

Chapter 5

MEDIATING A CEASEFIRE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION MECHANISM

This chapter reviews the building blocks and principles that guide the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring and verification (M&V) mechanism. These mechanisms are intended to enhance the accountability of parties and increase the predictability of their actions, with the aim of contributing to the sustainability and credibility of the ceasefire.

5.1 Key M&V elements and terminology

As part of broader guarantees, conflict parties often negotiate the establishment of political and operational mechanisms that are designed to oversee, promote and measure compliance with a peace agreement through a set of supervisory structures, committees or bodies. A ceasefire M&V mechanism can be visualized as a subset of this wider oversight framework. The most effective M&V mechanisms are realistic, implementable and sustainable.

M&V mechanisms may involve a range of explicitly stated or implied activities, including monitoring, verification, coordination, information sharing, early warning, investigation, reporting and dispute resolution, not all of which are necessarily stipulated in a ceasefire agreement. The level of detail on an M&V mechanism in negotiations and in formal agreements varies across contexts.

Preliminary ceasefires that focus primarily on de-escalation may require very basic levels of monitoring, mutual coordination, information sharing and reporting, without any capacity to undertake verification. In contrast, M&V frameworks for definitive ceasefires tend to be more elaborate, covering not only the ceasefire, but also interim, transitional and final security arrangements.

There are no set definitions for the broad elements of M&V mechanisms. It is therefore vital that the conflict parties understand and

agree on terminology and the implied actions associated with each term. This section offers general descriptions of the scope, actions and activities associated with commonly used terms in the context of ceasefires: monitoring, verification, investigation and reporting.

Monitoring refers broadly to the process of following up on the status of compliance with an agreement using visual and technical means of observation, as well as the gathering of information and reports from various sources. Observer teams and technical devices carry out these activities remotely or on site, continuously or periodically. Monitoring may be passive – that is, reliant on a range of dedicated or open sources for information, yet with limited or no ability to verify that information. In contrast, an active monitoring modality allows for the credible verification of inputs through dedicated resources. Active monitoring is not always possible, especially during the initial stages of some preliminary ceasefires, when trust levels are low and monitoring teams have limited access. Monitoring teams may be the conflict parties themselves; a mutually agreed third party; or joint groups of representatives from all conflict parties, with or without third-party representatives.

Verification serves to corroborate the veracity of incidents or actions, with the aim of establishing whether actions by a conflict party or parties are in compliance with provisions of an agreement. The conflict parties jointly agree on the modalities and mechanisms for the verification of incidents or actions, such as the redeployment of forces from one location to another, or an alleged violation of a ceasefire agreement. If verified incidents are cate-

gorized as violations of an agreement and the relevant provisions of the agreement call for an inquiry, an investigation may be launched to help establish attribution. Regular monitoring and information gathering can support a verification process. Single mechanisms tend to undertake both the monitoring and the verification functions, although the parties may agree to form separate mechanisms depending on the contextual requirements.

Investigations are an integral part of a verification process. The aim of an investigation may include ascertaining the circumstances around a verified event or attributing responsibility for an incident to an individual or entity that belongs to or is aligned with a conflict party or parties. Mediators can encourage conflict parties to agree on the broad guiding principles for investigation mechanisms as part of the main ceasefire agreement, while detailed modalities may be developed later, as part of implementation plans. The terms used to refer to investigations may vary according to regional and cultural sensitivities.

Investigative bodies typically require technical or forensic expertise, have specific terms of reference, and are expected to conduct and report on their work in the strictest confidence. A separate investigation mechanism may be used in the case of highly sensitive violations that could have far-reaching political and security implications. The inclusion of women in investigation mechanisms helps to promote gender equality and can facilitate sensitive investigations, including into violations involving conflict-related sexual violence. The results of investigations are usually submitted to oversight bodies that review findings and, in the case of proven violations, attribute culpability. Both the investigation and verification processes are predicated on unhindered access and security guarantees for the designated teams or personnel.

