, DFS/FPD, where necessary
4. PUBLIC INFORMATION	
Implement **public information strategy** and establish the political presence of the mission	Initial team (HoM, spokesperson), DPA, DPI
Regular **update of the SPM website**	Initial team, DPI/SCD/PSS
Organize **early press encounters** between the HoM and locally based media Official ceremony for the **inauguration of the office** (optional)	HoM, initial team (communica-tion staff), host government
5. BUDGET	
Contribute to the development of the **first RBB** (if the initial team has been deployed early enough) **and the mission regular budget process**	Initial team (CoS, strategic planner), DPA, DFS/FBFD

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[5]   Detailed roles and responsibilities of mission managers in the field are set out in the *DPKO Mission Start-up Field Guide* and in *chapters 1* and *9* of this *Guide*.

Mission managers: Mission start-up checklist	
Key tasks	**UN actors involved ***
6. LEGAL ISSUES	
Send courtesy copy of the draft SOMA to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and follow up for comments **Communicate comments on the draft SOMA to OLA** **Finalize other legal arrangements**	Most senior mission manager deployed, host country, OLA, DPA/OUSG
7. LOGISTICS, IT AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES	
Visit of office premises, conclusion of **lease agreements** Conduct of **bidding process**	Initial team (D/CMS), DFS, DSS
Ensure establishment of the **internal infrastructure of the mission and IT backbone**	Initial team (D/CMS), DFS/GSC
Obtain various **authorizations** (e.g., landing rights) and discuss potential refurbishment of building	Initial team (HoM), OLA
Ensure **finance and payment systems are set up**, operational and available to mission components	Initial team (D/CMS), UNDP, DPA/EO, DFS
Ensure **procurement systems** are set up and immediate operational requirements are satisfied	Initial team (D/CMS), UNDP, DFS/GSC
Establishment of a **Local Committee on Contracts** **Translation** of all agreements and contracts	Initial team (D/CMS)
Appointment of a **Conduct and Discipline Focal Point**	HoM
Establish **mission-wide integrated procedures** and systems for information analysis and management (records management, information security, knowledge management)	Initial team (CoS, HoM), ARMS, DPA/PMD/GLU
8. SECURITY	
Finalize safety requirements for the establishment of the mission	DSS
Ensure immediate security of mission staff is addressed and longer-term security arrangements are developed	Initial team (DO), DSS
9. GENERAL TASKS	
Maintain regular informal communication via e-mails or phone and establish **reporting modalities** with HQ.	Initial team, DPA, DFS, OLA, DSS, UNCT

*   If a specific task should preferably be undertaken by a specific manager, this is indicated in the third column. Mission managers may also delegate some tasks to other members of the initial team..

What leads to the establishment of a field-based SPM?

1. What leads to the establishment of a field-based SPM?

1.1 How is the establishment of a field-based SPM decided?

The decision to establish a field-based SPM can be triggered by various factors and/or actors linked to the political situation in a given country or region, and the fact that United Nations support to a given country or region needs to be reconfigured.[6] The system may deploy a regional and/or special envoy, potentially assisted by DPA staff on secondment, which, in some cases, may result in the establishment of a field-based SPM. Field-based SPMs may also be established as an immediate response to a specific situation in a given country or region, alongside the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) already present in the country or region.

In order to make an informed decision on whether and how the United Nations will engage politically in a given country or region, all the relevant parts of the United Nations system need to be mobilized. One of the first steps is the creation of an Integrated Task Force (ITF), chaired by the relevant DPA regional division, to coordinate HQ-level support.[7] The lead department role means DPA regional directors are responsible for ensuring that ITF meetings are convened (in consultation with ITF members) and decisions are followed-up. A DPA-led ITF may be preceded by an inter-agency task force, which may be

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[6] Not all such triggers or situations may lead to the establishment of a field-based SPM. The United Nations may instead opt to strengthen support to the Resident Coordinator (RC) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) through existing mechanisms (e.g., the RC Capacity Gap), or the use of resources available through the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) or the DPA mediation support capacity.

[7] Before a planning process or integrated United Nations presence is approved, the ITF could be called differently (e.g., "Inter-agency working group") but its core functions remain the same, i.e., acting as the principal HQ-level inter-departmental and inter-agency body ensuring a coherent and consistent United Nations engagement in a given country/region.

co-chaired by the appropriate DPA senior official and the relevant United Nations Development Group (UNDG) team, in the case of non-mission settings that are declared "special circumstances" by the Secretary-General.[8]

More details on the ITF are set out in *chapter 2*, and in the relevant guidance on the *Integrated Mission Planning Process and the role of Headquarters* (IMPP).[9]

The succeeding phases (the strategic assessment, the IMPP, and interaction with Member States leading to the formal establishment of an SPM) are generally not conducted in a strictly sequential order. Discussions with Member States may precede the launch of the IMPP or occur simultaneously.

1.1.1.   Assessment phase

The ITF undertakes a **Strategic Assessment (SA)**. An SA is an assessment tool approved by the Secretary-General for the whole United Nations system that allows the development of strategic analysis and options for engagement in conflict-affected countries where there may be a need for a multi-dimensional United Nations strategy for peace consolidation.

The conduct of an SA can take two to three months and includes a desk review and analysis, field visit(s) and consultations with external stakeholders. SAs (and pre-assessments, when applicable) should take into account the information, systems and planning already put in place by the UNCT.

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[8]   As outlined in the decisions of the Secretary-General on the policy on special circumstances in non-mission settings (20 January 2012), in a country where there is no United Nations peacekeeping mission or SPM on the ground but where demands upon the Organization are likely to rise due to a situation of armed conflict, heightened political instability or social unrest, a significant natural disaster with potential political repercussions, or other crisis involving increased reputational risk for the United Nations, the Secretary-General may decide to declare activation of a special circumstances mode for a limited period of time. Within 48 hours of the designation of special circumstances, an inter-agency task force co-chaired by the appropriate DPA senior official and the chair of the relevant regional UNDG team should be established. Non-mission settings are, however, not included in the scope of this *Guide*.

[9]   The IMPP guidelines are currently being reviewed.

As outlined in the guidelines on *United Nations inter-departmental and inter-agency strategic assessment (SA)*,[10] the final SA report should include:

a. Background and objective of the SA;

b. Key conflict factors;

c. Analysis of priority objectives;

d. Existing capacities;

e. Strategic options, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on United Nations configuration (if any).

The relevant DPA regional division leads the drafting of the SA, in consultation with ITF members. The ITF debates and endorses the final SA report. The Policy Committee then decides on a recommended option based on the conclusions of the SA.[11] In the case of no agreed option by the ITF, the ITF transmits two or more options to the Policy Committee for its final decision.

> Based on the strategic options set out in the SA report, the Secretary-General decides, in a Policy Committee meeting, what form the United Nations engagement should take. In cases where a field-based political mission is recommended, the IMPP should be launched (see page 19, section 1.2.1).

In the few cases where the United Nations system is not ready to start an SA—for example, if the situation in a given country is too volatile to engage in mission planning—relevant United Nations entities may elect to conduct a "pre-assessment" of the situation. A pre-assessment constitutes groundwork for future analysis, which will

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[10] SA guidelines would not apply to regional offices but general principles can be adjusted. (e.g., the importance of a shared needs analysis).

[11] The Policy Committee is the highest decision-making body in the Secretariat and provides support to the Secretary-General. It considers thematic, country-specific and emerging issues requiring strategic guidance and policy decisions. When relevant, the ITF is also the mechanism for drafting the Policy Committee paper that will serve as the cover for the submission of the SA. DPA regional divisions and the relevant desk officer, in particular, would be the drafter.

inform the SA. Pre-assessments have only been conducted in a few instances and on an ad hoc basis. However, the same general guiding principles of the SA should be applied.

Case study:
Libya integrated pre-assessment process and UNSMIL*

Further to the events that took place in Libya starting February 2011, and at the request of Member States, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Adviser on post-conflict Libya planning, who coordinated an integrated pre-assessment process funded by unforeseen funds.** The pre-assessment presence on the ground was limited due to security reasons; (ii) there was no (or limited) access to national counterparts; (iii) the potential engagement of the United Nations Secretariat on the ground hinged on milestones not yet in place (e.g., elections); (iv) other political and internal conditions made it premature to start full United Nations system-wide planning; (v) there was recognition of the lack of internal United Nations knowledge of Libya.

The pre-assessment became a process for joint learning for the United Nations system. Under the leadership of the Special Adviser, thematic sub-groups were created in the areas of political process, security apparatus, human rights and rule of law, economic recovery, public administration, social services and physical infrastructure and distribution networks. In each of these areas, the analysis included a review of the pre-conflict situation, an assessment of the impact of the conflict, a presentation of key challenges, and an outline of priorities to be addressed following a political agreement and the onset of a political transition in Libya.

The UNCT for Libya participated in each sub-group. The World Bank was also involved. Consultations were convened with United Nations colleagues, academics and other experts to share information and exchange perspectives on post-conflict challenges in particular. Throughout the pre-assessment process, each sub-group benefited from regular updates and analytical reports provided by external partners. The integrated analysis was also informed by ongoing political developments, including the mediation efforts being undertaken by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Libya. On 7 September 2011, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Security Council requesting the establishment of an integrated United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). On 16 September 2011, the Council adopted resolution 2009 (2011) establishing UNSMIL, with a three-month mandate. The analyses carried out in the pre-assessment laid the groundwork for subsequent planning for UNSMIL.

*   For more information, see the *after action review on Libya pre-assessment*, available on the DPA Intranet.

**   *See chapter 4* for more information on funding options.

During the entire assessment phase, the role of DPA may take many different forms depending on the situation in the country or region and, for example, whether there is a special envoy deployed. DPA desk officers should proactively reach out to relevant stakeholders, UNCT members and DPA senior managers to ensure that the decision-making process is well informed. In all cases, system-wide consultations and inclusivity are essential, and they are the responsibility of DPA.

1.2. What is the process leading to the formal establishment of an SPM?

1.2.1. Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

Integration is the guiding principle of SPMs with country-specific mandates.[12] The main elements of an integrated approach are set out in the 25 June 2008 decision of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee on integration, which emphasizes the need for effective strategic partnership and a shared vision between the mission and the UNCT.

> The first step after the decision to establish an SPM has been taken is to implement the IMPP, following the Guidelines on the IMPP and the role of Headquarters. These guidelines set out the different steps leading to the establishment of a new United Nations mission. These guidelines are supplemented by another set of guidelines on IMPP and the role of the field.

To support the implementation of an integrated approach, DPA staff members need to be aware of all relevant decisions on integration:

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on human rights in integrated missions—24 October 2005 meeting of the Policy Committee (24 October 2005);[13]

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on integration—Policy Committee Decision of June 2008 (2008/24);

» Decisions of the Secretary-General, update on integration—Policy Committee Decision of December 2010 (2011/10).

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[12] Regional offices are not covered by the principle of integration. They are however encouraged to coordinate with the UNCTs and RCs in the regions.

[13] Human rights need to be integrated into the activities of the SPM. More information on the institutional relations among OHCHR, DPKO, DPA and DFS in the context of the integration of human rights, on the purpose, roles, scope of activity of human rights components as well as on the responsibilities of senior mission leadership are found in the *policy on human rights in United Nations peace operations and political missions* (1 September 2011).

As part of the IMPP process, a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)[14] is undertaken. TAMs work within the strategic parameters set by the Strategic Assessment and focus on the operational aspects of planning (e.g., staffing structures, organizational structure of the mission, budgetary and support requirements, decision to outsource based on market opportunities and cost/benefit analyses, etc.) and on the mapping of current United Nations capacities, which assist in producing key ITF outputs such as reports of the Secretary-General. The duration of TAMs is tailored to the context; they typically last one to two weeks. They are usually deployed following a Strategic Assessment and before the issuance of the mandate of a new mission. However, in some cases, their deployment can happen at different stages in the planning process (and during the life cycle of the mission). (More details on TAMs—e.g., composition, objectives, generic ToRs, etc.—are set out in the IMPP guidelines.)

One of the initial outputs of the IMPP is a mission concept paper. The mission concept constitutes the basis for subsequent mission planning (see *chapter 6* for information on the mission support concept). The TAM report informs the mission concept.

DPA needs to ensure that the mission substantive concept (upon which the mission support concept will be developed by DFS) provides the following information:

» **What:** main goals and objectives of the new SPM, including several options, if necessary.

» **When:** timelines projected for setting up the new SPM (and possibly benchmarks), keeping in mind that a short timeframe may entail greater costs.

» **Where:** location of the new SPM (and potential field offices).

» **Who:** indication of capacity requirements, estimation of available national staff capacities.

» **How:** indication of whether there is a willingness to establish United Nations system-wide common services (e.g., co-locating

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[14]   In general, each organization funds the participation of its representatives in the TAM.

with UNCT, joint medical services).[15] The possibility of establishing common services should be explored to facilitate better system-wide coordination and economies of scale.[16]

The other main output of the IMPP is a formal recommendation to Member States to establish a new mission, through a report of the Secretary-General or a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council.[17]

Specificities of regional offices: The process of establishing regional offices (for example, UNOWA, UNOCA and UNRCCA) can vary, as the need for regional offices is not usually triggered by a specific conflict or political crisis. The genesis and scope of their mandates can thus differ from a country-specific SPM. In the past, regional offices have been mandated to facilitate coordination and information exchange among regional (or subregional) organizations, the United Nations system and other partners in the region they cover. They have also been established to carry out good offices, and to liaise with the governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy.

DPA regional divisions need to have a clear idea as to why a regional office should be established and what its mandate should be. It is also important to map out all actors in the region (regional organizations, diplomatic missions, United Nations missions, UNCTs, regional offices of agencies, funds and programmes, etc.), define how the regional office would operate with these actors, and consult with countries in the region to agree on their priorities. The Secretary-General can decide to dispatch an assessment mission

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[15] Clarity with regard to cost-sharing arrangements and roles and responsibility must be agreed from the outset, through an MoU or similar agreement, in order to avoid any problems when the SPM leaves.

[16] Common services form an integral part of the One United Nations concept advocated in the 2006 "Delivering as one" High-Level Panel Report to the Secretary-General. "Common services" is a generic term used to describe the implementation of common administrative functions among United Nations system organizations. The objective is to ensure that support services are cost-effective, high quality and timely. Common services include co-location of UNCT member bodies and common shared support services including, inter alia: security, IT, travel, banking, procurement. The UNCT has the overall responsibility to coordinate and oversee common services arrangements. More information on common services can be found on the *DOCO website*.

[17] The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is another output of the IMPP, but is developed at a later stage (see *chapter 9*).

**Case study: Establishment of the
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)**

UNOWA was established in 2002 following a recommendation from an Inter-Agency Mission deployed to 11 West African countries between 6 and 27 March 2001. In its Presidential Statement on "The situation in Guinea following recent attacks along its borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone" (*S/PRST/2000/41*, dated 21 December 2000), the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch the Inter-Agency Mission. In its report (*S/2000/992*), the mission recommended that the highest priority be given to the coordination of a comprehensive strategy to address the different aspects of the crisis in Sierra Leone and instability in the broader Mano River Basin. It recommended the establishment of an Inter-Agency Task Force on the West African Subregion, coordinated by DPA, and the establishment of a regional West Africa office. On 2 May 2001, a letter from the Secretary-General presenting the report of the Inter-Agency Mission was sent to the Security Council; on 25 June 2001, a letter from the Secretary-General announcing his intention to create UNOWA was sent to the Council; and finally, on 26 November 2001, the Secretary-General sent another letter to the Council setting out the mandate of UNOWA. The President of the Security Council, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 29 November 2001 (*S/2001/1129*), communicated that the members of the Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to establish UNOWA and took note of the functions of the Office as set out in the Secretary-General's letter of 26 November 2001.

to the region under consideration to review priority needs and challenges confronting the subregion and define appropriate strategies to address them. Regional offices are, in general, smaller than country-specific SPMs.

To date, all regional offices have been established through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

1.3.   How does DPA interact with the United Nations legislative bodies to reach a decision on the establishment of an SPM?

In most cases, SPMs have been formally established either by a decision of the Security Council or the Secretary-General, following an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council President. The formal establishment of the mission is a milestone in a start-up phase.

Although planning for a new mission needs to start well in advance of such a decision, many essential start-up tasks can only begin or be finalized once a mission is mandated.

The proposal or announcement of intention by the United Nations to establish a new mission is made to the Security Council or the General Assembly either through a letter or report of the Secretary-General. Once the proposal or announcement is made, and during its finalization, relevant DPA desk officers follow and engage in the decision-making processes of Member States, informing the ITF, as appropriate.

At this stage, there is a dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States, and among Member States, in order to have the mandate of a new SPM approved by the Security Council or General Assembly. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly has the authority on the modalities of implementation of the new mission.

The mandate of an SPM can be decided:

a. Through the adoption of a resolution or Presidential Statement of the Security Council, or of a resolution or decision of the General Assembly, based on the recommendations transmitted to the members of the Security Council in the Secretary-General's report; or

b. Pursuant to an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. In such cases, the DPA desk officer, under the guidance of the director and other DPA senior managers, and in consultation with the ITF, prepares a note to the Secretary-General, justifying establishment of the mission and its mandate, and prepares a draft letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, informing the members of the Council of his intention to establish a mission and outlining its tasks (see sample letter in the annex). After consultations, the President of the Security Council writes back to the Secretary-General informing him that the members of the Council "take note" of, or "welcome" the intention of the Secretary-General as stated in his letter. The process to reach consensus with

Member States on the mandate of the new mission may take several months or years and it is thus essential to prepare the Secretary-General's letter only following broad consultations with Council members, so that the Secretary-General has a good understanding of the likelihood of success.

