
The Evaluation of the Binational Dialogue process between Colombia and Ecuador was made possible thanks to the cooperation of:

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This document summarizes the main findings of the Evaluation process of the initiative called the Binational Dialogue Colombia-Ecuador\(^1\), which consisted of a sequence of bilateral meetings and other activities between citizens from the two countries, who constituted the Binational Dialogue Group (BDG). Such dialogue process was aimed at improving binational relations by means of a strategy that would favor dialogue as the approach to tackle differences and work on the countries’ positive agenda.

The Binational Dialogue was formally initiated in November 2007 and its last binational meeting was concluded in May 2009. It was a joint initiative between the Carter Center (CC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country offices in Colombia and Ecuador, grounded on the General Cooperation Agreement signed by the Carter Center and UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, in mid-2007\(^2\).

By the end of the meetings planned in the original design of the dialogue process, it was agreed that UNDP’s Democratic Dialogue Regional Project would conduct the evaluation of the initiative, considering that one of the main objectives of the said Project is to support, systematize and assess dialogue experiences at different levels, identifying and disseminating lessons learned to advance the field of study and practice of dialogue processes.

The evaluation of the Binational Dialogue was produced thanks to the cooperation of AECID’s Spain Fund-UNDP, and the support of the UNDP country offices in Colombia and Ecuador, the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and the Carter Center. We also acknowledge the generous support of the members of the Binational Dialogue Group, who openly shared their experience, and the staff of the two institutions who participated in the Binational Dialogue, who contributed with their perspectives and other input necessary to get this work off the ground.

The Evaluation Team comprised: Graciela Tapia (coordinator), Ana Cabria Mellace, Maureen Mayne, María del Carmen Tamargo and Agustina Cabrera. Anai Linares was in charge of editing and designing this Publication. Cristina Costa Bravo translated the publication into English.

The purpose of this evaluation is twofold. On the one hand, it is aimed at analyzing the dialogue process, its objectives and outcomes, in order to capture its contribution to and impact on the strengthening and improvement of bilateral relations between Colombia and Ecuador at different levels; and, on the other hand, it is aimed at identifying lessons learned that might be used in similar contexts as a guide for those individuals involved in citizen

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2. The idea started to brew among the organizations in June 2007, in the framework of the activities of the Peace and Development Programme in the Northern Border Zone undertaken by UNDP Ecuador, and the work of the Carter Center for strengthening the institutional process in that country. Finally, it crystallized in a formal agreement through the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Carter Center and UNDP offices in Ecuador and Colombia, by the end of October 2007.
dialogue processes with a view to achieve social and political impact, whether they act as stakeholders, facilitators or convening institutions.

Specific objectives include:

- To identify the objectives of the dialogue process, consider its evolution and assess its performance.
- To identify and analyze contextual aspects that conditioned the initiative.
- To identify tangible and intangible outputs and outcomes of the Binational Dialogue that may be helpful to assess future strategies.
- To identify and analyze considerations related to the process design and to lessons learned along with the practice and implementation of such process.
- To identify lessons learned to improve practice.
- To produce recommendations in the field of dialogue, addressed to participants, institutions and other interested stakeholders.

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I.1. Conceptual framework

In order to define the conceptual and methodological frameworks used in this work, it is helpful to make clear the definition of the term ‘evaluation’. Predominant approaches in the origins of applied evaluation in the field of social sciences, were influenced by the quantitative paradigm according to which objectivity and rigor are unavoidable elements for evaluating achievements and outcomes of social initiatives.

However, evaluation initiatives have evolved to more qualitative methodologies, taking into account the dilemmas faced by quantitative tools and linear assumptions, when applied to the analysis of the behavior of human groups, which are close to complex adaptive systems in their highly dynamic nature, difficult to predict and, therefore, difficult to adapt to merely quantitative criteria.

It is considered that evaluation is a specific type of social research that requires conceptual, methodological and technical open-mindedness and flexibility. It is a collaborative knowledge-building system and, for this reason, it is a space for permanent learning. It is a continuous process to build quantitative and qualitative value judgments and recommendations for future action, with a view to improve the interventions and their effects and results.

Accordingly, both the design of the evaluation process and the analysis of results are framed within the theoretical-conceptual axes of the approaches described in *Democratic Dialogue – A Handbook for Practitioners* (Pruitt, B. y Thomas, P., 2007), especially concerning dialogue principles and dialogue monitoring and evaluation.

The analysis also follows some features of the CDA -Collaborative for Development Action approach, stated in *Reflecting on Peace Practice*, in particular, the theories of change, the influence of peace initiatives and the analysis of alliances between internal and external third parties.

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5 CDA is a non-profit organization committed to improving the effectiveness of international organizations and development agencies in peace promotion and sustainable development. It has developed several methodologies for conflict and impact analysis in peace-building projects. Collaborative Learning Projects, *Reflecting on Peace Practice Project* [PDF], CDA. Massachusetts, 2004. Available in RPP Handbook, February 2009.

6 Refer to Application of the RPP Framework to the analysis case in Section III.
Similarly, some considerations refer to the *Multi-Track Diplomacy* conceptural framework, a systemic approach to peace building and conflict resolution developed by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. This approach defines efforts towards peace as a network of interconnected individual, institutional and community activities that go beyond high-level negotiations of official decision-makers (Track 1) and must therefore be articulated with efforts at other levels (Track 2). This approach is interesting if we consider the fact that the Binational Dialogue was introduced to participants as one operating at an intermediate level called Track 1 ½.

These are some of the axis that were considered in the development of the present evaluation, according to the guidelines in the *Democratic Dialogue* handbook (2007) regarding what is described as “best practices to consider in evaluation processes”:

**Axis 1 ➔ Considering evaluation as an integral part of the initiative design**

We agree with a wide range of authors in that evaluation must be an integral part of a project/process management. This involves a conception of evaluation as part of a continuum rather than a separate stage. For that reason, evaluation should be present from the design stage of the project/process/initiative, making explicit the expected objectives and outcomes intended by the selected strategy of intervention.

In *Democratic Dialogue* (Pruitt, B. y Thomas, P., 2008), the authors mention that “when it is an integral part of implementation, M&E serves two important functions:

- It provides the necessary inputs for learning and adaptation during the dialogue process and, over the longer term, is the basis for improving dialogue practice and contributing to process knowledge.
- It is the basis for accountability to the institutions that provide resources to make dialogue processes possible. Those institutions have a legitimate interest in understanding how and how well their investments are fulfilling their goals”.

In the specific case of the Binational Dialogue Process, evaluation was not integrated into the project design and management from the very beginning. However, some of the actions carried out over the process can be considered as such: an intermediate evaluation in the form of an anonymous survey addressed to participants was carried out by the end of the third binational dialogue meeting, as well as an informal consultation with participants to review the process in the light of external events.

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8 See Annex 2. BDG Meetings Matrix.
**Axis 2 ➔ Defining the scope of the evaluation**

Regarding the language used in the evaluation process, it is important to draw a distinction between the concepts of output, outcome, and impact, since they can make reference to different situations. A clear definition of their meaning promotes a more helpful and fairer evaluation.

According to the proposal of *International Conflict Research (2002)*, the elements to be assessed are defined as follows:

- **Outputs** are the direct results of the activities that are part of the initial and intermediate design of the process.

- **Outcomes** are the changes produced or promoted by the activities in the short term, such as agreements reached through the dialogue, or new perspectives and skills acquired by the participants. These can be intended outcomes, formulated as objectives in the planning process, and unintended outcomes, for better or worse, unforeseen by the planning group.

- **Impacts** are the larger or longer-term effects of the outcomes, often involving political or social fields. As stated in Democratic Dialogue – A Handbook for Practitioners (Pruitt, B. y Thomas, P., 2007), “assessing impact is challenging because impacts typically become evident only after a number of years, and because it is difficult to establish a clear causal link between outcomes and impact.” Important as this task is, therefore, it is beyond the scope of M&E per se.

In this particular case, it is difficult to assess political, social and cultural impacts because this work was carried out at a micro level, applying a selective convening strategy, focusing on the dialogue among 20 citizens from both countries who were considered relevant because of their position and network of influence. A macro-level strategy was not included in the design of the initiative. Therefore, it is appropriate to define this evaluation as an “outcome evaluation”, since the scope of the analysis is limited to the micro (personal and interpersonal) and mezzo (actions having an impact outside the group) levels.

**Axis 3 ➔ Considering participative spaces for exchange**

Although the assessment of this process poses a number of challenges in terms of the amount of institutional actors involved and the location of the teams (including the evaluation team) the development of some assessment tools has included, when possible, consultation with institutions. In addition, the preliminary findings and results of the evaluation have been presented to the participants. In turn, this space for interchange has provided the evaluation with the participants’ feedback, which is included in this document.

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9 Church and Shouldice. The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions. Framing the State of Play. INCORE, Ireland, 2002.
**Axis 4 ➔ Developing qualitative and quantitative indicators**

In the field of evaluation, indicators are the parameters (whether quantitative or qualitative) that serve as a reference to the change that has been achieved.

Nevertheless, in the case of abstract objectives, indicators can help obtaining an approximate idea of the change undergone. For this reason, a set of indicative indicators has been developed to assess the degree of accomplishment of the dialogue process’ objectives. These indicators oriented the design of interview guidelines and the analysis of the information obtained from such interviews.

**I.2 Methodology**

Two complementary evaluation strategies were utilized:

a. Data collection from *primary sources*, through the design and implementation of fieldwork based on *electronic qualitative interviews* and *individual qualitative interviews* (in-depth face to face).

   *Eleven members of UNDP and the Carter Center were interviewed through face-to-face, telephone or electronic interviews. Fourteen sources of analysis related to interviews to institutional members were completed.*

   *Fifteen members of the BDG were interviewed. In some cases, the same person completed an electronic interview and then a face-to-face interview in order to deepen some subjects. Members of the BDG completed twenty-one analysis tools.*

b. Data collection from *secondary sources*, through documentary analysis, identifying, selecting, reading and interpreting documents (reports, aid memoires, agendas, minutes, press articles, internal communications, etc.) that were produced by participants in the dialogue and by the sponsoring institutions during the process in order to reconstruct its time sequence.

   *Approximately 300 documents were analyzed, including conceptual documents, agendas, minutes of meetings, editorials in the media, action plans, press news and electronic exchanges, among others.*

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10 See Annex 4 Indicators of the Evaluation Objectives.
In 2007, based on prior activities of the Carter Center and UNDP country offices in Colombia and Ecuador, and given the existing social and political context, the two organizations proposed to launch a process to promote the improvement of relations between the societies of both countries. The strategy involved the design of a dialogue exercise between citizens from each country with access to their respective governments and/or influence on public opinion.

It was initially planned that the dialogue would be developed between November 2007 and March 2008, through 4 binational rounds of dialogue in Atlanta, Quito and Bogota. With the consent of the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador, advances were made in the identification of potential participants as well as in conducting a number of personal interviews aimed at committing them with the exercise were carried out.

II. 1 Political Context

The Binational Dialogue Group was initiated in a particular moment in the history of relations between the two countries. Although, in general terms, relations between Colombia and Ecuador have historically been fluent and peaceful, the beginning of the 21st century witnessed the transformation of such relations, which finally led to suspension of diplomatic relations, and its subsequent impact on the Binational Dialogue.

As stated by Ramírez (2009), during the last decade of the 20th century, as positive interdependency between the two countries grew, so did conflictive issues that put at stake the weakest aspects of the internal policy in each country – instability in Ecuador, political polarization in Colombia- as well as other conflictive issues such as drugs trafficking and armed confrontation.

The new century deepened the friction between the countries on sensitive issues, such as that of Colombian displaced people and refugees in Ecuador and, mainly, the implementation of the Democratic Security Doctrine, involving the alliance of Colombia and the United States to prepare the Plan Colombia and advance the fumigations on coca fields.

By the end of 2006, the efforts to develop agreed policies relating such sensitive issues were interrupted when fumigations, which had been suspended one year before, were resumed and the Government of Ecuador called the Ecuadorian Ambassador in Bogota for consultation.

In 2007, new presidential terms of office in both countries led to consider the possibility of new opportunities. A commission was created to study the effects of glyphosate- although

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11 See Annex 1GBD Activities and Context Timeline.
this research never reached its end—; Colombia interrupted fumigations later that year; President Correa rejected Chavez’ request to declare the FARC a belligerent force. In 2008, there were great expectations concerning the relations between the neighboring countries, especially for the Border Integration Zone (ZIF) and the Neighborhood Commission. Nevertheless, that promising moment soon vanished due to the escalation of regrettable events.

By the end of 2007, the issue of the humanitarian negotiations towards the liberation of people kidnapped by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) acquired increasing visibility in Colombia.

As on March 1, 2008, the Government of Colombia attacked a FARC camp settled in Angostura, inside Ecuadorian territory. Raul Reyes, second-in-command of that guerrilla, was killed during the attack together with 27 other people who were in the area, including one Ecuadorian and four Mexicans. This fact, added to other issues – the planning of the attack, the lack of acquaintance of the attack alleged by the Government of Ecuador, the treatment of the issue of computers found in the camp, among others–, led to the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries and to a communication escalade on the part of both governments as a means to show their differences.

Following the attack, the Permanent Council of the OAS met and ratified the principle of inviolability of a country’s territory and established that, although not condemned for this attack, Colombia should apologize before Ecuador. At the same time, a special commission of good offices was created to investigate the events in both countries. In its conclusions, the commission ratified the resolution and recommended to reestablish diplomatic relations and advance the rapprochement of societies from both countries in order to rebuild the broken trust.

The Rio Group meeting held on March 7 provided a promising opportunity for rapprochement (statements came from Ecuador showing willingness to resume relations). However, this opportunity vanishes when Colombian sources reemerge the hypothesis of a link between officials of the Ecuadorian Government and the FARC. On March 31, Ecuador brought a lawsuit against Colombia before the International Court of Justice, for the case of air fumigations.

Within that context, the Carter Center undertook a confidential exercise with the Presidents of both countries and their Chancellors, with a view to resuming relations. Subsequent statements and interpretations of such statements led to the failure of this attempt.

Meanwhile, the OAS continued its good offices mission and, on April 29, 2008, the first of four meetings between the Vice-Chancellors of both countries was held, fostered by this organization. The third and fourth meetings were held in May. At the same time, and under OAS auspices, it was agreed
upon with the military authorities of both countries to temporarily reestablish the validity of Border Security Chart.