Reporting is essential to M&V and underpins all its modalities. Ideally, the ceasefire agreement clearly lays out broad reporting lines with respect to M&V operations. More specific instructions can be set out in standard operating procedures or similar documents prepared to guide implementation. The level of detail to be negotiated among the parties needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Fundamental reporting issues include the procedures and cycles of reporting on M&V activities, both internally and to external partners; procedures for reporting on ceasefire violations and outcomes of investigations, both for individual cases and as compiled data; and the management of information and its confiden-

tiality, particularly with respect to the identity of survivors of sexual violence, for whom social stigma and other consequences may have life-long impacts. Periodic reports, which are jointly developed by conflict parties, to mutually identified and agreed stakeholders helps enhance transparency and build trust in the process. The conflict parties need to agree on the contents of such reports.

5.2 Designing a basic M&V mechanism


The scope, role, function and composition of a ceasefire M&V mechanism vary from one context to another, as these systems require tailored approaches. Certain elements, however, tend to be common to M&V mechanisms and can strengthen a ceasefire agreement.

In general, an M&V mechanism is an integral part of a broader framework entrusted with overseeing the implementation of a peace agreement. The M&V mechanism usually reports to a designated political oversight body, which may also be responsible for guiding political and economic mechanisms defined by a comprehensive peace agreement. In preliminary ceasefire negotiations, however, conflict parties may decide that such political oversight is neither feasible nor required to start with, and that it could be added later.

Within an M&V mechanism, a principal ceasefire monitoring committee, or its equivalent, usually sits at the apex and assumes overall responsibility for M&V functions. Subcommittees or substructures may assist the principal committee in providing comprehensive coverage of the ceasefire area; each may be entrusted with managing M&V functions in specific ceasefire area sectors. The committee and subcommittees are generally supported by monitoring teams that operate at the local level. These teams represent the most visible monitoring presence in affected communities (see Figure 2).

Decision-making is often delegated to lower levels to support the timely resolution of disputes and to prevent escalation. Only disputes that cannot be resolved locally or on the ground are referred to a higher-level committee. The joint composition of an M&V mechanism and its principal committee or subcommittees and teams can allow conflict parties to interact, exchange information, build personal relations, foresee potential conflicts and undertake prevention and resolution activities, all of which helps to sustain a ceasefire.

Figure 2: A generic model of a monitoring and verification mechanism



NOTES

- The principal ceasefire M&V mechanism generally takes guidance from and reports to a principal political oversight mechanism, if one is established.
- The number of committees and M&V teams at the regional and sub-regional levels varies across contexts, details of which are formally negotiated and agreed by the conflict parties.
- The nature of relationships between the ceasefire M&V mechanism and formal and informal networks of communities, women, youth groups, religious actors or business entities varies across contexts and requires formal agreement between the parties.
- Gender-inclusive composition of all committees is essential for a credible and responsive M&V mechanism.
- A third party, if invited to support a M&V mechanism, can play a wide range of roles, including provision of technical advisors and staff for secretariats to chairing or facilitating the mechanism at some or each level.

5.3 The roles of different actors in M&V mechanisms

The establishment of an M&V mechanism is guided by the type of ceasefire agreement, its mandate and the local conflict dynamics, which can affect access and security guarantees for monitors. Conflict parties play a pivotal role by instituting various forums of the mechanism and agreeing on the designated representatives' number and composition, including with respect to rank and gender balance. This section outlines various options around roles that can be played by third parties, national actors, civil society and local communities in support of M&V mechanisms.

5.3.1 Third parties

A credible third party typically serves as an additional guarantee for transparency and accountability, and as a deterrent against ceasefire violations and impunity. Third parties are often critical to the effective functioning of an M&V mechanism. Indeed, unless third parties play a formal or informal role in the operation of an M&V mechanism, some conflict parties may perceive it as lacking in transparency or objectivity.

