Reflections on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes

—Edited by Cate Buchanan—
ABOUT THE HD CENTRE

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) is an independent Swiss foundation dedicated to helping improve the global response to armed conflict. It attempts to achieve this by mediating between warring parties and providing support to the broader mediation community.

The HD Centre is driven by humanitarian values; its goal is to reduce the consequences of violent conflict, improve security, and ultimately contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflict. The HD Centre began operations in 1999 and has since become one of the world’s leading conflict mediation organisations. Operational engagements are complemented by policy and analytical work focused on civilian protection, mediation techniques, transitional issues and arms and security matters.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
114 rue de Lausanne
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland

Phone +41 22 908 1130
Fax +41 22 908 1140
E-mail info@hdcentre.org
Website www.hdcentre.org

Photo: a sign is seen after KFOR soldiers sealed-off an area to investigate the scene where one Kosovo Albanian died and three were injured in a minefield left from the Kosovo war in 1999, near the village of Harilaq, 20 km north of Kosovo capital Pristina on April 1, 2008. © Reuters/Photographer Hazir Reka

Design & layout: Richard Jones (rick@studioexile.com)

Reflections on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes
—Edited by Cate Buchanan—
‘Negotiating Disarmament’ explores issues surrounding the planning, timing and techniques of a range of security issues, including violence reduction, weapons control, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities, and justice and security sector transformation, in the processes of peacemaking—negotiations, agreements and implementation strategies. Through expert meetings, specific peace process reviews, perception studies, interviews and analysing experiences over the last two decades, as well as drawing upon the HD Centre’s own operational engagements, it aims to:

- provide practical and accessible guidance on a range of security issues to those actively engaged in peacemaking, including mediators, government officials, armed groups, donors, civil society and UN officials;
- demystify concerns by identifying strategies, trends and lessons over time;
- identify and describe common obstacles faced in addressing security issues in peace processes, and suggest ways these may be tackled; and
- contribute to the generation of analysis and the building of linkages within the violence reduction and prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and arms control communities.

The project is supported by the Governments of Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For more information, go to www.hdccentre.org

**Project publications to date**


CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION CATE BUCHANAN .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. WALKING THROUGH MINEFIELDS: VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT BY MEDIATORS DURING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
CAREY CAVANAUGH ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5

2. LAYING DOWN ARMS: THE M-19 RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA VERA GRABE ............................................................. 12

3. NEGOTIATING SECURITY ISSUES IN THE JUBA PROCESS ANTON BAARÉ ........................................................................................................... 20
THOSE AROUND THE peace negotiating table are charged with several responsibilities. Chief among these is to bring an end to or at least significantly reduce the incidence of violence, in the short and long term. Yet negotiating security issues is an eminently political endeavor, and a hornet’s nest of symbolism and tactics. It is now clear that security concerns cannot be sidestepped or relegated to low priority in peace processes, and that representatives of warring parties and those assisting dialogue face multiple pressures on which substantive agreement must be reached, including the transformation of security and justice systems; establishing control of the vast quantities of weapons in circulation; addressing the needs of those traumatised and disabled by armed violence; and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of fighting forces.

This second volume of Viewpoints: Reflections on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes brings together a rich collection of voices and experiences on security issues in peace processes, with the aim of contributing to the various debates and discussions around these difficult subjects. As a companion to the first volume of March 2008, this edition of Viewpoints collects a unique set of insights on security issues drawing upon the individual experiences of those involved in peace processes. From the perspective of representatives of warring parties, Vera Grabe, a leading member for sixteen years of the Colombian guerrilla group Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), describes that organisation’s gravitation towards non-violence and demobilisation. From the perspective of thematic advisers to peace processes, Anton Barré shares his views and recent experience as DDR adviser over the course of the negotiations to bring an end to the long running war in northern Uganda (the ‘Juba process’), while mediator Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh draws on the example of Nagorno-Karabakh to address the dramatic steps third parties may be called on to take in order to contain violence during the negotiation phase.

The Viewpoints volumes join a number of studies and publications in the ‘Negotiating Disarmament’ series. Some of these publications address thematic issues such as trends in weapons control and violence reduction provisions in peace agreements; armed civilians and militias; and understanding how to better address the presence of bombs and unexploded ordnance. Others include a three-part series of Country Studies which examine how security issues were negotiated in the El Salvador, Burundi and Sudan peace talks.

The Centre acknowledges the support of the governments of Canada, Switzerland and Norway for providing funding for the Viewpoints series, and for the ‘Negotiating Disarmament’ project. Appreciation is also extended to Emile LeBrun, Luc Choulet-Cambas, Suzanne Damman, and Wynne Russell, who have variously reviewed, edited, and assisted with drafting, as well as providing advice and ideas.

—Cate Buchanan
Editor, November 2008
Standing in the blistering sun in the middle of a minefield in the Caucasus, with snipers from both warring sides watching your every move, brings home in no uncertain terms the extreme steps mediators may be required to take to reduce the prospects of violence and death in order to advance the potential for peace. This situation, which I experienced in 2000 and 2001 while trying to advance resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, fit neither the typical image of peace mediation presented at diplomatic academies, nor the one held by junior diplomats. Peace mediation was supposed to be far more glamorous: crafting deals between leaders, arguing about the best venue for talks or the shape of the negotiating table, or maybe meeting charismatic rebel leaders deep in the jungle. But crossing live minefields on foot? This had never been raised as a possible essential component of promoting a standard peace plan. Why was this necessary? And what exactly were we doing?

The position of mediators and advisers in peace negotiations is one that comes with no textbooks. One of the many issues that third parties need to navigate with belligerents is the reconfiguration of security. To do so, mediators in particular must be ready to deal with and overcome a wide range of possible roadblocks, including lack of trust; spoilers; the excessive expectations of outside parties; tight timelines; militarisation and cultures of violent conflict resolution, among other barriers. In this opinion piece I will focus on one of those roadblocks, the threat of violence, and some ways in which mediators tackle this challenge, as well as acquire some leverage from its presence or impacts.

From 1992 to 2001, while serving as a career US Foreign Service officer, I was involved in negotiation or mediation processes seeking to remedy conflicts involving Armenia and Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh), Cyprus, Georgia (over Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (over Transnistria), and Tajikistan, as well as to reduce general tensions between Greece and Turkey. My responsibilities during these assignments included providing indirect support to UN efforts, directly supporting negotiations sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), working in the framework of a ‘Group of Friends’ to back UN mediation, shared leadership of an OSCE peace effort, and directing US bilateral engagement. This professional experience provided insights into a variety of peace processes, in particular those involving so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts.

Prioritising security issues

If every conflict is unique, all of them share a history of violence with the potential to escalate or re-erupt at any time. By now it is uncontroversial that armed violence prevention and reduction—through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and weapons control, as well as through more structural processes such as security sector reform (SSR)—should occupy an important place in most peace agreements, at least in mandate if not in detail. In reality, there is great variability in the extent to which security issues are addressed and the choice of emphasis, due to the circumstances of the conflict and the abilities of the mediators and negotiators, as well as external forces. In a case like Northern Ireland, for example, DDR (and particularly demobilisation) was absolutely central.1 In other cases, such as Cyprus or South Ossetia, violence prevention has been more important, both to

---

Ambassador (ret.) Carey Cavanaugh is Director and Professor of Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. During his diplomatic career with the US Department of State, he served at varying times as the acting US Special Cyprus Coordinator, Special Envoy for Eurasian Conflicts, and Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group.
ensure that dialogue can stay on track and to preclude giving external powers an excuse to engage militarily. Finally, a situation like the Basque conflict has demanded that attention be paid in equal measure to violence prevention and the disarmament of separatists.4

As many mediators can attest, the route to the dotted line can be meandering and circuitous, a fact that in part reflects the way in which peace process priorities change over the life of a conflict. For those whose job it is to keep the talks going, careful attention to both engagement and timing is essential. Mediators must judge what should be given priority and when, keeping in mind the admonition that "one size does not fit all."5

Managing the ‘peace space’
Mediators can take some tips from military experts in dealing with the comprehensive challenge presented by a peace process. Recent US military doctrine emphasizes the importance to combat operations of awareness of the 'battle space,' and of managing or shaping that space to achieve success. Battle space awareness demands knowledge and understanding of the area’s environment, security actors—including friendly and adversarial forces, neutrals and non-combatants—and conditions to enable timely, relevant, comprehensive and accurate assessments necessary to successfully apply combat power and complete the mission.4 Simply by substituting ‘diplomatic negotiations’ for ‘combat power’ and ‘peace’ for ‘battle,’ one can see that this approach is equally applicable to peacemaking efforts, which require the same strategic vision and firm understanding of the operating environment as waging armed conflict. Most envoys and negotiators do indeed develop a deep awareness of the environments in which both the conflicts at hand, and their peace processes, are embedded. The greater challenge for mediators comes in the managing or shaping of the ‘peace space,’ in particular when the parties to the conflict—or outside players—seek to use violence to advance their own interests and/or to undermine peace efforts. As in military operations, critical to mediators’ success are intelligence, surveillance, engagement and control—all of which can be used to produce battle or peace space effects that work to advance the overall strategy.

When it comes to peace space awareness, as noted above, mediators typically are able to develop the expertise required for the task at hand. Managing the peace space, however, often calls for resources and support that are simply not available, even to national or United Nations-appointed envoys. While the diplomat may be able to marshal superior arguments, that does not imply superior force—although Richard Holbrooke’s ability to suggest a resumption of air strikes against Serb forces if the Dayton peace talks collapsed came close.6 Furthermore, mediators have decidedly limited control over events as a whole. While lack of adequate intelligence is frequently thought to be the greatest constraint faced by mediators, in fact it is even rarer for mediators to possess the authority and latitude to actively engage in the manner required to reduce the prospects for violence.

“In the vast majority of cases, mediators are hard pressed to produce maximal effects with minimal resources . . . they are typically able only to tinker around the edges, using their experience, wits and creativity to establish an environment that supports or maintains peace efforts.”

Crossing a minefield for peace
In April 1999, a direct dialogue began between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to explore potential paths to resolve the conflict between their nations over the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated region of Azerbaijan. The struggle, already emerging by the late 1980s, metastasized with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, claiming thousands
of lives and displacing hundreds of thousands more before becoming largely ‘frozen’ through a Russian-brokered May 1994 ceasefire. Since 1992 it had been the task of the Minsk Group (operating under the auspices of the OSCE) to facilitate a peaceful settlement. For seven years the Minsk Group explored a number of potential peace plans, presenting three separate draft proposals to the parties in 1997–1998. None of these, however, were ever embraced by all of the parties to the conflict. By contrast, the direct dialogue that emerged between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held unique promise.

Because ‘ownership’ of the peace process was assumed by the elected leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the task of the Minsk Group mediators became as much one of shaping the peace space as it was the traditional one of helping craft an agreement. These efforts included politically engaging key neighboring states (Turkey and Iran), working with diaspora groups, meeting with refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and reducing the potential for renewed violence. To be sure, the 1994 ceasefire did not end all violence in the region; small numbers of military and civilian casualties continue to occur each year. What had ceased, however, was a level of violence that could impede the peace process.