Decisions may sometimes be taken by the Security Council or General Assembly without taking fully into account the rationale for the proposed mission concept. Some thematic peace and security areas often have standard language for mandates (e.g., children in armed conflict), while, in other cases, mandates can be quite specific, if not unique (e.g., piracy for UNPOS, internal boundaries for UNAMI). In such cases, DPA should be prepared to explain thoroughly to Member States the concept and the reasoning behind its proposals.

By the time the Security Council issues a resolution on a new SPM, or the President of the Security Council sends a reply to the Secretary-General, most of the start-up planning should have been completed. However, the decision of the Security Council or the response of the Council President may modify the strategies envisaged by the Secretary-General, and the mission concept may need to be revised or adjusted (e.g., organizational structure, budget, etc.), immediately after the decision. Revisions are done within the ITF framework.

Throughout this process, DPA staff members should be aware of the following:

» The report of the Secretary-General (or initiating letter), which informs the mandate, needs to outline clearly how the mission is envisaged. It is critical that consultations within the United Nations system are undertaken throughout the drafting process, and that the report is, as much as possible, based on United Nations system consensus. Regional divisions have limited influence on the mandate once the decision-making process among Member States starts.

» DPA managers and desk officers have a key role in communicating and interacting with Member States. Good interaction with Security Council members and the host government, through

regular bilateral meetings and telephone contact, is essential to help build buy-in and good understanding of the proposed role and limitations of a mission.

» While DPA may engage members of the ITF bilaterally on aspects of the mandate, the ITF as a whole must be updated regularly.

Case study: United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) mandate discussions

Discussions on the establishment of a regional office in Central Africa started in 2002, but were blocked due to a number of factors, including shifts in the interests of Member States and resistance from within the United Nations system. When Ban Ki-moon took office as Secretary-General, the process was re-launched. A letter proposing the mandate of the office was sent to the Security Council in December 2009 (*S/2009/697*). UNOCA would facilitate coordination among the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations system and other regional organizations. It would also contribute to conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

At the time, it was assumed that there was sufficient support among Security Council members to establish the office. However, some members expressed concerns regarding the relevance, financial implications and added value of the office. Between December 2009 and August 2010, DPA undertook considerable advocacy work with Member States, aided by the Council's positive appreciation of UNOWA—the office upon which the mission was modelled. During this phase, it was important to ensure strong and continued support from ECCAS, which was difficult to mobilize. One critical factor for the approval of the mandate was a letter from the ECCAS Chairman to the Security Council in August 2010. The then-President of the Council eventually convened an informal meeting of the Council, and replied to the Secretary-General's letter before the end of August (*S/2010/457*). The exchange of letters took eight months.

Among factors that positively influenced the discussions:

» Security Council debates on preventive diplomacy;

» The drawdown of other missions in the region (MINURCAT, MONUC, BINUB, UNMIS);

» Preliminary budget discussions with Member States before the adoption of the mandate. They were shown that the budget could be brought down to around $3,000,000 with a transfer of assets from MINURCAT;

» Positive discussions on UNOWA demonstrating the added value of a regional office.

Advocacy: The above points to the importance of developing an advocacy strategy in support of the establishment of an SPM.[18] Such a strategy identifies the key constituencies, defines key messages and can be adjusted as needed throughout the process. Establishing an SPM is an official process taking place primarily through diplomatic channels within the governing United Nations bodies. However, there is inevitably a public dimension that needs to be taken into account to respond to concerns or correct misunderstandings or misinformation that could affect the process. As part of the strategy, DPA regional divisions should be prepared to convey key messages through briefings and talking points for DPA senior leadership in high-level meetings with key interlocutors.

1.4.   Planning the transition, or exit from the start

Planning for the "broad" transition or exit strategy of an SPM is an important part of the mission's entry strategy and was the subject of a milestone report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in 2001.[19] In conflict and crisis situations, when confronting persistent threats to international peace and security, it can be difficult to set the goal of a transitional or exit strategy even within the United Nations family, let alone among parties to the conflict, if such a vision has not already been agreed by them. Notwithstanding those difficulties, the Security Council has increasingly been requesting the Secretary-General to propose a transition or exit strategy as well as benchmarks[20] and reporting mechanisms, even prior to the issuance of a mandate, or at least in the first report of the Secretary-General following adoption of the mandate.[21]

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[18]   See *chapter 10* for more information on communications strategy and public information.

[19]   Report of the Secretary-General on no exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations of 20 April 2001.

[20]   In broad terms and as commonly used in a United Nations context, a benchmark is a reference point against which change and progress can be measured. More information on benchmarking can also be found in the DPKO-DFS guidelines on component-level planning for rule of law and security institutions personnel ("Planning Toolkit").

[21]   Each SPM has a results-based budget and logical framework with specific objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, as well as performance measures and outputs. These components serve as benchmarks. Progress against each of these benchmarks is provided regularly to the appropriate legislative authority via periodic reports of the Secretary-General. The Security Council is increasingly providing peace consolidation benchmarks tied to a mission's overall mandate (*A/64/349*, para. 46).

Whether at the request of Member States or not, regional divisions should ensure that the broad outlines of a transition or exit strategy are included in the mission concept developed during the start-up phase. *Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking* (2010) provides more information on benchmarking.[22] Establishing baseline indicators at the start of a mission may be helpful in developing benchmarks down the line.

On the support side, the DPA regional division should also ensure that an initial support strategy for the eventual drawdown of a mission has been developed and that it is included in the mission support concept. This ensures continuation of commonly agreed service arrangements between UNCT members beyond the mission's existence, including United Nations Secretariat offices that may continue work on the ground, e.g., OHCHR.

ESTABLISHMENT OF
A FIELD-BASED SPM

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[22] Available at: *http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf*.

A collective effort: DPA partners and coordination mechanisms

2. A collective effort: DPA partners and coordination mechanisms throughout the start-up phase

Given the number of actors involved in a mission start-up, communication among the Secretariat's substantive, support and security elements and with United Nations offices, agencies, funds and programmes (AFPs) is crucial and coordination mechanisms need to be established as early as possible. This is the responsibility of the relevant DPA regional division, supported by DPA senior leadership, as necessary. DPA regional divisions and DPA senior leadership have guidance, management and support roles in the start-up process (and beyond).

United Nations system coordination takes place both at HQ and field levels.

2.1. HQ coordination

2.1.1. United Nations system-wide coordination

Integrated Task Force (ITF)[23]
At HQ, coordination takes place through Integrated Task Forces (ITFs). The ITF is the principal HQ coordination mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance and to consider all issues that could have a strategic significance or programmatic impact for the United Nations presence in the relevant country or region. It brings together all relevant departments of the

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[23] Before an integrated planning process is initiated, the ITF could be designated differently (e.g., "Inter-agency working group") but its functions would remain the same.

Secretariat and AFPs. Details on the establishment, composition and role of the ITF in a start-up phase and terms of reference (ToRs) for the ITF, can be found in the *IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters: Integrated Planning for United Nations Field Presences* (2009).

The relevant DPA regional division, in consultation with ITF members, drafts the ITF ToRs, and leads, organizes and manages the ITF.[24] In a start-up phase, meetings should be convened at least once a week. Thereafter, the frequency of the meetings can be adjusted depending on needs. In addition, the ITF may meet at various levels, i.e., director and working level, depending on requirements. Minutes of meetings are drafted by DPA desk officers, cleared by ITF members and should subsequently be circulated to the group systematically.

At HQ, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) members are coordinated by the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO).[25] OCHA coordinates the humanitarian entities, making DOCO and OCHA important entry points for the work of DPA with the AFPs, including their involvement in the ITF. In general, United Nations agencies participate in the ITF under the "2+4" formula: in addition to OCHA and DOCO, up to four representatives from the AFPs participate in the ITF, based on their involvement in the country in question. In some cases more than four agency partners participate in the ITF.

Once an initial team has been deployed on the ground (see *chapter 9* for details on the deployment of an initial team), and the communications systems are in place, representatives of the mission and the UNCT attend ITF meetings via video teleconference (VTC). As administrator of the RC system and because of its strong partnership with national Governments, it is crucial to initiate discussions with UNDP at the outset.

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[24] In those (exceptional) cases when a task force or working group already exists (e.g., Libya, Syrian Arab Republic), the main initial task is to review the ToRs, composition, etc., of the ITF.

[25] More information on DOCO's mandate and on UNDG can be found on *http://www.undg.org/?P=15*.

> ### Main recommendations of the
> ### Review of Integrated (Mission) Task Forces
>
> ### Paper for the Integration Steering Group (26 October 2010)
>
> » The ITF should develop a forward agenda, including predictable items such as regular reports of the Secretary-General and key planning processes. All members of the ITF are responsible for contributing to the forward agenda and ensuring their key planning processes and issues of concern are reflected.
>
> » Each ITF should adopt a timetable for meetings to increase predictability, better preparation and avoidance of scheduling conflicts with other task forces.
>
> » Headquarters away from New York should participate through VTC.
>
> » The ITF that does not have regular field representation should review the forward agenda with field colleagues, identify issues that would ensure value-added to the field, and work to ensure field representation.

2.1.2. Bilateral coordination within the Secretariat

As soon as establishing a new mission becomes a possibility, and prior to the issuance of a mandate, DPA regional division shall reach out to DPA/Executive Office (EO) (see *chapter 4*), DPA/Office of the Under-Secretary General (OUSG) and the following Secretariat entities:

a. **Department of Field Support (DFS)**

The corresponding DPA regional division and relevant divisions in DFS must work in partnership throughout the start-up process. The organization of and highest authority for DPA and DFS are elaborated in their respective Secretary-General's bulletins *ST/SGB/2009/13* and *ST/SGB/2010/2*.

The *Service-Level Agreement* (SLA) for administrative and logistical support to DPA-led missions provided by DFS describes the roles, responsibilities and the relationship among the different DFS divisions and sections,[26] DPA and the mission in a start-up phase.[27]

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[26] Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD), Logistics Support Division (LSD), Information and Communications Technology Division (ICTD), Field Personnel Division (FPD), Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG). The Global Service Centre (GSC) also needs to be fully involved from the beginning.

[27] The SLA will be reviewed in 2012.

DPA regional divisions should informally engage DFS at the working level as soon as possible—and before any formal decision to engage in mission planning—by contacting the DFS Office of Director, Planning and Coordination, which assists in identifying focal points on specific mission support issues and facilitates coordination within DFS itself, in order to assist in the planning process. However, as soon as formal planning for the new mission starts, USG/DPA should write to the USG/DFS requesting formal support from DFS and requesting the appointment of a focal point (see sample memorandum in the annex). DPA would then seek regular DFS/DPA coordination meetings, usually on a weekly basis, with the focal points in each division and units of DFS.[28]

b.   Department of Peacekeeping Operations

i.   Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)[29]

DPKO/OROLSI comprises the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, the Police Division, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDR), the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSR) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[30] Each unit provides advice, expertise and support to the relevant DPA regional division, depending on the availability of resources and capacities. When it is likely that a police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR or mine action component is envisaged for the mission, DPA desk officers should reach out to their counterparts in OROLSI and involve them in mission planning as soon as possible. OROLSI units play a lead role in the following start-up

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[28]   Under the Global Field Support Strategy, Global and Regional Service Centres have been established to improve service delivery to the field by delineating strategic, operational and tactical functions. DFS at HQ focuses on strategic issues such as policy, planning and strategic coordination, whereas the Global Service Centre groups technical expertise on service delivery and provides support to field missions globally. Regional Service Centres are established using resources of field missions in the same geographical area and provide back-office functions to those missions. See *chapter 6* for more information.

[29]   More information on the organization of DPKO and DPKO/OROLSI can be found in *ST/SGB/2010/1*.

[30]   Details on these components and critical managerial tasks on the ground can be found in the DPKO *Mission Start-Up Field Guide* (MSUFG).

tasks: assessing needs (e.g., through an SA, TAM, involvement in the ITF), developing options and recommendations for the formulation of Security Council mandates and the size, scope, tasks and structure of a rule of law and security sector component in a mission, as well as formulating related budget requirements and staffing tables and leading on recruitment. OROLSI's relevant unit should lead the process of starting-up the component in the mission, if applicable.[31] OROLSI is also able to deploy standing capacities rapidly[32] in the area of police, justice, corrections and mine action, which can help start-up new missions (pending recruitment of longer-term personnel) and provide additional support as the need arises—for example, in times of crisis.

Partnerships with other mission components, United Nations entities and non–United Nations entities are essential for police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components, in order to maximize impact and minimize duplication of effort— based on comparative advantage. Outside the Secretariat, United Nations agencies such as UNDP, UNODC and OHCHR have various rule-of-law mandates and should be contacted at the same time as OROLSI and involved in planning of any rule of law component, where appropriate.

ii.   *The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) provides advice on military matters (when relevant).*
c.   **Department of Safety and Security (DSS)** (*see chapter 7*).
d.   **The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)** (*see chapter 8*).
e.   **Department of Public Information (DPI)**
     Peace and Security Section (via DPA/OUSG Public Affairs) (see chapter 10).

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[31]   More information on the mechanisms and processes for internal coordination on United Nations activities on SSR, including during mission start-up, can be found in the Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Coordination on United Nations Assistance to SSR, under preparation by the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force.

[32]   The Police Division through its Standing Police Capacity (SPC) and the CLJAS through its Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC) can deploy from Brindisi, Italy, within 7 days of a Security Council resolution being passed, to support the start-up of police and other law enforcement components and justice and corrections components in new DPA-led SPMs.

f. **Department of Management (DM)**

A joint notification from DPA and DFS/OUSGs should be sent to inform DM/OUSG of a potential new SPM.

g. **The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**

OHCHR supports the work of SPMs and their human rights components notably in the areas of monitoring, investigation and reporting, protection, transitional justice, reparations, integration of human rights norms and standards across security sector reforms, legislative and other reforms as well as supporting governments in institution building. Where appropriate (particularly in relation to children's and women's rights), OHCHR and/or the AFPs work closely with DPA on all aspects of establishing and staffing human rights components of SPMs, creating benchmarks for success and providing guidance and support on human rights–related issues and activities of political missions.[33] DPA desk officers need to engage with the Peace Mission Support Unit of OHCHR and relevant desk officers in the immediate offset of mission planning as the human rights situation in the country will inform United Nations engagement.

h. **The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**

OCHA assists the Secretary-General in the coordination of humanitarian emergencies that require a system-wide response and, inter alia, ensures coordination between the humanitarian, political and peacekeeping dimensions of emergency situations. OCHA coordinates effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors and plays a key role in operational coordination in crisis situations, including providing support to the Humanitarian Coordinator. OCHA can facilitate the engagement of the humanitarian community

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[33] For additional information and details on DPA and OHCHR's engagement and responsibilities at Headquarters and the field in the planning and start-up phases of peace missions, see the 2011 *Joint Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions*, signed by DPA, DPKO, DFS and OHCHR. Integration of human rights in special political missions is also guided by the Joint DPA/DPKO/OHCHR Directive Public Reporting on Human Rights.

in the planning process. This engagement should be initiated at the outset, in particular when there is a significant humanitarian situation in the country in question and when the ultimate mission mandate could relate to humanitarian issues, the protection of civilians and the protection of humanitarian space.[34] DPA desk officers should identify their counterparts within OCHA as early as possible.

i.   **The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**

Where a country is on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), DPA should contact the concerned support officer in PBSO, and the Member State serving as chair of the Country-Specific Configuration. PBSO acts as the secretariat to the PBC, and should be a member of the DPA-led ITF. Early coordination helps in developing aspects of the mandate that identify how the mission will support the engagement of the PBC and the implementation of peacebuilding priorities agreed between the PBC and the host country. It also helps to ensure that the mandate and associated benchmarks draw upon the experience of this engagement, and promote timely sharing of knowledge between the respective entities.[35]

2.2.   Field-level coordination and cooperation

Before the establishment of an SPM in a given country, the United Nations is already represented on the ground by United Nations offices and the UNCT.[36] The UNCT is headed by a Resident Coordinator (RC). Close collaboration with the UNCT members and the RC is important in terms of understanding the political dynamics of the given country/region, for substantive planning, and for obtaining the technical and administrative support that the UNCT

DPA PARTNERS AND
COORDINATION MECHANISMS

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[34]   The decision of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee on Integration (2008/24) states that "integration arrangements should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space, and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors". For more information, see the study on Integration and Humanitarian Space at *http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/ details.asp?id=6205&title=un-integration-humanitarian-space*.

[35]   For information on the Peacebuilding Fund, see *chapter 4*, "How is a new mission funded?"

[36]   Except in cases where the SPM is starting up after a peacekeeping operation.

can provide. Prior to the establishment of an SPM, there may also already be political affairs officers (within the office of the RC) or peace and development advisers on the ground. It is important to liaise with them. Where there is a significant humanitarian situation, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (who is also the USG for OCHA) may decide, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC),[37] to designate the RC as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or to designate a separate HC. The HC heads the Humanitarian Country Team, which brings together humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and is responsible, inter alia, for developing the humanitarian strategy.