This Guidance defines a “third party” as an individual, organization, one or more UN Member States, or any combination of these entities, so long as they are not a party to the conflict, are mutually acceptable and, at the request of the conflict parties, can play a specific role in the monitoring and verification of a ceasefire. The need for, identification, scope and mandate of third parties tend to be contentious issues during peace processes, especially during ceasefire negotiations.

A third party can be a national or an international entity. An international third party may coordinate, collaborate or work jointly with national third-party actors, or operate independently of them. Historically, the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations, individual UN Member States, a consortium of States created for a specific context, and religious organizations have all played different types of international third-party roles in ceasefire M&V mechanisms (see Section 5.3.2 and Table 1).

Conflict parties may invite a national entity to support an M&V mechanism without any direct or formal input or support from external third parties. They may do so based on preferences or in view of contextual security and political dynamics that prevent inter-

national third parties from playing a formal M&V role. While all M&V mechanisms are resource-intensive, those supported by a national third party tend to face additional challenges related to technical, financial and human resources and capacities. In comparison to external actors, however, they typically operate on more detailed knowledge of the local situation.

By advising the parties to consider funding, the availability of secretariat support staff, and the technical capacities and timelines required for establishing such secretariats and support structures, mediators are able to assist them in negotiating options for M&V mechanisms. In so doing, mediators can clarify that a third party may take on one or several of the following responsibilities:

- full participation in all functions and across all levels of an M&V mechanism
- implementation of monitoring and verification, either as an integral part or independent of a national M&V mechanism
- strategic oversight through participation in supervisory committees as observers, guarantors or members
- provision of resources for an M&V mechanism
- provision of secretariat services to an M&V mechanism
- provision of technical support or advice, without being integrated in an M&V mechanism.

*In 2019, in the Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines, a national M&V mechanism operated alongside an international oversight body without being integrated into it.*⁴⁴

*In October 2015, the Government of Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which established a tripartite Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee involving the national military, ethnic armed organizations and civil society. International third parties had no role in the mechanism.*⁴⁵

5.3.2 Civil society and local communities

Among the most critical stakeholders in a peace process are national and local civil society organizations, including women's groups and civilian communities. Through direct engagement in M&V mechanisms, these groups can enhance the inclusivity and credibility of the structures. The following considerations can help to guide whether and how they may be involved:

44. The Terms of Reference of International Monitoring Team, <https://peace.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/IMT-TOR-APR-2019.pdf>

45. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, 2015, <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/2701>.

- How are civil society groups or local communities defined and perceived in the local context? How are they represented?
- Can local communities play an impartial role? What is their relationship with the conflict parties?
- How are these individuals or groups of people to be selected, assigned tasks, nominated or permitted to volunteer? How are they to be equipped to play their role?
- What has been and what could be the scope and nature of their formal or informal roles in the mechanism or conflict resolution more broadly?
- Do they need to be integrated into the M&V mechanism or should they work in a parallel, coordinated manner? Could they serve as credible third-party actors (see Section 5.3.1)?
- Do they have a history of involvement in previous M&V mechanisms and, if so, what was the nature of their involvement and its outcome?
- How will their personal safety be assured?

The roles that civil society groups and local communities could or should play in a ceasefire M&V mechanism depend on the specific context. Mediators may wish to familiarize themselves with the corresponding benefits, risks and opportunities, guided by the “do no harm” principle (see Section 3.6).

The M&V roles played by civil society and local communities generally fall into either of the following categories, although parties may wish to develop hybrid approaches (see Table 1):

- **Civilian ceasefire monitoring.** Groups or individuals from civil society or community-based organizations perform this function by monitoring and reporting violations in line with relevant provisions of

a ceasefire. Their degree of involvement in other M&V aspects – such as verification, investigations and attribution in case of proven violations – varies widely, from extensive to none. The relationship between these monitors and the M&V mechanism is normally formalized and can evolve over time.

- **Civilian protection mechanisms.** This approach is more focused on conflict or incident prevention, early warning, protection and de-escalation, and less on monitoring and reporting violations. Participants work collaboratively with the formal M&V structures without being formally integrated into them.