At the beginning of June, there were signs that would indicate the possibility of bringing the two presidents closer together. On June 6, Presidents Uribe and Correa agreed to resume diplomatic relations “without preconditions.” However, a new escalade in public statements culminated in the suspension of the reestablishment on the part of Uribe, while Correa declined the efforts.

Within this context, the Binational Dialogue Group met with the two Presidents. During the meeting with Correa, the Ecuadorian President ratified his decision of not resuming the diplomatic relations with the neighboring country.

In December 2008, Ecuador reestablished the requirement of presenting criminal record for Colombian citizens willing to enter Ecuador—such requirement had been removed in June that year. The measure was taken in response to the denunciation of a new operation of the Colombian force inside Ecuador’s territory.

In January 2009, Ecuador established five minimum conditions to reestablish diplomatic relations with Colombia: i) military control of Colombia over the shared border; ii) compensation for the attack on Angostura; iii) economic aid through the United Nations to assist Colombian refugees; iv) submission of information on the attack; and v) end of the ungrounded accusations on the relation between the Government and the FARC.

In addition, crossed judicial lawsuits were brought against governmental officials of both countries- namely, former Ministry of Defense Juan Manual Santos, or President Correa himself- for events related to the attack on La Angostura.

During this lapse of time, the Carter Center and the OAS carried on with negotiations to favor communication between the two Governments.

On September 24, 2009, and after the completion of the Binational Dialogue, the Governments of both countries announced their determination to achieve the normalization of their diplomatic relations. Both countries expressed appreciations for the efforts provided by the Carter Center and the OAS to achieve this result and indicated their willingness to request the facilitation of the said institutions to address public needs in both countries. Chargé d’Affaires were appointed in November 2009 in both countries and the process for restoring relations will continue in accordance with future agreements.
II. 2 Description of the Binational Dialogue Colombia-Ecuador Initiative

The Institutional Framework

In October 2007, UNDP country offices in Colombia and Ecuador, and the Carter Center drew up and signed an Institutional Memorandum of Understanding (IMOU) to operate as a general agreement between both institutions and as the descriptive document containing the most general alignments for the design of the Binational Dialogue Group.

Objectives

According to the IMOU institutional document, the dialogue would aim at creating a safe and flexible atmosphere in which citizens from the two countries could meet, in order to open new opportunities to improve bilateral relations. This would be done by means of initiatives that the members of the group could promote from their respective scope of influence, promoting mutual understanding, producing mutually positive public images and boosting agreed policies.

The interviews also make general reference to the promotion of the positive agenda between the countries. This objective was later modified due the political crisis 13.

Participants

Eleven Colombian citizens and twelve Ecuadorian citizens participated in the process. The original group comprised:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On the Colombian side:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Angelino Garzón</td>
<td>Governor of Valle del Cauca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Antonio Navarro Wolf</td>
<td>Elected Governor of the border department Nariño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Augusto Ramírez Ocampo</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister and Director of the Institute of Human Rights and International Relations of Javeriana University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Claudia Gurisatti</td>
<td>Director of “The Night”, nightly news show broadcasted on RCN Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Guillermo Rivera</td>
<td>Chamber representative of the border department of Putumayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Luis Carlos Villegas</td>
<td>President of the National Employers’ Association of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Luz María Sierra</td>
<td>El Tiempo Editor-in-chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Rafael Nieto Loaiza</td>
<td>Former Vice-Minister of Justice and journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ricardo Ávila</td>
<td>Director of the economy magazine Portafolio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sandra Suárez</td>
<td>Former Minister of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development and former Presidential Advisor on Plan Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Socorro Ramírez</td>
<td>Lecturer at the Institute for Politics and International Relations Studies at the National University of Colombia, specialist in Colombia-Ecuador relations</td>
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13 Refer to the analysis of Objectives in Sections II and III.
On the Ecuadorian side:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adrián Bonilla</td>
<td>Director of the Latin American School of Social Sciences – FLACSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Alfredo Negrete</td>
<td>Sub-director of El Comercio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Andrés Valdivieso</td>
<td>Advisor for the Minister of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dolores Padilla</td>
<td>Former Member of Parliament and candidate to vice-president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Francisco Carrión Mena</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Galo Mora</td>
<td>Presidential advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gonzalo Ruiz</td>
<td>Gama vision news Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>José Valencia</td>
<td>Director of the NGO &quot;Citizen Participation” and coordinator of the FLACSO programme on International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ricardo Estrada</td>
<td>Executive President of the Corporation for the Promotion of Export and Investment-CORPEI</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Two new members entered the Ecuadorian group after the first meeting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Margarita Carranco</td>
<td>President of the Association of Municipalist Women and second Vice-president of the Municipal Council of the Metropolitan District of Quito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Manuel Chiriboga Vega</td>
<td>Director of the Observatory of International Trade and former negotiator leader of the Free Trade Agreement between Ecuador and the United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the fourth binational meeting, three new participants entered the Ecuadorian group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Grace Jaramillo</td>
<td>Academic Coordinator of the FLACSO Programme on International Relations and writer for El Comercio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pedro Velasco</td>
<td>Mayor of Tulcán</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Patricia Estupiñán</td>
<td>Vistazo, Editor-in-chief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three individuals in this initial group accompanied only part of the process. Galo Mora and José Valencia left the group due to their appointment as government officials. Alfredo Negrete left the group for professional reasons.

Methodological Design of the Process

The Binational Dialogue was planned to be developed throughout four meetings of the BDG. Two of them would be held in Atlanta (host of the Carter Center headquarters), one in Colombia and one in Ecuador. During those meetings, efforts would aim at the creation of a space of trust for conversations, with the assistance of facilitators from the two institutions.

Two meetings were held before March 1, 2008, which was a key date in the development of the initiative. Two other meetings were held after that event. During the fourth and last meeting, it was agreed to extend the process with two additional meetings.

Each meeting was facilitated by the representative of the Carter Center for Latin America, Francisco Diez. The four first meetings were co-facilitated by Graciela Tapia, consultant for UNDP’s Democratic Dialogue Regional Project. In all the cases, a team of facilitators from UNDP and the Carter Center supported the work in groups.

Following is a brief description of the activities of the process. For further information on the activities, see annexes 2 and 3: BDG Meetings Matrix and BDG Activities Matrix.
Meeting 1 __Atlanta__November 2007

This space was arranged after several preliminary meetings in each country, and preparatory negotiations. The meeting was held on November 13-14, 2007, at the Carter Center headquarters. It brought together 25 people and had the participation of former President Jimmy Carter.

During this meeting, the main issue addressed by the participants was the joint analysis of the state of binational relations and the different perceptions on that issue. Other subjects were also discussed during the meeting.

Facilitators had prepared work instructions to identify divisors and connectors between both countries. This would allow to identify not only the issues of the negative agenda, such as drug traffic and security, but also elements of the positive agenda related to humanitarian and border development issues, as well as the possibility of promoting binational agreements in this direction.

This first meeting went through difficult moments. In general terms, the members from each country set themselves within their national views. The facilitators tried to create a safe space to talk respectfully, which led to a moment of catharsis before the joint identification of obstacles and opportunities in the binational relationship.

Between the first and the second meeting, some of the participants published editorial/opinion articles trying to include a broader view on the bilateral situation.

Meeting 2 __Quito__February 2008

After a number of reunions in each country, the second meeting was held in Quito. The Minister of Security, Mr. Gustavo Larrea, was invited to share luncheon with the group.

During those sessions, advances were made in consolidating the group space, and a list was developed containing possible actions that the group or some of its members could undertake in the short and middle term.

The third meeting, which was planned to be held in Bogota in mid-March 2008, had to be cancelled due to the military incursion and bomb attack of the Colombian army on March 1.

This situation, and the subsequent broken diplomatic relations, affected the evolution of the group dynamics. It even provoked that international actors intervened as third parties in the conflict. This implied a redefinition of objectives, strategies, and agendas, along with a change in the roles of the institutions.

During this period, the Carter Center carried out confidential negotiations between the two countries. Some of the members of the BDG took part on those negotiations on their personal capacity, acting as direct channels with political stakeholders. The exercise was successful in that it contributed in bringing about some agreements, although an escalation of public statements exchanged by the Presidents thwarted the rapprochement attempts.

Opinion-makers in the group kept on making efforts to increase the amount and quality of the information published, and broadened the approach to binational issues.
The Carter Center and UNDP held meetings with members of the group to assess the continuation of the binational meetings that had been planned within the initiative. It was agreed upon delaying the original date of the following meeting, which was expected to be held in Bogota.

**Meeting 3 __ Bogota __ April 2008**

Most part of the third meeting was devoted to sharing perspectives on the recent events and on the impact caused by the Colombian conflict in the two countries.

A document on the process mentions that, “a real generative dialogue was produced... Symbolic and human aspects were openly exposed and shared, which operated as a meeting point for all the members, bringing them to a state of personal willingness open to commitment.”

In this meeting, participants agreed upon advancing a number of common actions\(^{14}\), specifically oriented to have an influence on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. One of those actions was the writing of a letter and the collection of signatures of dignitaries to be presented before the Presidents of the two countries to request their efforts to resume diplomatic relations.

**Meeting 4 __ Atlanta __ May 2008**

This meeting was held in Atlanta on May 22-23, 2008. Former President Jimmy Carter, Regional Director of UNDP for Latin America and the Caribbean, Rebeca Grynspan, and the OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, also took part in this meeting.

This was the last of the meetings planned within the agreement between UNDP and the Carter Center. However, in view of the situation, the group largely decided not to end the process with that meeting, but to identify a common transition strategy that would allow the BDG to adjust the immediate objectives to the new situation while preserving the permanent objectives.

This led to the development of a short and middle term action plan, and to two additional meetings.\(^{15}\)

The action plan developed by the members of the group identified three types of initiatives: (a) with governments – letter submission, meetings with presidents and officials; (b) with the media – binational documentary and fora bringing together the owners of media companies, among others; and (c) initiatives at the border – meetings with local authorities, binational and academia fora. Similarly, it was agreed to support and promote meetings with the private sector and promote working on popular belief through symbolic activities (cycle-ride on the border, actions in football games played by the national teams) to emphasize goodwill among peoples and social sectors from the two countries.

\(^{14}\) See Annex 3 BDG Activities Matrix. 3\(^{rd}\) meeting of the BDG.

\(^{15}\) See Annex 3 BDG Activities Matrix. 4\(^{th}\) BDG meeting Action Plan.
Period between the 4th and 5th binational meeting—June to November 2008

A number of relevant events occurred in the political context and in the inner life of the BDG:

- On June 5, the letters were submitted to the Presidents. These letters included 280 signatures of citizens of the two countries, which were collected by members of the BDG to promote the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

- On June 6, the Carter Center announced the commitment of both Presidents to reestablish the relations at the Chargés d’Affaires level, following private negotiations with the heads of state.

- Within the framework of the activities agreed upon in the meeting held in Atlanta, two meetings were scheduled between the BDG and the presidents of both countries: June 25 (with president Uribe) and June 26 (with president Correa). During the week prior to the meetings, president Correa made some statements, expressing the difficulties to resume relations and Ecuador’s right to set the rhythm of the process. In turn, president Uribe showed his disagreement with Correa’s statements and both presidents declared the process of reestablishing relations suspended.

- This context caused that the meetings with the BDG did not occur in the best political moment. Nevertheless, the group was able to meet with both presidents, present their perspectives and listen to opinions. However, President Correa refused outright to resume diplomatic relations under such circumstances.

- Beyond the positive and negative effects for the BDG, these meetings were widely covered by the media. In some of the cases, the group was identified with the work of the Carter Center, which had an impact on the group and the institutions due to the implications of being perceived as “mediators”. On the other hand, some BDG members considered that the reaction of President Correa had weakened the legitimacy of the group.

- Subsequently, the Ecuadorian group and the Colombian group of the BDG held meetings in their respective countries in order to assess the willingness to continue the exercise. This allowed the identification of lessons learned, such as the importance of making a clear difference between the role of the BDG and the mediating role of OAS and former President Carter.

- Likewise, the Carter Center clarified with president Correa the role of the group, stressing the difference between the Ecuadorian BDG members’ efforts and the mediating role performed by other organizations. The Carter Center also committed itself to organize a new meeting between the president and the BDG, and to obtain support so that the Ecuadorian group could meet with ministries of the Government.

- Also during this stage, three new members entered the Ecuadorian group, since some of the previous participants had left the group after having been appointed officials of the National Government.

- Although some meetings were held with officials from the two countries, it was also agreed to reduce the level of visibility and focus the actions on the “positive agenda”, favoring the participation of the members of the group in activities developed by civil
society. One of those activities was the Academic Binational Forum on Development Policy, held in September 2008, Quito, and organized by OAS-UNDP-FLACSO. Some members of the BDG participated in this forum as organizers and lecturers.

- Finally, during this period the advisability of concluding a first stage of the work by identifying the lessons learned was discussed.

### Meeting 5 __ Quito __ November 2008

The date of the fifth binational meeting, funded by the CAF, had been planned following the invitation of President Correa to receive the BDG. Eventually, this meeting was cancelled. Not all members were present.

During the meeting, the group carried out an analysis of the political context in both countries, concluding that there did not seem to be any concrete possibility to resume diplomatic relations.

The Action Plan defined in Atlanta was revised, assuming that the cooling of relations was hindering the development of many of the activities. It was therefore agreed that the BDG would act, in general, with discretion in order to preserve itself from a potential escalation of tension between the two governments, waiting for a more propitious moment to adopt a higher profile.

UNDP staff members expressed before the group their intention to undertake an evaluation of the actions so far, in order to consider future strategies and lessons learned from the experience.

Finally, attendants agreed upon a strategy that would operate until the next meeting, the last one in this phase of the process, to be held after the general election in Ecuador. Preliminary conclusions of the Binational Dialogue Evaluation should be presented at that meeting.

During the period comprising November 2008 - April/May 2009, it was decided to support a number of activities that could be framed within the initiatives and fields of influence of some of the BDG members. Some activities were identified and coordinators assigned.

### Period between the 5th and 6th meeting of the BDG

Between the fifth and the last meeting, the BDG continued holding meetings with officials and supporting academic activities. Within this context, the OAS, UNDP and the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations of the National University of Colombia organized the Pasto Forum in February 2009. The Forum benefitted from the participation and promotion of several members of the group. Other activities carried out by members of the BDG in the framework of their political agendas supported the objective of strengthening goodwill among the Colombian and Ecuadorian peoples. Among these actions are a peace campaign promoted by the Governor of Nariño in the city of Pasto and the signature of an agreement of binational cooperation at the border between Tulpán and Ipiales.