Helping promote and preserve this relative calm became an essential task for the mediators. The threat of increased violence posed a genuine risk to maintaining the delicate but productive presidential dialogue, especially since considerable public sentiment existed in Armenia, Azerbaijan and particularly Nagorno-Karabakh itself questioning the propriety of the two presidents’ direct engagement. The potential for violence to intrude into politics was forcefully demonstrated by the assassination in Yerevan of the Armenian Prime Minister and other key political leaders during a parliamentary session in October 1999. Although official investigations indicated that the attack was not related to the on-going peace process, and the presidential dialogue continued, the OSCE mediating team began taking steps—some visible, some not—to help maintain a political and security environment in which the dialogue could advance.
The most visible manifestations of the violence management effort were multiple crossings by OSCE mediators of minefields located between Azerbaijan and Armenia and in the no-man’s-land that separated Karabakh Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces. The OSCE mediation team, comprising French, Russian and American diplomats, benefited from significant high-level political support and intelligence resources, enabling them to engage in these particularly dramatic gestures aimed at ensuring the peace process remained on track.\textsuperscript{10} The OSCE mission in the region provided ‘peace space’ reporting of developments on the ground, which the Minsk Group co-chairs augmented with intelligence from their own national means.\textsuperscript{13} When a potential opportunity to further solidify the ceasefire was identified, or signs of increased military activity

**Box 1.1 Background on Nagorno-Karabakh\textsuperscript{12}**

**1987–1991** Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) appeal to Moscow for transfer from the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) to the Armenian SSR. Inter-communal violence begins in both republics; populations begin to flee. Moscow imposes direct rule and state of emergency in NK. Fighting intensifies. Attempted coup in Moscow fails; Azerbaijan and Armenia declare independence from USSR; NK announces secession from Azerbaijan. Russian-brokered peace framework collapses after Azerbaijani officials killed; Azerbaijan revokes NK’s autonomous status. Soviet Union dissolved.


**1994** After bloody campaign, ceasefire agreement signed by Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh Armenian leaders. Armenian forces control most of NK, including historic Azeri city of Shusha, and seven surrounding Azerbaijani regions, including territorial bridge (the Lachin corridor) connecting Armenia and NK. CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping mandate approved, but strains between Russia and Western members of Minsk Group hamper efforts to find a peace deal.

**1995–1999** No progress in talks. In 1997 Minsk Group mediators present a ‘step by step’ plan which calls for staged Armenian withdrawal from occupied territories, demilitarisation of NK, and continuing negotiations on the future of NK and the Lachin corridor; accepted as a basis for further negotiations by Azerbaijan and Armenia, but rejected by NK. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian’s argument for a settlement sparks domestic dismay and his eventual resignation, to be replaced by Karabakh native Robert Kocharian. Kocharian and Aliyev hold bilateral meetings in United States and on Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Murder of Armenian Prime Minister and seven others in 1999 leads to domestic turmoil, stalls dialogue.

**2000–2003** Aliyev-Kocharian dialogue resumes. Earlier OSCE peace plans leaked to media to test domestic response. After a meeting in 2001 in Key West, both presidents optimistic, but opposition at home blocks progress and talks break down. Minsk Group co-chairs (United States, France, Russia) cross front line into NK. In 2002, United States lifts block on aid to Azerbaijan. In 2003, Ilham Aliyev succeeds his father Heydar as President of Azerbaijan.

**2004–2005** Minsk Group mediators announce that they will not bring any new proposals, saying that responsibility for reaching agreement and a settlement lies with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ceasefire violations lead to tensions along the Line of Contact. OSCE inspectors conclude that NK authorities are involved in ongoing settlement in the occupied territories, particularly the Lachin corridor. Kocharian and Aliyev resume meetings, with no breakthroughs. Ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact escalate.

**2006–2007** Talks between Aliyev and Kocharian at Rambouillet, France fail; rhetoric on both sides toughens. Minsk Group lifts veil of confidentiality, releases details of framework under discussion, reiterates Armenian/Azerbaijani responsibility for an agreement. Fighting intensifies around ceasefire zone.

**2008** Serzh Sarkisian elected Armenian President. UN General Assembly passes Azerbaijani-authored resolution calling for withdrawal of Armenian forces, respect for territorial integrity; Minsk Group co-chairs vote against it, calling it “unbalanced.” In November, Sarkisian and Aliyev meet in Moscow with Russian Federation President Dmitri Medvedev, sign a declaration reaffirming shared commitment to a political solution, stressing the importance of the Minsk Group process, and agreeing that the search for a solution should be accompanied by “legally binding guarantees”—the first document to bear both presidents’ signatures since April 1994.
were detected, the mediators undertook well-publicised crossings at locations where low-level violence—sniper attacks on innocent civilians, intermittent shelling—had occurred recently or where more significant conflict might soon erupt.13 Shining a public spotlight on the situation helped put into place temporary confidence-building measures, spread knowledge of conflict conditions, and emphasised the political and financial cost of renewed fighting. The impact of this active engagement was not simply the preservation of a dialogue space, but also the strengthening of the bona fides of the mediators.

The OSCE team also took preparatory steps to reduce the prospect of violence erupting on the outcome, positive or negative, of the presidential talks. If the talks ever reached success, it would be necessary to be able to move rapidly to implement provisions of a possible agreement; however, it was equally important to dampen expectations of success on the eve of talks to ensure that if they failed, disappointment would not lead to renewed hostilities. This issue was particularly salient at the talks in Key West, Florida in April 2001—the apogee of the direct presidential dialogue—when the backdrop of the Second Intifada and the violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories following the unsuccessful peace summit at Camp David in July 2000 provided a cautionary signal that no one could ignore.14 Accordingly, press coverage was carefully managed and steps were taken to make it harder for hostilities to recur.

It would be wonderful to be able to say that due to effective peace space management, the direct Armenian-Azerbaijan presidential dialogue in the early 2000s had yielded a comprehensive peace agreement. Unfortunately, it did not, and indeed has yet to do so. This inability to achieve peace, however, has not been the product of insufficient mediation; rather, it reflects how intractable such ‘frozen’ conflicts frequently become. By working to minimise violence and by helping shape the environment in which the peace process took place, the OSCE engagement enabled the effort by the two presidents to run its full course in the early 2000s and left the door open to further future engagement. Indeed, the resumption—albeit unsuccessful—of presidential engagement in 2005–2006 and again in November 2008 is a testimony to the durability of the peace space substantially created and maintained by international mediation.15

Assessing the risks of violence

It may not always be possible, or desirable, to intervene when violence occurs. Consequently, the question naturally arises: when does violence reach the critical threshold that requires response? There is no handy template. To the international community, mass violence itself is anathema. Nevertheless, peace talks in some conflicts continue even while death tolls reach the hundreds or even thousands, while in other cases the loss of even a single life may have seismic repercussions. The latter is especially the case in ‘frozen’ conflicts. The death of a single protestor along Cyprus’ Green Line may risk derailing productive peace talks, for example, while negotiations may proceed in southern Sudan despite widespread fighting and loss of life.16 Mediators will need to have sufficient awareness of when and how to act to prevent the level of violence from becoming an impediment to continued peace efforts.

“... the question naturally arises: when does violence reach the critical threshold that requires response? There is no handy template.”

Arguments that greater levels of death and destruction may help a peace process ‘ripen,’ while possibly logical in theory, are of little practical value. Not only do they risk international condemnation (note the reaction to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s initial position against a ceasefire in the July 2006 Israel-Lebanon war), but they represent an abdication of the responsibility to manage violence.17 Violence opens the door wide to unintended consequences and always poses the danger of the conflict spiraling out of control. In contrast, raising the spectre of possible future violence as an impetus for advancing peace in the present can be a highly effective tool.

Conclusion

Addressing violence during the negotiation phase will often be necessary for a peace process to continue. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was deemed essential that violence be minimised in order to maintain an environment that would enable the Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents to continue their direct dialogue and permit the Minsk Group co-chairs to help them explore potential peace plans.

No one disputes that diplomacy remains more art than science. Nevertheless, the practice of peace mediation can take advantage of lessons learned in military science by working to manage or shape the environment in which peace efforts take place. Effectively limiting violence to a level that does not impede the continuation or advancement of negotiations is essential, but will often call for resources not available to those given this lofty responsibility. Greater international cooperation will be needed to address this shortcoming. In the meantime, mediators and facilitators must be flexible and use their unique talents and creativity to maintain a milieu in which warring parties can peacefully resolve their differences.

Some suggestions to consider

1. **Always look holistically at the task at hand.**
   Responsibility for peace efforts demands that careful attention be paid not just to the peace process itself, but also to the environment in which it can survive and, hopefully, flourish.

2. **Carefully gauge the risk that varying levels of violence may pose to a particular peace process and engage appropriately.**
   Be prepared to ‘think outside the box’ to find creative solutions to help keep violence in check.

3. **Hold states and armed groups responsible for armed action in support of their goals that takes place within their boundaries.**
   Leaders of state-like entities should also be encouraged to rein in armed elements to bolster their claim to legitimacy.

4. **When violence occurs, engage quickly to try to keep it within manageable bounds.**
   Because of the potential for dramatic escalation, delay is always dangerous. Remember, things often look bad before they get even worse.

5. **Outsiders (Friends groups, major powers) can help support mediation efforts, as they may have greater freedom to maneuver.**
   These international actors may be able to apply pressure or promote other steps to reduce violence—confidence-building measures, ceasefires, etc.—that mediators cannot.

6. **Do not be afraid to use the power of the press and public opinion.**
   The media can be a powerful tool for drawing attention to the need for better behaviour by the parties to the conflict.

### Suggested resources for further information


### Websites

- Conciliation Resources [www.c-r.org](http://www.c-r.org)
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting [www.iwpr.net](http://www.iwpr.net)
- International Crisis Group [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)
- United States Institute for Peace [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)

### Endnotes

1. The decommissioning of paramilitary arms in Northern Ireland became the key stumbling block in the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. Securing peace required that an independent international body certify that the Irish Republican Army had met its disarmament and demobilisation requirements. See de Chastelain, General John, Brigadier Tauno Nieminen, and Andrew D Sens (2005), _Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning_, 26 September.
In the Basque negotiations, maintaining Euskadi Ta Askatasuná (ETA) 2006 ceasefire was essential for both sides. Following the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings, the Spanish government has little tolerance for further militant action, and Basque political leaders have stressed that further violence sabotages any possibility of meaningful dialogue. Indeed, the absence of violence became a virtual prerequisite for peace talks.


This definition of battle space awareness is drawn from the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (as amended through 30 September 2008). This doctrine is common to most western militaries stretching from Washington to London to Canberra.