In encouraging parties to ensure gender and age diversity in M&V mechanisms, mediators can suggest the adoption of targeted, context-specific modalities. This approach is applicable regardless of whether the parties are considering a national or international third-party option, as the M&V teams and mechanisms of either model are expected to be gender-balanced and to include young people. Section 5.4 offers mediators specific considerations to help guide discussions on the advantages of gender-responsive M&V structures.

5.4 Reinforcing the protection and safety of civilians through M&V mechanisms

In highlighting measures for responding to ceasefire violations that threaten the safety and protection of civilians, this section notes the need to build awareness and support for age and gender diversity in M&V frameworks.

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UN observers on patrol, 2005.

Credit: UN Photo/Luboš Podhorský



Table 1: Composition of selected monitoring and verification mechanisms

Context	Ceasefire M&V mechanism	Date established	Components		
			International third party	Conflict parties	Civil society
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) ^{46 *}	United Nations Military Observer Group	1949	✓	✗	✗
Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities (the Philippines) ⁴⁷	Coordinating Committees for the Cessation of Hostilities; Local Monitoring Teams	1997	✗	✓	✓
Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement on Sudan ⁴⁸	Joint Military Commission	2002	✓	✓	✗
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army ⁴⁹	Ceasefire Joint Military Committee	2005	✓	✓	✓
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations ⁵⁰	Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee	2015	✗	✓	✓
Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace (Colombia) ⁵¹	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism	2016	✓	✓	✓ ⁺⁺
Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic ⁵²	Executive Monitoring Committee	2019	✓	✓	✓

* The conflict parties coordinate with UNMOGIP as per agreed mechanisms. They do not form part of any joint M&V mechanism.

++ The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism had formal coordination mechanisms with civil society actors. The latter were not integrated into the M&V mechanism, however.

Ceasefire M&V mechanisms often develop informal coordination and collaboration mechanisms with civil society actors for their operations. This chart does not reflect those arrangements.

46. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip>.

47. Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities, 1997, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/244>.

48. Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement on Sudan, 2002, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-nubamountains-ceasefire2002>.

49. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, 2005, <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369>.

50. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, 2015, <https://peacemadaker.un.org/node/2701>.

51. Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016, https://unmc.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2017-272_e.pdf.

52. Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, 2019, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2147>.

During negotiations, mediators can encourage conflict parties to consider integrating the following elements in the evolving ceasefire document, including by providing them with access to technical advice and assistance:

- the adoption of inclusive M&V mechanisms that allow for relevant stakeholders such as civil society, women, and youth groups to play a meaningful role (as part of or in support of committees established for the purposes of reporting, receiving, responding to and investigating violations) – a step that takes on particular importance with respect to the management of potential ceasefire violations related to the safety and protection of civilians, conflict-related sexual violence and humanitarian coordination
- principles on the provision of services and support for survivors of violence and abuse in ceasefire-affected areas
- provisions relevant to the protection of civilians, codes of conduct and management of violations, all of which can be highlighted in outreach messages and materials about the ceasefire for communities, including women and young people
- provisions for M&V mechanisms that can receive reports of violations directly from civilians and civilian organizations
- commitments to develop standard operating procedures that lay out gender- and age-sensitive modalities for receiving and collecting information on incidents and complaints from individuals who have experienced conflict-related gender-based or sexual violence
- clear commitments to provide an enabling environment for M&V activities and to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information and of the identity of individuals, especially those who provide information about sexual violence, in a way that reflects a survivor-centred approach and the principles of “do no harm” and informed consent
- clear commitments to comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law while undertaking a wide range of M&V activities, especially with respect to the safety and protection of civilians.

In contexts where international third parties play a substantial role in supporting M&V activities, they are often expected to assume broader responsibilities. They may be tasked with providing technical expertise, delivering advice on the development of gender- and age-sensitive and -responsive standard operating procedures, training party representatives and reporting on the state of compliance regarding issues related to the safety and protection of civilians.