After discrete negotiations, on March 19, 2009, the Carter Center arranged a second meeting between President Correa and the BDG. At that meeting, the BDG took the chance

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16 See Annex 3 BDG Activities Matrix. 5th BDG meeting Action Plan.
17 See Annex 3 BDG Activities Matrix.
to raise the President’s awareness on the negative effects of broken relations on the border zone. This very positive event allowed the group to revalidate the legitimacy of its role.

Later on, by the end of April, the BDG met former President Jimmy Carter during his trip to Ecuador. They exchanged perspectives on the political context and studied the possibilities for the continuation of the Binational Dialogue initiative.

Meeting 6 __Evaluation and closing of this first phase of the initiative __Bogota__May 2009

The sixth meeting was also sponsored by the CAF. The main goal was to analyze the evolution of the group from its creation and identify lessons learned. This would help close this phase of the initiative and assess the possibility of undertaking a second phase in the future.

UNDP’s team presented the preliminary results and findings of the evaluation process. This work benefitted from the contributions of the participants, through plenary exchange. These contributions are included in the present document.

Additionally, the possibility was analyzed that the BDG might undertake a new stage of work. A period of three months was agreed upon to develop a project document in order to open the second phase and obtain new funding resources.

Further, a press statement was prepared and issued few days later, highlighting the importance of the Dialogue to overcome the differences and urging the governments to resume direct contact for reestablishing of diplomatic relations.
It is worth highlighting that assessing longer-term impacts is almost impossible and, therefore, conclusions from the analysis of interviews and documents are built on a more immediate basis since future events could modify the considerations on the initiative. A definitive evaluation of such processes cannot be considered out of the time and political context in which it is was carried out.\footnote{On September 24, 2009, the Governments of Ecuador and Colombia announced a joint communiqué on the terms of agreement to initiate a direct dialogue process with the purpose of reestablishing and normalizing their diplomatic relations. Both countries acknowledged the efforts of the Carter Center and the OAS towards the normalization of relations and expressed their willingness to request the facilitation of both institutions to tackle the public requirements of the two countries. Later on, both Presidents gave instructions to their respective Chancelleries to define the appointment of their Charges d’Affaires by October 2009, which was effective in November 2009, when Ecuador appointed Andrés Terán as Chargé d’Affaires in Colombia, and Colombia, in turn, appointed Ricardo Montenegro as Charge d’Affaires in Ecuador.}

The analysis of the interviews to BDG members showed up lack of consensus around some issues, as a result of the diversity of profiles of the participants, which was, in turn, the greatest strength of the group. The group shares some powerful interests, but also differs in some of the interests, roles and scope of influence of its participants.

Similarly, the convening institutions have complementary, though not identical, mandates and objectives: the characteristics of the Carter Center are those of an external third party in the conflict, and its priority work is at the highest political level. UNDP offices in both countries act as internal third parties, since their mandate involves working with the Governments of their host country.

III.1. On the objectives

The institutional document Institutional Memorandum of Understanding (IMOU) refers to the objectives and outcomes as stated by the two sponsoring organizations engaged in the dialogue process.

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**Objectives defined by the Carter Center and UNDP in the IMOU**

“The purpose of the meetings is to help generating a lateral, flexible and safe atmosphere for citizens from both countries to meet with the objective of jointly identifying and promoting new initiatives for a constructive change in bilateral relations and public perception, focusing on specific potential activities that each member of the group could foster within their respective scope of action and influence. [...] The political purpose of the sessions is to help opening a new opportunity for bilateral relations; such an opportunity does not involve commitment but the exploration and generation of initiatives to contribute to mutual understanding, produce mutually positive public images and boost agreed policies.”
The general objective as identified by the interviewees is “building a group to support the improvement of relations between the societies of the two countries”.

Some officials refer more specifically to working on the “positive agenda” of the two countries, in reference to the existing mutual interest in implementing development projects at the border. The later is a technical expression that does not emerge from the IMOU, but is repeated in the minutes of meetings as a guiding objective for action plans, even when some BDG members insist in the need of tackling also most conflictive issues regarding security and drug trafficking.

Two levels of objectives are distinguished in the IMOU:

- Objectives at the internal level, oriented towards the creation of a binational group and the building of a space of trust: “to help generating a lateral, flexible and safe atmosphere for citizens from both countries to meet”.

- Objectives at the external level: “achieving changes in bilateral relations and public perception”.

During the first meetings, the objective was broadly framed within the attempt of building trust among participants and promoting the work on the positive agenda in both countries. From the third round of dialogue, following the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, interviewees admit the original objectives were modified, and they largely mention that, from then on, the actions focused the reestablishment of relations as the major priority.

III.2 On the achievement of the objectives

There is wide consensus regarding the achievement of personal and group objectives at the internal level. Appraisal differs concerning the achievement of tangible objectives at the external level.

It is largely agreed that the events occurred on March 1, somehow modified the objectives or, at least, the “strategy” of the BDG. However, there is disagreement in considering whether the thread was lost or not as efforts focused the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Although a majority recognizes that such an objective was beyond their scope of action, they also consider that the situation required the efforts done and that the BDG helped moderate escalations in time of crisis.

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19 Colombia and Ecuador broke their diplomatic relations as a consequence of the attack of the Colombian army on a FARC inside Ecuadorian territory on March 1st, 2009.

20 For the Carter Center, the change in political context entailed new high-level intervention opportunities, in coherence with its institutional mission. This implied that the Carter Center set into motion an initiative of their own, in parallel to the joint project undertaken with UNDP. Such initiative aimed at the reestablishment of diplomatic relations at the highest level of government. For that purpose, the Carter Center requested the collaboration of some members of the BDG that were considered strategic to that end. This situation had a number of effects, which were diversely valued throughout the different stages of the process. At first, a certain political risk was perceived for some members of the BDG and some UNDP initiatives. This situation was overcome thanks to different actions oriented to build trust and redefine the group’s profile.
Regarding the achievement of the objectives, the appraisal of the process made by the officials of the institutions was more critical than that of the members of the BDG. They all agree vis-à-vis the achievement of objectives at the internal level.

There is a certain agreement in that the original objective was defined in a flexible manner to allow the group designing the concrete scope of the results of its work.  

In the participative evaluation, the members of the BDG concluded in stating that advocacy action had an impact on the governments, taking into account that the meetings with high-level authorities helped creating awareness on the negative impact of the crisis on border population and, therefore, to a certain extent, achieving the external objectives.

All the interviewees highlight the large production of opinion pieces, which might have resulted in a greater/better treatment of the issue by some media. Some opinion-makers recognize that, even though they maintained their respective stands, they moderated their opinions as a consequence of the group learning (outcome at both the internal and external levels).

Furthermore, concerning the achievement of external objectives at the external level, mention is done of the actions carried out by members of the group aimed at advocating on civil society through the participation of BDG members in academic fora and events, peace campaigns, and others.

III.3 On the process outputs and outcomes

Some interviewees in both institutions mentioned that they expected further specific results from the actions of the BDG. In this sense, the need to draw a distinction between the “process” logics and the “project” logics is recognized. The latter require the definition of tangible outcomes in definite timeframes, which is difficult to achieve when working with political processes.

Three levels of outputs and outcomes are analyzed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal personal:</th>
<th>Learning and change in perceptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal group:</td>
<td>Community building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External:</td>
<td>Activities beyond the group</td>
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21 A project document with clear objectives and expected results helps assess if such objectives and results were achieved and to what extent. The Institutional Memorandum of Agreement (IMOU) refers to “possible specific actions within its own scope of influence”. The actions are not conceived as expected outputs or activities of the process but rather as impact expectations. The only expected output stated in the IMOU is a document of agreed recommendations. Although the recommendations document was not completed, individual testimonies on the experience were collected aiming at the present publication.
Internal-personal level: Learning and change in perceptions

The results in this category are more tangible. A majority recognizes having undergone different levels of personal change, whether it is related to a better understanding of the issue or to a change in perceptions, beliefs and assumptions.

Internal-group level: Community building

Many agree in that a space for meeting was built, as well as a network of relationships, and that trust was generated within the binational group.

The national sub-groups underwent different processes in terms of internal cohesion: broadly speaking, the Colombian group needs increased internal cohesion and stability. It was also noted that the Ecuadorian group underwent a higher number of difficulties due to the composition of the group and the political context.

External level: Activities beyond the group

The only expected output specifically stated in the IMOU is a document containing agreed recommendations. Although such document was not produced by the end of the rounds of dialogue, the Carter Center has collected individual statements of some of the participants.22

Likewise, three categories of activities are identified:

I. Activities planned by the BDG and carried out by the group as a whole.
II. Activities at the civil society level not planned by the BDG as a group, but undertaken by members of the BDG within their own scope of influence.
III. Activities initially planned by the group but hindered by the political context.

I. Activities planned by the BDG and carried out by the group as a whole

Initiatives targeting the Governments

- Letter submitted to the Presidents containing the signatures gathered
- Meeting with the Presidents
- Meetings with ministers and members of the OAS

There is consensus among the members of the group in that the objective of resuming diplomatic relations was beyond the capacity of the group to achieve actual results, although it played a contention role in preventing a greater escalation by creating awareness among officials and Presidents.

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22 See Annex 3. GBD Activities Matrix.
Initiatives linked to the media

- Opinion-makers’ articles
  All the participants referred expressly to the impact of the experience on the opinion-makers of the BDG in the development of editorials and programs. They recognize greater in-depth analyses, greater quality contents, and a more balanced and less confronting approach to the facts, among others.23

- Participation in TV programs
  Some members of the BDG were interviewed in national and international TV programs for the same purpose. Even though the majority maintained their respective stands, they moderated their opinions as a consequence of the group learning (outcome at both the internal and external levels).

- Production of a binational documentary
  The efforts to produce a binational documentary, still to be defined at the moment of the interviews were also reported. This initiative was defined later, once the binational meetings ended, and benefited from the participation of opinion-makers from both countries and an interview with former President Jimmy Carter.24

II. Activities at the civil society level not planned by the BDG as a group undertaken by members of the BDG drawing on opportunities within their own scope of influence

Although it is recognized that some of the activities did not require the existence of the group to be developed, it was noted that the contribution of its members was a distinctive input to achieve the outcomes that were finally generated by such activities.

- Advocacy actions of some of the members to promote peace in the football game Ecuador - Colombia 2008.
- Binational meeting conducted by the Colombo-Ecuadorian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, held on July 12, 2008, in Bogota, with the participation of four panelists.
- Academic conference in Quito convened by OAS, UNDP and FLACSO. Some members of the BDG participated as organizers, moderators or lecturers. September 2008
- Academic conference in Pasto convened by OAS, UNDP and the Institute for Politics and International Relations Studies at the National University of Colombia, February 2009. Some members of the BDG participated as organizers, moderators and lecturers. This event reveals a greater sense of ownership and identity by some of the members of the BDG. The importance of the FLACSO event and the Pasto conference was especially reiterated, since, for the first time, academic spaces were opened convening stakeholders to discuss the issue.
- Meeting of businesspeople, Colombo-Ecuadorian Chamber of Commerce in Bogota.
- Binational meeting of businesswomen in Bogota.

The following activities were developed by some members of the BDG as private individuals within their own scope of influence:

- Actions to address the issue of human trafficking in Colombian women.
- Peace-building campaign promoted in Nariño with participants of the Government, chambers and trades of commerce and industry, and universities.
- Signature of a binational treaty for border development in Túcán-Ipiales.

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23 Some paragraphs excerpted from the think pieces are specifically focused on the promotion of constructive change.
24 See Annex Table of Activities. 5th Meeting Action Plan.
Advocacy initiatives to influence Civil Society.

III. Activities initially planned by the group that were hindered by the political context

These activities include initiatives in binational fora with media leaders, exchanges by which journalists from one country participated in the media of the other country and business binational fora. Such activities were suspended during the political crisis.

III.4 On the process design

In general, the design of the process is positively valued by participants but less appraised by members of the institutions. This seems to be in close relation with the results expectations. Most of the participants value the flexibility in the conduction of meetings. On the other hand, members of the institutions mainly agree in recognizing a certain unbalance between flexibility and structure to promote specific outcomes.

The effectiveness of the more structured approach in the meetings of the Ecuadorian group of the BDG was highlighted. This was reinforced by the inclusion of new members in the group and permanent monitoring of the Carter Center office in Quito.

Most participants noted that flexibility allowed for the moments of catharsis when necessary. This seems to have been relevant considering that, beyond the interest in working on the positive agenda, the negative agenda of the countries was deep and addressing it was unavoidable.

The profile and selection of the members of the group was positively assessed, in most of the cases, in terms of diversity and multisectoral background. There are some critical remarks on the original composition of the Ecuadorian group due to its lack of geographical and gender representativeness. It was also noted that there had been insufficient analysis in inviting some members of the executive power as participants, which may have biased independent reflection on a number of issues.

Participants appreciate the direct participation of former President Carter, noting the high value of his convening power and capacity for inspiration within the group.

A key reflection on dialogue initiatives refers to the crucial importance of the strategic design of the process to account for objectives, expected results, resources needed, and indicators to assess the achievement. Similarly, the design of a dialogue process should also include the articulation of convening or sponsoring institutions, their roles and responsibilities, thus defining the strategy to manage relationships among all actors involved.

Such a design should not undermine the flexibility of the initiative, nor minimize the role of participants. Further, main participants (citizens, politicians, etc.) should be involved in the consultation during the design stage, increasing their ownership over the process.

See Section IV: Conclusions and Lessons Learned.
III.5  On the future of the group

There is no clear agreement on the future of the group. In general, a majority considers that the BDG should continue its efforts on improving bilateral relations, although not necessarily using the same strategy or maintaining the same participants.

During the participative evaluation meeting, it was recognized that it would be highly recommended to conclude some of the initiatives left uncompleted, with a special focus on border development and the media. In the shorter term, it was agreed to work on a document supported by the Carter Center to gather such initiatives and look for funding resources.

UNDP and CC members also agreed on the strategic relevance of some of the members of the BDG for future actions of the said institutions. Hence, the importance of maintaining the space alive or latent so it can be reactivated when new opportunities of interaction or financial support arise.

III.6  On the Institutional Alliance

The management of both institutions was positively assessed by the members of the group, who highlighted the importance of the institutions’ future role in supporting specific initiatives.