A field-level mechanism (for example, a Strategic Policy Group[38]) bringing together the mission and the UNCT must be established to support senior leadership in providing strategic direction, planning oversight and coordination to the United Nations field presence. At the very minimum, the RC and the Head of Mission, once deployed, should have a strategic exchange on an overall United Nations plan in the country. If a mission planner has been deployed as part of the initial team, the planners on both the UNCT side (planning adviser or coordination officer in the RC office) and the mission side could prompt this strategic exchange, and establish a Joint Planning Unit (which could initially be located in the RC office if space is an issue for the mission start-up). Where there is a humanitarian situation and an OCHA office present, that office represents the humanitarian community in the Joint Planning Unit.

> More information on integrated field coordination (mechanisms, main functions, composition) can be found in the *IMPP Guidelines for the Field* (2009) and in *chapter 9*.

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[37] The IASC is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance, involving the key United Nations and non–United Nations humanitarian partners. It was established in June 1992 in response to General Assembly resolution *46/182* on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance.

[38] The SPG is the senior integrated coordination body for United Nations presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation and/or political mission and a UNCT. It is usually chaired by ERSGs or SRSGs.

In terms of support coordination, the UNCT and in particular UNDP can provide administrative and logistical support to the mission in its start-up phase and/or share resources with the mission, on a cost-reimbursable basis. For instance, the SPM could draw from the UNCT communications equipment capacity since the UNCT sometimes has substantial in-house photo and multimedia capacity. There are currently no guidelines on how the mission and the UNCT may cooperate on the provision of support services. DPA, DFS and UNCT senior leadership should engage with each other to ensure that support coordination is given high priority. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the cooperation and coordination of support services for United Nations activities is currently under development.

2.3.   HQ-field coordination

After mandate adoption and once the first staff members of the mission have been deployed, DPA regional divisions must maintain daily contacts with them to provide guidance and support in the start-up phase.[39] DPA regional divisions are the primary source of mission-related information at HQ. Once the communications systems are in place, official guidance is provided to the mission via code cable from DPA/OUSG. DPA desk officers are involved in drafting code cables. As soon as possible, weekly situation reports (sitreps) should be sent by the mission, on a regular basis, first by e-mail and then by code cable.

In addition to formal guidance, DPA regional divisions, and the relevant desk officer in particular, should maintain regular informal communication with the team on the ground through e-mail and by phone.[40] If necessary, and as a subset of the ITF, DPA may also convene weekly conference calls or VTCs with mission staff to discuss detailed support arrangements. All relevant counterparts within

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[39]   Technical and strategic guidance on police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action issues are provided to the mission by DPKO/OROLSI units, in coordination with DPA (*ST/SGB/2010/1*).

[40]   Guidelines on communication between mission and Headquarters throughout the mission's life cycle can be found in *HQ Support to Special Political Missions: Guidelines for desk officers*.

DFS (including the Global Service Centre[41]), DSS, OLA and other ITF members as appropriate, may be invited. It is important, however, that these conference calls or VTCs do not substitute for the ITF, which is the only mechanism that brings the whole United Nations system together.

Example: Agenda for UNOCA weekly conference calls during the start-up phase

1. Update on the establishment of UNOCA (ITC connections, facilities and refurbishment, logistics and assets)
2. Staffing
3. Financial issues
4. AOB

DPA staff members at HQ and mission staff in the field are encouraged to create a profile on the Secretariat-wide social networking platform "UNite Connections" (*https://unite.un.org/homepage/login/*) and keep it up-to-date with recent developments to keep improving communication among staff members.

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[41]   The Global Service Centre comprises the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (UNLB) and the United Nations Service Centre in Valencia (UNSV). It provides the back office functions (administrative, human resources, logistics and telecommunications support) and training for all field operations.

How is senior leadership selected and appointed?

3. How is senior leadership selected and appointed?

Depending on the nature of the mission, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), a Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG), or a Special Coordinator will serve as the Head of Mission (HoM) and the most senior United Nations representative in a given country.

In an integrated mission, the HoM is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the mandate of the mission and has overall authority over United Nations activities in country. The HoM is responsible for ensuring that all of the United Nations components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach. He/she has the authority and the responsibility to establish the political framework for the UNCT, and provide overarching leadership to it, within the parameters of the mandate established by the relevant resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly.[42] The HoM works with the UNCT through the Resident Coordinator (RC), who is responsible for the planning and coordination of United Nations development operations.[43]

In most SPMs, the presence of the HoM is critical to the start-up of mission activities, as he/she defines the strategic orientation of the mission, and makes initial important management decisions, including over recruitment. Moreover, the arrival of the HoM on the ground sends a political signal and solidifies the mission's political presence. The HoM should therefore be deployed as early as possible,

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[42] For more information on managerial structures and their interrelationships, see *the Policy on Delegated Authority in United Nations Field Missions led by the Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Department of Field Support.*

[43] For information on the relationship among the SRSG, RCs and HCs and the relationship among the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC, see the 2000 Note of guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarians Coordinators and the 2006 Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions.

and his/her appointment should ideally be planned before the mandate is adopted.

3.1.   Senior leadership appointment process

The general selection and appointment of the SRSG or Deputy SRSG (DSRSG) for a mission follows the process laid out in the SOP *Vacancy Management and Succession Planning for Senior Mission Appointments (SRSG and Deputy SRSGs [Political and Rule of Law]) in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.* This SOP also includes guidelines and templates for SRSG and DSRSG Terms of Reference (ToRs) and sets out the division of role and responsibilities between DFS Senior Leadership Appointment Section (SLAS) and DPA.[44]

SPM senior leadership appointment processes are essentially coordinated by DPA/OUSG. The process initiated by DPA can take up to four to six months.

The above-mentioned SOP lays out the various steps of the SRSG and DSRSG selection and appointment process. They can be summarized as follows:

1.   Identification of specific job requirements (ToRs);

2.   Discussion with DPA senior management on the appropriate profile;

3.   Based on the ToRs and the profile of the desired HoM, compilation of a list of candidates;

4.   Political consultations within the United Nations and with Member States;

5.   Interviews (as needed);

6.   Submission of a short list of candidates to the Secretary-General, which includes a minimum of three qualified candidates, including at least one qualified female candidate;[45]

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[44]   The selection process for Special Advisers, Special Envoys, etc., before an SPM is mandated, is outside the scope of this *Guide*.

[45]   In cases where a female candidate is not presented, there should be a written explanation of the relevant circumstances.

7. Appointment by the Secretary-General and notifications sent to USGs (contractual appointment is usually for one year, renewable for a second year). Security Council members are informed of the proposed appointment and have the opportunity to object the decision or suggest other candidates.[46] The Secretary-General also calls the recipient government and sends a formal letter announcing the appointment. Guidance on this process, as well as on the public announcement of senior mission appointments by the Secretary-General can be found in the *SOP on communications related to senior mission appointments*;

8. Directive articulating the role of the HoM, responsibilities and strategic objectives is issued by the Secretary-General to the newly appointed HoM. The Directive is produced by the ITF, under the leadership of DPA;

9. In-briefing at HQ (more detail below);

10. Deployment (ideally, mission leadership should be deployed immediately after issuance of the mandate of the mission).

DFS/SLAS usually directs the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) on the preparation of Letters of Appointment for all Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) and Under-Secretary-General (USG) level appointees, once the start date is determined and agreed.

For "multi-hatted" leadership positions (e.g., DSRSG/RC/HC, ERSG/RC/HC), where the incumbent also serves as the Resident Coordinator (RC), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and UNDP Resident Representative (RR), candidates are reviewed through an inter-agency advisory panel (IAAP) process chaired by DOCO.

1. The lead department (DPA) updates and finalizes the ToRs and the post profile for the position, following consultation with UNDP and OCHA;

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[46] Under the silence or "no objection rule", Security Council members have a final opportunity to oppose the decision and/or propose other candidates, once they receive the letter. If no one "breaks the silence" before the deadline of the procedure, the President of the Security Council will write back to the Secretary-General informing him/her that the members of the Council "take note" of his/her intention to appoint the person concerned.

2. DPA initiates the IAAP selection and appointment process by informing the UNDG Chair and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)[47] of the upcoming vacancy, preferably through a note, submitting the finalized ToRs/post profile for the DSRSG/RC/HC position;

3. DOCO disseminates the vacancy to its membership for nomination;

4. Nominations received are reviewed by the IAAP through a voting process;

5. Following the conclusion of the voting process, the IAAP short-listed candidates are submitted to the UNDG Chair and the ERC by DOCO;

6. UNDG Chair may convene interviews of the short-listed candidates jointly with the ERC and USG/DPA. Subsequently, the recommendation is made in a note to USG/DPA;

7. USG/DPA conveys the recommendations from the interview process in a note to the Chef de Cabinet in the Executive Office of the Secretary General (EOSG) for the Secretary-General's review and approval;

8. Once a decision is made by the Secretary-General, the information is shared by EOSG with the office of DPA/OUSG;[48]

9. DPA informs all candidates of the Secretary-General's decision;

10. If the selected candidate is to assume an HC function, the ERC informs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)[49] of his/her intention to designate the ERSG/DSRSG appointee as HC and asks for the IASC's concurrence on a no-objection basis[50].

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[47] The ERC is responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring United Nations humanitarian assistance and acts as the central focal point for governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental relief activities. The ERC also leads the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

[48] There may be informal consultations with the host authorities on the appointed candidate.

[49] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.

[50] Further information can be found in the *Guidelines for the selection and appointment of RC.*

3.2. Mission leadership team

The HoM needs to be supported by a senior leadership team that may include DSRSG(s), a chief of staff (CoS), a director/chief of mission support (D/CMS), a chief security adviser (CSA), a chief human rights (where the mission is to include a human rights component), police and/or military adviser(s)[51] (where the mission is to include a police and/or military component), and administrative staff to support the team. The selection and appointment of an experienced special assistant is also critical at the earliest juncture, especially if the HoM is from outside the UN system. As an intermediary step, the relevant desk officer or someone from the associated regional division should be deployed ad interim until a selection is made.

Selection decisions for all positions at the D-2 level and above are made by the Secretary-General. Recommendations for selection for positions at the D-2 level are made by the head of department/office/mission for review by the Senior Review Group,[52] which then provides its recommendations to the Secretary-General.

DFS leads the selection process of the D/CMS. DPA should approach DFS early in the mission planning process to start the selection process.

OHCHR, in consultation with the HoM, leads the selection process of the chief of human rights, who acts as adviser to the HoM and is also representative for OHCHR in the country (specific agreements with regard to the selection of the chief of the human rights component are described in the 2011 *Joint Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions*, which delineates the shared responsibilities among DFS, OHCHR and the mission leadership).

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[51] As is currently the case for UNPOS, BINUCA, UNIOGBIS, UNIPSIL, UNAMI, UNOWA, UNSMIL.

[52] The Senior Review Group is a standing advisory body composed of senior United Nations officials at the Under-Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General levels appointed by the Secretary-General.

SENIOR LEADERSHIP
APPOINTMENT AND SELECTION

The selection and appointment process of police advisers as well as the division of roles and responsibilities among DPA/OUSG, DPKO/OROLSI/OUSG, and the Police Division is set out in the *SOP on Vacancy Management and Succession Planning for Head of Police Components in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions*. The selection and appointment process of military advisers is set out in the SOP on Selection and Extension Procedures for Mission Military Seniors (May 2009).

Every effort should be made to ensure that the HoM, once appointed, is involved in the selection decisions and is provided with a support team possessing a full understanding of United Nations procedures, on both the administrative and substantive sides, and with gender and geographical diversity.

While the formal appointments are being finalized, members of the senior leadership team may be deployed on a temporary basis and assume ad interim functions to address immediate start-up requirements and challenges. The use of temporary duty assignments (TDYs) is an important mechanism for constituting the leadership of a start-up team. (See *chapter 5* for more information on temporary appointments.)

Within the first six months of their appointment, all senior leaders (D-2 level and above) might be invited to attend the Senior Leadership Programme, a five-day senior leadership training on the key strategic challenges senior leaders confront in their missions and the tools available to face them. The training is held twice a year in New York. (For further information, contact Integrated Training Service, DPKO-DFS or go to *https://point.un.org/SitePages/its.aspx*.) USG/DPA takes the final decision on the participation of DPA senior leaders in this training.

3.3. Roles and responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of DFS/SLAS and DPA are set out in the *SOP on Vacancy Management and Succession Planning for Senior Mission Appointments*. While DFS/SLAS circulates monthly reports on expirations of appointments, DPA/OUSG, DPA/Office of the

Assistant-Secretary-General (OASG), EOSG and DPA regional divisions are responsible for the other steps of the process laid out in the SOP.

DPA regional divisions need to:

» Have a good understanding and knowledge of the selection and appointment process set out by DPA/OUSG and reflected in the above-mentioned SOP.

» Trigger thinking on senior leadership and potential candidates within the division and DPA/OUSG early (this includes consultations with Member States).

» Draft the ToRs for the HoM and Deputy HoM based on the mission concept, on the future mandate of the mission and on a gap analysis given the diversity of capabilities already available on the management team (see SOP and annex for generic ToRs and sample ToRs).

» Prepare lists of potential candidates (minimum of three candidates, including at least one female candidate).

» Draft notes with recommended candidates from DPA/OUSG to EOSG.

» Ensure ongoing engagement with the AFPs, in the case of a "multi-hatted" position.

In-briefing: Once appointed and prior to his/her deployment, the HoM should take part in an in-briefing at HQ, New York. SLAS coordinates the tailored integrated administrative in-briefing and DPA is responsible for organizing the substantive in-briefing of senior officials. DPA regional divisions are responsible for coordinating meetings (including a briefing by the ITF and an integration briefing conducted by the IMPP working group, if the principles of integration apply[53]), and prepare background and guidance documents (including the Mission Concept) to assist the HoM in his/her new tasks. The *SOP on in-briefing and debriefing of senior managers of DPA SPMs and DPA supported special envoys* provides further information on

SENIOR LEADERSHIP
APPOINTMENT AND SELECTION

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[53] DPA regional divisions should reach out to DPA/Policy and Mediation Division/Guidance and Learning Unit to assist in organizing the integration meeting.

the process, including the list of meetings to organize. To the extent possible, the new HoM should be provided with the opportunity to return to HQ for further briefings a few months after deployment.

The start-up phase ends once the HoM has been deployed on the ground.

How is a new mission funded?

4. How is a new mission funded?

All SPMs mandated by the Security Council are funded from the programme budget through the assessment mechanism. The availability of assessed funds allows the mission to begin deployment against a staffing table and incur expenditures relating to the start-up of the mission. However, in most cases, before a mandate is issued, SPMs are first funded with unforeseen or extra-budgetary (XB) funds, administered by DPA/Executive Office (EO). Securing funding throughout the mission start-up phase is crucial, as operational planning is highly dependent on the availability of financial resources.[54]

This chapter primarily addresses funding options for pre-mandate and post-mandate processes, before the allotment of the annual budget of the mission.

4.1. Overview of funding framework

There are two distinct funding phases in the start-up of an SPM: *(i)* pre-mandate funding (i.e., during the assessment phase), and *(ii)* post-mandate funding.

Post-mandate funding covers two phases: *(1)* the period between the issuance of the mandate of an SPM and the allotment of its annual budget; *(2)* the period from the allotment of the annual budget, which refers to the way SPMs are funded, with biennial budgets approved by the General Assembly.

Although funding mechanisms vary from one SPM to another, there are budgetary rules that DPA staff members should be aware of:

» The regular SPM budget year is from January to December.

» The financial period for SPMs runs over two consecutive calendar years.[55]

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[54] Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations are set out in Secretary-General's bulletin *ST/SGB/2003/7*.

[55] The General Assembly approves a biennial budget. DPA and DFS/FBFD then allocate annual allotments.

» The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (*ACABQ*)[56] and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly meet three times a year (October, March and May) to discuss budgets. SPM budgets are considered in October and March.

» Generally, if the mandate of a mission is issued between January and March, and if the mission budget is developed and submitted in time for the March session of the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee, start-up funding requirements can be covered by the regular programme budget. A budget adopted during that General Assembly session is "retroactive" in that it covers the period from the mandate date of that year to the December period.

» SPMs are funded as a pool, as part of the programme budget, through assessed contributions, through the special political missions provision of the regular budget.[57] It is thus possible to reprogramme funds within the SPM total regular budget envelope (**only** after the issuance of a mandate) for temporary bridge funding[58] of mandated activities (from the date of the mandate). Reprogramming involves the transfer of resources from other SPMs that have underspent their budget. The allocation of funds is a matter of judgement by the Controller/Department of Management (DM), based on recommendations from DFS, DPA and each SPM. DPA/EO, DPA/OUSG and DFS/Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD) are responsible for interacting with the Controller's office.

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[56] The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly which, among other things, (a) examines and reports on the budget submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly; and (b) advises the General Assembly concerning any administrative and budgetary matters referred to it.

[57] To facilitate the allocation of resources, SPMs have been divided into three clusters and another category (United Nations Assistance Missions). This *Guide* addresses Cluster III SPMs (political good offices, integrated peacebuilding offices, regional political offices) and DPA-led assistance missions. More information on how SPMs are funded can be found in the Report of the Secretary-General on review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions (*A/66/340* of 12 October 2011).