The selection of the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio as a venue for peace talks was designed in part to underscore NATO military power, with the roaring of jet engines serving as a constant reminder to the Serbians of the potential for air strikes. See Holbrooke, Richard (1998), To End A War, Random House and Burg, Steven (2003), ‘Coercive diplomacy in the Balkans’ in Robert J Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, sixth edition, Rowman & Littlefield.

The Minsk Group is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States. In addition to Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has as permanent members Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Turkey, as well as on a rotating basis the OSCE troika.


The October 27, 1999 attack killed two key political figures, Prime Minister Vagzen Sarkisian and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchian, as well as six others. Although there were initial concerns that this incident was related to Nagorno-Karabakh peace efforts, this was never proven. In fact, an American diplomatic team led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had met with President Robert Kocharian and Sarkisian for several hours earlier that day to discuss positive developments in the peace process. Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian was thought to have missed the attack only because he had accompanied the US delegation to the airport. See Time (1999), ‘Armenian shootings may provoke political crisis,’ 28 October.

The assassinations did serve to stall the considerable momentum then present in the peace process. The political violence also led members of both governments to stress periodically the significant personal risks being taken to advance peace.

French President Jacques Chirac and Russian President Vladimir Putin had played direct roles in promoting the Karabakh peace efforts. Indeed, progress made in discussions between Aliyev and Kocharian with Chirac in Paris in January and March 2001 led to the decision to invite the parties to Key West, Florida. Presidents Clinton and Bush also met with the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents throughout this period, in the United States and in Europe, to assist and advance their personal dialogue. As for intelligence support, it is noteworthy that at Key West the Russian delegation was led by Viacheslav Trubnikov—the former director of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

The OSCE has been ably represented on the ground since 1997 by Polish Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, who serves as the Chair in Office’s personal representative for the Minsk Conference. Based in Tbilisi, but with offices in Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert/Khankendi, the monitoring of developments on the frontlines by Kasprzyk and his staff has proved crucial to Minsk Group mediators’ peace process-shaping activities.


For example, the first crossing took place near the village of Kazan after the killing of a teenage Azerbaijani girl (shot while cooking dinner in her home) and an Armenian farmer (shot while working in his fields). See Blair, Betty (2000), ‘In search of peace for Nagorno-Karabakh,’ Azerbaijan International, Winter. See also Anderson, John Ward (2001), ‘Peacewalk: mediators tiptoe across minefield separating Armenia and Azerbaijan,’ International Herald Tribune, 17 July.

See Ross, Dennis (2004), The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. The sharp upsurge in violence following Camp David led the US Nagorno-Karabakh team to dampen reports that any breakthrough might be possible at Key West. In fact, however, due to the presidential dialogue there had been considerable progress toward a workable solution.

Presidents Robert Kocharian and Heydar Aliyev last met in August 2002. Following Aliyev’s death in 2003, his son Ilham Aliyev was elected president and the direct engagement resumed.

See the example of the August 1996 motorcycle protests at Dherinia in Cyprus, where one Greek Cypriot was killed and more than a dozen injured; the event necessitated the dispatching by the United States of an envoy to the island to help reduce the chance of greater violence in hopes of preserving some movement in UN peace efforts for the island. See the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/1996/1016, December 10, 1996, paragraph 2.

Secretary Rice refused to endorse an immediate ceasefire, suggesting that a greater change in the status quo in Lebanon would increase prospects for a more enduring peace. This came just before an Israeli air strike against the Lebanese village of Qana killed 28 civilians, 19 of them children (Red Cross/Human Rights Watch count, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/middle_east/5228554.stm). See Kessler, Glenn (2007), The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy, Macmillan. Far from crushing Hezbollah, further fighting only invited international condemnation—including from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and France—and served to further exacerbate the divisions between the parties and the paralysis gripping the Lebanese government.
I was a member of the Colombian armed group Movimiento 19 de Abril or M-19, for 16 years, from its appearance on the public scene in 1974 to its demobilisation in 1990. I started as a grassroots member and later became one of the movement’s top leaders, in charge of its international programme and political action. I also participated in the peace process launched in 1984 at the time of the Belisario Betancur Administration (1982–1986). After the demobilisation of M-19, I became the first member of a guerrilla movement to be elected to the Congreso de la República (National Congress). After the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly) which had responsibility for drafting a new constitution for the country completed its work, I was elected in 1990 and again in 1991 to serve as a senator in the National Congress until 1994. I then became the human rights attaché to the Embassy of Colombia in Spain until 1998. I am part of the generation of Colombians who grew up under the influence of the Frente Nacional (National Front), the first years of the Cuban revolution, the icon of Che Guevara, and the winds of Latin American revolution during the 1960s and 1970s. Back then, those wanting to change the world either become a hippie or a guerrilla member. For many, the second option was closer to their ideals. However, even within the ranks of the guerrilla movement, there were different trends back then. One of them was exemplified by M-19, born as a reaction against the guerrilla movement itself and the traditional left. For me and many others, this path was an appealing one: an emerging movement open to people who simply wanted to participate without feeling trapped in dogmas and a priori definitions.

M-19 and the pursuit of change in Colombia

M-19 emerged in the early 1970s as a “critique of the existing left-wing groups in the country, in particular breaking with the international models (Maoism, Leninism, etc.) which dominated left-wing armed groups in Colombia.” It started as an urban guerrilla movement operating in Bogotá, Cali and other cities, but by 1978 had widened its scope of action to regions such as Caquetá, and after 1984 to regions such as Cauca and Valle. As time went on, the movement gave priority not to territorial control, but to a broad political and military presence, with independent cells in Colombia’s major cities. By the mid-1980s, the M-19 had eclipsed all other guerrilla organisations in urban operations.

It is difficult to give a total number for M-19’s direct and indirect supporters over the years, not only because the number of supporters fluctuated but also because the movement considered itself to be much larger than the number of its combatants. By mid-1985, for instance, the movement’s combatants probably numbered between 1,500 and 2,000, making it the second-largest armed group in Colombia. At the time of its demobilisation in 1990, the government’s figure of 800 combatants was almost certainly a serious underestimation.

Moving from peace as a battle flag . . .

Two concepts shaped M-19 during the 1980s and became crucial to its demobilisation in 1990: democracy and peace. In relation to the first, M-19 came to question its fight for socialism, and decided in 1979 to define...
itself as ‘a democracy in arms,’ asserting the need for urgent democratic change. From then on, M-19’s actions were aimed at realising this goal as well as challenging the socialist revolutionary paradigm of the left and other armed movements.

The second concept, peace, first came to the fore at the time of the presidential administration of Julio César Ayala (1978–1982), who governed under an anti-insurgent National Security Statute. In 1980, M-19 laid siege to the Dominican Republic’s embassy in Bogotá, taking 14 ambassadors hostage and demanding the release of political prisoners while denouncing the human rights crisis in Colombia. While in negotiations to end the siege, Jaime Bateman, M-19’s general commander, realised that “the process of resolving the siege was a model of what could be a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in Colombia”—a solution based on dialogue, truce and unconditional peace.

**Box 2.1**

**M-19: A timeline**

1970, April 19 Populist party of former military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular-Anapo), is denied electoral victory by Conservative candidate Misael Pastrana Borrero—the seminal moment behind the eventual creation of M-19.

1972 M-19 formed on a platform that combines populism with national revolutionary socialism.

1974, January M-19 members steal Simón Bolívar’s sword and spurs from the exhibit in the liberator’s villa, gaining national attention.

1976, February M-19 kidnaps, tries and eventually executes Jose Raquel Mercado, president of Confederation of Workers of Colombia, on charges of bribery, selling out the interests of workers, and links to the US Central Intelligence Agency.

1976–1978 M-19 engages in public actions such as the distribution of milk, chocolate, and toys, as well as armed propaganda actions.

1979, New Year’s Eve M-19 tunnels into a Colombian Army weapons depot, taking over 5,000 weapons.

1980, February M-19 guerrillas seize the embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogotá, taking hostage 14 ambassadors. After 61 days of negotiations with the government of Julio César Turbay Ayala, hostages are peacefully released and hostage takers allowed to leave the country for exile in Cuba. Later accounts have alleged that the Colombian government may have paid a ransom of USD 1 to 2.5 million.

1982 President Belisario Betancur offers an amnesty for all guerrilla groups; peace talks begin.

1984, August Ceasefire signed between government and M-19 at Corinto in Cauca Department.

1985 In June, M-19 drops out of peace process accusing the government of (among other things) systematic violations of the truce provisions and failure to enact promised political reforms. In November, M-19 guerrillas storm the Palace of Justice in Bogotá, taking scores of hostages. Betancur refuses to negotiate and sends in the military; 100 people, including 41 guerrillas and 11 Supreme Court judges, killed in the assault.

1987 M-19, FARC, ELN and other guerrilla groups form a joint front, Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, to negotiate with the government.

1988, May M-19 kidnaps two-time presidential candidate and Conservative Party leader Alvaro Gómez Hurtado; releases him two months later in exchange for a promise of talks designed to pave the way for a national summit to include representatives of the country’s principal guerrilla groups. In September, the government offers the whole guerrilla movement a conciliatory ‘Peace Initiative.’

1989 In March, government and M-19 sign an agreement under which M-19 promises to demobilise and reintegrate into Colombian society in exchange for a full pardon for all of its members. In November, the two sides sign a ‘Pact’ laying out provisions for reintegration of former guerrillas and a broad-scale agenda for political reform.

1990 In March, after signing an agreement with the government and having surrendered all their arms, M-19 becomes a political party, the Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD/M-19). In April, AD/M-19 presidential candidate and former commander Carlos Pizarro Leongómez is murdered; Antonio Navarro Wolff assumes his place as candidate and party leader, finishing third in that year’s presidential race. On December 9, elections held to a National Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting a new constitution; M-19 delegates make up 19 of 70 members, Navarro elected co-president of the Assembly, together with representatives from the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

1991 On February 1, Bolívar’s sword returned as a symbol of M-19’s demobilisation and desire to change society through its participation in legal politics. New Constitution proclaimed 4 July. AD/M-19 candidates win 22 seats in the new National Congress.
amnesty. This approach not only transcended military action in relation to the siege and resulted in the diplomats’ release (although not that of the political prisoners), but also paved the way for a public debate on peace between M-19 and politicians from different parties. Under the Betancur Administration (1982–1986), M-19 moved on to the so-called “War for Peace,” waged between 1981 and 1984, by the end of which time the government had signed peace agreements with three guerrilla organisations: M-19, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and the Workers Self-Defense Group (ADO).