According to members of both institutions, the alliance between UNDP and the Carter Center went through a wide range of difficulties related to information exchange, management of the initiative and decision-making. Such weaknesses became evident in the moment of the political crisis that led to broken diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia, in the midst of the process of the binational dialogue.

The issues that were identified as weaknesses in the interviews are some of the challenges facing organizations when creating alliances in contexts of conflict.

The situation of broken diplomatic relations between the countries forced the organizations to readjust and adapt the process to a new situation not foreseen during the design phase.

In the case of the Carter Center, the transformation of the political context brought new possibilities for high-level intervention that was coherent with its institutional mission. However, inefficient communication strategies in time and form for joint evaluation of potential risks and impact on actors involved and/or other external stakeholders, failed in achieving a successful agenda management.

For UNDP, that new situation put off the process and implied difficulties and lack of definition in terms of human and material resources needs for effective management. Bureaucratic procedures for decision-making caused delays, as the political events and the Carter Center’s agenda accelerated. This was an additional impediment to manage a process that was already complex due to the diversity of participants and levels of decision-making.
However, it is worth noting that, in spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, collaboration experiences at the local level minimized the effects of such difficulties. The articulation between the two organizations in fieldwork allowed them to successfully support the development of some specific activities that involved the participation of some members of the group, such as the development of binational fora in Quito and Pasto. This collaboration also fostered the promotion of fluent information to carry out the evaluation here presented.

Finally, representatives of the two institutions and the members of the BDG carried out a participative evaluation on the initiative based on the input and preliminary conclusions of the evaluation process. The reflections generated in the meeting accounted for important learning, challenges and positive outcomes of the experience, which are included in the general evaluation.

III.7 Application of the “Reflecting on Peace Practices” CDA framework to the BDG initiative

Following is a brief description of the relevant elements of the Reflecting on Peace Practice learning model (RPP, 2004), developed by Collaborative Learning Projects. 26

Theory of Change

The Theory of Change is a conceptual tool that can be used to ground the development of a rigorous approach to planning, design, execution, evaluation and learning in change processes and initiatives. In the fields of dialogue and peace building, difficulties often arise when we try to communicate the aims in a clear manner by identifying indicators or signs to show progress. The challenge increases in the case of joint efforts between institutions/agencies and partners have different perspectives on what they want to achieve and the strategies to advance common objectives.

Personal Change

Strategies focused on personal change are aimed at transforming the perceptions, attitudes and values of the actors involved in the initiative, in the hope that such internal transformation will have an impact on external behavior. If we are to design an initiative to promote “internal change”, it is crucial to rely on a strategy that promotes the creation of spaces and processes where participants are able to understand the impact of culture, reflect on experiences from an articulating vision, find a common language to achieve mutual understanding and jointly produce new meanings.

Structural Change

Strategies focused on structural change are aimed at achieving socio-political transformation. Therefore, it is important to rely on a strategy that promotes the implementation of coordinated joint actions pursuing the sustainability of the expected results. This requires drawing some attention to identify people and institutions that have the capacity to promote

26 Collaborative Learning Projects. Reflecting on Peace Practice Project [PDF], CDA. Massachusetts, 2004. Available in RPP Handbook, February 2009. The aim of this approach is to promote a more effective way for international agencies involved in peace practice to carry out their work; it is based on the analysis of experiences of agencies and institutions whose programmes are aimed at preventing or mitigating violent conflicts.
collaborative interaction and the required articulation of the stakeholders involved in the project management.

Lessons Learned from Case Studies mentioned in the CDA RPP Project

a) *Individual/Personal* → *Socio-Political*. Programming that focuses on change at the Individual/Personal level, but that never links or translates into action at the Socio-Political level has no discernible effect on peace. Peace building efforts that focus on building relationships and trust across conflict lines, increasing tolerance, and increasing hope that peace is possible, often produce transformations in attitudes and perceptions. However, impacts are more significant if they are translated into actions at the socio-political level.

b) *More people* ↔ *Key people*. RPP has also found that approaches that concentrate on More People but do nothing to link to or affect Key People, as well as strategies that focus on Key People but do not include or affect More People, do not “add up” to effective peace work.

Here is presented an analysis of the Binational Dialogue Ecuador-Colombia initiative in the light of the *RPP* Matrix presented in that model. Such Matrix accounts for a number of possible assumptions on the degree of influence of the BDG and on the theories of change that guided the origins of the initiative.

In the description of the process in the IMOU, one can identify the following elements regarding the expectations of change aimed by the initiative:

- The aim of the constitution of the BDG is to contribute to the improvement of the bilateral relations between the two countries (expected advocacy at the social and political level).
- For this purpose, relevant individuals are selected for their capacity to influence governments and public opinion in their respective field of action (more people – key people).
- Following the strategy implemented during the process, it was required that key people build greater mutual understanding based on a larger amount of information on the facts and the perspective of their pairs, trusting this may help change their own view on the issue and, therefore, their approach to the conflict (individual/personal change).

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Once undergone such change at the personal level, the members of the BDG could generate advocacy messages to influence public opinion (transfer to another level: more people-individual) and national policy (transfer to another level: socio-political).

Regarding the key people-more people quadrant, the initiative prioritized a “key people” approach, according to two criteria. On one hand, those considered able to influence formal decision-makers at the political level; on the other hand, those public opinion-makers considered to have the capacity to have an impact on collective beliefs. The strategy consisted in working with people who were able to connect and/or “jump” to the highest levels of decision-making as well as to the base, when necessary, and boost broader effects at the social level through the impact generated in the media.

As for the level of impact, from the analysis of the IMOU we can understand that the objectives of the initiative were personal change and socio-political change, translated into actions planned beyond the group and the promotion of agreed policies.\(^{28}\)

It has to be noted that the number of people and the amount of time planned in the original design of the process to carry out this initiative – four binational meeting in four months, seem to be insufficient to perform a successful articulation and implementation of actions intended to achieve such an impact on the social system.\(^{29}\) In order to achieve the objective that was mentioned in the IMOU it would have been helpful to plan a larger local coordination system in order to help the articulation of joint actions.

A possible assumption of the promoters of the exercise may have considered the description in the IMOU as the first stage of a broader process, or, where appropriate, a process to be articulated with other ongoing or future initiatives, whether organized by the convening institutions or external institutions, not necessarily and solely linked to the group itself.

Consequently, the greatest challenge and potential of the initiative seemed to rely upon the ability of the group and/or its members to coordinate and articulate with other projects or actions to promote them.

Interviewees highlighted a number of tangible outcomes that, although not necessarily framed within the action plans of the group, were able to articulate the efforts of some of the convening parts in initiatives that were similar to those planned.

Although those efforts were not always supported by the group as a whole, nor formally convened by the two institutions at the same time, the participation of some members of the group has proven to act as a leverage point to promote such efforts.

\(^{28}\) In that sense, the IMOU states that: “The purpose of the meetings is to help generating a lateral, flexible and safe atmosphere for citizens from both countries to meet with the objective of jointly identifying and promoting new initiatives for a constructive change in bilateral relations and public perception, focusing on specific potential activities that each member of the group could foster within their respective scope of action and influence. [...] The political purpose of the sessions is to help opening a new opportunity for bilateral relations; such an opportunity does not involve commitment but the exploration and generation of initiatives to contribute to mutual understanding, produce mutually positive public images and boost agreed policies.”

\(^{29}\) See Annex Institutional Memorandum of Understanding: “The séances will start November 12-14, 2007, at the Carter Center headquarters in Atlanta, followed by a meeting in Bogota and a meeting in Quito. The dates of the later are to be defined in the first meeting, in November. The séances will conclude with a final meeting in Atlanta, March 19-20, 2008.”
Some examples have been mentioned, such as the efforts in the high-level negotiations promoted by the Carter Center following the events of March 1. Some members participated in those rapprochement activities and contributed discreetly to build bridges between the Carter Center and the Governments.

Similarly, UNDP’s efforts with OAS, FLACSO and the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations of the National University of Colombia were enhanced with the participation of some members of the BDG in such spaces, who acted as real driving forces in initiatives such as the Pasto Forum. Presumably, if it was not because of the existence of the group, some of the activities might not have benefited from the support of all these people.

By the end of the first phase, the BDG met anew with the President of Ecuador. The group positively valued the meeting, especially that the members could express their opinion on the border issue. Subsequently, a number of binational initiatives in the border zone involving the governments restarted and the political negotiations to resume diplomatic relations were moved forward, with the intervention of the OAS and the Carter Center as facilitator, to get the relations resumed at the Chargé d’Affaires level.  

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30 See Political Context.
III.8 Application of the CDA framework to the role of the institutions

In order to frame the reflection on the role of the institutions, it seems convenient to draw a theoretical distinction in the field of conflict resolution as described in the RPP analysis regarding the so-called “third parties”, a term that refers to actors outside the conflict who fulfill the role of facilitators. In this sense, we distinguish “internal third parties” and “external third parties”.

In this case, the role of Colombia and Ecuador UNDP Country Offices could be considered as that of an external third party: since they represent the international community and have a thorough understanding of the local context, they play an important role as facilitators; at the same time, they work closely with the governments of the host countries. Meanwhile, the role of the Carter Center as well as that of UN agencies, the Department of Political Affairs, the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean or the Democratic Dialogue Regional Project, shared the characteristics of external third parties.

Internal third parties tend to be more vulnerable when facing conflict. External third parties are free to get in and out of the conflict, thus being more resilient.

Case studies analyzed by RPP have shown that, in a context of conflict, initiatives can enhance their effectiveness by building strong alliances between external and internal third parties. In such cases, establishing alliances among and articulating external and internal third parties should be part of the strategic work of peace building for conflictive relations among them should put at risk the achievement of the objectives they are trying to promote. Hence, the importance of setting up processes that allow for making clear assumptions and expectations, frameworks and needs of each party involved in the alliance in the context of the initiative they are undertaking.

According to members of both institutions, the alliance went through a series of difficulties due to the political crisis between Ecuador and Colombia. Such difficulties were mainly related to information exchange, communications and decision-making.

It was underlined that, despite the difficulties mentioned above, willingness for articulation on the part of the members of both institutions at the local level allowed providing successful support to some of the specific activities in which group members were involved.

The members of the group, who highlighted the importance of the institutions’ future role in supporting specific initiatives, positively assessed the management of the initiative by both institutions.

31 We call internal third parties those who, despite performing the role of facilitators, are more identified with one of the parties, due to mandate or other circumstances, or are conditioned to a certain extent; those who, be they neutral or not, have a sense of belonging to the context of the conflict and, therefore, have a more direct experience of it, can also be considered as internal third parties.
External third parties are facilitators or mediators that are not involved in the conflict for they do not have direct interests involved in it or those standing at considerable distance from the context of the conflict, regardless of their interests in it. Such a role enables them to be perceived as impartial parties by the stakeholders involved.
III.9 References to the Multi-Track Diplomacy conceptual framework

The Binational Dialogue initiative was presented to participants as an intermediate track called track 1 ½, in reference to the Multi-Track Diplomacy conceptual framework developed by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy.

As described in the methodological remarks, Multi-Track Diplomacy defines peace efforts as a framework of interconnected activities among stakeholder from different sectors and high-level negotiations. Negotiations among formal decision-makers are called Track 1, and refer to the role of decision-makers. Track 2 refers to the efforts of social organizations whose mission is framed within peace efforts.

BDG initiative is framed somewhere between Track 1 and Track 2 and is therefore named Track 1 ½, since, although the Carter Center is a non-governmental organization, the role of its reference, former US President Jimmy Carter, enables direct advocacy among high-level political decision-makers.

This exercise was undertaken under the assumption that a group of citizens able to influence decision-makers and public opinion may act as a driving force to connect different “tracks” or levels: on one hand, top-level political channels and, on the other hand, some key channels in civil society (the media, NGOs, employers, academia, among others).

UNDP country offices, whose aim is to foster the positive agenda of the two countries, expected the initiative would mean additional support to their programmes through the articulated efforts of some citizens who have significant influence on different fields of action. It is noted that, in order to boost the positive agenda in border-related issues, the participation of a larger number of representatives linked to the border zone from the very start of the process would have been strategic, although this was not the case for the Ecuadorian group. Nevertheless, some of the participants proved to be crucial for articulating efforts that lead to the promotion of a number of activities for peace and border development as the above-mentioned Pasto Forum and Nariño peace campaign, among others.

Although the alliance between UNDP and the Carter Center was not explicitly planned as a strategic objective, the IMOU reflects an articulation of activities that seemed to have taken into account the existing complementarities and common objectives of both institutions.

The Binational Dialogue Colombia-Ecuador turned out to be a creative and innovative process addressing the complexity involved in the relations between the two countries in the context described above.

We close this report with some of the conclusions and main learnings identified during this dialogue process that may be useful in future initiatives. Such conclusions and learnings are related to: a) the potential of dialogue in conflict transformation on the longer-term; b) the importance of a strategic design of the process; c) management and facilitation challenges; d) the future of the initiative, and e) the role of convening and sponsoring institutions.

### IV.1 Potential for conflict transformation on the longer-term

The initiative highlighted the importance of dialogue as an informal space and structured process for achieving a better understanding of substantive information on the elements underlying the issues and the different perspectives the latter involve.

It is crucial to think about mechanisms that account for the effectiveness of the group to measure impact of this type of dialogue strategies within (changes at the internal level) and beyond (changes at the internal level).

Experience also proved how this operates in some levels of individual change that foster social change, as some of the tangible results presented and analyzed in the chapters and annexes of this report show.

The potential of the experience also looks promising beyond the continuation of the group as such, provided its members are able to capitalize on the personal change undergone and enhance the links among them to articulate with other similar initiatives and with informal efforts of the members at different levels.

From a conflict transformation viewpoint, the success of an initiative like the present one also depends on the long-term sustainability of the efforts through the articulation of the group, or its members, with other processes at different levels and with different groups of people.

In the words of peace-building expert Juan Pablo Lederach (2008): “Social change needs dynamic, adaptable platforms that match the character of their host environments, while purposeless adaptive processes generate aimless and unshaped chaos. And that is the challenge for social change: how can we create smart flexible platforms and purposeful process structures and constant capacity to adapt?”

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By the end of the current evaluation process, the countries had resumed dialogue by resuming relations at the Chargés d’Affaires level, seeking a rapprochement that may help resuming diplomatic relations. In this context, it is likely that the links between members of the Binational Dialog Group reactivate for specific actions, to continue promoting the positive agenda between countries.

It is worth highlighting that longer-term impact is impossible to assess and, therefore, conclusions are built on a more immediate basis since future events could modify the considerations on the initiative.