[58] Unlike PKOs, SPMs do not currently have the possibility to obtain a pre-mandate commitment authority from the peacekeeping reserve fund for a mission start-up. In the past, as an alternative procedure, a mandate for the deployment of a short-term mission and a team has been issued, and secured funding for the planning of a longer-term mission (e.g., UNAMIS in 2005 and UNSMIL in 2011).

4.2. What are the pre- and post-mandate funding options available before the allotment of an SPM annual budget?[59]

Before the SPM receives funding from DPA programme budget sources, other funding options must be explored. The source of these alternate funding options must be clearly identified, in collaboration with DPA/EO, during the assessment phase (or pre-assessment phase, if applicable), before the mandate is issued. This allows for quick deployment of assessment missions, and subsequent deployment of staff.

As soon as a mandate is approved, an initial allotment (which may be based on an initial estimate without a full budget) may be issued by the Controller, prior to the submission of a full budget.[60] It is crucial to secure funding then, as there may be a funding gap between the issuance of a mandate and the allotment of the regular budget. The best funding options should be explored as soon as possible. This is usually supported by DPA/EO.

Start-up activities taking place prior to the issuance of the mandate and between the time the mandate is issued and the allotment of the regular budget have to be funded either through the Secretary-General's fund for unforeseen expenditures relating to the maintenance of peace and security, or from extrabudgetary (XB) funds.

1. **The Secretary-General's unforeseen expenditures relating to the maintenance of peace and security**: this is one of the most common sources of funding in a start-up phase and can be requested by DPA/OUSG. It is a source of short-term funding only.[61] DPA regional division needs to consult with DPA/EO early, who can advise on the process. The Secretary-General has authority to enter into commitments

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[59] The 2011 Report of the Secretary-General on the funding and backstopping of SPMs (*A/66/340*, see above) was discussed in the ACABQ in the same session of the General Assembly (*A/66/7/Add. 21*). The report may be re-examined in the sixty-seventh session of the Assembly.

[60] The submission of the full budget defines funding requirements and allows for proper (and full) allotment to be issued.

[61] This source is applicable both prior to and after the issuance of a mandate.

for unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures related to the maintenance of peace and security in amounts of up to $8 million a year,[62] or up to $10 million with a Security Council resolution and the prior concurrence of the ACABQ.[63] The formal process for the request of unforeseen funding is a note from the USG/DPA to the Chef de Cabinet (EOSG). The release of unforeseen funds, once approved, could take one week. If there is a need for additional resources, and as per *ST/SGB/2003/7*, revised and supplementary programme budget requirements may be submitted, when in the interest of peace and security (rule 102.4), and this will require General Assembly approval.[64] Not all requests may be approved during the year. It is thus important to identify alternative funding sources.

2.   **Extra-budgetary funds:** XB funds are voluntary contributions and may be earmarked (e.g., given for a specific purpose, location or duration) or un-earmarked (e.g., from general and unrestricted contributions that allow flexible use of funds according to a Department's priorities).[65] Note that XB funds are not always sufficient to cover requirements: fundraising[66] may take time, and it may also take time to receive funds, even after Member States/donors have pledged support. DPA regional divisions should coordinate with the donor relations officer within DPA/EO. *DPA extra-budgetary resources management* policy establishes

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[62] Note that there are competing needs from different HQ departments for this $8 million fund.

[63] Authorizations to incur commitments in accordance with General Assembly resolutions relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses shall be issued by the Under-Secretary-General for Management (Rule 102.7, *ST/SGB/2003/7*).

[64] If a decision of the Security Council results in the need for the Secretary-General to enter into commitments relating to the maintenance of peace and security in an amount exceeding $10 million in respect of the decision, that matter shall be brought to the General Assembly, or, if the Assembly is suspended or not in session, a resumed or special session of the Assembly shall be convened by the Secretary-General to consider the matter.

[65] This source is applicable prior to and after the issuance of a mandate.

[66] OROLSI units can provide limited support to raise voluntary contributions for rule of law and security institutions components of an SPM.

the principles and norms guiding fundraising and the use of XB funds within DPA. It defines the types of XB funding covered and how they are organized.[67] More information on DPA XB funding can be found on the *DPA Intranet* and by contacting DPA/EO.

Considerations for providing an accurate estimate of start-up planning needs

In a start-up phase, the needs for start-up planning must be identified and assessed from the very beginning in order to give an accurate estimate of costs, allowing for the use of all allocated funds. Lack of anticipation may trigger delays in staff deployment and the receipt of equipment from other missions, as well as leading to the possible expiration of earmarked funds, which could lead to under-spending.

Considerations to be taken into account to get an accurate cost estimate include:

» Support functions from regional missions, whether in the form of a financial support mechanism, logistics support mechanism, assets available on transfer from other missions, capacity of local infrastructure, and support from a DFS regional centre;

» Support component mechanisms considered suitable for the mission, and staffing requirements and deployment of temporary expertise as required;

» Travel requirements, both in relation to mandated activities and support from other missions or from HQ;

» Capacity and availability of staff expertise in the host government;

» Contributions expected from the host government;

» Range of mandated activities and funding required for the fulfilment of the mandate.

START-UP FUNDING

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[67] XB funding should not be used for mandated activities, such as the payroll of mission personnel.

4.3. Regular programme budget

DPA is involved in regular budget processes from the earliest stages of the planning process. DFS supports programme budget funding for almost all the field-based missions.[68] The budget in the first year of an SPM requires the definition of the start-up requirements of a mission in the initial period, such as temporary staffing support, acquisitions and capital investments. The budget also includes ongoing requirements such as staffing resources for the initial year. Further information on regular programme budget may be found in the *SOP on budget processes for field-based SPMs.*

In a start-up phase, DPA staff members should be mindful of:

» **Timelines:** The timelines for development of the first regular budget submission may be compressed. The first full budget for the new SPM needs to be submitted to the *ACABQ* and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly as early as possible after the issuance of a mandate, in order to be discussed at the October or March session. There is therefore a need for constant engagement with DPA/EO, DFS/FBFD, and between DFS and the Controller's office.

» **Responsibilities:** Most of the administrative tasks for which the mission is normally primarily responsible (development of results-based budgeting,[69] development of a logical framework, staffing tables, post justifications, cost estimates, etc.) are performed by DPA and DFS at HQ, unless relevant staff has already been deployed on the ground.

4.4. Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

The Secretariat signed a global MoU with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) that allows DPA and its political missions to apply for PBF

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[68] DPA/EO and DPA/OUSG are responsible for most Cluster I and II SPMs.

[69] Results-based budgeting (RBB) requires the formulation of budgets that are driven by a number of desired results which are articulated at the outset of the budgetary process, and against which actual performance is measured at the end of the budget period. (Results-based budgeting: the experience of United Nations system organizations, Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva, 1999: *http://www.unjiu.org/data/reports/1999/en99_03.pdf.*) More information can also be found in the *RBB Guidelines.*

funding (see *memorandum ASG/PBSO to USG/DPA, 28 July 2011*).[70] The PBF is a multi-donor trust fund of the Secretary-General, designed as a rapid and flexible mechanism for addressing critical peacebuilding gaps in the immediate needs of countries emerging from, or at risk of relapsing into, violent conflict. It is not specifically designed to fund operational start-up activities but targets activities and programmes that are critical to the country. Applications for funding are always submitted on a country basis, by the senior-most resident United Nations official, in full consultation with the United Nations system present in country. Priorities should be identified by national stakeholders; assistance is then delivered through the United Nations, by the most appropriate United Nations organization. DPA staff members should keep these parameters in mind, as well as the capacity of the new mission to implement, monitor and report against the proposed activities, when considering applications for the PBF during the start-up phase. (For more information see *www.unpbf.org*.)

4.5. Roles and responsibilities of the main actors involved in the process

Roles and responsibilities can vary considerably from SPM to SPM. The DPA regional division leads the process of formulating the resource requirements for personnel and operations. DPA regional divisions work closely with DPA/EO for securing and administering pre-mandate funding and, concurrently, with DFS/FBFD for securing and advising on post-mandate funding and ensuring a smooth handover of administrative support to DFS, when relevant.

DPA/EO is the first entity the DPA regional division should reach out to. The Executive Officer can direct the request to the appropriate focal point within the EO. With the relevant DPA regional division providing the resource requirements based on the mission concept, DPA/EO is responsible for budgeting and facilitating access to XB and unforeseen funds for pre-mandate activities. Support from DPA/EO may include project approval, issuance of allotments, recruitment

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[70] *http://dpaintranet.un.org.* The first project was implemented in UNIOGBIS.

of special advisers and/or technical expertise, travel processing, expenditure monitoring, closing of the project and donor reporting. It is important for the EO to know the goal, size and activities of the mission in order to provide advice and decide whether the mission will be administratively supported by DPA/EO in the initial phase, and when there will be a handover to DFS.

Depending on the size of the pre-mandate logistical support required, DPA/EO may provide funding to DFS divisions to deliver the necessary pre-mandate support.

DFS/FBFD takes the lead in budget planning and budgeting for post-mandate operations. It provides advice, guidance and assistance to DPA on funding-related issues by sending guidance and templates, for example, and reviewing budget proposals.

The Headquarters Office of Programme Planning Budgeting and Accounts (DM/OPPBA)/Controller's office establishes policies, procedures and methodologies for the estimation of requirements and provides policy guidance. DM/OPPBA prepares and presents the Secretary-General's proposals for budgets and other administrative and budgetary matters relating to field missions to the legislative bodies. The office also issues allotments of the Secretary-General's unforeseen expenditures account and XB funding sources. DPA normally does not interact directly with DM/OPPBA. EO and/or FBFD are the principal points of contact between DPA/DFS/Missions and OPPBA on all financial and budgetary matters.

With the involvement of DPA senior management and in consultation with relevant substantive backstopping departments, DPA regional divisions are responsible for:

» Engaging and liaising with DPA/EO to explore pre-mandate funding options, as soon as there are talks about a potential SPM;

» Assisting the EO in preparing pre-mandate funding proposals for the Secretary-General's unforeseen expenditures or XB funding sources;

» Mapping other United Nations actors on the ground (e.g., UNCT, PKO, Regional Service Centres) and inquiring about their

capacities, in case the SPM needs to be administratively supported by one of them in the start-up phase;

» Identifying their desk officer counterparts within DFS/FBFD;

» With the assistance of DFS, and based on the mandate of the mission, identifying logistics activities, support and substantive human resources requirements of the mission so as to provide responses to DPA/EO and DFS on the new mission;

» Liaising with DPA/EO and DFS/FBFD on a regular basis, and convening and chairing coordination meetings with them;

» Contributing to the development of the first RBB and the mission start-up budget, in consultation with the ITF;

» Assisting, along with FBFD, in preparing the presentation of the SPM budget to the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee.

Backstopping

The multifaceted substantive mandates of field-based SPMs require complex HQ backstopping for planning, direction and substantive support. DPA senior managers, directors and desk officers should assess backstopping needs at HQ from the outset of the planning phase, temporarily re-assigning staff from other areas or divisions as required. Backstopping needs are likely to be more significant in a start-up phase and options to respond to these needs (e.g., XB funds, include new HQ posts in the mission budget) should be explored early.

Identification and development of capacity requirements and recruitment options

5. Identification and development of capacity requirements and recruitment options

Human resources are crucial to the proper functioning of a mission and to the delivery of a mandate. From the onset of the planning phase, it is important to have a clear understanding of what the mission can hope to accomplish, what the current UN capacities and gaps on the ground are. Senior mission staff must plan for a workforce for the mission component based on the mission concept. This includes considering the scope for partnerships to secure access to specialized or time-limited competencies. Capacity requirements and staffing needs have to be identified as early as possible as they have direct budgetary implications, and an impact on logistics planning as well.[71]

The Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict Review

DPA staff should be aware that the review of Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, conducted by an independent Senior Advisory Group appointed by the Secretary-General in 2011 (see document *A/65/747-S/2011/85* of 22 March 2011), which emphasized that stronger civilian capacities are vital to building lasting peace, underscored the importance of nurturing national capacities in conflict-affected countries, and stressed the need for the United Nations to be more responsive, flexible and cost-effective in providing support. The Secretary-General's response (*A/66/311-S/2011/527*, 19 August 2011) pointed to the need for the Organization to draw on a greater variety of sources of civilian capacity to meet specialized needs, envisaged a more broadly composed workforce in which United Nations staff are supplemented by other capacities, and attached priority to building partnerships to enable easier access to needed capacities. Key recommendations can be found at *http://www.civcapreview.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ziyWBYGp7pM%3D &tabid=3188&language=en-US*. DPA staff should keep abreast of the status of implementation of the recommendations, which may have an impact on the information provided in this chapter.

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[71] In a mission start-up, the capacity requirements of a mission, or the mix of capacities, are subject to change.

5.1.   Planning for capacity requirements and recruitment strategies[72]

DFS and DPA, in consultation with all members of the ITF, work closely together during the identification of staffing requirements and the development of capacity needs, which should begin before the issuance of a mandate.[73]

The staffing tables (including the number of posts required, categories, levels and functional titles) and the organizational chart of the mission (including mission components and reporting lines) are designed in a collective effort based on the relevant discussions between all actors involved on the requirements of a mission, and finalized by DFS/Field Personnel Division (FPD).

It is especially important, at the early stages of mission planning, to take the political aspects in the mission's area of operation into account. For example, the need for a balanced representation of locally recruited staff from different ethnic, regional and/or political groups, and the need for regional representation in the case of regional offices. Potential political bias or local perception of such bias for international staff recruited from neighbouring or nearby countries should also be carefully assessed before actual hiring begins.

Each SPM is different and involves unique requirements. Although organizational charts and staffing tables of past missions may be useful, it is important to consider the needs of each mission while designing these tools and to avoid using a "one-size-fits-all" template. For example, if there is a large peacekeeping operation nearby, the capacity for that mission to backstop certain functions might be considered. Also worth noting:

» DPA provides inputs on the staffing requirements of the mission's substantive components, based on the mission concept and/or the mandate of the mission, and on inputs by other Secretariat

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[72] This chapter addresses recruitment at the D-1 level and below. For selections at the D-2 level and above, see *chapter 3*.

[73] At a later stage, it is important to provide room for change in the definition of capacity requirements in the light of insight gained by the mission on the ground, working with host authorities and other partners.

substantive departments, offices and AFPs, when relevant.[74] It is important to keep in mind what the mission is supposed to deliver, and what human resources, capabilities and skills are going to be required to achieve its objective. It is also important to have a clear understanding of what UNCT and local or regional capabilities are, to avoid supplanting national capacity.

» DFS/LSD, DFS/ICTD, DFS/FBFD and DFS/FPD provide their inputs on staffing requirements of the support components, based on their assessment of needs.

» DFS/FPD reviews the inputs and justifications and provides an organizational chart and a staffing table for the requirements including human resources staff in the mission.

FPD finalizes staffing tables and the organizational chart, with the agreement of relevant DPA and DFS partners through correspondence or final meetings. (This is conducted as part of the budgetary process.) FBFD then puts together a draft budget (including the mandate, RBB, posts and their justifications) for submission to OPBBA.[75] FBFD coordinates the replies of DPA and DFS to OPBBA's questions. After clearance of the draft budget by OPBBA, the budget process is followed. The approval of final staffing tables could take a long time as the ACABQ may not authorize all the positions requested by DFS/DPA at its first meeting, and staffing tables may thus have to be revised.

Steps towards recruitment of staff should be taken before the issuance of a mandate, in anticipation of the approval of staffing tables and budgets (e.g., reviewing rosters of candidates, short-listing candidates, identifying staff members for temporary duty assignments [TDY]). However, no recruitment (with the exception of TDY)

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[74] DPKO/OROLSI leads on the development of staffing requirements of a mission's rule-of-law and security institution components as well as related recruitment, in coordination with DPA and DFS. Also note that OHCHR can provide a detailed benchmark for optimal staffing of the human rights component.

[75] Post justifications and ToRs are provided by DPA, after consultation with relevant departments and offices (as per the *Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions*, OHCHR is to provide substantive backstopping to budget and staffing processes) for the substantive components and by LSD, ICTD, FBFD and FPD for the support components relevant to each of those divisions.

can be finalized before the mandate of the mission has been issued (see subsection on pre-mandate options for more information on temporary deployments).

DPA and FPD (along with staff deployed on the ground, if any) should develop a recruitment strategy and agree on a timeline. The strategy should be based on prioritized recruitment needs, taking into account the mandate of the mission and the political situation of the host country. Where possible, staff capacity from neighbouring missions or the UNCT should be used to expedite interviews and other procedures.

5.2.   What staff should be recruited as priority?

Staff to be recruited as a priority may vary for each mission (for example, some SPMs may require the early deployment of electoral planning capacities or translation/interpretation capacities). However, to the extent possible, and to avoid any delays in the start-up of a mission, priority recruitment (in addition to the HoM) should be given to the following:[76]

Substantive activities:

» Chief of staff (further detail in *chapter 9*);

» Special assistant to the HoM;

» Political affairs officer(s);

» Strategic planner/personnel with expertise in programming, monitoring and evaluation;

» Heads of substantive components;

» Spokesperson and public information officer(s)/personnel with expertise in outreach, advocacy, communications and resource mobilization;

» Personnel with gender expertise (if the expertise is not already available in the UNCT).

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[76]   This list is not exhaustive.