These approaches, however, treated peace as a battle flag. While peace gained importance in the discourse, its invocation was mainly used as a tactic in the struggle for political and military legitimacy on the parts both of the government and the guerrilla movement. Although both the government and the armed groups sought to work out a truce in order to foster political actions and a debate on political and social issues, both sides still sought to create political strength based on military might, and neither side was fully open to dialogue. The institutional dialogue proposed by the government was organised around thematic commissions and had little effect. For their part, the guerrilla movements party to the agreements called for the creation of ‘peace camps’ in the shanty towns of several cities; however, M-19 developed military training schools within the camps, even though the government and the armed forces continued to ask the guerrilla groups to lay down their arms. Thus the truce was built upon belligerence and uncertainty, and was characterised by sieges and surveillance of the camps and attacks against M-19 representatives—the latter eventually serving as the catalyst to break the truce. The period culminated in the storming by M-19 of the Palace of Justice in November 1985; more than 100 people died during the attempt by the military to recover the building by force.

The Palace of Justice incident was a turning point for M-19’s conceptualisation of peace. Initially, confrontation intensified, and M-19 took its struggle to...
the point of war, increasing the belligerence of its actions and creating militias, including the Batallón América, composed of combatants from different Latin American countries as well as the Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera (National Guerrilla Coordination). However, despite our strengthened military action, we were increasingly questioning the value of the armed approach. We perceived the war-weariness of some in the population who shared M-19’s political views, exacerbated by the worsening ‘dirty war’ unleashed in 1985, the growing presence of paramilitary groups, and the increasing threats, assassinations, disappearances and persecutions against progressive and democratic sectors. These sectors fostered a movement demanding respect by all parties for the lives of all social, cultural, political and media leaders. Meanwhile, a proliferation of new actors in the confrontation was leading to a violent dynamic in which it was no longer clear who the enemies were, what they were fighting for, and who was benefiting from the violence. The intensification of the war started affecting the civilian population in the areas under the control of guerrilla groups. It was unacceptable to harm those whom we were supposed to defend, intensifying the alienation of the people from politics—the very opposite of what M-19 hoped to achieve.

Concurrently, we saw the risks of authoritarianism in the guerrilla movement grow, culminating at the end of 1985 in the discovery in communal graves of the corpses of 163 guerrilla members from the Ricardo Franco Frente, murdered by their leaders as a result of an internal purge. As M-19 was carrying out joint armed actions with this group but had also adopted democracy and the defence of human rights as political guidelines, a serious debate took place on the relationship between war and authoritarianism. In particular, many of our leaders focused on the need for coherence between the end and the means: it was senseless to speak about a struggle for democracy while adopting anti-democratic behaviour.

Meanwhile, some sectors within the administration of Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) were acknowledging the need to modernise, to adapt the state’s structures of government to new political realities, and to offer adequate institutional channels for dealing with social and political conflicts. As a consequence, the government offered the whole guerrilla movement a conciliatory ‘Peace Initiative’ in September 1988. M-19 decided that it was time to regain the country’s support by accepting that to achieve political change, it needed to change its own objectives and perspectives first. That meant that it needed to stop adding fuel to the flames, to dare to accept that the time had come to look for alternatives to the war, and to understand that its own strength had to be part of the solution.

. . . to peace as a strategy

The question then became what type of peace to propose. M-19 could not afford to follow the same strategy used to negotiate the 1984 peace agreement, and simply reiterate its willingness to initiate dialogue and achieve peace. Peace needed to become a strategy and stop being a tactic.

Paradoxically, the starting point for the change was the kidnapping in May 1988 by M-19 of Álvaro Gómez, a former presidential candidate and renowned representative of the national oligarchy. What began as an act of war was actually the beginning of a peace process. M-19 saw the kidnapping as an opportunity to resume political action aimed at achieving compromise. In order to do this, it was crucial to regain political space, to fight against existing distrust, and to pave the way for dialogue between the two sides. The need for a different perspective was first acknowledged by Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, M-19’s commander, a highly effective military decision-maker who had great credibility with all sides. To the government’s astonishment, and the scepticism of most M-19 members, Pizarro dared not only to offer to release Gómez, but also to do something heretical at that time: declare M-19 willing to lay down its arms if the government was willing to carry out genuine reforms aimed at restructuring the political regime and its electoral system in order to permit new political forces to participate and establish rule of law to guarantee fundamental rights and strengthen participatory democracy. For M-19, these measures were crucial to the fight against social inequality and poverty. The government accepted cautiously but with speed.

The principles underpinning the negotiation process were the privileging of political rather than military action; an emphasis on gaining the support and approval of the population; an acceptance of direct dialogue; and a commitment to joint problem-solving. To further negotiations, both sides agreed to:
• Concentrate M-19’s military force mainly inside the Santo Domingo camp, with a ‘demilitarised strip’ between the camp and the towns located further down the mountain. This would create a separation of forces as an effective bilateral truce.

• Hold bilateral discussions and negotiations, to take place in the Santo Domingo camp.

• Use a ‘Working Table for Peace and National Reconciliation’ (Working Table) as the framework within which political agreements would be reached, with the participation of different political representatives, social leaders, members of the civil society, intellectuals, the media, the government and M-19. This forum was also open to other guerrilla groups that might decide to join the process.

• Create ‘Roundtables for Analysis and Agreement’ (Roundtables) as complements to the Working Table, thus offering a series of more open forums where regional and sectoral organisations and groups could also participate. These roundtables were tasked with dealing with the main components of a future political pact, which would be translated into laws or governmental resolutions.

• Create a political movement of civilian character. In order to do so, political commitments were established regarding M-19’s electoral participation after its demobilisation.

It quickly became necessary to determine whether the peace process was a bilateral or collective process. M-19 had taken initiatives to promote unity amongst the insurgent groups that were now faced with the need and the opportunity to hold discussions and define their position regarding peace. It was a turning point: the time had come to work out whether and how it was possible to work together. The issue exposed the limits of guerrilla unity: the different conceptions, responsiveness, and political culture of the groups; irreconcilable tensions between some of them; leadership competition—with M-19 no exception. This huge gap was made evident during the peace negotiations with the government, when the initiative to create a joint movement was not supported by all the other groups. At this point, M-19 realised that it needed to follow the path of peace alone. However, three armed groups—the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (PRT) and the Quintín Lame Armed Movement—eventually signing peace agreements (the PRT in January 1991, the EPL in February 1991, and Quintín Lame in May 1991) within the framework of a step-by-step peace process. The peace agreement signed with M-19 also paved the way for peace processes during the 1990s with other groups; the Ernesto Rojas Commandos in 1992; the Socialist Renovation Movement in April 1994; the urban militias of Medellín in May 1994; and the Garnica Front in June 1994.

Two key issues were discussed during the peace process: the reintegration of guerrilla groups, and political, social and economic reform. The reintegration of the guerrilla groups (including amnesty, security, economic and social guarantees for the demobilised, and development programmes in areas under the influence of armed groups) was negotiated directly between the government and M-19. The social and legal guarantees demanded by M-19 embraced three points: amnesty, or at least a commitment not to take any legal action against former fighters; a reintegration programme; and a security plan.

The main question during the negotiation process was how to transcend the government-guerrilla dialogue and foster the participation of all political and social sectors, as the main goal was to consolidate democracy and guarantee long-lasting peace. For this reason, issues of a more political character (how to create favourable political conditions, undertake constitutional reforms to deepen democracy, implement reforms and measures in the fields of human rights, justice and social and economic policy) were taken out for debate to public spaces, such as the Roundtables and the Working Table, in which citizens could participate. These Roundtables delivered their results to the Working Table as contributions to the political Pact for Democracy and Peace (Pact) that was to be integrated into the peace agreement, and voted on by the national Congress. This Pact addressed issues ranging from constitutional reform to practical measures intended to secure the demobilisation and reintegration of guerrilla groups, pave the way for their participation in elections, and guarantee the livelihoods and security of former combatants.

Needless to say, there were complications. However, both sides realised that trust and transparency were of the utmost importance. For example, both sides worked to avoid the politicisation of the murder in May 1989 of an M-19 leader, Afranio Parra, by the police in Bogotá: M-19 did not denounce the government, while the latter investigated the murder appropriately and arrested those responsible.
The challenge of laying down arms

As noted above, one of the driving forces behind the peace process was the leadership, moral authority and talent of Carlos Pizarro Leóngómez, M-19’s general commander. Pizarro not only seized the opportunity to foster dialogue with the government and the country, but also knew how to persuade and lead the guerrilla members and grassroots towards the path of peace.

Many members of the movement—including people like me, more inclined to politics than war—understood that the armed struggle was just a means to an end. However, one of the most difficult challenges was dealing with our own fears, and those of the grassroots, in relation to disarmament and demobilisation. Laying down our arms was, to many of us, unthinkable, as we feared treason and the uncertainties of a future without the availability of weapons as an ‘insurance policy.’ We had not realised that peace needed to become a one-way journey. The transition to civilian life risked the end not only of our life as a group, but also of an identity forged on the use of arms: of the social and political recognition we enjoyed as guerrilla members. Finally, however, the support of the thousands of people that came to the Santo Domingo camp was the trigger that brought about our acceptance of the timeliness and potential of the process. The debate that took place within the movement eventually convinced even the most sceptical members. The final decision to lay down our arms was put to a vote by all the members of M-19; there were only three votes against the decision.

“Laying down our arms was, to many of us, unthinkable, as we feared treason and the uncertainties of a future without the availability of weapons as an ‘insurance policy.’ We had not realised that peace needed to become a one-way journey.”

When the negotiation process was launched in 1989, I was one of M-19’s leaders, secretly living in Bogotá. Initially I barely believed that the process would succeed; however, after the Santo Domingo camp deliberations and vote, I was convinced. I was then entrusted with the task of paving the way and explaining the movement’s decision, as it had been welcomed by some of our friends in the government and other political groups, and also persuading remaining skeptics. However, the success and stability of the process always depended on the attitude adopted regarding the use of weapons. An unambiguous attitude towards disarmament was an absolute necessity. A strategy based on the communist principle of a ‘combination of all forms of struggle’—meaning that it was possible to talk about peace, accept war and not surrender any weapons—was detrimental and had no place within the peace process: we needed to break away from armed struggle.

In fact, by the end of 1989, although both parties to the process had committed themselves to peace, the Pact that was to be included in a constitutional reform fell apart in Congress, and the constitutional reform bill was withdrawn. A whole year of work was lost. The question arose: Was it possible or advisable for us to return to war? In the words of Antonio Navarro Wolff, one M-19’s commanders, we decided to make “a leap of faith.”

In January 1990 Pizarro and Antonio Navarro Wolff, M-19’s commanders, travelled to Bogotá and concluded an agreement with the presidential candidates of the Liberal Party: whoever won the elections had to commit themselves to convene a National Constituent Assembly. After making this commitment, M-19 demobilised on March 9, 1990: its arms were surrendered and melted down to ingots before the eyes of an international commission composed of politicians and military officers. Two days later, M-19 participated in the national elections as part of the Acción Nacionalista por la Paz (Nationalist Action for Peace), a coalition formed by M-19, the Democratic Front, Christian Democracy, and United Colombia, as well as a group of independent politicians. The results were surprising, especially taking into account the short campaign period: M-19’s commander arrived third in the race for mayor of Bogotá, and I was elected to Congress after a campaign that lasted less than three days. I view this less as a personal achievement than as an example of how powerful a favourable attitude and positive decision-making within the struggle for peace can be. In total, one mayor and five councillors in five different cities came from M-19.