A definitive evaluation of such processes cannot be considered out of the time and political context in which it is was carried out.

### IV.2 Importance of the strategic design of processes

It is necessary to address the dilemma of how to provide flexibility to the design of an initiative framed within a political dialogue process and, at the same time, foreseen objectives, specific outcomes and indicators to evaluate if the process has generated the intended change. For that purpose, it is crucial to revise “project logics” to the political processes.

Promoting a space for “multi-track diplomacy” is strategic in that it provides an opportunity for connection between the formal decision-makers level and civil society, boosting their articulation within the framework of platforms and thus connecting different fields of action.

It is necessary to take into account management and funding aspects of the process at an early stage so as to ensure the proper development of activities to produce results. This involves assessing investment of different resources, time, and energy, funding, making sure such investment is coherent with the expected results.

Dialogue initiatives as the one here evaluated, comprise procedural and projectual elements. One of the characteristics of such initiatives is that they put the stress on the process itself, which involves applying some flexibility to the definition of results.

Although the structure of the initiative must take into account the general elements of a project, volatile political contexts prove that a strategic design of the process is crucial.

The assessment also raised the following dilemma: “How to provide flexibility to the design of an initiative framed within a political dialogue process and, at the same time, foreseen objectives, specific outcomes and indicators to evaluate if the process has generated the intended change.”

On one hand, this design shares a number of elements with a general project design, such as the identification of objectives, expected outcomes, resources needed, and identification of indicators to evaluate the initiative, project risks, both internal and external, and others. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider more specific elements in dialogue processes, such as conflict analysis; identification of key actors (strategic who), conveners, third party
facilitators, observers, technicians; ground rules; relations with the media; articulation with other relevant processes, among others. This also implies thoughtful planning of more effective space (strategic where) and time (strategic when) to build the climate and trust required to achieve the kind of objective pursued.

The design of a dialogue process should also include the articulation between the convening or sponsoring institutions, their roles (conveners, methodological advisors, facilitators, internal and external third parties, etc.) and responsibilities, thus defining the strategy used to manage relationships between all the actors involved.

It is crucial to ensure the availability of tools for funding institutions to evaluate internal impact –changes at the internal level—, and external impact –changes at the external level—, in order to carry out the appropriate cost-benefit analysis.

In addition, such design must identify the spaces and mechanisms for follow-up and readjustment, agreed upon by stakeholders, aimed at fulfilling the objectives.

### IV.3 Challenges for process facilitation and management

This experience represents an opportunity to reconsider facilitation strategies in dialogue spaces such as the BDG’s, with a view to achieve an effective balance between the “flexibility” required to build trust, and certain “structure”, so as to further focus discussion towards the achievement of specific results.

It is important to weight the capacity to put into practice the proposals that might emerge along the process. It is necessary to consider features related to process management and funding in early stages to ensure the correct development of planned outputs, and of activities that may emerge as outcomes.

Likewise, it is important to early assess the investment in terms of resources, time, energy, funding, to ensure coherence with the expected results.

### IV.4 Future of the initiative

Beyond the continuation of the group as such, this initiative could be reshaped, or continue as an independent initiative that might be driven by the same or different institutions or even by some of its most active members, and be a precedent to be articulated with new processes and initiatives.

What seems to be proven is that such a process enables members and institutions involved drawing on strong links for articulation that could be reactivated in the future with strategic potential. The ongoing or future contribution of the members to the improvement of relations between the countries will be best measured on the longer term, regardless the continuity of the group. It is worth noting that the possibility of some of the members
assuming strategic positions, even at the international level, represents an invaluable opportunity.  

**IV.5 Role of the convening institutions and their alliance**

Strengthening institutional relations and alliances among actors is strategic to enhance their capacity to promote spaces for dialogue, even when they perform different roles, and generate mechanisms to ensure collaborative management.

Building an alliance between the Carter Center and UNDP was challenging in terms of interaction due to their complementary, though different, agendas and objectives. This situation also proved to be its major potential. Consequently, the capacity to articulate the process is a key element for its constructive management, especially in times of crisis, when volatility and political risk may have various impacts on this kind of processes and their actors.

The role of the institutions involved in this initiative accounts for some of the lessons learned from past case studies compiled by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects: Reflecting on Peace Practice concerning partnerships between organizations that promote initiatives in that field:

- “Partners must take the time to understand and define where their missions have common or different visions, state them explicitly, and accept them as valid ones”.

- “It is extremely important that the role of each agency be clearly and explicitly defined from the start, and those roles should be renegotiated and re-assessed when necessary. The relationship should be horizontal and based on mutual consultation, with equal influence on decisions, and involving joint processes for setting strategies, defining goals, and evaluating results.”

Constructive treatment of differences involves not only adequate processes, but also dialogic abilities and attitudes in managers, in order to face challenges from a constructive interaction. Some of the difficulties facing alliances aimed at initiatives of this kind, in terms of intra and inter-organizational communication and decision-making, could be smoothed by the joint identification of an institutional actor that would assume an articulating role, promoting mechanisms for collaborative and shared management.

In the light of the analysis of this experience, it can be concluded that experiences of this type should consider strengthening the synergy among partner institutions as one of the “specific objectives” in order to boost common interests while safeguarding the differences.

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34 One Colombian member —Angelino Garzón— and one Ecuadorian member —Francisco Carrion Mena— were appointed as Ambassadors of their countries to the United Nations in Geneva and New York, respectively.

1. BDG activities and context timeline

**Timeline Context**

- **October 2002**: Binational technical commission verification on glyphosate.
- **2005**: Ecuador demands Colombia to suspend aerial spraying until effects are verified, and, afterwards, to respect a 10-km strip along the border for aerial spraying.
- **January 2006**: Colombia suspends aerial spraying “temporarily.”
- **January 9 2007**: Ecuador presents complaint against Colombia before the OAS for spraying of herbicide along the border.
- **August 23**: Farmers in Narino resist spraying and manual eradication.
- **November 2007**: Pres. Uribe considers facilitation by Chavez and Cordoba completed.
- **December 18**: FARC announces release of hostages.
- **January 16**: Ecuador requests international committee to manage further FARC hostage releases.
- **February 2**: The FARC announce they will hand over hostages to Venezuelan President.
- **February 7**: The FARC announce they will hand over hostages to Venezuelan President.
- **February 21**: Galo Mora (BDG member) assumes duties of Minister of Culture of Ecuador.
- **March 1**: Colombian troops attack FARC camp inside of Ecuador. 26 people are killed, including guerrilla second-in-command, "Raul Reyes".
- **November 12-14**: 1st Binational Dialogue Round Colombia-Ecuador in Atlanta.

**Timeline Binational Dialogue Group**

- **December 2007**: Jose Valencia (BDG member) assumes duties of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador.
- **January 15**: Pres. Uribe proposes negotiating with the FARC.
- **February 21**: Galo Mora (BDG member) assumes duties of Minister of Culture of Ecuador.
2. **BDG meeting matrix (*)**

*Developed by the Evaluation Team, based on process documents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Outputs and Outcomes Achieved</th>
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| 1st Binational Round            | November 12, 13, 14 2007 | - To provide an opportunity to start building trust among the members of the group aiming at initiating honest dialogue on their concerns  
- To conduct a joint assessment on dividers & connectors between Colombia and Ecuador  
- To the possible extent, advance the identification of opportunities for joint work | - List of the participant's aspirations and concerns  
- Based on the Positive Agenda of both countries, identification of main issues that are likely to provide opportunities for specific actions:  
  a. Border development, binational cooperation and agreements  
  b. Mechanisms for dialogue and communication  
- Request by the participants to UNDP to support a fieldtrip to the border area during the next meeting of the group.  
- Agreement within the group to maintain the initiative in the strictest confidence towards the media |
| Atlanta                         | 2007                |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2nd Binational Round            | February 1-2 2008   | - To conduct a fieldtrip to the border with all the participants of the BDG, to increase their awareness on the situation of conflict existing in the binational area  
- To develop recommendations and actions on two key issues: 1) perceptions and imaginaries between the two countries, 2) border development | - The trip to the border was cancelled due to bad weather conditions, and replaced by an invitation to the mayors of two border municipalities and two UNHCR staff members to participate in the meeting.  
- List of recommendations on the following issues:  
  - Imaginaries: involve the media, invite journalist to visit the area as a token of goodwill, and increase attention to collaborative interaction dynamic at the border.  
  - Border Development: boost a binational development plan for the area of border integration establishing three border sectors.  
  - Promotion of the Group: agreement to announce the agenda while maintaining the low public profile of the group, and to draft a document on the recommendations that would be sent by Andrés Valdivieso and Galo Mora (Ecuador) and Rafael Nieto and Guillermo Rivera together with other Colombian members of the group (Colombia) to their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs (in Spanish, “Cancillería”) to present the ideas using the most appropriate method.  
- Request to invite the CAF to the next meeting in Bogota.  
- It was approved to write a supporting letter by the United Nations Secretary General and former President Carter to support the work of the Group. |
| Quito                           | 2008                |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Parallel national emergency     | March 4, 2008       | - To address the crisis that provoked the breaking-off of diplomatic relations  
- To manage to have the participants not focused exclusively on the crisis and reciprocal blaming, but rather focus on the development of recommendations on action strategies to help both countries overcome the crisis and | - Discussions were conducted to make clear the roles and objectives of the Group and agree on the BDG as a space for information sharing.  
- Similarly, opinions were exchanged with conveners to identify steps to support their Governments. |
<p>| meetings                        |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Quito and Bogota                |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |</p>
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<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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| Ecuador Group Meeting                                                            | March 17, 2008     | - To receive ideas on the next steps of the work of the Group, after the formal breaking-off of diplomatic relations  
- To define the commitments of the group of Ecuador to advance towards the 3rd round  
- Check alternatives to hold small binational meetings with some of the members of the Group to break the ice and advance the agenda of the 3rd binational round  
- Share the synergy between the recommendations made by the OAS and those issued from the last meeting in Quito  
- The group of Ecuador ratifies its commitment to the work of the BDG, although it shows itself uncertain on the proposals to move forward.  
- Facing some proposals made by CC/UNDP officials, it was accepted to promote small among members of the Group that are available to travel to the other country.  
- Identification of methods to support OAS’ resolution. |
| Small binational meeting with members of the BDG, UNDP and CC                    | April 14, 2008     | - To inform the participants at the meeting on the objectives and outcomes of the initiative as foreseen by the Carter Center, including the participation of BDG members to promote the reestablishment of binational relations  
- To make clear the role of the BDG, confusing after the media referred to the Group as the “Carter Group”  
- To receive recommendations from the group for the next Binational Round, to be held in Bogota  
- The members of the BDG reflected on the events occurred during the previous weekend, which thwarted the expectations of the confidential exercise of the CC to advance in resuming diplomatic relations.  
- The group produced recommendations for the next binational meeting in Bogota and suggested stepping up efforts in actions that involve exchanges with civil society stakeholders, including academia, culture and business, given the fragility of the bilateral relation.  
- It was also suggested providing further support to the ZIF initiative. |
### 3rd Binational Round - Bogota

**April 26-29, 2008**
- To enable conversation on the crisis to promote mutual understanding
- To exchange opinions with Colombian political and communications actors: Secretary of State Mr. Araujo, Presidential Advisor Mr. Eastman, and the Peace Commission of the House of Representatives
- To identify immediate actions to be undertaken by the members and/or the group, at different levels, to help overcoming the crisis and promote the rapprochement of governments and the populations in the shorter term (over May until the 4th Round in Atlanta)
- To work on the axes of the positive agenda previously established in Atlanta and on the initiatives that were identified in Quito
- To promote reflection on “a critical path with specific objectives” to be developed in the medium and long term
- The group committed to gathering signatures to support a letter to Presidents Uribe and Correa, asking for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and thus advancing the initiatives previously agreed.
- It was also planned to prepare two short documentaries, one from a Colombian viewpoint, including archive material about the sensitivity existing towards the FARC issue, and another one in Ecuador on referring to the issue of sovereignty, inviting relevant people to discuss the issue.
- Following some moments of tension, there was a truly generative dialogue in which members heard to and understood the reasons and sensitivities of the Ecuadorian members on the issue of territorial sovereignty, and of the Colombian members on the violence executed by irregular Colombian armed groups and their imperative need to reach peace and security.
- It was recommended to create the conditions for a meeting between some members of the Peace Commission of the House of Representatives (Colombia) and some members of the Constituent Assembly (Ecuador).
- It was agreed to plan an agenda containing specific issues to be dealt in a second phase of the dialogue, after the Atlanta meeting, including seminars, meetings and open dialogues.
- It was recommended to invite representatives of the IADB and the CAF to the next binational meeting in Atlanta.
- The participants conducted a structured evaluation of the dialogue process so far, and strongly supported the continuation of the initiative.