In some settings, however, M&V mechanisms may lack the mandate or technical capacity to respond to issues concerning the protection of civilians. In these situations, mediators can seek clarity on what systems or actors outside of the M&V mechanism are able or mandated to undertake monitoring and reporting on such issues, and how their efforts may be able to complement M&V work.

5.5 Problem solving, dispute resolution and decision-making in M&V mechanisms

Problem solving, dispute prevention and resolution, and de-escalation underpin all levels of any implementation mechanism. Following the signing of a ceasefire, these functions tend to assume greater importance, as the number of complaints and disputes may spike, and even minor infractions may lead to a rapid escalation of tensions.

The nature of disputes can vary significantly, as can the responses. Ceasefire-related disputes that revolve around ambiguities in specific agreement provisions are usually referred to higher security or political oversight bodies, preferably in line with terms set out in the agreement. Other disputes may be linked to the occurrence or outcome of a ceasefire violation verification or investigation, or to civil society or local community grievances and complaints, as conveyed to an M&V mechanism.

Mediators can advise conflict parties to include formal processes for problem solving and dispute resolution in their agreements, emphasizing that these provisions facilitate de-escalation, especially in the case of preliminary ceasefires. During the ceasefire implementation phase, such provisions can allow parties to develop their standard operating procedures.

The joint nature of M&V structures can provide an inbuilt set of guarantees and facilitate dispute prevention and resolution among stakeholders (see Figure 2). In many cases, such guarantees and functions are reinforced through the inclusion of third parties, which can take on any of a variety of roles, such as arbitration, monitoring, verification and investigations.

Most ceasefire agreements include a decision-making process based either on consensus or on a majority vote. While building such consensus may take time, doing so fosters ownership and trust among the parties. If conflict parties lead and manage ceasefire monitoring without the involvement of a third party, they may choose to support deci-



The United Nations Mission in South Sudan facilitates a community conflict resolution roundtable, 2015
Credit: UN Photo/JC Mclwaine

sion-making and conflict resolution through rotational or co-chairmanship options, or by balancing representation within the mechanism. If third parties are involved in M&V systems, their impartiality may help the conflict parties to reach consensus, or they may hold the “deciding vote” on a decision.

5.6 Technology and M&V mechanisms

In the broader context of ceasefire mediation and specifically with respect to facilitating M&V, mediators can advise the parties to explore the use of technological tools. While technology cannot replace human efforts on M&V, it has the potential to complement and support them.⁵³ The following ceasefire M&V activities may benefit from the use of technology:

- information management, which involves processes for collecting, collating, synthesizing, analysing, storing and disseminating information
- the reporting and management of ceasefire violations, including procedures for classifying and responding to violations, as well as means stakeholders can use to report alleged violations or file complaints, such as cell phone-based platforms enabled by a geographic information system
- monitoring and verification functions, including via aerial sensors (aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and other drones, or balloons) and ground-based platforms (radars, motion-detecting sensors, cam-

eras), whose use may require an agreed concept of operations to address potential sensitivities

- data collection and management in the context of ISAs, TSAs and FSAs, and the use of technology for gathering data on combatants, weapons and equipment in these processes.

Mediators are encouraged to take the following considerations into account when assessing the applicability of technological options:

- the specific value added of the proposed technology
- the resources and technical skills required to set up, operate, maintain, repair and update the proposed technology
- the technical literacy, existing capacities and comfort level with the use of proposed technology, both among the parties and any persons or bodies required to operate it
- the information security and other risks associated with the proposed technology
- the enabling environment (for example, the presence of cellular telecommunication infrastructure and its coverage if open source ceasefire reporting is being considered)
- the sourcing of technology and its potential political implications, as well as the option of diversifying sources to obtain the conflict parties' support
- broader public trust and perceptions of the proposed technology.

53. UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict, 2019, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DigitalToolkitReport.pdf>.