Meanwhile, a new national political movement emerged: the Alianza Democrática M-19, AD/M-19.
(Democratic Alliance M-19, AD/M-19), under the leadership of M-19 and with the participation of left-wing sectors and other regional civic and political groups. Pizarro became the first candidate of the movement to run for president, but was murdered in April 1990; the mass attendance at his funeral reflected the support the process had gained. Again, we had the choice between peace and a return to war; we chose peace, and put Navarro forward as a replacement candidate. Our decision to renounce violence was enthusiastically welcomed by the people, whose support was shown in the streets and through massive demonstrations. Indeed, Navarro received 12.5 per cent of the vote in the presidential elections, and 19 M-19 candidates were elected to the new National Constituent Assembly in December 1990, making the party the second-largest political force in the Assembly. Furthermore, when the new Constitution was adopted and the old Congress revoked, our party won 22 seats—although this represented a drop from second to third political place, behind the Colombian Liberal Party and tied with the Conservative Party of Andrés Pastrana.

However, the party’s electoral success did not last. In subsequent elections, AD-M-19 did not run under a single and unified banner, instead fielding individual candidates. As a consequence, none of our candidates was elected to Congress, while at the local level, only a few were elected. It was only years later, thanks to the emergence of a new political force called Polo Democrático (Democratic Pole), that former guerrilla members and leaders of other left-wing parties started winning seats again in the Congress. Despite its loss of electoral power, however, M-19’s peace strategy has won it a respected place in Colombia’s history. Although M-19 inspired resentment and rejection within some sectors, its attitude, awareness and timely demobilisation resulted in high levels of support—definitely not the same hostility shown today towards active armed groups.

Some suggestions to consider

1. True security requires coherence between the means and the end: the decision to give up on war and commit to peace, without having a foot in both camps. Words are not enough to build peace. It is essential to clearly differentiate the concepts and dynamics underlying the various processes at play: building peace during war is quite different from building it upon the renunciation of violence. Making peace an aim is not enough for it to become a strategy.

2. Political transitions, including from war to peace, must be based on long-term, not short-term strategies. Groups making the transition from fighting forces to democratic politics face many challenges. Becoming a political entity relies on knowing how to make alliances without losing one’s own identity, and reaching a peace agreement entails understanding that your political opponent remains. M-19 failed to understand this. Likewise, we failed to bridge the gap between traditional power structures and the popular support needed to emerge as a new organisation.

3. Reintegration must address practical needs, but must also keep in touch with the broader political dimension. M-19’s reintegration mainly worked on a trial-and-error basis. A lack of experience on all sides resulted in the faulty implementation of programmes vital to many demobilising combatants (loans, livelihood, housing, education, and health projects). Consequently, many former fighters faced difficulties in the first few years, trying to honour social and family commitments with no real source of income. This point notwithstanding, negotiators must maintain a balance between the practicalities of economic and social reintegration of former combatants and the elaboration of political proposals.

4. Reintegration requires an enabling legal framework. Legal frameworks for reintegration must include the suspension of criminal proceedings against guerrilla groups, amnesties, and the legal acknowledgement both of new political organisations and of their right to participate in elections. Such frameworks require close follow-up to ensure effective and correct implementation. Amnesties and mechanisms for access to electoral processes should be clear and adaptive.

5. For guerrilla movements, becoming a legal political party poses security dilemmas. Special measures are necessary to guarantee the lives of former guerrilla members, who can be more vulnerable to social violence than ordinary citizens. In M-19’s case, although security measures were agreed on, especially for commanders, these did not necessarily guar-
antee that demobilised members—or indeed even commanders, as the murder of Carlos Pizarro showed—would not be the target of attacks.

**Suggested resources for further information**


**Websites**

Geneva Call www.genevacall.org

International Peace Observatory www.peaceobservatory.org

International Center for Transitional Justice www.ictj.org

Peace Brigades International www.peacebrigades.org

Washington Office on Latin America www.wola.org

**Endnotes**

1 For a detailed analysis of M-19’s history and transition to peace, see García-Durán, Mauricio, Vera Grabe Lowenherz and Otty Patiño Hormaza (2008), *The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics*, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Management.

2 Ibid, p. 11.


6 An area within Cauca Department (southwest Colombia) where the camp for negotiation was established in 1989. It became a pilgrimage site for political and civil society representatives, as well as for thousands of people expressing their support for the peace process.

7 García-Durán, Mauricio, Vera Grabe Lowenherz and Otty Patiño Hormaza (2008), p. 28.
In early 2006, the first reports emerged that the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) had initiated talks with the Ugandan armed group the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) to bring about a negotiated end to the group’s long-running insurgency against the Government of Uganda (GoU). This was surprising, given that at the time the GoSS itself was barely a year old after coming into being as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan (GoS). The initiative was an unexpected development for the international community because of the roles the LRA and SPLA had played in each others’ conflicts, and the LRA’s historically secretive nature.

The roots of the LRA conflict date back to the coming to power of the current Ugandan government of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986, whose rise to power was followed by the hard-handed pacification of eastern and northern Uganda. The litany of the conflict is oft repeated: a spirit-possessed, unpredictable leader of the LRA; the lack of a clear or articulated political agenda by the LRA; widespread use of child soldiers, with estimates of abducted youth at 60,000; and two million people displaced in northern Uganda.

The Uganda–Sudan border has been the main theatre for the LRA conflict, with the region characterised by blurred boundaries and shadow economies, including a flourishing trade in small arms and ammunition. The LRA moved into southern Sudanese territory around 1993 to escape the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), and remained there intermittently throughout the war related to that part of Sudan, becoming embroiled as an ally of the GoS against the SPLA. GoS support for the LRA was a reaction to the proxy arming of the SPLA by the NRM.

From August 2006 to early 2008, I was the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) adviser in response to a GoSS request to Denmark and (later) Sweden to support a negotiated solution to the protracted crisis. Acting for both Nordic countries, I was seconded to the Office of GoSS Vice-President and chief mediator Riek Machar as one of several support measures. I came to the assignment with a background in DDR, human rights and development work in Uganda dating back to 1993, when I was involved in the demobilisation of the then national army (now the Uganda People’s Defence Force, UPDF). In 2001–02 I was stationed in Uganda as adviser to the Uganda Human Rights Commission and worked with the Uganda Amnesty Commission on the 2002 peace agreement between GoU and the Uganda National Rescue Front 2 in the West Nile sub-region.

Background to the mediation process

If the GoSS’s extended hand was unexpected outside the region, it was perhaps less of a surprise for the people in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. For them, the conflicts have been connected by strong ethnic, cultural, economic and solidarity links between the two regions. In 2005, cultural leaders from northern Uganda extracted a promise from the late Anton Baaré is a social scientist and conflict and development consultant for NCG Denmark with 15 years experience in East and West Africa and Southeast Asia. He works on governance and civil society-related programming and on incorporating conflict management and social accountability in development assistance. Since 1994, he has worked as implementer, manager, process consultant, mediator, and evaluator in conflict-affected areas. He lectures in the Department of Anthropology and Ethnography of Århus University in Denmark and teaches at the Feinstein International Centre and the Institute for Human Security at Tufts University.
SLPM/A leader John Garang to tackle the LRA ‘problem’ after the SPLM/A had agreed the peace accord with the GoS.6

Earlier efforts to revive the peace talks and resolve the conflict from within Uganda, led by Betty Bigombe, had collapsed by 2005. Further raising the pressure, in October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) unsealed its indictments against five of the top LRA commanders for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.7 Thus, the initiative of the fledgling GoSS to broker and internationalise a new mediation effort seemed to many both unlikely and unconvincing—a curiosity coming out of south Sudan’s no-man’s land. The UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland was an important exception to the general disbelief of the GoSS offer.8 Indeed it was not uncommon in those early days to hear the effort described as Egeland’s ‘rogue project.’

The architecture of the mediation initiative began small, with the GoSS working with a few peace international and religious NGOs and some support from Norway and Switzerland. It eventually grew to include former Mozambican President Chissano as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General (SESG), and observers acting in ‘good office’ roles from Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Norway, Canada, the European Union (EU) and the United States. As the stature of the process grew, the international community, including the UN, saw possibilities for managing the tricky political situation presented by the LRA. It allowed them to describe the process as an ‘African solution for African problems’ while still supporting the ICC warrants.9 In practice, this meant that supporters of the process could engage with the parties while still stating that a final peace agreement should adhere to the 1998 Rome Statute, which in principle allows national prosecution instead of prosecution by the ICC. Indeed, this key demand by the LRA has been agreed to by the GoU on condition that the LRA leader signs the Final Peace Agreement (FPA).

From its inception, the Juba process was criticised as fundamentally flawed by those who felt the mediation team had accepted LRA negotiators that did not adequately represent the LRA fighters on the ground. The GoSS mediation was also criticised for prioritising political demands from the Ugandan diaspora. Critics contended that talks should instead focus on personal security incentives and viable futures for LRA members and not be broadened to encompass the longer-term recovery and reconciliation issues inside Uganda, as this could imperil the process.10 Meanwhile, the mediation process in late 2006 and early 2007 had to deal with ongoing military manoeuvring and clashes between the LRA and the UPDF around the assembly area in Eastern Equatoria. It was only in late 2007–early 2008 that LRA military actions in the DRC and Western Equatoria would dominate the security concerns.

Thus, the process did not receive international support either for the merit of its chief mediator, Riek Machar, or for the solidity of its design and process. Rather, it was supported—in some instances reluctantly and late in the game—because it was considered the ‘only game in town’ and one that possibly could deliver a compromise solution that in all likelihood would be difficult to achieve with a more straightforward UN-mediated alternative or a bilateral arrangement of a few of the western donor countries organising talks with the LRA.11

**Security on the Juba agenda: Strategy and tactics**

As appears typical in most peace processes, there were major gaps between the rhetoric, process and practice of addressing security issues as part of the negotiations in Juba. When security arrangements are highly contested, the space to apply good practice can be exceedingly narrow. One of the first challenges was to achieve some semblance of on-table parity between the parties. The LRA has never controlled any territory (unlike, for example, the SPLA), and its political agenda was at best obscure, linked to old grievances within the 1985 self-exiled Ugandan diaspora. However, the LRA had been around so long that it could also adopt ‘new grievances’ against the NRM government.12 These included undemocratic rule by the NRM with an unrepresentative national army, i.e., the UPDF, and the political and economic marginalisation of people from northern and eastern Uganda—specifically the lack of regional representation in government and forced displacement. The ICC indictments and the group’s inclusion on international terrorist lists further complicated matters. The GoSS stood accused of promoting negotiations with known terrorists and indicted war criminals.
“... there were major gaps between the rhetoric, process and practice of addressing security issues as part of the negotiations in Juba.”