### 4th Binational Round - Atlanta

**May 23-24, 2008**
- To promote specific discussions to achieve a Final Document
- To define a transition strategy within the new context of the bilateral relations between Colombia and Ecuador
- To define the group’s short and long-term agendas, how to move forward and for how long
- To have the participation of the OAS through the invitation of Jimmy Carter and Rebeca Grynspan (UNDP RBLAC Director) to Secretary General José Miguel Insulza
- Agreement of the BDG, with a mention of former President Carter pointing out that it would be necessary to define an end date for this work. In this sense, it was agreed to hold two additional meetings to assess the monitoring of the initiatives identified in the Action Plan.
- Design of an Action Plan with specific initiatives the members of the group committed to promote:
  **a) Advocacy on Governments:**
  - Meetings with the Presidents. The BDG agreed to arrange a personal interview with each president. For this purpose, it asked President Carter to send a note on June 6, to convene both presidents to hold an interview with the BDG for the group to inform them on the objectives and contributions of the BDG.
  - Letter to the Presidents. Submission of a letter to the presidents including signatures collected to ask for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
  **b) Advocacy through the Media:**
  - Promoting the production of a binational documentary by Colombian and Ecuadorian journalists, including a joint message, security and trade issues, the situation of refugees and displaced persons; as a testimony of the situation of citizens in the border zone. The documentary would include a 30-minute interview with President Carter.
  - Exchanging a list of columnists and promoting Ecuadorians having spaces in the Colombian media and vice versa. A monthly space was provided by Diario El Tiempo (newspaper) for Ecuadorian columnists as well as a fortnightly space in Revista Criterios (the group failed to engage Diario El Comercio and El Telégrafo in this initiative).
| Meeting with Representatives of the Binational Dialogue Group (BDG), Plan Ecuador, UNDP and the Carter Center | June 6, 2008 | - To create a working group to help the organization of binational meetings in the border zone proposed by the BDG  
- To figure out how the two binational meetings at the border area proposed by the BDG could be coordinated with the Plan Ecuador  
- To identify clear objectives for the first meeting and design an action plan with responsibilities  
- To identify strategies to link the work undertaken in the Ecuadorian side with that in the Colombian side  
- To identify next steps |
| Meeting with Ecuadorian Members of the Binational Dialogue Group (BDG), UNDP, and the Carter Center | June 20, 2008 | - To prepare the audiences with the two presidents  
- To discuss the integration of new Ecuadorian members in the group  
- To discuss the organization of the two binational meetings in the border zone |
| - Assessing ongoing initiatives whether to boost or articulate them (ex. initiatives with Ebert Foundation, UDLA, etc.) When such initiatives are not to be continued, a workshop should be convened to promote a press pool, comprising no more than 6-8 media from the two countries, to deepen the information and work on joint articles.  
- Initiatives in the Border Zone:  
- Border Meeting: organize a meeting with local authorities in the border zone (Rumichacha Bridge) to contribute to the formulation of a development plan for the border zone. Invite the CAF, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Cancilleries), the European Union and UNDP, to support the ZIF development plan.  
- Cycle-ride: Carry out a cultural and symbolic event to bring societies closer at the San Miguel Bridge, at the border, in which 100 cyclists of both nationalities rode for peace; ask the governments for financial support.  
- Meetings and Fora:  
- The members of the group identified some ideas to organize binational meetings of businesspeople, workers/ unions, and on the issue of security, to boost relevant authorities to promote them. The group will not fund such meetings. |
| Quito | Meeting with Colombian members of the Binational Dialogue Group (BDG), UNDP, and the Carter Center |June 24, 2008 | - To analyze the political context for the meetings with the two Presidents  
- To prepare a strategy for both meetings  
- To discuss on the action plan of the BDG, on the two binational meetings in the border zone | - It was suggested that the meeting should begin with a statement of a Colombian member before giving the floor to the Ecuadorian members. It was considered important to start with a language that is closer to the President.  
- It was decided to start the meeting with President Uribe with a brief introduction of the BDG by Bruno Moro and Francisco Diez, followed by the intervention of Luis Carlos Villegas.  
- It was decided to organize a preparatory meeting with the Ecuadorian members at breakfast the next day. |
| Bogota | Meeting with the Ecuadorian members of the BDG |July 21, 2008 | - To sound out the Ecuadorian members of the BDG on their willingness to continue with the BDG and their ideas to move forward  
- To collect their perspectives on the new context and the need for adjustments in the BDG action plan  
- To tell the BDG Ecuadorian members of the efforts on the Carter Center and its intention to submit a funding proposal to the CAF | - It was felt that the Ecuadorian context was unusual and required the current members have a very cautious attitude.  
- It was felt the BDG had been involved in a political approach that had probably been misunderstood by President Correa. Having entered into a "political arena" now demanded legitimating from the President.  
- It was mentioned that many activities of the action plan should be suspended and others reconsidered.  
- Representatives of UNDP suggested the need to postpone the meetings of the BDG for the moment, expressing optimism that the situation would change in the medium term and allow the BDG resume a more active role.  
- Some participants felt that progress could be made through binational initiatives at the civil society level.  
- Other members of BDG agreed on the importance of having at least one more round of dialogue. |
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<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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| Informal Assessment of the CC with the BDG and UNDP, after the meetings of the BDG with President Uribe and President Correa | July, August and September, 2008        | - The CC carries out an informal assessment to survey individually each member of the BDG and obtain information about their willingness to continue as part of the BDG and their ideas for the future.  
  - Two group evaluation meetings are held: one for with the Ecuadorian members, one with the Colombian members.  
  - It is proposed to evaluate the incorporation of new members in the Ecuador group with a mechanism for proposal and voting among existing members.  
  - In addition to individual interviews, joint meetings were conducted with all members of the BDG Ecuador on one hand and with all members of the BDG Colombia on other hand.  
  - One of the lessons learned that stands out from the evaluation is the importance of drawing a clear distinction between the role of the BDG and the mediating role of the OAS and President Carter.  
  - Following this assessment, the BDG decided to continue its efforts and aims to focus its work on initiatives that contribute to the positive agenda, such as activities at the civil society level and proposals to governments. The Colombian members identified three priority areas to influence the positive agenda: 1) border development and re-launching the Border Integration Zone (ZIF); 2) strengthening neighborhood mechanisms (evaluation of the ten existing mechanisms, reflection and proposals); 3) strengthening discussions on security mechanisms.  
  - It was more clearly foreseen that the stages of the process leading the BDG to the last round of dialogue would focus on lessons learned. |
| National Meeting Group Ecuador                     | September 16, 2008                       | - To introduce the new Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Ecuador, José Manuel Hermida.  
  - To identify criteria for selecting new members of the Ecuador group and discussion on the said criteria.  
  - It is stipulated that the meetings would be confidential and the members would review the minutes of the meetings that would be sent after each meeting.  
  - The importance was highlighted of prioritizing the following criteria for choosing new members of the group: person with access to President Correa/representative of the Border/person of the journalistic field.)  
  - The following individuals were elected by consensus:  
    - Pedro Velasco, Mayor of Tulcán (Border)  
    - Patricia Estupiñán (journalist)  
    - Grace Jaramillo (academic)  
  - The desirability of incorporating an additional person from the border was discussed, given that there are “three borders” with marked differences. It was clarified the importance of those selected live in capitals with easy access to air transport to ensure, as far as possible, their participation in group meetings. |
| National Meeting Group Ecuador                     | September 30, 2008                       | - To update on the status of relations between Colombia and Ecuador.  
  - To agree on meetings of the Ecuadorian member of the Group with the three Ministers.  
  - Talk about the incorporation of three new members into the Ecuador group.  
  - Discuss the draft compilation Document of the BDG.  
  - The Group was concerned about preventing incursions into the political arena and create the perception that the Group wished to act as mediator.  
  - It was agreed to draw on meetings with ministers to propose that the Group’s space could serve a role, providing assistance in the area of each ministry, promoting bilateral relations at different non-political levels (civil-military relations, commercial, academic, for example).  
  - It is expected that the document of the BDG is multipurpose and reflects the Group’s identity as a binational entity.  
  - It was requested to include some changes and then make an e-mail exchange for knowledge and tacit approval of the members of the BDG. |
| Teleconference among some members of the           | October 21, 2008                          | - To prepare the meeting of the Colombia Group with Foreign Minister Bermúdez.  
  - It was decided that the main purpose of the meeting with the Foreign Minister would be to generate a positive impression to strengthen the relationship of the BDG with the Colombian government.  
  - It was decided to start the meeting with the Foreign Minister, summing up the purpose of the BDG. |
| Colombia Group and UNDP and the Carter Center Bogota |  | and its purpose of strengthening a number of aspects of the relationship between the two countries. |
| --- | --- | - Participants emphasized the importance of hearing the Colombian government's agenda regarding Ecuador and asking the Foreign Minister his opinion on the usefulness of the BDG. |
| Meeting of some of the members of the Ecuador Group of the BDG with UNDP Quito November 3, 2008 | - To clarify the objectives of the luncheon with President Correa and the binational meeting to be held on November 6 and 7 | - It was emphasized the importance of a deep reflection on the "political-strategic definition" of the BDG at the next binational meeting in Quito. |
|  |  | - Ecuadorians members of the BDG decided not to hold any meeting with government representatives at the BDG binational meeting so as to focus on "the internal." |
| 5th Binational Dialogue Round Quito November 6-7, 2008 | - Initially, to participate in a luncheon with President Correa on 7 November (main goal: "to re-legitimize" the BDG) | - The luncheon with President Correa was canceled at the last minute because the President decided to convene an itinerant cabinet on November 7. |
|  | - To consider the initiatives that have been developed in recent months, evaluating scenarios for medium and long term | - The meeting yielded some agreements between the members in attendance on the following: |
|  | - To advance the implementation of actions in the media, at the border and in binational forums and meetings | - Timeframe: it was decided to adopt an operation strategy for the period November 2008 - April / May 2009 (or until after general the elections in Ecuador, whatever its date) and conduct the last meeting planned for this phase of the BDG after that date. The BDG decided to extend its own operation until that next meeting and then assess the steps to take depending upon the context. |
|  | - To develop an short-term action plan (six months), selecting 2-4 specific initiatives aimed at strengthening ties between the peoples of the two countries and steps required to leave a medium/long-term legacy of in the positive bilateral agenda | - Operation mode: It was decided that the BDG would work with a general tone of discretion in order to preserve itself from possible escalation of tension between governments. |
|  | - To identify the people responsible for these initiatives | - Contributions: BDG members expressed their interest in continuing being supported by the Carter Center, the CAF and UNDP during this phase. UNDP, in agreement with the CC, will lead an evaluation of the initiative and will define the scope of its future contributions. The CC confirmed its commitment to the initiative and pledged to talk to the CAF on the extension of the financing granted. The CAF specifically offered support for the group during a luncheon with its representatives. |
|  | - UNDP to submit the Concept Note and features of the BDG assessment process, to be conducted by UNDP DDRP | - Responsibilities: to perform some of the activities identified, some members of BDG agreed to take specific responsibilities as listed below. |
|  |  | - Initiatives: it was agreed to advance some specific activities under the leadership of some of its members as specified below: |
|  |  | 1. Private Meeting with Key Entrepreneurs of both countries. (It would replace the forum with ANDI-CORPEI scheduled for November 2008 in Guayaquil). |
|  |  | 2. Visit of the Peace Commission of the House of Representatives of Colombia to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Legislative and Fiscal Commission of Ecuador. |
|  |  | 3. E-alerts. Mini-studies with an overarching question (e.g. study on the costs of broken relations). There will be a release every time there is one, no regular dissemination required. Should be seen as an alert. |
4. Means:
   - Preparation of papers, articles, columns, documentaries by BDG members.
   - Possible meeting at "El Tiempo" with journalists of both countries on specific issues (e.g. International financial crisis).
   - Media Blog (an initiative that emerged from the meeting of media editors and publishers of Quito).

5. Security
   - Building academic spaces for both countries to work on the subject.
   - Analyze discrete initiative with FLACSO Ecuador to convene military, civilian and police authorities to meet with Colombian members and discuss the issue. Explore funding resource for a project in this area.
   - Visit of BDG members to the military detachments at the border and dialogue with Ecuadorian military leaders (invitation of Minister Ponce).

6. Exploration of a possible binational meeting of trade unions

7. Chair Colombia in Ecuador
   - Refloat the experience carried out earlier in FLACSO.
   - Explore with the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN).

8. Publication of a book with a contribution of each member of the BDG on this experience of dialogue.

Next Meeting of the Binational Dialogue: April or May 2009, date to be determined after the elections in Ecuador.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting with Members of the Group Ecuador of the BDG who did not attend the 5th Round in Quito</th>
<th>November 20, 2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>- To inform members of the BDG Ecuadorians who did not attend the meeting on the results of the meeting and gather their perspectives</td>
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</table>
| - The members in attendance agreed that, at this juncture, there was little chance of improvement in relations between Colombia and Ecuador. As an example, he mentioned the hard speech by President Correa to the Ecuadorian armed forces on 27/10/08 (speech reading).
  - It was suggested that someone close to President Correa asked if he is willing to resume diplomatic relations with Colombia to be clear about the actual position of the President. Depending on his response, the BDG would know whether there is hope. For most of the attendants, while important activities can be developed at the civil society level, one of the objectives of the BDG should be the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador. Once this objective is achieved, the BDG would be satisfied and ready to complete their work. Others, however, reminded that this was not the original purpose of the BDG, beyond the fact that, given the current circumstances, it had become a priority objective of the BDG. |
| Meeting Group Ecuador BDG Quito | December 3, 2008 | - To inform everyone of ongoing activities  
- Agree on steps to implement such initiatives | - Pasto Binational Academic Forum: Ecuadorian BDG members make proposals to support the implementation of the forum in coordination with Socorro Ramírez.  
- Mini-studies on the cost of not having diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador: the first study should be ready December 15, 2008. Socorro Ramírez will be consulted to obtain data from the Colombian side. Importance of diffusion in different media through a press conference and sending them to all media.  
- Visits to the detachments at the border: efforts to reconfirm the interest of Minister Ponce to organize these visits.  
- Meeting with members of the Committee on International Relations and Public Safety of the Legislative and Fiscal Commission: it is proposed to organize a private and discreet meeting of two or three BDG Ecuadorian members with some members of the Committee on International Relations and Public Safety.  
- Binational meeting of parliamentarians from Colombia and Ecuador: members of the Committee on International Relations and Public Security will contacted to assess the interest of the Commission in carrying out this initiative.  
- Binational documentary: efforts the resume this activity.  
- It is proposed that members of the BDG Ecuador meet every second Wednesday of the month at lunchtime (13h-14h30). |
| Luncheon of the Ecuadorian members of the BDG with Socorro Ramírez Quito | January 6, 2009 | - Building on Socorro Ramírez’ visit to exchange opinions on the future of the BDG | - It was considered important to have a closing session of the current stage, including a group participatory exercise to identify lessons learned.  
- Some members felt that despite the limitations of the group it is still a positive mechanism for furthering the objectives.  
- The Pasto Forum would be held February 9 and 10; Socorro Ramírez would send a draft program and efforts would be made so BDG members participate in it.  
- It was mentioned that one member of the Colombian group, Angelino Garzón, had been appointed ambassador of Colombia in Geneva.  
- The work of Margarita Carranco to address a case human trafficking in Colombian women in Ecuador was positively assessed. It was reported that a meeting on the subject would take place on February 15, involving participants from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. |
| Meeting Ecuador Group Quito | January 14, 2009 | - Finding and evaluating the actions of the Ecuadorian group: mechanisms and systematization  
- Discuss the continuation or suspension of actions  
- In the case of continuation: minimum goals for 2009  
- Request for meeting with members of the Ecuadorian and Colombian members of the | - Pasto Binational Academic Forum: the development of the initiative was discussed and it was suggested to invite a higher-profile Ecuadorian person to the opening of the forum like, for example, Fernando Cordero or Marcos Martinez (chairman of the Committee on International Relations and Public Safety of the Legislative and Fiscal Commission).  
- Discussion on continuation or suspension of activities, the members in attendance agreed on the importance of thinking from that very moment on a withdrawal in line with the importance of BDG. Several members emphasized the importance of setting dates for the end of this phase and proposed organizing the closing binational meeting after the first round of the general elections (i.e. early May). In parallel, it was suggested to discreetly assess the possible interest of the new |
| Meeting Colombian Group with the Carter center | February 10, 2009 | - To evaluate the results of the Pasto binational forum  
- To prepare for the next BDG binational meeting  
- To discuss the implementation of the binational initiatives proposed during the last round binational dialogue |
| Meeting Ecuador Group with UNDP and Carter Center | February 12, 2009 | - To inform all the members of the latest political developments in Ecuador and its impact on the relations between Ecuador and Colombia for analysis purposes  
- To evaluate the results of the binational meeting in Pasto  
- To take stock of the actions of the Ecuadorian group: systematization and mechanisms according to what was agreed at the last meeting  
- To report on direct efforts of the OAS and the Carter Center with the governments of Colombia and Ecuador |

BDG by the OAS delegation that will visit Colombia and Ecuador at the end of January

- Assessment and evaluation of the activities of the Ecuadorian group: mechanisms and systematization; in addition to the evaluation process conducted by UNDP in consultation with the Carter Center, participants suggested to perform an internal assessment to close this phase of the process. They also proposed to close this phase with:  
  - An important event  
  - A systematization of the BDG experience (document)  
  - A last BDG binational meeting focused on lessons learned.  
- Testimony and recommendations. It was also proposed to produce a publication telling the experience of the BDG and it was suggested that instead of collecting the testimony of each of the members, it would be better to develop a joint document. It was also discussed the possibility of preparing some recommendations for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Cancillerías). Additionally, the Ecuadorian members in attendance expressed interest in knowing the vision of the Colombian members regarding the possible closure of this phase and the internal assessment.  
- Request for meeting with Colombian and Ecuadorian members of BDG by the OAS delegation that would visit Colombia and Ecuador at the end of January; meeting with the OAS was considered an interesting opportunity, both to inform on the criteria of the BDG to the OAS delegation, as well as to gather the perspectives of the bilateral delegation on the situation. It was emphasized that the meeting should be private, and should not reach the media.