Logistical, operational and administrative activities:

- » Director or chief of mission support;
- » Human resources officer(s);
- » Procurement officer(s);
- » Finance officer(s);
- » Budget officer(s);
- » Communications and information technology officer(s);
- » Engineer(s);
- » Logistics specialist, supply officer, fuel officer;
- » Transport officer, movement control officer, air operations specialist;
- » Property management specialist, warehouse asset manager;
- » Administrative officer(s);
- » Chief security adviser and security officer(s).

5.3. Roles and responsibilities of DPA in the pre-mandate planning phase

The relevant DPA regional division leads the process and works closely with DPA/EO to identify capacity requirements during the pre-mandate phase, and concurrently with DFS/FPD to coordinate planning of human resources requirements for when the mandate is approved.

DPA is not always involved in the technical aspects of recruitment processes, but may still have responsibilities ranging from assisting with the shortlisting of candidates to participating in interview panels.

During this stage, DPA is responsible for:

- » Having a clear understanding of human resources processes, timelines[77] and the division of responsibilities between DPA and DFS, as set out in the SLA;

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[77] Recruitment processes for SPMs are similar to PKOs. More details can be found in the *DPKO Mission Start-Up Field Guide*.

» Providing DPA/EO with relevant pre-mandate staffing requirements and ToRs;

» Providing DFS/FPD with relevant staffing requirements and documentation on the mandate of the mission, in a timely manner;

» Liaising with DFS, requesting expert guidance on the organizational design and staffing requirements of the new mission (e.g., categories of staff, number, grade level) and convening coordination meetings, on a regular basis;

» Drafting substantive job descriptions (e.g., political affairs officer, strategic planner, United Nations Volunteers in substantive positions) if they do not already exist, or tailoring existing ones;

» Coordinating with relevant entities for specialist recruitment (e.g., DPKO/OROLSI for police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action experts, OLA for legal affairs officers, UN Women for gender expertise, OHCHR for human rights officers);

» Liaising and establishing working relationships with the UNCT on the ground to agree on potential assistance in a start-up phase (e.g., on local recruitment).

5.4.   What are the pre- and post-mandate options for the temporary deployment of international staff?

In a start-up phase, there are two types of posts:

» Temporary post;

» Regular post (post approved and budgeted, only after the issuance of the mandate).

Since no staff can be formally recruited before funding has been identified and approved, and given that recruitment processes for regular posts can be lengthy, DFS/FPD and DPA usually identify and deploy staff from HQ and other missions on temporary assignments, prior to the issuance of a mandate, to facilitate the start-up of the mission.[78]

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[78] For rule-of-law and security institution components, DPKO/OROLSI, in coordination with DPA and DFS, identifies and deploys staff from HQ and other missions, as well as its standing police, justice and corrections or mine action capacities, on temporary assignments. The standing police capacity is especially designed to provide mission start-up support.

There are two main mechanisms to deploy temporary personnel: temporary duty assignments (TDY) and temporary vacancy announcements (TVA). HQ may also provide additional support and deploy staff on official travel or temporary appointments, or recruit experts on consultancy contracts. During the pre-mandate phase, and based on planning scenarios, the DPA regional division works with DPA/EO on staffing requirements within available pre-mandate funding (see *chapter 4*).

Case study: Funding temporary assignments in the start-up of UNOCA

A small team on temporary duty assignment (TDY) was deployed prior to the start of the regular budget cycle. Its deployment was funded by DPA extra-budgetary funds, as part of start-up funding, and administered by DFS. From January (allotment of annual programme budget), TDYs were funded from the travel budget of the mission. However, although TDYs are a quick and efficient way to deploy staff on the ground, they can be costly and funds can run out quickly (as a staff member on TDY is entitled to both the post adjustment at the parent duty station and DSA for the full period of the TDY which is to be reimbursed by the mission).

5.4.1. Temporary duty assignment (TDY)

Missions in a start-up phase can bring highly experienced and qualified staff members on board on TDY before and after the mandate has been issued, provided funding has been identified and set aside for such purposes. While the need for a TDY is most acute during the initial phase, the need may continue to exist for an extended period after the mandate has been approved, depending on the circumstances and the support structure. DFS/FPD is responsible for coordinating the TDY process.

A TDY is an agreement between two offices to allow the temporary loan of a staff member from one office to assist the other office for an agreed period not exceeding three months. It is not a contract. TDY staff must return to their parent office after the agreed period is over. During the TDY assignment, the staff member is considered to be on official travel. However, if the new mission recommends the person sent on TDY for the post, and if he/she meets the requirements

(e.g., rostered by Field Central Review Board, FCRB), then that person may be recruited against the post or released on assignment for up to two years, with an initial period of one year.

TDYs do not need to be advertised and are therefore good for rapid deployment of staff to meet urgent support requirements during the start-up phase. It may take up to two weeks to identify and deploy a staff member on TDY.

Qualified staff from downsizing or liquidating missions may be temporarily placed in start-up missions on TDYs (pending their clearance for the roster, if not already rostered). During this period, the staff member has the chance to apply and be competitively selected for a post in the start-up mission.

Although TDYs are advantageous for a mission, they must be managed realistically. Disadvantages include risks of not having a successor in place before a TDY ends, the cost,[79] the refusal of the parent mission to release his/her staff (or to ask for a replacement before the individual can be released)[80] and not having enough time dedicated to efficient handover to the eventual successor.

5.4.2. Temporary vacancy announcement (TVA)

TVAs are advertised to fill a position temporarily until the position is filled through established procedures, or because the position is temporary in nature. There has to be a vacant post for a TVA to be issued.

The selection process against a TVA may take six to twelve weeks, depending on how long the TVA is advertised, and how long it takes to review the candidates comparatively and bring the selected candidate on board. The parent office/mission is allowed up to 60 days to release the individual, once he/she is reassigned to the mission.

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[79] The salary and allowances of the staff member on TDY continue to be paid by the releasing mission, while the receiving mission meets the cost of DSA for the full period of the TDY.

[80] The parent office/mission has authority on the release of the individual and the conditions.

5.4.3.   Support from Headquarters, the Global Service Centre (GSC) and Regional Service Centres (RSC)

HQ staff from substantive departments and offices may be deployed for a few weeks, on official travel or temporary assignment, to assist in a start-up mission. DFS/FPD may also provide additional support by deploying a human resources specialist on the ground or providing additional backstopping resources at HQ. As part of the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), SPM staff for back office start-up operations (e.g., administrative, human resources, logistics or telecommunications support staff) may also be embedded within the structure of the appropriate RSC.

Although not commonly used, the option of gratis personnel[81] may also be considered in order to bring on board experienced experts. Interns may also be identified for additional support at HQ. More information on gratis personnel can be found in *General Assembly resolutions 51/243* of 16 September 1997 and *52/234* of 26 June 1998, and in *ST/AI/1999/6*.

5.5.   United Nations Volunteers (UNV)

The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, based in Bonn, Germany, can play a significant support role during mission start-up. United Nations Volunteers usually come on board more quickly than United Nations staff. It is important to consider United Nations Volunteers for new SPMs by including provision for them when composing mission staffing tables.

Whenever a new mission is envisioned to include United Nations Volunteers in its staffing table, the UNV programme needs to be involved in both staffing preparation and programme planning at the earliest possible stage, including during TAMs or other assessment exercises. In this regard, UNV provides not only personnel but also expertise in peacebuilding and community/civic engagement programme policy and design.

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[81] Personnel provided to the United Nations by a government or other entity responsible for the remuneration of the services of such personnel (*ST/AI/1999/6*).

United Nations Volunteers are not United Nations staff, but they can be employed in over 100 professional categories.[82] The collaboration with UNV is described in a global MoU signed between DPKO/DFS and UNDP (on behalf of UNV) in November 2003. This MoU, together with the United Nations Volunteers conditions of service, governs the involvement of UNVs in United Nations missions. The cost of UNVs is charged to the mission budget or to the UNCT if the volunteers are to be attached to agencies, funds or programmes. For contacts and further information on UNV, see *www.unvolunteers.org*.

The recruitment of United Nations Volunteers is solely the prerogative and responsibility of the UNV programme. DFS liaises with and coordinates with the UNV office. DPA regional divisions or mission managers may be asked to draft ToRs for UNV substantive positions. Where relevant, other substantive offices may also provide support. During mission start-up (and throughout the life cycle of a mission), the UNV field unit embedded within the mission (or the UNCT, depending on the size of the mission) is responsible for managing the mission's United Nations Volunteers.

5.6.   What is the recruitment process for international regular posts in the post-mandate phase?[83]

Most regular post recruitment decisions can be made only after approval of the budget of the mission and once the HoM has been deployed. In order to assist in the process, a human resources manager should be on the ground early in the deployment process.

> DPA is usually not directly involved in the technical recruitment process but needs to follow the process closely and regularly, especially with regard to ensuring timelines are met by DFS/FPD and, when necessary, to give their feedback on substantive candidates and take part in interviews.

Occupational group managers (OGMs) within FPD are in charge of recruitment. Candidates are usually identified by DFS/FPD from a roster of staff cleared in the field (by the FCRB) and at HQ (by the HQ

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[82] It is part of the agreement between the two organizations that there be a balance between UNV substantive and operational support positions in a mission.

[83] See *chapter 9* for information on the recruitment of national staff.

CRB). Final decisions on recruitment up to a D-1 level are within the authority of the HoM.

The recruitment and deployment of roster-cleared international staff can take two to three months (including time for medical clearances, training in Brindisi, etc.).

In addition, when there is difficulty in attracting qualified applicants to a specific duty station or to fill positions that require very specific skills for which rosters do not exist, DPA should consult with DFS/FPD on the possibility of issuing position specific job openings (PSJOs).

Staffing selection processes in field missions are guided by *ST/AI/2010/3*. An SOP on staff selection in peacekeeping and special political missions that provides further guidance on the policy implementation, including delineation on the roles and responsibilities between field missions and Headquarters, is currently being developed by DFS.

Training: in general, staff deployed to a field-based mission for the first time are required to go to UNLB, GSC and attend two weeks of pre-deployment training.[84] Further information on training[85] and the list of mandatory online courses are available on DPA intranet (*http://dpaintranet.un.org/dpaintranet/pages/WebPageDetail.aspx?Page_Id=545*). The Guidance and Learning Unit, within DPA Policy and Mediation Division is the focal point for DPA training.

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[84] Efforts are under way to provide SPM-specific trainings. Once there is adequate capacity on the ground, it is important to organize relevant training. Missions should contact learning focal points in their region. (For a list of learning focal points in offices away from HQ, contact the Learning, Development and Human Resources Services Division in OHRM.)

[85] The *Policy on Training for all United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel* may be applied on a case-by-case basis to DPA-led missions.

Putting mission infrastructure and minimum capacity into place

6. Putting mission infrastructure and minimum capacity into place

6.1. How is mission infrastructure put into place?

Logistics support functions for an SPM include logistics planning, communication and IT services, air operations, surface transport operations, supply and medical services.

The basic logistical elements to be considered in the start-up phase of a mission in order for it to be able to start functioning are:

» Infrastructure: the mission headquarters (MHQ) building, warehouse(s) (to stock and manage equipment upon arrival), living accommodations, airfield infrastructure (to support the operation and unloading of aircraft), and field offices, where appropriate;

» Transport: vehicles, and in some instances air transport;

» IT backbone and information management systems: phones, code cable/encrypted services, fax machine, Internet/Intranet, e-mail, Lotus Notes and VTC facilities;

» Equipment and service contracts: power supply (generator), water supply;

» Basic emergency medical support;

» General services: mail and pouch, records management and archiving.

6.1.1. Who is involved in logistics planning?
The relevant DPA regional division is the political lead in this process and needs to work closely with the Office of the Director, Planning and Coordination, DFS, who coordinates with DFS divisional focal points on the logistics and communication support planning.

DFS[86] delivers coordinated logistics support and guidance to field operations, in the full range of logistics services, including living and working accommodations, engineering, supply, medical, movement control, surface and air transport, and communication and IT services. DFS provides advice and information to DPA, maintaining regular communication on ongoing developments on the ground. Support is delivered in accordance with DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for United Nations Field Missions (June 2009).[87]

The Global Service Centre (GSC) and Regional Service Centres (RSCs) have also developed a portfolio of service packages specially targeted at SPMs, and are well equipped to support many areas of the start-up process.

As part of the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), the GSC, comprised of the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (UNLB) and the United Nations Service Centre in Valencia (UNSV), provides the back office functions (administrative, human resources, logistics and telecommunications support) and training for all field operations. When necessary, GSC can quickly deploy experts to provide

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The Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS)

The GFSS (Report of the Secretary-General, document *A/64/633* of 26 January 2010) provides a new model for field missions to improve the timeliness, efficiency and accountability of support operations. Approved by the General Assembly in 2010 (*A/RES/64/269*), the GFSS defines four pillars designed to improve mission deployment and delivery of support services: modularization, service centres, financial framework and human resources framework. The new service delivery model is to be rolled out over a five-year period.

The establishment of service centres is intended to improve service delivery to the field by distinguishing strategic, operational and tactical functions. DFS at Headquarters focuses on strategic issues like policy, planning and strategic coordination. The Global Service Centre (GSC) groups technical expertise on service delivery and provides support to field missions globally. Regional Service Centres (RSCs) are established using resources of field missions in the same geographical area and provide back-office functions and training to those missions. Currently there is only one RSC, in Entebbe, Uganda. Two more locations, one in West Africa and one in the Middle East, are being considered for the establishment of RSCs.

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[86] DFS/Logistics and Support Division (LSD) in particular.

[87] Environmental considerations should be in the background of all start-up activities on the ground. An environmental focal point should be appointed in each SPM.

technical assistance on the ground in the start-up phase of a mission. RSCs may also provide support to missions in the same geographical area. DPA regional divisions do not have to interact directly with these centres. The Office of Director, Planning and Coordination, DFS, is the point of contact for the DPA desk officer. DPA staff members should, however, be aware of the roles of GSC and RSCs.

6.1.2. Logistics planning processes: the involvement of DPA and the mission concept

To adequately support the establishment of an SPM, DFS must be involved in all the planning stages of the new SPM.

During the planning phase, DFS develops a mission support concept, which is the reference document for all logistics start-up activities. The mission support concept is based on, but different from, the mission substantive concept developed by DPA regional divisions in the initial planning stage. The mission support concept complements the substantive operations working towards achievement of the mission mandate and includes information on staffing, budget, equipment and goods required (and how they will be sourced), etc. The process usually takes a minimum of two weeks. The mission support concept can only be derived from the mission substantive concept. The mission support concept feeds into the Secretary-General's report.[88]

In order for DFS to provide adequate technical support to the mission start-up, the main responsibility of DPA is to provide the necessary strategic and political information on the new mission, before the mandate is issued, to start support planning as early as possible (see *chapter 1*).

Once the mission substantive concept (as well as a UNDSS security assessment—see *chapter 7*) is received by DFS, that department takes the lead in developing a mission support concept for their respective areas, in consultation with the relevant DPA regional division. If DFS and/or GSC could not take part in the TAM (see *chapter 1*) or if further assessment is necessary, they could choose to send a technical survey to the field with their own experts.

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[88] DPA with the assistance of DFS/LSD must ensure that all logistics resource requirements are included in the mission's budget and that the required funds are allocated to DFS for the required services and support.

In addition to the mission support concept, a material resource plan listing all necessary equipment could be developed by DFS/GSC to ensure better coordination of funding and efficient delivery of material into the mission area.

DPA is not directly involved in technical logistics support, but is responsible for:

» Having a clear understanding of support issues and timelines;

» Providing DFS with the strategic direction of the mission to inform logistics support and deployments in a timely manner (through the mission substantive concept, in particular);

» Liaising with DFS focal points, requesting expert guidance and coordinating meetings on a regular basis;

» Liaising with the UNCT to clarify and agree on the technical support the UNCT could provide in the start-up phase, until the team deployed on the ground is self-sufficient.[89]

Logistical challenges DPA should be aware of:

1.   The availability of start-up funding is crucial in logistics support planning. In general, strategic deployment stocks (SDS) in a GSC cannot be released if start-up funding has not been approved and is not readily available.

2.   Small SPMs may have unique challenges in a start-up phase due to reductions in approved posts and functions, which may create delays in the process. Assistance from experts from GSC may be required.

3.   The origin and way of acquiring equipment have an impact on the speediness of mission start-up. Equipment can be sourced from: United Nations reserves, SDS (requires full reimbursement from the mission), specific category of equipment from a liquidating mission (can be a lengthy process), local lease (costs spread over several budget periods, flexible, rapid availability), new procurement (full cost to the mission, slowest source), agency loan or agency procurement.

4.   Shipment of equipment to a landlocked country can be challenging and hence create delays. This needs to be taken into account while developing the mission concept and timelines.

5.   SPMs current funding cycles and mechanisms could delay the acquisition of equipment. The provisions concerning access to and reimbursement of the SDS are currently not applicable to SPMs.

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[89]   An umbrella MoU on cooperation and coordination of support services for United Nations activities is currently under development.

6.2.   How are property and services acquired?

The acquisition, by purchase or lease, of property and services involves procurement activities. Procurement is essential in the start-up of a mission as the needs of the new mission are significant.