While the mediation team had a strategy on DDR, what conditions were ‘right’ to bring it to fruition is a complex question. The incomplete status of the FPA (which awaits Joseph Kony’s signature) means we are not yet able to judge whether the basic minimum conditions for negotiating security arrangements and DDR were in place. In the following sections I first explore what was seen as ‘given’ on DDR in the negotiations; secondly, when in the Juba process DDR was formally discussed; thirdly, who was actually doing the negotiating on security issues, particularly on whose authority and with what claim to legitimacy of representation. Finally, I discuss possible options for talking about DDR differently within both the constraints and dynamics of an overall negotiation process.

**Negotiating DDR in Juba**

The final agreement outlines a segmented DDR. A clear distinction was made between the disarmament and demobilisation phases on Sudanese soil with UN involvement and a Ugandan-led reintegration programme. It also stipulates that disarmament and demobilisation shall be guided by the 2006 UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), the operational viability of which is yet to be proven. The IDDRS include a rights-based set of detailed prescriptions and good practice covering a host of issues such as the handing in of weapons; child protection; and preferences for so-called community-based approaches to reintegration. Yet the agreement actually does not borrow heavily from the IDDRS; instead it defers to national experience and approaches. There is one significant exception: the incorporation of emerging good practice related to the inclusion of women in DDR through specifically designed pro-
grammes with separate earmarked funding: “As far as possible funding for specific measures for women and girls in the reintegration phase of the DDR process shall be earmarked for that purpose.”

The reintegration focus

The DDR protocol refers to non-UN solutions and instead highlights Ugandan experience and existing recovery reintegration programming. In doing so, the protocol does not attempt to set the highest possible standards for reintegration, but instead leaves them to comprehensive dialogues on policy, early recovery and DDR practice taking place in Uganda. Perhaps counter-intuitively, negotiating a comprehensive reintegration programme for the LRA combatants currently ‘in the bush’ was never a high priority. Rather, for reasons explained below, mediators worked to ensure that any LRA reintegration fit into the ongoing programmes already in place under existing recovery and development programming in Uganda.

This approach was possible for two reasons. First, the GoU, with massive support from its donors, had made significant strides in preparing its Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) that included reintegration programming for ex-combatants (although to date it has not begun). Second, the DDR protocols were aiming to cover LRA forces still in the bush, estimated at only 1,000 to 3,000 individuals. In comparison, the Uganda Amnesty Commission reported its ongoing reinsertion programme already covered about 12,500 former LRA combatants by August 2008. In addition, nearly 2 million people (90 percent of the northern population) would be resettling as result of a peace agreement. Hence, the aim in Juba was to negotiate transitional reintegration: a short, targeted programme aimed at establishing sufficient security and minimum basic conditions for long-term development.

DDR planners inside Uganda, for example from the World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP, see Box 1), worried that the Juba agreement on reintegration would set a higher standard or range of benefits than for those previously disarmed and result in ‘retroactive eligibility’, leading to thousands of former LRA back in civilian life claiming new benefits. This situation had to be dealt with in Aceh for example, and needs to be carefully factored in by negotiators.

Box 3.1
The World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

Launched in 2002, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is a multi-agency effort to support a regional planning and financing framework for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region. The MDRP targets an estimated 415,000 combatants in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The program is financed by the World Bank and 13 donors—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission—and collaborates with over 30 partner organisations, including UN agencies, the African Development Bank, the EU, and NGOs.

The demobilisation focus

Demobilisation was also conceived as concerning only the current force of the LRA. In principle (and from a northern Uganda local security sector perspective), one could have argued that a wider approach was needed, in particular one that linked the disarmament and demobilisation of the LRA with that of auxiliary forces (i.e. the ethnic militias) that were organised by the Ugandan government in 2002–2003 to expel the LRA from Uganda.

As the LRA was outside Uganda, from the outset it was evident that demobilisation would include cross-border movement from Sudan and reception of (former) LRA members in Uganda. Under the given conditions the implementation mechanisms for disarmament and demobilisation by the UN in Sudan and nationally owned and led reintegration programming in Uganda were de facto de-linked. The prominent role of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) would be similar to that of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC), which dealt with the return of Rwandan combatants from DRC. Once inside Uganda, UN agencies would need to find an appropriate role in recovery and reintegration taking account of determined political leadership by GoU and pre-existing donor coordination and aid harmonisation arrangements. The GoU had requested the MDRP—a partnership that included key UN organisations—to take the lead role on reintegration programming for ex-combatants, including those from the LRA.
The disarmament focus

The mediation team felt that options for disarmament outcomes were straightforward. First, the LRA could hand over its weapons to the UPDF after assembly in northern Uganda. While this struck some as unlikely, one has to recall that this is how the GoU settled with the UNRF II in 2002. In this case, all weapons were handed directly to the UPDF and a large part of the UNRF II was integrated in the UPDF. A second option was that the SPLA could receive the LRA weapons. There is a realist attraction in this scenario, as the SPLA are interested in strengthening their capacity and would likely welcome the influx of weapons. However, neither option is palatable to the international actors involved. Firstly, endorsing even only as witnesses, a possible agreement that would formally agree to increase the arsenal of the SPLA would be a political mistake in the context of the Sudan 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UNMIS’s mandate on DDR. Secondly, the IDDRS paradigm that to “increase security, reducing the number of weapons in circulation remains a central goal of DDR” clearly speaks to internationally preferred outcome of any negotiation on disarmament.

“Pragmatism often trumps ideals in DDR and the mediation team felt that reducing the threat posed by LRA military capabilities was amenable to political intervention.”

In fact, the GoSS mediation had no a priori buy-in regarding international involvement in the disarmament exercise. Indeed, as I elaborate later in this paper, the mediation team had been advised to avoid including the UN in the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT). Furthermore, there was awkwardness about the collaboration between GoSS and UNMIS on security matters. The mediation team thus set out to find common ground between the parties; if that meant that weapons deposition would be handled ‘pragmatically’ rather than within the confines of ‘international standards’ it would be considered and a bridge to cross once it was reached. Pragmatism often trumps ideals in DDR and the mediation team felt that reducing the threat posed by LRA military capabilities was amenable to political intervention. The primary challenge was to entice the LRA to seek a political solution. Weapons control focussed on the LRA’s military leadership was conceptualised as a way to reach armed fighters, not as a means of extracting and destroying the LRA arsenal.

Bringing DDR into the peace talks

Officially started in July 2006, the Juba process was protracted, with repeated walkouts and foot dragging by the LRA. It lost momentum in the second half of 2007. While the mediation team was busy trying to figure out how best to move forward with the scenario described above, international actors played a surprising (and not so welcome) role in determining the timeframe of negotiations by controlling the purse strings. By late 2007–early 2008, donors to the UN fund supporting the Juba negotiations and actors—notably the United States—had put the 31st of January 2008 as a de facto deadline on the talks. The intricacies and possible merits of this development are outside the scope of this paper. However, when the time came for serious negotiations on DDR, there was no political space for a thorough but slow approach to engage the LRA and the GoU along the lines of a mediation-team developed military sub-committee.

The GoU and the LRA agreed on a five-point agenda: cessation of hostilities, comprehensive solutions, accountability and reconciliation, permanent ceasefire, and DDR. As part of the agreed agenda, in between talking about security arrangements and DDR, negotiations were to centre on accountability and reconciliation issues, including the ICC indictments; and a political settlement, referred to as ‘comprehensive solutions.’ These two issues, especially the ICC indictments, were commonly seen as the contentious core of negotiations.

Talks first focused on achieving a cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA), and would conclude with agreements on a permanent ceasefire and DDR. Strictly speaking, therefore, disarmament was on the agenda from the outset. At a superficial level, the manner in which DDR was approached in Juba resonates with some of the good practice suggested in recent times, especially the retention of expert advice, preferably throughout the negotiations. Complementary to my involvement, UNICEF staff advised the mediation team since early 2006 until the end of the formal
However, a strategic perspective on how to negotiate DDR as part of wider security arrangements only emerged during the process—as is commonly the case. In the ebb and flow of peace negotiations, DDR is typically placed towards the end. DDR was seen, incorrectly I believe, as a technical matter easily subjugated by political expediency, not unlike what has been described as the attitude in the Abuja talks on Darfur conflict where technical expertise on negotiating security arrangements was disregarded and political expediency determined rushing negotiations and buy-in on such arrangements.28

From the outset, political-legal challenges towered over any possibility of addressing security arrangements head-on. But the parties were willing to discuss aspects in the context of specific tasks such as assembly arrangements for the LRA; or type of access required for military monitors. It was when these opportunities arose that mediators could plant seeds they hoped to nurture at a later stage in the talks.

Considerable progress was made when budding security arrangements became part of the CoHA of August 2006. This agreement—the first of its kind in over two decades of war—determined issues such as assembly of the LRA and no-go areas for the UPDF. Evidently, the mediators saw the assembly areas as precursors to disarmament and demobilisation sites: hence the agreement on locations was an important step forward. Another notable achievement of the CoHA was the establishment of a Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT), the first technical forum where LRA and UPDF military personnel would work together. Without prematurely pressing the matter, the mediation team saw the CHMT as precursor to a type of technical-military sub-committee of the type that was an element of the peace talks in El Salvador: “a sub-committee composed of commanders of the armed forces and the FMLN and assisted by UN experts.”29

The second point on the agenda took place under the broad heading ‘comprehensive solutions.’ In fact, this was a catch-all title suggested by the mediation team to allow the GoU to maintain that negotiating political issues would be kept at a minimum; the alternative ‘political solutions’ had previously been flatly rejected. At the same time, the title allowed the LRA to claim that the national scope and the discussion of historical root causes of the conflict would be on the table in any comprehensive discussion. The protocols on this agenda item covered participation in national politics, return, resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and economic and social development of areas affected by the war. The latter, of course, is an important aspect of the reintegration component of DDR. Clause 18 of Comprehensive Solutions protocol in May 2007 established the PRDP as the leading process for recovery and development.

An important example of how and when agreements relevant to DDR were woven into the protocols is the institutional arrangements for security organs that were also part of the comprehensive solutions protocol. Clause 8.2 established that “members of the LRA who are willing and qualify shall be integrated into the national armed forces and other security agencies in accordance with subsequent agreements between the parties.”30 Achieving this primer clause was a critical milestone, and sets the stage for a two-track dissolution of the LRA—one ‘military to military’, the other ‘military to civilian’. What is perhaps less evident is that it increased the possibility that at some point LRA weapons would end up in the UPDF armoury: that LRA combatants at some point will integrate in the UPDF taking their weapons with them.

**Lack of engagement and one-sided access**

“The LRA should swallow their pride and know that this is mere soft landing for them. We shall not disclose our strength, neither shall we disband the UPDF.”