- Report on and analysis of recent political developments in Ecuador and the impact on the relations Colombia-Ecuador.  
- Evaluation of the results of the binational meeting of Pasto:  
  - Seven BDG members participated in the binational academic forum of Pasto: Socorro Ramírez, Antonio Navarro, Guillermo Rivera, Adrián Bonilla, Pedro Velasco, Grace Jaramillo and Dolores Padilla.  
  - The event was described as a success. About 300 participants were expected initially but the number of attendants eventually reached over 500.  
  - The event was attended by many representatives of the border area, allowing dialogue about the situation of daily living in border towns.  
  - While differences were noted between the three border areas (Pacific, Andean and Amazonian), many similarities arose regarding the problems faced by the populations of the three subregions.  
  - On the other hand, reference was made to the campaign launched by Antonio Navarro
| Luncheon-meeting of the BDG Ecuadorian members | March 11, 2009 | - To report on a possible meeting with Foreign Minister Falconi through the governor of Nariño to promote better relations between the peoples of Colombia and Ecuador.  
- Stickers with the motto: "Colombia-Ecuador: A single identity" were distributed and have been placed in shops, taxis and buildings. |
|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Quito             |                  | - To analyze the latest events that affect the relations between Colombia and Ecuador and assess the outlook on the possible resumption of diplomatic relations.  
- To assess the visit of the OAS Secretary-General to Ecuador.  
- To prepare for the meeting with the OAS International Verification Commission planned for March 16.  
- To prepare for the meeting of the BDG with President Correa, scheduled for March 19.  
- Views were exchanged on issues related to the political situation in both countries, particularly on diplomatic relations (border situation, apostille, assessment of conditions imposed by Ecuador, among others).  
- The visit of the Secretary-General of the OAS to Ecuador was dismissed.  
- Issues were addressed concerning the work of the group with the presidents of each country. In particular, a strategy was defined for the next meeting with President Correa. |
| Luncheon-meeting of the BDG Ecuadorian members | April 8, 2009 | - To assess the meeting of the BDG with the President of the Republic.  
- To assess the meeting of the Ecuadorian members of BDG with the OAS International Verification Commission.  
- To prepare for the meeting of the BDG with former President Jimmy Carter.  
- To talking about the visit of the UNDP evaluation team.  
- To prepare the binational meeting in Bogota.  
- It was considered that the luncheon with President Correa had been a success and that the BDG had shown maturity.  
- It was emphasized the importance of identifying the most effective way to follow up on some key issues discussed with President Correa. Such follow up could be done through Foreign Minister Fander Falconi.  
- It was proposed to address the issue of the closure of the BDG and its future prospects during the meeting with former President Carter.  
- It was proposed to deliver a silver platter with the names of all past and current BDG members as a memento and appreciation to former President Carter.  
- It was proposed to give to former President Carter a document summarizing the steps taken by the BDG and, if possible, signed by all members.  
- It was proposed to organize a meeting of members of the BDG with the evaluation team and the Carter Center to discuss the evaluation exercise and lessons learned to better prepare the binational meeting in Bogota.  
- For the binational meeting in Bogota, it was suggested that each member bring a short paper on his/her personal experience as a member of the BDG to serve as a base or key input to the evaluation exercise and lessons learned.  
- It was suggested that the Carter Center sent to the BDG framework questions to help guide and structure the said input.  
- It was suggested to leave a binational agenda as legacy or product of the closing meeting of Bogota. This agenda could be delivered to the two Departments of State and the civil society (directly to the relevant actors or through the media). |
| Luncheon of the BDG to prepare the meeting to be held in May | April 28, 2009 | - To give an account of the agenda for the meeting of May 12-13  
- To collect expectations to adjust the content and methodology of work  
- Ensure a space on the agenda to present preliminary results of the evaluation  
- Provide space to advance the binational agenda and a space to discuss the future of the group |
|---|---|---|
| Quito | 6th Binational Round  
Closure Meeting of the first phase and Evaluation  
Bogota | May 12-13, 2009 | - To conduct a participatory evaluation of the binational dialogue process from its inception, drawing lessons learned  
- To develop a binational agenda that can be delivered to both governments and other key stakeholders  
- To think about the future of the BDG and identify a possible second phase  
- Participatory evaluation was performed of the results with the inputs submitted by the team coordinator of the Evaluation of the Binational Dialogue  
- It was decided to conclude the first phase of the process with this evaluation and consider how to continue the initiative of the Binational Dialogue Group, with a second phase that brings together a similar group, or some new members  
- It was decided that the 2nd phase of the BG focus on the following areas for a positive agenda:  
  - Security: Colombia and Ecuador should talk about this issue to set policies aimed not only at the militarization of the border area, which involves potentially greater displacement of Colombians to the neighboring country, among other negative impacts  
  - State Policy for the border: follow up activities that arose at the meeting of Pasto, promoting further integration among border towns  
  - Media: working with and towards them. Seek greater advocacy  
  - Advocacy on government: seeking the restoration of diplomatic relations  
  - Regional / international work: Agencies targeting organizations such as UNASUR, CAN, OAS, strengthening these levels  
- It was decided that the Carter Center, supported by one member of each country as focal point, draw up a draft document incorporating suggestions and comments of members of the Group  
- A press statement was developed and released highlighting the importance of dialogue to overcome differences and urging governments to resume direct contact to restore diplomatic relations |
3. **BDG activities matrix (*)**

*Developed by the Evaluation Team, based on process documents*

**Types of Activities:**

I. Activities planned by the BDG and carried out by the group as a whole or by some of its members

II. Activities at the civil society level not planned by the BDG as a group
   i) Initiative undertaken by members of the BDG, supported by the group
   ii) External initiatives supported or considered as an opportunity by members of the BDG to promote the general objective

III. Activities initially planned by the group that were pending, suspended or not executed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVOCACY LEVEL</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
<th>RELATION ACTIVITY-GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>Meetings of the BDG with OAS delegation</td>
<td>March 9-12, 2008 Quito and Bogota</td>
<td>The Carter Center conducted a confidential mediation exercise aiming to promoting the restoration of bilateral relations. In this context, the CC sought support from some members of the group to act as bridges between governments and as key actors to reach agreements.</td>
<td>The Carter Center worked with both Foreign Ministers and both Presidents with the support of some members of the group, and defined a set of signals to be sent from one government to another as signs of goodwill. 80% of the signals are sent, but an escalation of public statements over the weekend of April 11 between the Presidents foiled the attempt of rapprochement at that time.</td>
<td>Activity type I BDG initiative and execution (all members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Carter Center confidential exercise with both governments, with participation of some BDG members</td>
<td>April 1-6, 2008</td>
<td>The BDG agreed to write a letter and collect signatures of distinguished citizens requesting all necessary efforts to revive bilateral relations and favorable attention to the letter.</td>
<td>Identical letters were sent to the Presidents Correa and Uribe signed by members of the BDG and distinguished citizens of both countries (291 signatures in total), requesting the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador.</td>
<td>Activity type I BDG initiative and execution (all members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Handing over of letters by the BDG with signature of citizens from both countries to the Presidents</td>
<td>June 3, 2008 Quito Bogota</td>
<td>The BDG agreed to write a letter and collect signatures of distinguished citizens requesting all necessary efforts to revive bilateral relations and favorable attention to the letter.</td>
<td>Identical letters were sent to the Presidents Correa and Uribe signed by members of the BDG and distinguished citizens of both countries (291 signatures in total), requesting the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador.</td>
<td>Activity type I BDG initiative and execution (all members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Businesspeople Meeting convenes by the Colombian-Ecuadorian Chamber</td>
<td>June 12, 2008 Bogota</td>
<td>Some members of the group participated in the forum to assess the status of trade relations under the circumstances of the moment.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Activity type II External initiative with participation of BDG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity type</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Actions for peace during football game Colombia-Ecuador</td>
<td>June 19, 2008 Quito</td>
<td>Four members of the BDG (Angelino Garzón and Luis Carlos Villegas from Colombia, and Ricardo Estrada, Andrés Valdivieso, from Ecuador) were in charge of managing an opportunity to promote messages of brotherhood between the two countries during the match. Luis Carlos Villegas asked the director of the Chamber of Cosmetics and Toiletries Industry of the ANDI for his support. Meanwhile, Ricardo Valdivieso and Andrés Estrada supported the initiative from Ecuador, facilitating contacts with the Ecuadorian Football Federation and getting typical Ecuadorian hats. It was expected that teams would come out wearing typical hats of both countries; it was also planned that the teams would leave the field with a big banner with the shields of both countries and the motto &quot;Ecuador and Colombia, one flag&quot; and that one child from Colombia and one from Ecuador sing the anthem of each other's country. This would add to the distribution of flyers with the same inscription than that in the flag.</td>
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<td>There were some changes of plans on the day of the game. The teams did not held the &quot;Ecuador and Colombia: a single flag&quot; flag when they entered the pitch, but the flag was shown at the stand during the entire match. The eleven Colombian players wore the traditional offered by the Ecuadorian players, but there was no reciprocity (the Ecuadorians did not wear hats). The media picked up the story in relation with some of the activities supported by group members.</td>
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<td>Activity type I BDG initiative executed by some of its members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Meeting between the BDG and President Uribe</td>
<td>June 25, 2008 Bogota</td>
<td>Share with the President concerns about the binational situation and show BDG efforts to improve relations between the two countries.</td>
<td>The BDG made a communiqué in which it reported that: 1. The President expressed his appreciation for the efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center and the Binational Dialogue Group and considered it suitable they continue their work towards the reconciliation between the two countries. 2. The group will meet tomorrow in Quito with the President of the Republic of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, and transmit the content of the topics discussed with the President of Colombia. After the meeting with President Correa, the Group will issue a public statement on the result of its efforts at the two meetings.</td>
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<td>Activity type I BDG initiative and execution</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Government** | Meeting between the BDG and President Correa | June 26, 2008 Quito | Share with the President concerns about the binational situation and show BDG efforts to improve relations between the two countries. | - President Correa reaffirmed his stand not to re-establish links with the neighboring country.  
- Some Ecuadorian members of the BDG felt that their efforts had not received sufficient support from the President.  
- The Carter Center released a statement which acknowledging that no conditions exist to continue good offices at the national authorities level for the restoration of diplomatic relations; however, it believes it is still necessary and important to continue with the efforts of citizen groups interested in contributing to the rapprochement between the two peoples. | Activity type I  
BDG initiative and execution |
| **Media** | Exchange spaces for columnists | Ongoing, since July 2008 | Initiative promoted by the Colombian and Ecuadorian journalists of BDG to promote greater knowledge of the situation in both countries. | - Publication of an article by Ricardo Ávila in Revista Criterios.  
- El Tiempo offered a monthly space for Ecuadorian columnists. | Activity type I  
Initiative and execution by some BDG members |
| **Civil Society** | Binational Meeting of Businesswomen (Fundación Mujeres por Colombia) | August 20, 2008 Bogota | Two women of the Colombian and one of the Ecuador Group attended the meeting. | Several media outlets covered the meeting and wrote articles about it. | Activity type II  
External initiative with participation of 3 BDG members |
| **Civil Society** | Binational forum on development policy | September 8-9, 2008 Quito | The activity was organized by the OAS, FLACSO and UNDP. The forum was organized by two members of the BDG (Adrián Bonilla and Grace Jaramillo). Socorro Ramírez and Antonio Navarro gave presentations. | Publication pending by FLACSO. | Activity type II  
External initiative with participation of 4 BDG members |
| **Government** | Meeting of the Ecuadorian members of the BDG with Defense Minister Javier Ponce | October 1, 2008 Quito | Ecuadorian BDG members met with Defense Minister Javier Ponce to inform him of the actions and objectives of the BDG and know his views on the relations between Colombia and Ecuador. | - The Minister suggested clarifying the role of the BDG and expressed that it could play an important role in strengthening and enriching relations between Colombia and Ecuador at the civil society level.  
- He offered to facilitate a visit by members of the BDG to border detachments. | Activity type I  
BDG initiative and execution |
| Government | Meeting of the Ecuadorian members of the BDG with Minister of Internal and External Security, Gustavo Larrea | October 16, 2008 Quito | Ecuadorian BDG members met with the Minister Gustavo Larrea to inform him of the actions and objectives of the BDG. | Minister Larrea stressed the importance of the BDG, in particular to support initiatives in business and academia, and binational development. | Activity type I BDG initiative and execution |
| Government | Meeting of the Ecuadorian members of the BDG with Chancellor M. Isabel Salvador and Vice-Minister José Valencia Quito | October 16, 2008 Quito | Ecuadorians BDG members met with the Foreign Minister and the Vice-Foreign Minister to inform them of the actions and objectives of the BDG. | - Minister Salvador drew attention to the importance of systematizing the efforts of the BDG to clearly distinguish the public nature of their efforts and the mediating role of other agencies, with emphasis on focusing on initiatives at the level of civil society.  - Vice Minister Valencia made a distinction between positive agenda items that depend on national governments and those that could be addressed by civil society and local governments. | Activity type I BDG initiative and execution |
| Government | Meeting of the Colombian members of the BDG with Foreign Minister Bermúdez | October 22, 2008 Bogota | Colombian BDG members met Foreign Minister Bermúdez to inform him of the actions and objectives of the BDG. | The Foreign Minister said that it was important that private initiatives for rapprochement between the peoples of Colombia and Ecuador were undertaken along with official ones. The BDG was differentiated as an unofficial channel for official efforts. | Activity type I BDG initiative and execution |
| Civil Society and Government | Creation of binational mechanism to address human trafficking issues. Repatriation of a number of victims, with support of BDG members | December 2008 Quito | Faced with a case of human trafficking in Colombian women in Quito, it was decided to establish a binational mechanism to address such problems and proceed to the repatriation of some of the victims to Colombia with special protection. | Margarita Carranco led the initiative. She was supported by the foreign offices and ombudsmen of the two countries, Antonio Navarro and Pedro Velasco. | Activity type I Initiative and execution by some BDG members |
| International Organizations | Meeting of the Colombian members of the BDG with OAS International Verification Commission | January 23, 2009 Bogota | The members of the OAS International Verification Commission met in confidence with Colombian members of the BDG. | - The OAS delegation informed the Colombian members of the BDG of the status of its efforts.  - Colombian BDG members described their vision and made suggestions to the Commission. | Activity type II OAS initiative with participation of the Colombia group |
| Civil Society | Pasto Forum  
“Colombia- Ecuador: Building Bridges, Peace Policy and Development for the Border” | February 9-10, 2009  
Pasto | Several BDG members took part in the meeting convened and organized by UNDP, OAS and the National University of Colombia; Antonio Navarro Wolf and Socorro Ramírez were key organizers. Participants also comprise Adrián Bonilla, Guillermo Rivera, Grace Jaramillo, Pedro Velasco and Dolores Padilla as speakers and / or moderators. | - Seven members of the BDG participated in the binational academic forum of Pasto.  
- The event was described as a success. Initially about 300 participants were expected, but the number of attendants eventually reached over 500  
- Of 507 participants, about 32% were Ecuadorian.  
- Attendants include some Ecuadorian mayors, civil society representatives and academics, but no governor attended and member of Assembly that had agreed to attend as a speaker, canceled his participation at the last minute.  
- On the Colombian side, several people attended from the government, such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Sub Secretary of Sovereignty and Border Development and a representative of Social Action (Acción Social).  
- There were brief and discrete exchanges between members of the BDG (Ecuadorians and Colombians), Foreign Minister Bermúdez and OAS.  
- The forum received extensive media coverage. | Activity type II  
External initiative organized by two BDG members with participation of 5 BDG members, with deep engagement and impact of some of them in the design, organization and development of the event. |
| International Organizations | Meeting of the Ecuadorian members of the BDG with OAS International Verification Commission, in Quito | March 16, 2009  
Quito | The members of the International Verification Commission of the OAS met in confidence with Ecuadorian members of BDG. | - The delegation of the OAS informed some Ecuadorian BDG members of status of its efforts.  
- The Ecuadorian members described their vision of BDG and made suggestions to the Commission.  
- The Ecuadorian Government gave its approval to this meeting. | Activity type II  
OAS initiative with participation of Ecuador group |
| Government | Luncheon with the BDG and President Correa | March 19, 2009 | The main purpose of this luncheon was to obtain a re-legitimization of BDG by the Ecuadorian government. This objective was met. | - BDG members stressed the readiness of President Correa to hear their perspectives and suggestions, especially in relation with making the impact of the breaking-off of diplomatic relations at the border.  
- President Correa was prepared to revisit the issue of criminal record and gave its support to binational initiatives at local government level. | Activity type I  
BDG initiative and execution (meeting proposed by presidency) |
| International Organizations | Meeting of the BDG with former President Jimmy Carter | April 28, 2009 | BDG members shared their views on the relations between Colombia and Ecuador with Jimmy Carter. The vision of the future of the BDG was discussed. | - BDG members made suggestions to Jimmy Carter's on how to approach his meeting with President Correa.  
- Possible strategies to help improve relations between the two countries at this juncture were discussed. | Activity type II  
External initiative with participation of the BDG |
Media