Procurement policies, guidelines and principles are set out in the *United Nations Procurement Manual*. Although the Manual is applicable to both SPMs and PKOs, SPMs may face specific challenges due to their nature, size and resources.[90]

6.2.1.   Roles and responsibilities

The Field Procurement Liaison Team (DFS/OUSG/FPLT) and UNLB/GSC should be jointly consulted early in the planning stages and prior to the deployment of a mission to determine the most appropriate course of action to provide procurement support to the start-up mission.

In order to conduct procurement activities, an SPM must have the appropriate procurement capacity and infrastructure. A delegation of procurement authority is typically issued by the USG/DFS to the Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS), who further delegates to the procurement staff.

The Policy on Delegated Authority in United Nations Field Missions led by DPA and supported by DFS provides additional information on delegation of authority. Templates and forms for delegation of authority can be obtained from DFS/OUSG.

DFS is responsible for assessing the procurement capacities of SPMs and providing support for the implementation of procurement capabilities. It is currently piloting an initiative (COMPASS) to explore how to provide adapted procurement support to SPMs that are not granted a delegation of procurement authority from the USG/DFS due to lack of procurement capacity. DFS/LSD and DFS/ICTD

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[90]   For example, as regards internal controls purposes, the Procurement Manual specifies certain officers (e.g., vendor roster officer, legal officer) who may not be included in an SPM staffing table because of its size or lack of resources. Alternative arrangements may be found with the assistance of DFS.

assist in cataloguing all the requirements of a mission, identifying which requirements could be secured through UNLB material or system contracts.

Comprehensive Operational Mission Procurement and Acquisition Support Service Initiative (COMPASS)

Within the framework of the GFSS, DFS has embarked on the COMPASS initiative to review the current procurement support arrangements in place for SPMs and make recommendations on how to address the requirements for enhanced procurement support to SPMs and potentially start-up missions that do not have the required procurement capacity, infrastructure or internal controls. It is envisaged that a Service-Level Agreement will be signed between UNLB and each SPM supported by COMPASS, detailing the activities and level of support to be provided by each entity. The initiative is currently being piloted for one year in UNOCA and UNOWA/CNMC. A delegation of procurement authority has been issued to the director, UNLB/GSC to procure on behalf of these SPMs. The COMPASS pilot will use the best practices gained from the experiences with these missions to finalize the COMPASS proposal. The proposal is expected following the end of the pilot phase, and will address options on how best to support SPMs, on the use of GSC and the resulting resource implications.

The Procurement Division (PD) within the Department of Management (DM) is the technical authority for all procurement policies and guidance and direction to field missions. The Procurement Operations Service (POS) is responsible for undertaking procurement activity for DFS and processing field cases over the USG/DFS's delegation of procurement authority threshold, through PD for approval.

DPA has no direct responsibility in procurement processes. DPA staff members should however be aware of procurement principles, processes and timelines for various requisitions (see the General Procurement principles in annex). DPA regional division also has a coordination role. As much as possible, the division should answer requests from DFS, GSC and PD, when necessary, keep abreast of any development regarding procurement activities, and coordinate meetings with relevant actors.

In addition, with the assistance of the relevant departments, DPA should:

» Establish which AFPs are operating within the mission area, in order to obtain more information on their contractors/suppliers (for potentially considering these vendors in bidding exercises), and on accommodation and transport arrangements.

» Ensure that an experienced Procurement Officer (PO) is deployed as early as possible to assist in the start-up phase.

» Ensure that a PO is included in the staffing table (to the extent possible).

» Ensure that certifying officers[91] are approved and given designation and delegation of authority, ideally prior to their deployment.

6.2.2.   What are the options for procurement in a start-up phase?

An SPM shall have a D/CMS along with the appropriate procurement staff, infrastructure, software and internal controls in place prior to receiving a delegation of procurement authority. Until that time, various support arrangements may be determined in consultation with DFS/FPLT, including:

1. **Issuing a delegation to the Director, UNLB/GSC or to a neighbouring mission** to initially conduct procurement activity on behalf of the mission in the start-up phase.[92]

2. **Seek assistance from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes (if the first option is not possible).** In a start-up phase, AFPs—UNDP in particular—may provide procurement services and record the mission's expenditures on behalf of the mission. These services, however, require the advance approval of ASG/Office of Central Support Service (OCSS/DM) and involve administrative fees. It should also be recognized that UNDP may itself face

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[91]   The certifying officer is the United Nations official responsible for managing the utilization of resources.

[92]   UNLB or the neighbouring mission must also be issued a specific delegation of procurement authority by the USG/DFS prior to undertaking procurement activity on another mission's behalf.

capacity constraints as it often services other AFPs at the country level.

3. **Seek assistance from HQ (DFS and DM).**

Small initial budgets may not be able to cover all of the start-up costs and this may hinder procurement processes. Requisitions should therefore be prioritized in accordance with immediate needs (e.g., safety and security, medical services). If the relevant officers (D/CMS, finance officer) are not yet on the ground, this is managed by DFS/LSD and DFS/ICTD.

6.2.3. What are the key procurement issues to consider prior to the deployment of an SPM?

The requisition/acquisition process can start as soon as an allotment from the regular budget for the new mission has been issued, and once a team has been deployed. There also needs to be the required procurement software and certifying officers in place. As soon as bank accounts are set up and operational, the direct purchase mechanism allowing purchases of up to $4,000 should be utilized.

The relevant DPA regional division and desk officers need to be involved and follow up on:

1. **Facilities and leasing** (e.g., MHQ, warehouses, field offices). Leasing is an important and expensive part of the start-up phase. To the extent possible, and in line with the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) provisions, the host country should provide accommodations for free.[93] Based on information provided by the TAM, a site assessment team (which should include an engineer, a security officer, a communications officer and a PO), identifies useable properties and sends an assessment report to the PO on the ground. Most of the responsibilities for leasing contracts are then transferred to the ground.

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[93] If it is not possible for the mission to obtain free accommodations, leasing modalities should be defined in a "Use of premises" agreement, signed at the mission level.

2. **Identification of needs and procurement of new equipment.** This determines which requirements (e.g., vehicles) can be addressed in advance.

3. **Commodity supplies** (e.g., water, electricity).

**For logistical issues,
mission support start-up completion essentially includes:**

» MHQ and other buildings (warehouse[s]) have been refurbished and are operational;

» Operational premises are secure and MOSS compliant, including fire safety;

» Field offices have been identified (but do not need to be fully operational for the start-up phase to be over);

» IT backbone, main communication and disaster recovery and business continuity systems are functional;

» Basic equipment has been requisitioned for and/or arrived at the new mission;

» Bank accounts are created and being operated by the SPM financial staff;

» Required contracts are in place;

» Staff check-in and check-out procedures are in place.

How to ensure safety and security of the mission and its staff?

7. How to ensure safety and security of the mission and its staff?

7.1. Roles and responsibilities

Security of staff is a priority. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations rests with the host authorities. Security for buildings and equipment is also crucial.

The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) is responsible for providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system to enable the safest and most efficient conduct of the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. *The Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System* outlines the United Nations security system and the roles and responsibilities of each actor involved.

On the ground, the designated official (DO) is responsible for the safety and security of all United Nations staff in-country. The RC is normally appointed as the DO for security by the Secretary-General, unless a more senior official (e.g., SRSG) is resident in the country and is appointed as DO, on the advice of UNDSS. The DO has to attend a two-day training course. He/she reports to the Secretary-General through the USG/DSS and is supported by the chief security adviser (CSA) and the Security Management Team.

DPA is not directly responsible for setting up a safety and security system. However, DPA staff members should have a good understanding of DSS processes and are responsible for:

» Reaching out to the DSS director of regional operations and his deputy as early as possible. DSS desk officers assigned to regions are relevant points of contact;

SAFETY AND SECURITY

» Liaising with DSS on a regular basis, being aware of DSS activities on the ground and coordinating meetings;

» Ensuring DSS is part of the ITF;

» Providing DSS with relevant information on the new mission, e.g., activities and requirements for the substantive programme, number of offices, locations, etc.;

» Including security planning in general mission planning;

» Inviting DSS to take part in the TAM, and coordinating assessment visits to new mission locations, when necessary;

» Assisting DSS in consulting with the UNCT on the ground and sensitizing the UNCT before the arrival of the mission;

» Understanding the activities of the UNCT on the ground and mapping UNCT offices to inform decisions on the location of field offices and on resource/cost sharing.

7.2. Setting up a security system: what is the planning process and what should DPA be aware of?

In all field-based SPMs, DSS needs to assess the potential security risk to staff and develop a plan for corresponding risk-mitigation measures that are required to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

In addition to conducting desk reviews, DSS HQ staff travel to the field in order to understand and map existing capacities, and then assess the needs for the new mission. The security assessment is based on potential threats and risks—which are in turn based on the situation of the country, the security on the ground and the profile of the new mission. Based on the assessment, DSS determines the number of security staff required, the location of the MHQ and field offices, and—jointly with DFS—identifies premises, and decides whether to build new buildings or use prefabricated building units.

Security of premises and equipment is a key element to take into consideration in a mission start-up. There are different options, depending on the threat assessment and the capacities of the host country. For example, the mission may (i) hire local staff, (ii) use the

host country police, (iii) contract local companies (going through the United Nations procurement process), or (iv) "borrow" Secretariat security officers.

DPA staff members shall be aware that:

» Not all security staff in the mission are funded from the DPA SPM budget; part of security staffing is supported by the DSS budget.

» Close protection (two cars and five staff, often armed) for the HoM should always be included in the initial budget, even if it is eventually not needed. The decision for close protection is based on a threat assessment and the HoM.

» Setting up a security system can be more challenging if the mission is not integrated. In the case of a non-integrated mission, there is a security section within the mission, responsible for day-to-day issues (e.g., close protection) and a separate DSS section, responsible for the overall safety and security of the UNCT and the mission.

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How is the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) concluded?

8. How is the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) concluded?

8.1. What is a SOMA? What are the arrangements before a SOMA is concluded?

The Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)[94] formalizes the status of a United Nations mission in the host country. It confirms the applicability of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the mission, its personnel, premises, property, funds and assets. The SOMA also outlines the obligations of the mission to the host government.

> The SOMA addresses issues such as security, communication, transportation, entry and exit of personnel and goods, provision of premises by the government, exemption from taxes and fees and so on.

Until a SOMA is concluded, the 1946 Convention applies to the mission so long as the State concerned is a party to the Convention. However, the Convention does not provide the full extent of privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities granted to a United Nations mission under a SOMA and it does not address certain other vital issues such as security and claims against the Organization. Accordingly, it is essential for the United Nations to conclude a SOMA as quickly as possible after the deployment of a mission in the host country.

As a practical matter, there may be difficulties when the mission is first established in ensuring that the mission receives all the privileges, immunities, facilities and exemptions to which it is entitled under the Convention, especially if the SOMA has yet to be concluded. In such a case, the new mission or DPA can request assistance from UNDP on the

STATUS OF MISSION
AGREEMENT

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[94] A SOMA can be in the form either of a treaty or an exchange of letters. In the case of the latter, around the time when the UN letter is signed by USG/DPA and sent to the Permanent Representative, OLA will provide DPA a sample response that the Permanent Mission could use. The treaty is, however, the most common form. It allows the government to hold a signing ceremony either at HQ or in the host country's capital.

ground to facilitate the procurement and importation of goods, based on provisions of the Convention. UNDP usually has in place the necessary arrangements with the relevant host country authorities and is usually able to assist the mission temporarily, with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the host country authorities, until the necessary arrangements are put in place by the United Nations Secretariat.

8.2.   Roles and responsibilities

The Headquarters Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) is responsible for providing legal advice to Secretariat departments and offices and, through them, to United Nations presences in the field. While DPA regional divisions are not responsible for drafting the SOMA, they need to be aware of the process, to liaise with their OLA counterparts on a regular basis, to invite OLA to coordination meetings, and to provide OLA with relevant information and any comments on the proposed agreement during the drafting process.

8.3.   How to conclude an agreement and how is DPA involved?

When the establishment of a mission is being considered, DPA regional divisions should contact the SPM focal points within OLA as soon as possible. OLA should be part of the preparatory missions on the ground, or at least be provided with an opportunity to provide input into matters that should be raised with the government during the preparatory mission.

8.3.1. Drafting process

The drafting process starts once it is clear that a new mission will be or has been established. OLA is responsible for the drafting of the SOMA and its negotiation.

In order for OLA to prepare the first draft of the SOMA, DPA regional divisions, through DPA/OUSG, shall provide the following information to OLA, preferably via a note or memorandum:

» The anticipated number and composition of the staff of the mission;

» Whether the staff will include civilian police advisers or military advisers and, if so, whether they will be uniformed and armed;

» Whether there will be a guard unit (military personnel of national contingents);

» Whether United Nations security officers will be deployed and, if so, whether they will be armed;

» Whether a close protection detail will be deployed and, if so, whether its members will be armed;

» Transportation arrangements for the office and whether it will have its own aviation assets or vessels;

» Telecommunications arrangements for the office, including for in-country communication between United Nations offices and among staff.

Once a draft SOMA has been generated by OLA, OLA sends it to DPA, who shares it with DFS and DSS (and possibly with DPKO if there are to be civilian police advisers and military advisers). If there is already a team on the ground, DPA should share the draft with them too. DPA then sends comments back to OLA and asks OLA to finalize the draft in the light of them.

OLA then prepares a cover letter to the Permanent Representative of the host country, attaching the draft SOMA and requesting that the draft be forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A request is also made for the government's comments on the draft, if any, to be received as soon as possible. This letter is signed by USG/DPA. If there is already a field presence, OLA usually requests that the mission provide a copy of the USG's letter directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible. The mission is also requested to emphasize to the government the need to conclude the agreement expeditiously.

During this process, DPA is responsible for liaising with OLA, sharing OLA's first draft with DFS and DSS and with the mission in the field, if there is already an established presence, collecting and transmitting to OLA comments on the first draft, and arranging for the formal transmittal of the finalized draft to the Permanent

Representative of the host country in New York and the informal transmission by the mission on the ground to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

8.3.2.   Timeline and conclusion of a SOMA agreement

Negotiations for the conclusion of the SOMA are usually conducted through an exchange of correspondence between the Permanent Mission and DPA, which receives the government's comments, relays them to OLA, assists OLA with preparing a response and then transmits the finalized response to the Permanent Mission. Sometimes, negotiations are conducted face-to-face between the Permanent Mission and OLA. DPA should be prepared to attend any such negotiations. It is important to impress upon the mission, if deploying, that they should not engage in negotiations directly with the host authorities, as this is the sole purview of OLA. However, given limited capacity by the host authorities to deal with such agreements, delays are likely to occur, and the mission should be kept duly informed by both OLA and DPA on the status.

The timeline for the conclusion of an agreement varies and is partly dependent on how long it takes to receive the host authorities' initial comments on the draft. On average, it takes anywhere from 3 to 9 months to conclude an agreement.[95] OLA will prompt DPA to follow up on the status of the SOMA with the Permanent Mission every two months by providing draft letters to be sent from USG/DPA to the Permanent Representative. DPA should also prompt the mission to follow up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to encourage a formal response from the Government through its Permanent Mission in New York.

Once agreement is reached, OLA finalizes the text of the SOMA for signature. Signature of the SOMA typically takes place on the

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[95]   In some cases, a SOMA would have to be ratified by the Parliament (or the relevant national body) before it can enter into force. Therefore, the conclusion of the SOMA does not always guarantee that the agreement enters into force immediately (which makes it particularly important that such agreements are concluded as quickly as possible).

ground, with the HoM signing for the United Nations and the Minister of Foreign Affairs signing for the Government. Alternatively, it may take place in New York, typically between USG/DPA and the Permanent Representative of the host country. If signed on the ground, DPA should ensure that the mission immediately cables the text of the signed agreement back to HQ, so that OLA may register it and have it published in the United Nations Treaty Series (online and in hard copy).

8.3.3. Other legal arrangements

The United Nations may need to enter into supplementary agreements or arrangements such as additional security arrangements. It is also necessary to establish clear legal arrangements with the host government on the terms and conditions on which premises are provided (free of charge) to the Organization. These arrangements are usually negotiated and concluded at the mission level. They must, however, be reviewed and cleared by OLA. If there is no legal affairs officer on the ground, DPA and OLA are directly involved in the process. Relevant information must be received in a timely fashion from the mission in order for OLA to draft any such agreement.

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CHAPTER 9

Beyond the start-up phase: how to ensure continuity between HQ and the field

9. Beyond the start-up phase: how to ensure continuity between HQ and the field

Throughout the start-up phase, and as the capacity of the mission increases, the elements of mission planning progressively shift to field level. Headquarters retains a key role in the process as it becomes responsible for providing guidance and backstopping. As outlined below, after certain junctures, the mission leadership begins to undertake many tasks HQ divisions were responsible for, in addition to those specific to the leadership on the ground. At this stage the mission is expected to report to HQ once a week on the progress of the start-up.

This chapter outlines the overall role of mission leadership, the specific technical start-up tasks to be performed on the ground to allow the mission to reach the end of its start-up phase, and the first steps to be taken to implement the mandate.

9.1. The mission leadership

Mission leadership includes the primary decision makers of the SPM who are responsible for setting the mission's political direction as well as for defining, implementing and monitoring its mandate.