—Government of Uganda negotiator, 200631

In August 2006, the make-up of the GoU delegation suggested that its real concern was keeping the talks limited to security. Its position was that the negotiations were with a militarily spent force without a political cause or agenda. In this scenario, DDR was supposedly at the core of the ‘soft landing’ on offer to the LRA.32 “The LRA should swallow their pride and know that this is mere soft landing for them. We shall not disclose our strength, neither shall we disband the UPDF,” was the incensed retort from the GoU negotiator when the LRA in its initial position paper on DDR claimed that the UPDF, “like any post-colonial Ugandan army, was not national in character.”33 The LRA demanded: “In their place, Uganda shall constitute and build a new national army that guarantees security, peace and sustainable prosperity of the people of Uganda.”34
There was a remarkable mismatch between the number and seniority of security actors in the GoU and LRA delegations. GoU security sector delegates were high-powered and included the head of central military intelligence of the UPDF, as well as the director of Uganda’s external security organ. Their ‘counterparts’ on the LRA side had military backgrounds from previous Ugandan armies and were drawn from the diaspora. The lack of parity was glaring, but also reflected the attitudes of both sides. The GoU was saying: these talks are not about politics but security (viz. the ‘soft landing’ language), while the LRA’s position was the reverse. Thus the LRA, especially, used access to and direct involvement by its military commanders as a key bargaining chip.

Persistent efforts by GoSS mediators failed to convince the LRA to match the GoU’s delegate composition. In fact, at some point this pressure threatened to derail the talks, as evidenced by top LRA commanders’ flat refusal to negotiate directly in Juba and their demand—not for the last time—to change mediators.35

A key issue was who on the LRA side was actually accessible to negotiate security arrangements. After the LRA’s refusal to engage in talks directly through their own senior (read: credible) military representatives, the mediation team continued to talk to a LRA delegation without any direct representatives from the military high command. In part because the mediation team could not get the direct engagement of the LRA military high command, the DDR expert for some time doubled as adviser to the CHMT, among other roles, to invest in relationship-development. The view was that the CHMT provided a platform for confidence-building with LRA military representatives. Eventually, it was reasoned, the three forces that made up the CHMT—the SPLA, the UPDF and the LRA—would invariably be involved in disarmament and demobilisation exercise. The mediation team felt they had achieved a breakthrough when three LRA officers joined the CHMT in September 2006.

It was hoped that these military workings would morph in time into a technical working group on DDR, but this was not to be. When the time came to formally discuss DDR, LRA participation in the CHMT had dwindled to one person. This reduction took place in the aftermath of the purported execution by senior LRA leaders of Vincent Otti—the LRA’s second-in command and the mediation’s main military interlocutor—in October 2007.
The demise of Otti was a blow from which the Juba talks never fully recovered. In January 2008, with the talks under duress by externally-imposed deadlines, two key LRA interlocutors in the CHMT were fired, allegedly for being too close to Otti.36 Thus, in February 2008 when the protocols on a permanent ceasefire and DDR were negotiated and signed, there was no significant engagement of LRA military commanders.

Missed opportunities?

William Zartman, a leading mediation theorist, asks questions that are almost too close for comfort for many practitioners, myself included.37 Were there viable alternatives? Not new, but existing practice tried and tested in other processes that was overlooked, dismissed or even declined for consideration? Did the international actors appropriately manage the factors under our control, such as flow of funds, the phasing in and consolidation of the office of the SESG, the timeliness of available expertise, and the quality of and the willingness of collaboration, amongst other elements?

On reflection alternative decision-making could have occurred but as every practitioner knows, things rarely go to plan and the ability to improvise is key. After the initial euphoria in the wake of the CoHA in September–October 2006, the first signs were showing of the eventual disconnect between progress on the political track and tangible security improvements and implementation of security concessions by the LRA. At the same time, from the vantage point of the mediation team’s DDR negotiators and based on the information made available, it was near impossible to gauge UPDF movements in Sudan. The critical issue on the ground was to reach an agreement whereby the LRA would leave Uganda and assemble in Owiny-Ki-Bul just across the border in Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria province.

Internally, the mediation team was struggling with the CHMT immediately after the signing of the CoHA. It is one thing to celebrate the real political achievement that the parties had agreed to on paper, but as soon as the ink was dry, there was a predictable scramble to develop an operational, well-equipped and fully-funded monitoring mission—all within a few days. Equally as important, we needed the CHMT to involve the African Union (AU). International–African presence and the prestige of the AU was an assurance that the mediation team gave the LRA in August 2006. This offer addressed their concerns about the SPLA as neutral guarantor of its security. Not surprisingly, for the LRA it was a major leap to trust the SPLA, a force they had been fighting, and one that had strong personal and operational links with the UPDF. The African participation in the CHMT would not materialise until May 2008, until after the intervention of the SESG. Superficially, we might draw the lesson that improving the standing and rapid response capacities of the AU is important. The banal reality is that a few AU officers arriving in Juba within a few days could have made a major impact on momentum and trust. It may also have lessened the tendency to be lenient on the LRA regarding its obligation to assemble and be accessible for the CHMT—issues that would plague the Juba process.

In late August 2006, the UN informally offered advice to the mediation team not to commit the UN to the CoHA or as a member of the CHMT. However, both the LRA and GoU delegations had accepted, and in fact welcomed, an earlier draft CoHA formulation that included the UN in this monitoring role. Whereas an AU contingent evidently needed a reasonable mobilisation time, even under the best of circumstances, UNMIS’s resources and personnel on the ground made a quick technical response a viable option, at least in principle. But it was not forthcoming.

“There are three main peacekeeping operations in the region: MONUC in Congo, UNMIS in South Sudan, and EUFOR in the Central African Republic (and Chad). While these three missions have a mutual problem in the LRA, little has been done to coordinate efforts on intelligence sharing or strategizing to deal with the threat from a regional perspective.”38

As noted, linking the CoHA monitoring to the wider UNMIS monitoring never materialised; instead, the CHMT (with some bilateral technical assistance) stood rather isolated until military observers from five African
countries arrived. But even after this contingent came
the CHMT remained a somewhat awkward entity as
it was monitoring a peace process with cross-border
tentacles in four countries, three of which were covered
by different UN missions. Later, analysts pointed out
what the mediation team and the CHMT had been
struggling with 18 months prior: “There are three main
peacekeeping operations in the region: MONUC in
Congo, UNMIS in South Sudan, and EUFOR in the
Central African Republic (and Chad). While these
three missions have a mutual problem in the LRA, little
has been done to coordinate efforts on intelligence
sharing or strategizing to deal with the threat from a
regional perspective.”39 On November 30 2008, Joseph
Kony again failed to sign the FPA while allegations and
evidence of LRA military operations, abductions and
killings in south Sudan and DRC were mounting.40

Negotiating security issues in Juba was further blind­
sided by an unwillingness to find ways to systemati­
cally share, or at least triangulate, available intelligence
data. On several occasions one of the UN agencies
would impromptu share UN security assessments
with the mediation team. However, throughout the
two years of the Juba process the mediation team’s
DDR negotiators and the CHMT leadership achieved
neither a hands­on UNMIS–CHMT collaboration, nor
formalised procedures for managing the very real and
difficult arrangement of a two­tier monitoring system.
In effect UNMIS was monitoring the monitors.

Assembly in name: Owiny-Ki-Bul

In the CoHA two LRA’s assembly areas were identified
on Sudanese soil: Ri-Kwangba in Western Equatoria
for the main LRA force already at that time camped
in the adjacent Garamba National Park in the DRC,
and Owiny-Ki-Bul, Eastern Equatoria. The midpoint
of the latter (it turned out) was less than 30 kilometres
across the northern Uganda­southern Sudan border.
Owiny-Ki-Bul assembly area was key, in principle, to
extracting the LRA from Uganda and create a situa­
tion were the UPDF and LRA would not clash. The
peace negotiations needed this precondition. However,
it became an immediate problem that Owiny-Ku-Bul
assembly area’s precise location and perimeter were
not specified with sufficient detail. This led to signifi­
cant operational difficulties that were compounded by
the clause requiring the LRA reach that assembly area
within three weeks (i.e. before the end of September
2006). As noted earlier, the LRA military command’s
refusal to engage in senior level talks led to proxies in
the LRA’s political delegation negotiating the security
arrangements, including the assembly areas. When a
deal was possible under these circumstances, the media­
tion team and the GoU were the ones who made it.

The first substantive meeting of the CHMT took
place on­site in Owiny-Ki-Bul in early October. I was
assigned to advise the CHMT on this mission and was
disturbed by the implications of the lack of military
definition and precision in the delineation of the area.
It was a considerable—and literally ‘on the ground’—
mediation challenge to get the LRA and UPDF officers
in the CHMT to formally agree on a method of deline­
ation that, out of context, are basic: a geographical
centre, a radius and a perimeter. It was not until
November 2006 that these technical details were
agreed in the addenda to the CoHA.

“I will not allow my team to go to Owinyi-
Ki-Bul. Let them stay in the bushes there
and if possible be killed one by one and
not as a group in Owinyi-Ki-Bul. I will not
allow that because I know it could be a
plan on my people.”

—Vincent Otti, 2006”

But as these specifics were put on paper it was already
clear that the assembly area, with a southern edge just
15 kilometres away from the Ugandan border, was not
a tenable location, as it offered no strategic depth or
response time to the LRA if attacked. Conversely, the
LRA retained the capability to strike targets in northern
Uganda in a matter of hours. As early as late October
2006, the mediation team started putting the case to
high­level UPDF officers in Kampala that insisting on
two assembly areas (aimed at keeping the LRA forces
separated in two groups with the Nile between them)
would be unworkable. Indeed, security in Eastern
Equatoria subsequently deteriorated, threatening the
whole process. The LRA never assembled but remained
close enough to the formal assembly areas for the talks
to continue.
In April 2007 the SESG secured a formal agreement between the parties to abandon the idea of an assembly area in Eastern Equatoria, a major political achievement that put the negotiations back on track. There was renewed optimism when breakthrough protocols were signed in May and June of that year that included pointer clauses to, especially, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. At the time, I expressed serious concern about this political progress moving too far ahead of the security arrangements, which lagged. Yet, in reality, few real advances had been made. The LRA severely limited access to its representatives on the ground to an advance party in the remaining assembly area on the Sudan–DRC border. The main military LRA interlocutor there was second-in-command Vincent Otti. The LRA’s main force was in the general area but, strictly speaking, not assembled. It was only accessible on its own terms and mainly encamped in the DRC.

On the other hand, by June 2007—in contrast to the jumbled and improvised start-up of the CHMT—food deliveries, operations systems and procedures seemed to have taken hold. The AU observers were in place, and Denmark and Canada had provided bilateral technical assistance to strengthen the CHMT. After initial weaknesses had been ironed out, the UN-operated support fund for the Juba process became operational. The Juba Initiative Fund, launched by UN OCHA in October 2006 with an initial budget of USD 4.8 million, would support the negotiations and the CHMT until it was closed in June 2008. Military dialogue in the CHMT was improving and it seemed we were on route to a military sub-committee. The mediation team took two new tactical lines: direct engagement on ceasefire and DDR discussions with one or more non-indicted senior LRA commanders, and a joint strategy and firm technical working relations with the SESG team (that had just added a senior military adviser).