KEY GUIDANCE POINTS: MEDIATING A CEASEFIRE M&V MECHANISM

The nature and type of an M&V mechanism

- Ceasefire monitoring and verification (M&V) mechanisms are intended to enhance the accountability of conflict parties and increase the predictability of their actions, so as to contribute to the sustainability and credibility of the ceasefire.
- The most effective M&V mechanisms are realistic, implementable and sustainable. That said, M&V mechanisms are enablers, at best. The sustainability of a ceasefire is rooted in the willingness of conflict parties to adhere to their commitments.
- An M&V mechanism is typically an integral part of a broader framework entrusted with overseeing implementation of a peace or ceasefire agreement. The M&V mechanism usually reports to a designated political oversight body.
- The concept, scope and structure of an M&V mechanism are driven and guided by the nature and objectives of a ceasefire. Preliminary ceasefires may feature only basic monitoring while the M&V frameworks for definitive ceasefires tend to be more elaborate, covering not only the ceasefire, but also interim, transitional or final security arrangements.
- A key function of the mediator is facilitating consensus among the conflict parties on the basic building blocks of an M&V mechanism, including M&V objectives, a conceptual framework, procedures, and roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders.
- Within an M&V mechanism, a principal ceasefire monitoring committee (or its equivalent) usually sits at the apex and assumes overall responsibility for M&V functions. Subcommittees or structures may assist the principal committee in providing comprehensive coverage of the ceasefire area. Their work is supported by monitoring teams operating at the local level.
- Clarity on how decisions are to be reached and disputes or disagreements are to be managed within the M&V structures can strengthen a ceasefire agreement and enhance its sustainability.
- The complexity of some contexts calls for an incremental approach to M&V. In such cases, mediators can encourage parties to incorporate provisions in ceasefire agreements that allow for an incremental expansion of M&V activities, which usually evolve in terms of scope, details and structures.

Capacities and resources for M&V mechanisms

- A good understanding of the technical aspects of M&V can help parties develop pragmatic options for negotiations. Mediators can support the parties by continually assessing their need for capacity-building and facilitating requested assistance in a transparent and equitable manner.
- M&V frameworks require specialized capacities, time and resources once ceasefire implementation commences. By ensuring that the parties have access to technical advice during negotiations, mediators can help them to be realistic about M&V framework options.
- Mediators can advise the parties to explore the applicability of technological tools. While technology cannot replace human efforts on M&V, it can complement and support them. M&V activities that may benefit from the use of technology include information management, remote monitoring and verification functions, and data collection for interim, transitional and final security arrangements.

Roles of stakeholders in M&V mechanisms

- Conflict parties play a pivotal role in designing M&V mechanisms by agreeing on the various processes and forums of the mechanism, and on their composition, including the number, rank and gender balance of their members.
- A credible third party can serve as an additional guarantor of transparency and accountability, and as a deterrent against ceasefire violations and impunity. They are often critical to the effective functioning of an M&V mechanism.
- An effective, well-resourced, gender- and age-responsive M&V mechanism is critical for ensuring the credibility and sustainability of a ceasefire that contains extensive provisions on the safety and protection of civilians. In cases where international third parties are tasked with supporting M&V mechanisms; they are often expected to assume some responsibility in these areas.
- Mediators can encourage conflict parties to negotiate, agree on and unambiguously articulate potential roles and responsibilities of women, youth groups, civil society and local communities in a ceasefire M&V framework. These steps can have the effect of broadening the ownership of a ceasefire among communities, while also enhancing its credibility and sustainability.
- The M&V roles played by civil society and local communities generally fall into one of two categories, although parties may develop hybrid approaches. The first category is civilian ceasefire monitoring, whereby civil society actors monitor and report on violations in line with relevant ceasefire provisions. The second approach is more focused on the protection of civilians, including through conflict or incident prevention, early warning, protection and de-escalation.

Ceasefire monitoring in Kidal, Northern Mali

A mixed commission visits Kidal in northern Mali to monitor the ceasefire agreement signed by the Government of Mali and Tuareg rebels in 2013.

Credit: UN Photo/Blagoje Grujic