Once members of the mission leadership are deployed, they undertake managerial tasks that HQ carried out at the beginning of the start-up phase.[96] As there is a gradual transfer of responsibilities, mission managers have to make essential management-related decisions on planning processes (e.g., development of a mission work plan, results-based budgeting, and an Integrated Strategic

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[96] *The International Peace Institute's Management Handbook for United Nations Field Missions* (June 2012) provides useful information on management theories and practices, offers practical tools and insights on key elements of management and presents real-life examples from United Nations field missions.

Framework (ISF) for missions where the principles of integration apply), finance and budget issues (e.g., budget documents, establishment of a finance support structure), recruitment (e.g., of national staff, and of staff up to the D-1 level by the HoM) and information management, among others.

In addition to the HoM (see *chapter 3*), mission leadership includes:[97]

» Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs) [political and multi-hatted];

» Chief of staff (CoS);

» Director or chief of mission support (D/CMS);

» Heads of substantive components.

Further guidance and information on roles, responsibilities, managerial structures and reporting lines can be found in the *Secretary-General's note of guidance on integrated missions clarifying the roles and responsibilities of SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC* (2006) and in *the Policy on Delegated Authority in United Nations Field Missions led by the Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Department of Field Support*.

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General: The DSRSG's specific responsibilities in a start-up vary depending on the division of labour among senior mission managers and on whether he/she has to coordinate activities with the UNCT through the RC and UNCT mechanism.[98] DSRSGs' core functions include:

» Managing the mission components under his/her responsibility, including providing policy guidance and overseeing the development of component work plans; and

» Supporting the HoM by performing specifically delegated HoM responsibilities and officiating as HoM in his/her absence.

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[97] Roles and responsibilities of mission managers, as well as critical mission start-up tasks for mission management, are detailed in the *DPKO Mission Start-Up Field Guide (MSUFG)*.

[98] In some cases (e.g., UNOCA, UNOWA), there is no DSRSG. It is desirable to refer to the director and senior political affairs officer.

In a structurally integrated mission, the ERSG or DSRSG is "multi-hatted" and serves simultaneously as Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

» In the RC capacity, he/she is responsible for coordinating UNCT and United Nations operations and development plans. There is an RC office on the ground to support the coordination of recovery and development activities.

» In the HC capacity, he/she is responsible for coordinating humanitarian plans and operations and for maintaining links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community. He/she is often supported by an OCHA office.

Mission-specific ToRs for the DSRSG/RC/HC should be developed in consultation with UNDP, DOCO and OCHA.

Chief of staff: The CoS is responsible for ensuring the effective direction and management of all the activities of the mission, in accordance with the strategic vision and guidance of the HoM, the DSRSG (if present), and HQ. To this effect, the CoS oversees the core mechanisms and processes that enable the integrated delivery of the mandate of the mission, in particular strategic and operational planning, policy coordination, senior-level decision-making and information management. In a start-up phase, the CoS has planning and budgeting responsibilities. He/she is also responsible for monitoring senior leadership appointments and selection of substantive staff against mission vacancies. The CoS also supports the HoM in his/her responsibilities towards accountability for the conduct and discipline of SPM personnel and may be requested to act as the conduct and discipline and/or ombudsman focal point for the SPM. As often happens, if he/she is deployed before the HoM, he/she needs to undertake additional managerial tasks until the HoM arrives on the ground.

Director/chief of mission support: During mission start-up the D/CMS is the focal point for all contacts with the lead office for coordination of support and plays a key role in planning and establishing the mission's internal infrastructure, including mission-wide

facilities, staffing levels, communications and logistics.[99] The D/CMS is accountable for all mission assets and all decisions taken in the area of mission support. All financial, administrative (including recruitment) and logistics authorities that are delegated to a mission are personally vested in the D/CMS, and he/she has legal responsibility.

The deployment of the **chiefs of a mission's components** or minimal operational substantive teams should also be prioritized to support the mission leadership, including in decision-making processes regarding recruitment and mandate implementation, such as the design of planning tools. Depending on the mandate of the mission, chiefs of substantive components may include:

- » Head of political affairs;
- » Head of the human rights component (who is also OHCHR's representative in the mission area);
- » Head of the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (SSR/DDR) unit;
- » Police adviser;[100]
- » Military adviser;
- » Head of the child protection unit;
- » Head of the gender unit;
- » Head of electoral affairs;
- » Head of public information.

9.2. The transfer of technical responsibilities in a start-up phase and establishment of support structures

Mission leadership is usually deployed as early as possible. They are typically supported by a political affairs officer (or officers), a finance officer, a procurement officer, a human resources officer, engineer(s), ICT officer(s) and administrative officer(s).

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[99] Further to a code cable, dated 13 July 2011, on reporting lines for head of mission support components, the head of the mission support element reports directly to the HoM.

[100] See *ST/SGB/2010/1*.

Once deployed, mission leadership is responsible, among other things, for making arrangements for the provision of the office premises[101] (which would have ideally been identified during the TAM), discussing and finalizing administrative, logistics, internal information management and safety requirements for the establishment of the mission, and undertaking discussions with the host government on legal issues and the mandate of the mission. Mission management may delegate some tasks to members of the initial team. The HoM, CoS and all senior managers must also take responsibility for conduct and discipline issues.

In addition to the tasks set out in the previous chapters of this *Guide*, the following tasks can specifically be undertaken by mission leadership, once on the ground. The division of roles and responsibilities may vary, depending on who has been deployed (e.g., (D) SRSG, CoS, D/CMS).

Legal issues: The most senior mission manager deployed on the ground should communicate and follow up with the host government on legal issues. (See *chapter 8* for more information on the SOMA.)

» Pending preparation of a draft SOMA, mission managers should give advance notice to the authorities that the United Nations will be looking to conclude a SOMA and that a draft will be transmitted to the authorities through the country's Permanent Mission in New York.

» Once a draft copy of the SOMA has been received, mission managers should forward a courtesy copy of the draft to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, as need be, follow up with the Ministry to encourage them to send their comments to HQ via the country's Permanent Mission in New York. Any comments or feedback provided directly to the United Nations mission should be communicated back to HQ for transmission to OLA.

Budget development: Mission managers on the ground shall contribute to the development of the RBB and the budget development

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[101]   Every effort must be made to obtain accommodation and office space from the government or government land that can be developed as greenfield sites (i.e., undeveloped sites). See *chapter 8* on legal arrangements for the provision of premises.

process. Ideally, the RBB should be drafted at the mission level, with the assistance of a strategic planner on the ground. (See *chapter 4* and the SOP on budget processes for field-based SPMs in annexes, for more information on budget issues.) A timeline should be established at the earliest possible point to establish clear internal deadlines for budget submission, so that a comprehensive process can be undertaken with all relevant stakeholders. Budgets are strategic documents, not just financial, and must be given due attention by the HoM and the CoS.

Recruitment of international staff: Mission managers, with the assistance of DFS/FPD, need to finalize the recruitment of international staff and put in place a plan to ensure continuity of service. To the extent possible, there should be a handover period between temporary staff and staff recruited against the post. (See *chapter 5* for more information on recruitment.)

> Mission leadership should be aware that, in case expedited recruitment is needed, the mission may hire off a roster by advertising a vacancy. In this case, the HQ 60-day minimum duration rule to advertise a job vacancy on the ground does not apply.

Recruitment of national staff: (The following cannot be undertaken from HQ.) DFS/FPD issues delegations of authority and guidance for the recruitment of local staff to field mission staff. Vacancies are advertised in local newspapers and on the radio. The recruitment of local staff is usually done by a human resources officer on the ground. In the absence of an HR officer, mission management (usually the CoS) may send a short list of candidates to DFS/FPD, who may assist with recruitment. Once a pool of candidates has been identified, UNDP may assist with finalizing recruitment on the ground (e.g., by conducting interview panels, reference checks). This can be an expensive and time-consuming process, as the mission will be charged for UNDP services. Nevertheless, the use of UNDP may be an expedited way to recruit national staff, if technical expertise (e.g., engineer, driver) is required immediately, especially in a start-up phase.[102]

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[102]   Mission leadership should be aware that locally recruited staff are essential in any mission start-up, for support functions in particular. The recruitment plan should take into account the political aspects of a mission (e.g., the need for representation of different ethnic backgrounds and political parties among locally recruited staff).

Financial management: (The following cannot be undertaken from HQ.) Mission managers (D/CMS in particular) should ensure that the focus of the mission (and of the finance officer, if there is one) is to set up finance and payment systems, and ensure that all financial management systems and tools are operational and available to mission components.

Until a minimum capacity is established, the mission may need to make temporary use of UNCT financial management arrangements (UNDP in most cases). In this case, final financial decisions still rest with UNHQ. However, since demand could outgrow the capacity of UNDP to service the mission, there can be delays in payments and financial transactions. The team on the ground shall liaise with UNHQ on a regular basis and inform the relevant DPA regional division and the desk officer, DPA/EO and DFS/FBFD of any financial operations carried out by UNDP on their behalf. The mission may also be assisted by RSCs or a neighbouring peacekeeping mission.

Procurement: Mission managers (D/CMS in particular) should ensure that the focus of the procurement section on the ground is on satisfying immediate operational requirements and on establishing systems to ensure that the goods and services needed to implement the mission mandate can be requested. (See *chapter 6* for more information on procurement.)

GSC can assist with the activation of procurement software, needed before procurement can begin. Setting up procurement systems in a new mission may take three months or longer, depending on the resources of the SPM. In a start-up phase, the mission should assess its needs and the availability of goods on the ground and liaise with DFS to determine the appropriate course of action to fulfil the requirements. The mission should have a pre-determined procurement support plan as agreed with DFS/FPLT and could include support from GSC or neighbouring missions or "piggyback" on UNDP contracts (with the express advance approval of the ASG/OCSS).

If local procurement is possible and the appropriate infrastructure, internal controls and delegations are in place, the procurement

process on the ground starts. The following are examples of procurement tasks that may be undertaken from the ground:

» Conclusion of lease agreements. Lease agreements are competed or negotiated as appropriate, drafted by the PO after a sourcing/solicitation exercise and the appropriate contract approval is obtained, in consultation with OLA. The agreements must be clear and include provisions for renovations and structural adjustment to premises if necessary.

» Conduct of a bidding process and negotiations with landlords.

» Access to vendor rosters of agencies.

» Establishment of a Local Committee on Contracts (LCC) to review all procurement over the applicable threshold. Entry into contract is approved at the mission-level if it is within the delegation of procurement authority held at the mission-level; otherwise it must be forwarded to PD for review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts (HCC) and approval by the ASG OCSS, which is required for leases where the total value for the proposed life of the lease is over $1,000,000.

» Translation of all agreements and contracts into the host country's official language and into English (recommended).

» Establishment of requisition and contract expiry date tracking and reporting systems (this is essential in a mission start-up due to the breadth and volume of the activities).

Logistics and political involvement on the ground: As soon as relevant mission managers (e.g., D/CMS) and staff are deployed, most of the support planning responsibilities are transferred to the field. Support may also be provided by mission staff embedded in GSC. (See *chapter 6* for more information on logistics.)

All efforts should be made to ensure that support arrangements are in place before the deployment of the HoM. However, support issues are also a political matter that can require the presence of the HoM, in particular to obtain various authorizations such as landing rights, premises for MHQ and other key sites (e.g., a logistics base or interim storage facility to stock and manage receipt of equipment), and discuss possible refurbishment of government buildings.[103]

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[103]   If the refurbishment is of leased facilities, it should be negotiated under and included in the lease agreement.

The refurbishment of facilities for MHQ and the establishment of a basic logistics facility are key to communication activities in the start-up phase. Communication systems are crucial for security and business processes and for interacting with UNHQ. They should be set up immediately upon deployment.

Case study: UNOCA start-up and infrastructure

The Gabonese Government allocated four presidential villas to serve as UNOCA HQ and as the residence of the SRSG. This was less costly for the mission. However, all villas required thorough refurbishment, which could not be done without the agreement of the host authority. The negotiation process was difficult and lengthy and resulted in delaying the start-up process, since none of the core infrastructure could be installed before the end of the refurbishment process. It is important to negotiate potential refurbishment of buildings with the host authority as soon as possible. This experience also showed that alternate options to government-provided buildings should be explored.

Information and knowledge management: In a start-up phase, it is important to establish mission-wide integrated procedures and systems for information analysis and management. This includes information sharing, reporting requirements, security classification, records management and publication of Intranet content.

Records management and archiving

In a start-up phase, the risk of losing documents and information is considerable. Records management is the systematic creation, use, maintenance and disposition of records to meet administrative, programmatic, legal and financial needs and responsibilities. A sound records-management programme on the ground is essential for the proper functioning and accountability of an SPM. Archiving is also essential, and all the more important as there may be requests from legal institutions (e.g., the International Criminal Court) for United Nations archives at a later stage. Archiving systems should be put in place from the start of the mission to facilitate its future transition or closure. More information on records management and archiving can be found on the United Nations *Archive and Records Management Section (ARMS) website.*

BEYOND THE START-UP PHASE:
HQ AND FIELD CONTINUITY

Information security

Maintaining information security is challenging when communication systems such as code cables are not yet functioning. Information should be handled carefully and mission leadership should be aware that no internal information should be shared externally without the explicit approval of the originator of the information, under the overall supervision and guidance of the HoM. More information on tools for successful records management and information security is available in the *DPKO Mission Start-Up Field Guide.*[104]

Knowledge management

Knowledge management refers to a set of activities an organization engages in to gather, organize, share and analyse its experiential knowledge, drawing upon and mining unstructured information throughout the organization in order to form a body of institutional knowledge.[105] From the start of a mission, it is important to engage in knowledge-sharing activities within and between peace operations and at HQ.

» On the ground, mission managers need to support the establishment of lessons-learning mechanisms and knowledge-sharing activities by, ideally, ensuring the appointment of a best practices officer, if the SPM has adequate financial resources, or a focal point within the mission. Mission managers should also ensure that staff deployed on TDY write end-of-assignment reports and/or handover notes to ensure continuity of work in the start-up phase.[106]

» At HQ, DPA desk officers may reach out to DPA Guidance and Learning Unit (GLU) for advice and assistance on how to promote knowledge-sharing activities. GLU also supports the management of SPMs by conducting lessons learned activities and after action reviews, aimed at informing future processes. As a rule, one or several after action reviews should be conducted on the start-up of the mission, or the different phases of the start-up.

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[104]   Additional information can also be found in the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (*ST/SGB/2007/6*, 12 February 2007)

[105]   *Policy on Knowledge Sharing* (DPKO/DFS, May 2009).

[106]   See *SOP DPA end of assignment reports*.

Further guidance on knowledge management and available tools can be found on the DPA Intranet and in *DPKO/DFS Policy on Knowledge Sharing*.

Oversight, investigation and discipline systems: Mission leadership should oversee the early establishment of systems an SPM needs to have in place to maintain internal oversight, conduct investigations and address disciplinary matters. The functions of these systems should be clearly communicated to staff, and there should be no tolerance for breaking UN standards of conduct. It is especially important to establish an appropriate working culture at the outset. The HoMs and CoS should be fully trained on performance management and, when necessary, establish a work plan and performance expectations both in writing and via townhall meetings.

A conduct and discipline focal point should be appointed from the start-up phase. He/she advises the HoM on all conduct and discipline issues involving all categories of personnel in the mission, with the support of a regionally based conduct and discipline team or the Conduct and Discipline Unit in DFS. The focal point supports the HoM in designing and implementing measures to prevent misconduct, including the delivery of mandatory training, ensures oversight of the enforcement of United Nations standards of conduct and advises on remedial action to be taken where misconduct has occurred, and receives, assesses and supports the HoM in referring allegations of misconduct for appropriate action. He/she receives complaints of misconduct, and transmits them to the appropriate bodies for investigation (e.g., security investigation units at the mission level, Boards of Inquiry,[107] or the Investigative Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services). The HoM and CoS need to follow all complaints personally to ensure the appropriate actions are taken.

Security: Mission managers are supported by the Safety and Security Section, which is the principal adviser on issues related to

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[107] A Board of Inquiry (BOI) is a mission management tool used to assess the facts of incidents of suspected or alleged misconduct by a staff member or members.

the security of United Nations civilian personnel. In a start-up phase, mission managers should ensure that the security section addresses the immediate security of mission staff (including conducting a mandatory security briefing for newly arrived staff and regular radio checks), and develops longer-term security arrangements. (See *chapter 7* for more information on safety and security.) A mission evacuation plan should be in place as early as possible and daily security updates should be provided.

9.3.   Towards mandate implementation: the development of United Nations strategic priorities on the ground

As soon as an initial team has been deployed, clear plans to implement the mandate of the new mission need to be developed. This should take the form of (a) an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), and (b) an internal mission work plan.

Mission leadership should be on the ground for the development of key strategic objectives, together with the UNCT. Substantive mission managers should also be involved in the conceptualization of objectives and plans, not only because of their technical knowledge but also because they are responsible for the implementation of plans.

A joint strategic planning unit with both mission and UNCT planners, and United Nations regional offices where appropriate, should be established at the outset of the mission, if not prior to the mission being established.[108] If a strategic planner has been deployed, he/she is responsible for the development of planning tools, along with mission managers. If there is a capacity gap on the ground, the mission may request support from the ITF at HQ.

Further information on key practical planning tools and processes (e.g., the template for an annual work plan for a rule of law and security institutions component, and a "do's/don'ts" checklist on indicators) can be found in the Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Personnel, developed by DPKO/OROLSI.