Development and publishing of articles and thinks pieces by BDG members

From September 2007 to May 2009

Published over 30 articles on Colombia-Ecuador by members of the BDG. It is noteworthy that also over 70 articles were published on Colombia-Ecuador making reference to members of the BDG.

Opinion makers of the group have reported that as a result of their participation in the BDG they were able to weight up information more in-depth and be more constructive in their appraisal of bilateral relations.

Activity type II
Initiative and implementation by some BDG members

Civil Society

Drafting of a publication containing contributions of each member of the BDG, accounting for this dialogue experience

March-October 2009

This publication will describe the history of the Binational Dialogue Group since its inception until the end of the second stage.

The publication is in preparation to the closing date of this report (September 2009) and include contributions from some members of BDG and Carter Center officials.

Activity type I
BDG initiative and execution

Civil Society

Binational Document

October 2009

Binational documentary containing interviews with opinion makers from both countries to former President Jimmy Carter and views of members of the group on various issues related to bilateral relations.

This film has been broadcasted in whole or in part in at least two visual media in Colombia and Ecuador.

Activity type I
BDG initiative and execution

ACTIVITIES type III: PENDING, SUSPENDED OR NOT EXECUTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVOCACY LEVEL</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>ORIGINAL PLAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADVOCACY IN THE MEDIA</td>
<td>Use of monthly Spaces in a Colombian and an Ecuadorian newspaper for columnists of the other country.</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
<td>Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Support for binational media initiatives</td>
<td>SUSPENDED (two Ecuadorian and two Colombian BDG members were expected to attend the II Binational Forum of Media Directors and Publishers)</td>
<td>Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<td>b) Assess current initiatives to support with their participation or articulation. Examples: Ebert Foundation, UDLA, II Binational Forum of Media Directors and Publishers (planned for October 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c) In the event that such initiatives do not have continuity, to convene a workshop to promote a press pool, with no more than 6-8 means of two countries for deepening information and work on joint articles.</td>
<td>SUSPENDED (lack of funding, conditions felt as not propitious)</td>
<td>Plan Quito November 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADVOCACY AT THE BORDER ZONE</td>
<td>Meeting at El Tiempo between journalists of the two countries on specific topics (e.g. International financial crisis).</td>
<td>SUSPENDED</td>
<td>Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Meeting of local authorities of the municipalities of the ZIF in Rumichaca to address the border development plan of the ZIF</td>
<td>SUSPENDED</td>
<td>Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Objective: To initiate a process to develop and implement the development plan of the ZIF</td>
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<td><strong>MEETINGS AND FORA</strong></td>
<td><strong>OTHER INITIATIVES IDENTIFIED ON THE SHORT TERM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>From Colombia: mayors, indigenous governments, afro descendant representatives From Ecuador: governors, prefects, mayors, presidents of parish councils. Other participants: CAF, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Plan Ecuador, UE, UNDP-ART/REDES, UNDP-ART/PDP-FN, CAN</td>
<td>Quito November 2008</td>
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<td>Cycle-ride San Miguel Bridge: 100 cyclists per country, cultural activity with artists from both countries.</td>
<td>NOT EXECUTED Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binational Public Forum on Security.</td>
<td>NOT EXECUTED Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting of Entrepreneurs from both countries.</td>
<td>SUSPENDED (conditions felt as not propitious) Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binational Meeting of Workers.</td>
<td>NOT EXECUTED Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closed and confidential meeting on security issues. / No meeting / Military, police and civilians discussing behind closed doors, ideally in a third country.</td>
<td>NOT EXECUTED Plan Atlanta May 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private Meeting of key Businesspeople from both countries (It would replace the Forum with ANDI-CORPEI scheduled in Guayaquil).</td>
<td>SUSPENDED (conditions felt as not propitious) Plan Quito November 2008</td>
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<td>Visit of the Peace Commission of the House of Representatives of Colombia to the Committee on International Relations and Public Safety of the Committee on Legislation and Fiscalization of Ecuador.</td>
<td>SUSPENDED Plan Quito November 2008</td>
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<td>E-alerts Mini studies with a frame question. The first on: What are the costs of not having binational relations? There will be a release every time we have new study, no regular dissemination required. Should be seen as an alert.</td>
<td>Conducted one study on the costs of not having binational relations in Colombia, not disseminated</td>
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<td>Exploration of a possible binational meeting of trade unions.</td>
<td>SUSPENDED</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair Colombia in Ecuador.</td>
<td>SUSPENDED</td>
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4. **Indicators of the evaluation objectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
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</table>
| Objective 1 | I.1. Knowledge about the objectives.  
To identify the objectives of the Dialogue process; evolution and accomplishment of these objectives  
I.2. Coherence between the objectives as understood by participants and the actual objectives stated in the project document.  
I.3. Dispersion in the definition of the project’s objectives.  
I.5. Perception of changes in the objectives over the process.  
I.6. Effects of changes in objectives on the process. |
| Objective 2 | I.7. Identification of external events that had an impact on the process.  
To identify and analyze the contextual elements that conditioned the initiative  
I.8. Positive/negative effects of the external events on the process. |
| Objective 3 | I.9. Identification and appraisal of outcomes/outputs in the process.  
To identify and analyze tangible and intangible outputs and outcomes of the Binational Dialogue that may help the evaluation of a future strategy  
I.10. Internal/external outcomes and outputs.  
I.11. Intended/unintended outcomes and outputs. |
| Objective 4 | I.12. Considerations on the design.  
I.14. Objective time line considerations.  
I.15. Adequacy of the participant’s profile.  
I.18. Expectations about UNDP-CC alliance beyond the process time line. |
| Objectives 5 and 6 | I.19. Identification of best practices that might be replicated in the future.  
To identify lessons learned to improve practice. To generate recommendations for participants, institutions and other interested actors, in the area of dialogue  
I.20. Identification of changes that may be required in the future.  
Considering that the production of pieces in the media has been identified as one of the most outstanding outputs within the Binational Dialogue process, some paragraphs extracted from articles and columns written by BDG opinion-makers are reproduced here for illustrative purposes, as a token of the favorable approach aimed at improving and/or resuming binational relations.

“It is necessary to highlight that, despite the tense situation, Uribe came to Ecuador. Our country must acknowledge this attitude and be reciprocal somehow to regain progressively the level that corresponds to the very important relations between the two nations and their peoples, and insistently requested by civil society. Despite Ecuador not renouncing its firm position regarding the deep differences with Colombia, the gesture could help their resuming direct dialogue on every issue, including the most conflictive ones, frankly and pragmatically, in order to find a way out.” (Carrión Mena, 2007)  

“There is an atmosphere of confrontation that common sense has to calm down. Spirits must be disarmed, belligerent language banished. We must pave the way for the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations broken by such an unwise event. This is a request of the two communities, who shall be neighbors forever and ever, and deserve fruitful bonds of supportive unity, fostering of cultural activities and dynamic trade exchange.” (Ruiz Álvarez 2008)  

“The issues of peace and war require a rational system to soothe strong feelings and find arrangements among peoples who are, in fact, brothers, neighbors and complements. Our two countries share the central role of their presidents, with weak institutional counterbalance systems. Therefore, the responsibility relies mainly in Correa and Uribe to find a solution to the conflict. However, civil society must also put on the pressure.” (Chiriboga, 2008)  

“On February 9-10, Pasto will host a binational conference called “Building Bridges” which, such as the one held in Quito, brings authorities and local organizations together, academia and multilateral organizations, seeking for closer and beneficial binational relations. Governments should hear those voices and others coming from civil society, to remind us that the existing differences are necessarily nothing but temporary, while neighborhood will last forever.” (Ramírez, 2009)

“It is obvious that the government’s approach is not resuming diplomatic relations, but citizenship does not longer agree. Maybe the moment has come to start dialogue, to understand each other, even through a minimal agenda. People living by the Northern border and on the Colombian side – in the midst of poverty, insecurity and neglect- are also sovereign. And if we have to give up some ground so that they have a better life, let’s just do it.” (Jaramillo, 2009)40

“…However, even facing those circumstances, the long common border works in favor of the commercial relations between the two countries. That border has been the source of countless problems, but has also provided so many opportunities.” (Ávila, 2009)41

“…It is time to think about common good, to leave behind the strategy of deepening the differences by adopting radicalizing measures, and move towards practical solutions. Be the concept of sovereignty respected, Colombia and Ecuador are two nations that share a common origin and a common fate. Their governments must understand that fact and facilitate the reestablishment of such necessary relations.” (Nieto, 2009)42

41 Ávila, Ricardo. “Ecuador-Colombia una frontera de oportunidades”, El Tiempo, Colombia, 25 de enero de 2009.
42 Nieto, Rafael. “Relaciones necesarias”, El Tiempo. Colombia, 1 de febrero 2009
6. Abbreviations

AECID  Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development  
BDG  Binational Dialogue Group  
CAF  Andean Development Corporation  
CC  Carter Center  
CDA  Collaborative for Development Action  
DDRP  Democratic Dialogue Regional Project  
FARC  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  
IMOU  Institutional Memorandum of Understanding  
RBLAC  United Nations Development Programme’s Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean  
RPP  Reflecting on Peace Practice  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme

7. Analyzed documents

- Process conceptual notes  
- Meeting agendas  
- Minutes and/or memoires of binational dialogue meetings and national meetings  
- Process documents (meeting design – internal reports)  
- Press articles produced by participants  
- Articles on the activities of the BDG or the institutions  
- Press releases on the BDG and institutions  
- Documents on BDG’s activities  
- Online communications between officials and BDG members  
- Interviews with officials and members of the BDG  
- Intermediate evaluation report

8. Bibliography


**Church C. & Shouldice J.** The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions. Framing the State of Play. INCORE, Ireland, 2002. Published in: <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk>.