We began DDR sensitisation of LRA officers in the CHMT and LRA on the ground in the assembly area. At the same time, we began to plan a joint mission to Uganda of DDR negotiators advising the GoSS (UNICEF and myself) and the SESG’s aforementioned senior military adviser. But these plans did not come to fruition. Contractual issues and other matters normally fully within operational control came in the way. Personal relationships were lost. The SESG team reinforced the politics-first approach without quietly putting in place measures to bridge the collaboration gap on security monitoring between the CHMT—which now included a very important contingent of monitors from African countries—and UNMIS. Indeed, it was only very late in the process (February 2008) that the UNMIS/UNDDR unit in Juba conducted an impromptu workshop on DDR at the request of the mediation team. Despite a job well done on extremely short notice, the workshop could only ever have a modest outcome. That the GoU refused to attend reflected the chaotic politics of the time. Only the LRA political delegation attended, with LRA military representatives and AU military observers also not present.

As political attention in the latter half of 2007 centred around what turned out to be an eight-month suspension of negotiations, the impact of factors extraneous to the DDR negotiations described earlier came to the fore. Otti was allegedly killed on orders of the LRA supreme commander, leaving the mediation without its main military interlocutor, and the gap was never filled. Joseph Kony then refused direct contact with the chief mediator and the SESG. Internationally sanctioned deadlines set the pace of the Juba talks, which resulted in fast-tracking the negotiations around security arrangements. On the LRA side, credible military interlocutors were reduced to one individual on the CHMT. Despite several attempts to convince the LRA delegation that the time had come to include the available military expertise in its negotiation team, the LRA decided against this.

Conclusion

DDR was a formal point of negotiation through the Juba process. Thematic assistance, including specific expertise on children and women, was available to the mediation team early on and throughout the process. On paper, the outcome reflects a progressive approach to DDR with ample reference to international standards, including the IDDRS and UNSCR 1325 and 1612. Yet inevitably, it is difficult to be conclusive about a process that is still open-ended. From the outset, the Achilles heel of the Juba negotiations was the necessity to rely on proxy negotiators.

Without a signature from the LRA High Command on the Final Peace Agreement, it is too early to tell if the DDR elements agreed will become the reference point for what promises to be an onerous implemen-
Negotiating Disarmament Viewpoints Volume 2

The ‘nothing is agreed before everything is agreed’ principle applied in Aceh is playing out very differently in the LRA case. Negotiating security arrangements is foremost a political matter: the art of the possible, rather than the pursuit of the perfect. DRR is no substitute for political will; the Juba process is neither the first nor the last laboriously negotiated document that may never move beyond peace on paper. The protocol is silent on many of the points that a progressive doctrine of security management calls for. There is no commitment for LRA weapons to be handed over for destruction to the UN or the AU, for example. What was achievable at the time included the endorsement on paper of a formal commitment to the IDDRS. In principle, this commitment opens the door to applying higher standards. It would also include full technical involvement of the UN that sets the stage for what would be a ceasefire monitoring team with a military sub-committee (finally).

In the eight months since the LRA delegation initialed the FPA implementation plan (including the interlinked security arrangements spelled out in the formal ceasefire and DDR protocols), progress has been held up as Kony has not signed the FPA. Fundamentally, implementing DDR is contingent on concurrent progress on securing the necessary national justice mechanisms to satisfy the international justice criteria of the ICC.

After flouting yet another deadline on November 30, 2008, Kony appears likely to “soon reshuffle his negotiating team to bring on board some rebel commanders,” according to media reports. Ironically, this would reverse the parties’ positions from when the process started, with the GoU stressing political process and the LRA (finally) being ready to include direct military actors in its delegation. There is, however, also the fact that in March 2008 the GOSS declared the talks closed and formally there are no negotiations. Neither is the GoU willing to reopen talks.

One should not overlook the fact that signing the FPA introduces a formal role for the UN in what will be a cross-border DDR exercise. It is also important to be aware of the fact that during the signing deadlock, the financial and organisational infrastructure supporting the Juba peace process has all but been dismantled. Resuscitating it will take time and effort. More international understanding and quiet support should have been forthcoming to plan and prepare for the possibility of success: in case the LRA signs, it will be necessary to be ready to have the FPA arrangements such as the Ceasefire Monitoring Team (especially its AU component and UN liaison team) in place and operational.

Instead, in southern Sudan the process seems to hinge foremost on the personal tenacity of the GoSS chief mediator. The office of the SESG continues to be focused mostly on responding to political exigencies. The need and opportunity to use delays in the political process for discrete technical preparations for possible implementation of the negotiated security arrangements have been ignored, and implementation of the crucial first steps of disarmament and demobilisation risks becoming a case study of ‘functional ignorance.”

Some suggestions to consider

1. DDR—especially the two Ds—is intricately linked to and determined by the security arrangements put in place during peace talks.

The implication for good practice is that mediation teams consistently need to include expertise that can manage the continuum from peace talks to implementation.

2. Helping to build and support the negotiation and conflict management skills of members of armed groups willing to engage in negotiations is an area in need of greater activity from a range of actors. Adversaries are typically not well-schooled in negotiating with each other, and armed groups particularly, could benefit from exposure to insights from former rebels.

3. Security programming by development agencies can be more proactive.

Development agencies can play a far greater role in facilitating more considered appreciation by conflict parties of security arrangements and options for parties to peace processes, rather than viewing their role as typically limited to post-agreement implementation.

4. Sharing intelligence and people-power on the ground is vital to further a shared goal—the negotiated end of armed conflict.

This is critical, not the least in conflicts that play out in several countries with different UN missions.
Suggested resources for further information


International Center for Transitional Justice, Human Rights Center of University of California and the Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University (2007), When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, December.


Worden, Scott (2008), The Justice Dilemma in Uganda, USIP Briefing, United States Institute of Peace, February.

Websites

Enough Project www.EnoughProject.org

Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs www.ochaonline.un.org

Unicef www.unicef.org

Small Arms Survey www.smallarmsurvey.org

Endnotes


4 Other support included contributing to the UN-managed peace negotiation fund (the Juba Initiative Fund) and funding basic services inside the LRA assembly areas through CARITAS Uganda.

5 On 24 December 2002 the GoU signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFF II). Terms included a battalion of UNRFF II soldiers being incorpo-rated in the UPDF. This rebel group hailed from Yumbe District in Uganda’s West Nile region. The Front’s immediate history starts in the mid-1990s, but the insurgency has roots dating back to the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979. A local peace process started in 1998, leading to an informal ceasefire in early 1999.


8 See Egeland, Jan (2008), An Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity, Simon & Schuster.

9 The US formal position does not condone impunity but it side-steps direct support for the ICC warrants. Instead, it asserts this is a matter for the GoU as a signatory to the Rome Statute. For more detail see Embassy of the United States (2008), ‘Assistant Secretary Of State For African Affairs Jendayi Frazer Meets With Journalists In Uganda, Embassy News, 18 November at http://kampala.usembassy.gov/latest_embassy_news.html

The critique that the mediation has too broad a focus was articulated in the International Crisis Group’s Africa Briefing N°41, Peace in Northern Uganda?, 13 September 2006. It was further detailed in Africa Report N°124, Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, 26 April 2007.

10 For a concise and insightful summary of this and other dilemmas surrounding the Juba process, see Smock, David (2008), Uganda/ Lord’s Resistance Army Peace Negotiations, USIP Briefing, United States Institute of Peace, August. On the US dilemmas, he states: “[In January 2008,] the U.S. government faced a dilemma over whether to accept Machar’s invitation to become an official observer . . . The dilemma arises from the fact that the LRA has been declared a foreign terrorist organization, and State Depart-ment policy is not to negotiate with terrorists. Based on the hopes that these peace talks will result in the quick dissolution of the LRA, the State Department accepted the position of official observer” (p. 2).


12 Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Juba, Sudan, February 24, 2008. Reintegration of ex-combatants was part of the PRDP framework and a continuation of the Amnesty Commission’s work supported mainly by the MDRP.

13 Ibid Clause 4. Clause 5 on demobilisation is a bit wider and mentions the UN DDR and World Bank, a reminder of the fact that the ‘letter’ of the IDDRS is not necessarily a priori adopted by the World Bank or for that matter bilateral donors. Inserting the IDDRS in the text had little to do with technical issues. Rather, it expressed a pragmatic political approach: an example of political ambiguity that moved agreement on technical issues not likely to be agreed upon at the time forward, and drew in the UN on specific commitments.

14 Ibid Clause 2.15

15 Ibid Clauses 2.2 and 7. DDR negotiators took note that two basic sets of preconditions needed to be applied. In Sudan, where the DD process is set to take place the UN has a natural role, and that frame was applied to the relevant DR clauses. In Uganda, the frame applied is one of ‘national ownership.’

16 The IDDRS distinguishes between reinsertion and reintegra­tion in the following way: “Reinsertion is a form of transitional assis­tance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food,
Clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs." See www.unddr.org/whatissdr.php

The Monitor (2008), ‘Government pardons 23,000 rebels,’ Kampala, 12 August, quotes the Amnesty Commission’s spokesperson on a figure of 12,418 LRA recipient of the Amnesty Certificate that gives access to its reinsertion programme. That reinsertion programme consisting of one-off in-kind and in-cash benefits, is generally acknowledged as woefully inadequate. In all fairness it should be recognised that in a situation where 90 per cent of the population is internally displaced even the most sophisticated reintegation programme realistically would only achieve resettling former individuals from the LRA into internal displacement.


For more information, see www.mdpr.org

See the Government of Uganda (2007), Peace, Recovery and Development Programme for Northern Uganda, which covers the issue of auxiliary forces, p. 51. The point made at this juncture is that mediators deliberately sought to de-link disarmament and demobilisation by the LRA from that of auxiliary forces to avoid any attempts to link the two issues—a link that, as it turned out, neither party raised at the negotiating table.


IDDRS chapter 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR, www.unddr.org/iddrs/oz2

UNOCHA staff advised the deletion of the UN reference in earlier drafts of the August 2006 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as inclusion required legal clearance ‘from New York’. On the ground collaboration with UNMIS was shaped by the mission’s mandate to monitor all armed groups and forces in southern Sudan, i.e. including the SPLA, UPDF and LRA. This was hardly conducive to the sharing of security-sensitive information in addition to the UNDDR struggling to get the Sudan DDR exercise on track.

In December 2007 news reports noted: “LRA rebel chief Joseph Kony must leave his hideout in DR Congo’s Garamba National Park by January 31 or be flushed out, a meeting of the Great Lakes countries in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa resolved. Sources said the deadline had been agreed on earlier in the Tanzanian town of Arusha on September 8. The Ethiopian meeting, under the so-called Tripartite Plus arrangement, was convened by the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice.” The New Vision, ‘DRC gives Kony one month to quit,’ 6 December.