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[108]   Note that integration tools and policy do not apply to regional offices.

9.3.1. Development of an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)

As per the *IMPP Guidelines for the Field* (2009), a Strategic Policy Group (SPG),[109] consisting of mission and UNCT leadership, and chaired by an SRSG or ERSG, should be established. The SPG aims to provide strategic direction to maximize the individual and collective impact of UN peace consolidation efforts by promoting the development and implementation of a strategic partnership between the mission and UNCT.

All integrated presences need to develop an ISF at an early stage. The ISF is a short (15-20 pages) document embodying the main elements of the Secretary-General's 2008 decision on integration, including:

» An expression of the strategic partnership between the SPM (in this case) and the UNCT regarding peace consolidation;

» A shared vision of United Nations strategic objectives for peace consolidation;

» A set of agreed results, responsibilities and timelines for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace;

» A mechanism for monitoring and evaluation.[110]

More specifically, the ISF adds value as:

» An integrated peace consolidation plan that presents a joint mission/UNCT strategic vision and related sequenced priorities;

» A shared accountability framework that documents these joint priorities;

» A living management and operations tool to facilitate regular stocktaking and prioritization of key initiatives.

In addition, the ISF provides missions and UNCTs with a unified process to respond to related reporting requirements from United Nations governing bodies, including the RBB cycles, requests from the Security Council for benchmarks, and/or medium-term strategies.

BEYOND THE START-UP PHASE:
HQ AND FIELD CONTINUITY

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[109] The SPG is the senior integrated coordination body for United Nations presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation and/or political mission and a UNCT.

[110] IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field (2009).

To this end, a monitoring and evaluation framework measuring progress and performance (through indicators and benchmarks) and ensuring accountability should be established, as an integral part of the ISF. In certain cases, the ISF can be merged with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). In other cases, it informs the UNDAF, which reflects the UNCT contribution to the country's peace consolidation objectives along with other development results that UN agencies seek to achieve.

The decision to begin the ISF exercise is taken at the field level, in consultation with the ITF. It requires the involvement of senior mission and UNCT leadership. Senior leadership should ensure that all staff understand the primacy of the ISF. The ISF is formally endorsed by the SRSG/ERSG, RC/HC and the ITF, and is signed off on by the USG/DPA. If there is a lack of capacity on the ground, the mission may request support through the ITF. DPA Guidance and Learning Unit may also provide additional support and guidance.

> More information on the ISF (e.g., purpose, methodology for development, generic outline) can be found in the *IMPP Guidelines for the Field* (2009).

9.3.2. Development of an internal mission work plan

At the mission level, an annual work plan should be developed, mapping out the work of each substantive section in order to implement the mandate of the mission. Each mission component or unit should have an annual work plan, as a basic management tool.

A work plan is a detailed document stating what outputs will be delivered and what activities will be carried out in a given time period, how the activities will be carried out, and how much progress towards expected accomplishments will be achieved. The basic elements of the work plan of a unit include:

» Unit objectives (as a contribution to mission objectives);

» Tasks necessary to achieve each objective;

» Resources and division of roles and responsibilities;

» Internal and external partnerships needed to deliver on tasks;

» Risks to achieving these tasks and proposed risk management strategies.

A work plan is used as a monitoring and accountability tool to ensure the effective implementation of the programme.[111] It is based on the overall mandate of the mission and should be aligned with the mission's RBB logical framework and with UN-wide plans such as the ISF in particular and the UNDAF.

Coordinating mission work planning with the AFPs is important. Ideally, mission work planning should not be undertaken until the ISF process has laid down the core objectives/outcomes for peace consolidation and thus mandate implementation within this. The benchmarks set out in the work plan of each unit should include the UNCT input and be congruent with the objectives and outcomes of the ISF.

Ideally, a mission work plan, compiling the work plan of each section, is developed by strategic planners on the ground, in consultation with the heads of substantive sections, and with the UNCT, where relevant. It is important that mission staff meet with civil society organization to discuss priorities for the year and to inform the work plan. All internal mission work plans should be run through internal mission teams that lead on cross-cutting issues (e.g., the gender unit). The internal mission work plan is approved by the mission leadership.[112]

9.3.3. Essential political tasks in a start-up

The role of the political unit and the political affairs officer(s) (PAO) of an SPM is essential in a start-up phase, especially if there is a political transition under way. The PAO plays a critical role in early assessments and situational awareness of the political environment of the mission. A PAO should be deployed as early as possible to establish key contacts, and to undertake detailed political analysis and planning.

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[111] See Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Personnel (Tool 2.1).

[112] In the case of human rights components, work plans should be discussed with OHCHR as the heads are also representative of the HC and are accountable for delivering on his/her strategic priorities in the country.

The responsibilities of a PAO and the political unit are context-specific and can vary greatly depending on whether the unit is functioning in a post-conflict transition context or as part of a regional office, for example. The main functions of a PAO can include, inter alia, analysis, reporting and strategizing, advocacy and advice, and mediation. The PAO also makes recommendations on the design and implementation of the political elements of the mission concept and the ISF.

The following is an indicative list of the substantive tasks a PAO/political unit should undertake in a start-up phase:

» Develop analytical background documents: biographies of political leaders, mapping of political parties, analysis of parliamentary majorities/transitional/constitutional arrangements, risk analyses.

» Engage with the UNCT to make use of their local knowledge and contacts.

» Establish a key list of local contacts (e.g., politicians, the diplomatic community, civil society).

» Establish and expand information management systems to gather and analyse political information, including media monitoring.

» In consultation with other relevant components and actors, and based on the mandate of the mission, develop a political strategy; involve local actors from the start to ensure their engagement and national ownership.

» Prepare prioritized recommendations for courtesy calls by the HoM, followed by background notes and talking points.

» Ensure the mission is either involved or fully aware of any ongoing political processes; engage in conflict mediation between political actors, if appropriate.

» Provide political analysis and advice to the HoM on the mission implementation plan, the political environment and political strategy.

» Establish key fora to share information and coordinate activities on the ground (with Member states, UNCT, government counterparts, regional organizations etc.).

» Establish reporting requirements/modalities with UNHQ and request guidance and support from DPA desk officers, when necessary.

» Develop the work plan of the political component, including timelines/milestones/benchmarks, and provide inputs to work plans of other units.

Further information on the political affairs component and the critical tasks of the head of PAO in managing mission start-up can be found in the *DPKO Mission Start-Up Field Guide (MSUFG)*. Political affairs officers should also be familiar with *Draft Guidelines for Political Affairs Officers to support implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security* (31 October 2000).

BEYOND THE START-UP PHASE:
HQ AND FIELD CONTINUITY

How to communicate the start-up of an SPM

10. Communications strategy and public Information: how to communicate the start-up of an SPM

10.1. Public information, strategic communication and expectations management

Successful start-up of an SPM relies on a strong communications strategy designed to build awareness and an accurate understanding of the mandate of the mission, to manage expectations and to generate trust and political acceptance of the role of the UN.

Planning for a public information strategy is crucial in a start-up. A communications strategy, at HQ and in the field, must be developed as early as possible and tailored to the specific context of the country/ region and mandate of the mission. The key messages to be communicated by the mission should be clear and support the mission's priorities, activities and positioning. The strategy should also be coordinated with the RC's communications unit and clear distinction should be made between the role of the mission and that of the UNCT.

Public information activities could include press briefings, statements, interviews and dissemination of material in support of the activities of the mission. A public website should be established as soon as possible to support the immediate dissemination of information regarding the goals and activities of the mission, and to communicate security updates and talking points about the work of the mission. The mission or a relevant DPA desk officer should prepare a basic fact sheet giving an overview of the mission. The mission should liaise with HQ about its Intranet strategy, so that HQ may to respond to its needs.[113]

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[113] The Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information is responsible for the websites of United Nations field presences. DPI provides the template. It is the mission's responsibility to upload and update the content of its website. The DPA Intranet is managed by DPA HQ and DFS. Missions can either update the content themselves or send in information to the DPA Intranet Manager.

Communication on the mandate of the mission from the outset is crucial for the future of the mission, and publicizing the arrival of the HoM on the ground is a key step. Early press encounters between the HoM and locally based media, and an inaugural ceremony organized with the host government, are important early "public moments" to begin educating constituencies and building positive perceptions of the mission and its leadership. United Nations Information Centres (UNICs) in a country or region, and public affairs staff of UNCTs can play a helpful support role in projecting the start-up activities in-country. Staff multimedia capacity is an important asset early in a mission as part of a core public information team, to help document the mission's deployment through photos and videos.

A critical goal of any communications strategy is to manage expectations—on processes, timelines of deployment and on the extent and limitations of the mandate of a mission. For political missions, in particular, it is often crucial to emphasize that the political involvement of the UN is to provide impartial assistance or good offices, without interfering in nationally owned processes. Expectations need to be managed on an external level (e.g., with the host government, local media, civil society organizations and other stakeholders) and also on an internal level (e.g., within the mission and with the UNCT).

In a start-up phase, when there are no public information staff yet on the ground, the communications strategy should be developed jointly by the HQ Department of Public Information (DPI) and DPA/ OUSG, under the direction of the HoM, once appointed. The Peace and Security Section of DPI may provide additional support in developing and implementing a communication and outreach strategy including media relations, website development, printing of publicity material and publications, etc. As the mission starts deploying, responsibilities for communications strategies are transferred to the mission, with UNHQ providing guidance and input. It is important for the communication strategies to reflect field realities, in order to manage local expectations.

As the principal voice of the mission, the HoM needs to work closely with the mission's public information component and/or

spokesperson, if applicable, as well as with DPA and DPI officers at HQ. The mission has to gauge the level of public visibility—and the content of the public message—that best supports the carrying out of the mandate at any given time. In any case, the HoM must be able and willing to assume public communications as a key responsibility. This includes a willingness to engage with local and international media and proactively explain the United Nations role, and to disseminate the messages of the Secretary-General, both in the field and at UNHQ.

> Efficient information sharing and effective collaboration with the public information components of the UNCT, UNICs, SPMs and PKOs in the region is crucial to supporting the communications strategy and the positioning of the United Nations as a whole in the region. Developing extended networks with media and counterparts in regional organizations, NGOs and other relevant partners is also key to outreach activities.

More guidance on public information tools and the role of the HoM can be found in the Guidance *to SRSGs on Public Information*. Guidance on public information strategy and tools can be found in *Operational Policy: Policy and Guidance for Public Information in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* and the Public Information chapter of *DPKO Handbook on Multidimensional Peace Operations*.

10.2. Roles and responsibilities of DPA

While most tasks are usually undertaken at the field level, in the start-up phase DPA regional divisions need to:

» Involve DPA/OUSG public affairs officers from the outset of the process of proposing and establishing an SPM;

» Reach out to the Peace and Security Section of DPI, through DPA/OUSG public affairs;

» Involve public information staff in assessment missions and planning of the activities;

» Ensure proper staffing, budgeting and procurement procedures for public information requirements;

» Reach out to the DPA Intranet manager to include the new SPM on the DPA Intranet and reach out to the Senior Officer for Strategic Communications and Public Affairs (DPA/OUSG) to have it included on the DPA public website.

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

List of acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AFPs	Agencies, funds and programmes
ARMS	Archives and Records Management Section
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BINUCA	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies en Centrafrique
CLJAS	Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service
CMS	Chief of mission support
CNMC	Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission
COMPASS	Comprehensive Operational Mission Procurement and Acquisition Support Service Initiative
CoS	Chief of staff
CRB	Central Review Board
CSA	Chief Security Advisor
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DM	Department of Management
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DO	Designated official
DOCO	Development Operations Coordination Office
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSA	Daily subsistence allowance
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
EO	Executive Office
FBFD	Field Budget and Finance Division
FCRB	Field Central Review Board
FPD	Field Personnel Division
FPLT	Field Procurement Logistics Team
GSC	Global Service Centre
GFSS	Global Field Support Strategy
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCC	Headquarters Committee on Contracts

HoM	Head of mission
HQ	United Nations Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICTD	Information Communications Technology Division
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ITF	Integrated Task Force
LCC	Local Committee on Contracts
LSD	Logistics Support Division
MHQ	Mission headquarters
MOSS	Minimum operational security standards
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
MSUFG	Mission Start-Up Field Guide
NGO(s)	Non-governmental Organization(s)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning Budget and Accounts
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OUSG	Office of the Under-Secretary-General
PAO	Political Affairs Officer
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PD	Procurement Division
RBB	Results-based budgeting
RC	Resident Coordinator
RSC	Regional Service Centre
RSG	Representative of the Secretary-General
SA	Strategic assessment
SAM	Strategic assessment mission
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary-General
SLA	Service-level agreement
SLAS	Senior Leadership Appointment Section
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks

SOMA	Status-of-Mission Agreement
SOP(s)	Standard operating procedure(s)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security sector reform
TAM(s)	Technical assessment mission(s)
TDY	Temporary duty
ToR(s)	Terms of reference
TVA	Temporary vacancy announcement
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNOCA	United Nations Office for Central Africa
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNRCCA	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
USG	Under-Secretary-General
VTC	Video teleconference
XB	Extrabudgetary funds

For further guidance[114]

General guidelines

» Service-Level Agreement for Administrative and Logistical Support to DPA-led Missions provided by DFS (December 2010)

» HQ Support to Special Political Missions: Guidelines for Desk Officers (August 2009)

» DPA Mediation Start-up Guidelines (March 2011)

» DPKO Mission Start-Up Field Guide (August 2010)

» After action reviews and lessons learned documents available on DPA Intranet

Communication, coordination mechanisms and planning

» IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters: Integrated Planning for United Nations Field Presences (May 2009)

» IMPP Guidelines for the Field (June 2010)

» United Nations Strategic Assessment (May 2009)

» Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Personnel (February 2012)

Integration

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on integration—25 June meeting of the Policy Committee (26 June 2008)

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on integration—16 December meeting of the Policy Committee (16 December 2010)

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on integration—Follow up to 16 December meeting of the Policy Committee (4 May 2011)

» Decisions of the Secretary-General on human rights in integrated missions—26 October meeting of the Policy Committee (26 October 2005)

» Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (1 September 2011)

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[114] Most of the guidance documents are available on DPA Intranet and/or relevant United Nations entities' websites.

Senior leadership appointment

» SOP on Vacancy Management and Succession Planning for Senior Mission Appointments (SRSG and Deputy SRSGs [Political and Rule of Law]) in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (March 2009)

» Delegated Authority in United Nations Field Missions led by DPA and supported by DFS (December 2010)

» SOP on Communications related to senior mission appointments (November 2010)

» Note from the Secretary-General—Guidance on the relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators (December 2000)

» Note of guidance on integrated missions clarifying the roles and responsibilities of SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC (2006)

» SOPs on in-briefing and debriefing of Senior Mission Leaders and Special Envoys (October 2009)

» Guidelines for the selection and appointment of RC (November 2009)

» Vacancy Management and Succession Planning for Head of Police Components in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (October 2009)

Start-up funding and budget

» Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, ST/SGB/2003/7

» Secretary General Report on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, A/C.5/54/29 (November 1999)

» RBB guidelines, DM/OPPBA (January 2006)

» DPA Extra-budgetary resources management (May 2010)

» SOP on budget processes for field-based SPMs (2012)

» Secretary-General's Report on SPM funding and backstopping (*under consideration*)

Staffing and recruitment

» Staff Selection System, ST/AI/2010/3 (April 2010)

» Secretary-General's Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/65/747, March 2011)

» DPA guidelines for Recruitment Processes (June 2009)

» SOP on on-boarding of staff for United Nations Peace Operations (April 2008)

» SOP staffing table and post management of United Nations operations (April 2008)

» SOP on Staff Selection System for PKOs and SPMs (*under development*)

Logistics planning and procurement

» Secretary-General's Report on Global Field Support Strategy (A/64/633, January 2010)

» Strengthening cooperation in public information, DPA and its field missions (Code Cable, 5 May 2011)

» DPKO/DFS Environmental Policy for United Nations Field Missions (June 2009)

» United Nations Procurement Manual, Rev. 6 (March 2010)

» Procurement support for Special Political Missions — COMPASS initiative (Code Cable, 24 May 2011)

Legal issues

» Contact OLA SPM focal points

Safety and Security

» United Nations Field Security Handbook (January 2006)

» Inter-Organizational Security Measures: Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Field Security Management System (2006)

Public information

- » Operational Guidance Note from United Nations Peacemaker on Public Information in Peace Processes (October 2006)
- » Chapter on Public Information from DPKO Handbook on Multi-dimensional Peace Operations (December 2003)
- » Unofficial Guidance to SRSGs on Public Information (May 2004)
- » Strengthening cooperation in public information, DPA and its field missions (Code Cable, 5 May 2011)

Information and knowledge management

- » DPKO/DFS Policy on Records Management (March 2009)
- » DPKO/DFS Policy on Knowledge Sharing (May 2009)
- » Contact DPA/Guidance and Learning Unit

The purpose of this *Guide* is to provide guidance to DPA staff on the tasks that need to be carried out to establish a field-based special political mission (SPM). The *Guide* is designed to ensure that no critical tasks are omitted in the planning, design and set-up of an SPM.

The *Guide* addresses all phases of the start-up of an SPM, from the point when a decision is made for the United Nations to consider active involvement in the resolution of a particular situation to the moment when the mission has reached what is commonly called a "steady state".

www.un.org/depts/dpa