

## **Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks**

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This paper is based on the author's document "Consequential Conflict Transformation Model, and the Complementarity of Track One, Track One and a Half, and Track Two Diplomacy" written for, and presented at The Carter Center in the summer of 2000 as part of the Graduate Assistantship project for the Conflict Resolution Program. As a result the paper cites The Carter Center frequently as an example of a pure Track One and a Half organization.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The complexity of intrastate and interstate conflict has become a critical challenge to the field and to methods of conflict resolution even though the number of conflicts has decreased since 1999 with 2005 having the lowest number since the end of the Cold War (SIPRI Yearbook, 2006). In other countries such as Afghanistan, Angola (Cabinda Province), Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Uganda, to mention only a few, brutal conflicts have persisted despite the end of the Cold War (Weeks, 1992). The prevalence of ethnic conflict has proven that ideological differences are no longer the major cause of conflict, but rather ethnic identity and the distribution of resources are today's main sources of violence (Lederach, 1995). Conflicts in the Balkans, Sudan and Rwanda stand as prominent examples of ethnic identity conflicts (Ryan, 1995). This is clear evidence that conflict is endemic to human existence, survival and political relations. As Weeks (1992) rightly confirms, "conflict is as much a part of our existence as is evolution" (p. 7).

In trying to find the best methods of resolving conflicts, a variety of types of diplomacy have been identified. Nowadays terms such as "formal diplomacy", "Track One Diplomacy", "Track Two Diplomacy" and "Multi-Track Diplomacy" are common in conflict resolution vocabulary (Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Ziegler, 1984; De Magalhaes, 1988; Montville, 1991). "Quiet Diplomacy" is popularly known as President Thabo Mbeki's approach to regional political problems in Southern Africa (Christopher Landsberg, 2004). Regardless of the multiplicity of these levels of diplomacy, there are still a lot of other conflict resolution activities that have not been clearly defined. For example, peacemaking activities undertaken by non-political third parties between high political representatives of warring groups, or governments does not fit in the definitions of Track One, Track Two, and Multi-Track Diplomacy.

It is therefore the purpose of this paper to present Track One and a Half Diplomacy as operationalized at The Carter Center in order to enhance the ongoing struggle for clarity of its definition. Furthermore, the paper argues that the greatest strength of Track One and a Half is its ability to apply both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy within a strategic framework for peace. It is this ability that promotes and facilitates the complementarity of all the three tracks.

The paper sets the stage for this discussion by summarizing the already well-documented definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy, and outlines their strengths and weaknesses. Then the paper defines Track One and a Half Diplomacy, gives its strengths and weaknesses, and finally presents a model that shows the position of the three levels of diplomacy and how they can complement each other.

## **DIPLOMACY TRACKS**

### **Track One Diplomacy**

Track One Diplomacy or Official Diplomacy has a long history whose roots lie in the remote history of humankind. De Magalhaes (1988) describes Official Diplomacy as, “[a]n instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties” (p.17). The most important feature that distinguishes Track One diplomacy from all other forms of diplomacy is its formal application at the state-to-state level. It follows a certain protocol to which every state is a signatory. Track One Diplomacy is usually considered to be the primary peacemaking tool of a state’s foreign policy. It is carried out by diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of states and is aimed at influencing the structures of political power.

Also included among the Track One players are the United Nations, the Vatican, and regional economic and political groupings such as the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and many others. Negotiation is sometimes used as a synonym for Official Diplomacy, whereas in fact it is simply a conflict resolution process used by all those mentioned above to resolve conflicts. Making this distinction, Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall (2005) said, “[o]nce again, we are reminded of the universalism-particularism dimension of diplomacy: While negotiating to further the interests of their polities, diplomats typically identify the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the avoidance of war as common interests”.

**Strengths of Track One Diplomacy** - Track One Diplomacy was developed as a foreign policy tool to specifically improve relations among nations. Although the strengths of Track One Diplomacy are numerous, the most widely cited in the literature are four. First, Track One Diplomacy has the ability to use political power to influence the direction of negotiations and outcomes (Sanders, 1991). This power might include using the threat of military force if a party decides to go against international treaties. Second, Track One Diplomacy has the capacity to access material and financial resources that give high leverage and flexibility in negotiations (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000). Third, Track One Diplomacy can employ in-depth knowledge about the parties’ interests because of the use of various intelligence sources (Stein and Lewis, 1996). Fourth, Track One mediators have the competence to use broad knowledge of their states’ foreign policies, and also the foreign policies of the conflicting parties.

**Weaknesses of Track One Diplomacy** - Regardless of Track One’s strengths outlined above, Track One Diplomacy has several identifiable weaknesses. The first weakness of Track One Diplomacy is that its conflict resolution approaches are corrupted by power. State power can

be a liability to durable peace, rather than a facilitative tool. Power can suppress underlying issues of weaker parties, thereby undermining the sustainability of a peace agreement (Diamond & MacDonald, 1996). Second, diplomatic missions, an asset to Track One Diplomacy, are normally closed down at the peak of conflicts between countries “thereby reducing communication when it is needed most” (Ziegler, 1984, p. 27). Third, officials cannot, of course, speak against their country and, as a result, may either be too rigid or delay negotiations through consultations with their leaders at home (Volkan, 1991; Sanders, 1991). Fourth, Track One Diplomacy is affected by electoral cycles.

### **Track Two Diplomacy**

Traditional diplomacy or Track One Diplomacy has for a long time been complemented by another form of diplomacy called Track Two Diplomacy (Montville, 1991). Like many other conflict resolution theorists and practitioners worried about the failures of Track One Diplomacy, Montville coined the phrase ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ (Volkan, 1991). Montville (1991) defines Track Two Diplomacy as, “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (p. 162). Montville emphasized that Track Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One Diplomacy, but compensates for the constraints imposed on leaders by their people’s psychological expectations. Most important, Track Two Diplomacy is intended to provide a bridge or complement official Track One negotiations (Nan, 2004; Agha, Feldman, Khalidi, Schiff, 2003). Examples of Track Two organisations are Search for Common Ground, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), and many others.

**Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy** – The strengths of Track Two Diplomacy have been discussed in detail, but separately by Montville (1991), Ury (1999), Sanders (1991), Ryan (1995), and Lederach (1997). First, Track Two parties are not inhibited by political or constitutional power; therefore, they can express their own viewpoints on issues that directly affect their communities and families. Second, Track Two officials do not have the fear of losing constituencies because they are the constituency. Third, Track two empowers the socially, economically, and politically disenfranchised groups by giving them a platform from which they can air their views on how peace can be achieved in their own communities or nations. Fourth, Track Two is effective both at the pre-violent conflict and post violent conflict stages; therefore it is a very effective tool for violent conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. Fifth, Track Two involves grassroots and middle leadership who are in direct contact with the conflict. Sixth, Track Two is not affected by electoral cycles.

**Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy** – Regardless of its advantages, Track Two Diplomacy also has several weaknesses. The first weakness is that Track Two participants have limited ability to influence foreign policy and political power structures because of their lack of political power. Second, Track Two interventions can take too long to yield results. Third, Track Two has limited ability to influence change at the war stage of a conflict. Fourth, Track Two participants rarely have resources necessary for sustained leverage during negotiations and for the implementation of agreements. Fifth, Track Two is not effective in authoritarian regimes where leaders do not take advice from lower level leaders. Sixth, Track Two actors due to their

lack of political power, are in most cases not accountable to the public for poor decisions. Seventh, because of their multiplicity Track Two actors/organizations are notoriously known for their lack of coordination.

As already mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy do not cover the full range of peacemaking activities found in the current field of conflict. In addition, both tracks, because of their limitations leave certain gaps in the peacemaking and peacebuilding activities which have already been filled in by certain unique individuals such as retired politicians, religious leaders, and by organizations such as The Carter Center, the Community of Sant'Egidio (Bartoli, 2005), the Conflict Management Group, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Caucasus Links (Nan, 2005), the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Crisis Management Initiative. Since these individuals and organizations' activities do not fit in the definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy, evidence in the following section shows that these activities can be labelled Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

### **Track One and a Half Diplomacy**

Track One and a Half is a term that has been used in conversations by many people in conflict resolution. The origins of the term "Track One and a Half Diplomacy" are elusive and its operationalization confusing. However, Dr. Susan Allen Nan, in her PhD dissertation writes:

[T]here is a type of conflict resolution effort that defies categorization with other types above (Track One and Track Two diplomacy), and is commonly called "Track One and a Half." This is the long-term unofficial facilitated joint analysis among negotiators, LUFJAAN for short, that Conflict Management Group conducted January 1996, May 1996, June 1997, and July 1998 (Nan, 1999, p. 202).

Inspired by Nan, and in an effort to operationalize Track One and a Half Diplomacy for The Carter Center interventions, Mapendere (2000) defined Track One and a Half Diplomacy,

...Public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization or institution. The aim of such interaction is to influence attitudinal changes between the parties with the objective of changing the political power structures that caused the conflict (p. 16).

Nan (2003) defined Track One and a Half Diplomacy as "unofficial interactions between official representatives of states" (p. 9). In 2005, Nan redefined Track One and a Half as "diplomatic initiatives that are facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involve officials from the conflict in question" (p. 165). Nan's definitions are not dissimilar from Mapendere's (2000) definition in that the parties are official representatives, but facilitators are ordinary citizens.

Therefore, the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track One is that the third party is not a representative of a political institution. Pure Track One conflict resolution efforts are facilitated or mediated by government representatives or representatives of political institutions such as the UN and regional groups. President Clinton's Camp David mediation between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak is purely Track One, while Former Finnish Prime Minister Martti Ahtisaari's mediation in Aceh is Track One and a Half.

On the other hand the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track Two is the parties to the process. In Track Two Diplomacy, the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are not official representatives of the conflicting sides, but influential citizens. This is not the case for Track One and a Half where the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are official representatives of the conflicting groups. Therefore, Track One and a Half Diplomacy can also be called "hybrid diplomacy" because it is a cross-fertilization of Track One and Track Two that gives the third party diplomatic agility to flip from Track One to Track Two conflict resolution techniques in accordance with the situation.

The Carter Center is an example of an organization that practices Track One and a Half Diplomacy. In December 1999, Former President Carter and his staff mediated between President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan. This is a pure Track One and a Half activity because The Carter Center's involvement was not driven by a political institution's agenda but by its own philosophy. By operating at a Track One and a Half level, The Carter Center has the advantage of applying an eclectic approach to international and ethnic conflict, such as the use of high-level diplomacy, private problem-solving workshops, direct mediation, interactive conflict resolution, and other confidence-building interventions.

In 1995 the Carter Center negotiated the "Guinea Worm Ceasefire" between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement in order to allow the Carter Center to treat communities affected by the guinea-worm disease (Carter, 1995). In addition, in 1994 Former President Carter helped neutralize the nuclear tension between North Korea and the United States. Again in 1996 President Carter together with Retired General Colin Powell prevented an imminent disastrous military confrontation between the Haitian military government and the U.S. government (ibid). These activities are cited here not because they are the only Track One and Half activities undertaken so far in the field of international and ethno-political conflict, but because they have been widely documented.

### **Conduct of the Process**

Track One and a Half as a hybrid form of diplomacy can be conducted in various ways. It can be carried out privately in the same manner Track Two activities are conducted, or publicly like Track One Diplomacy. President Carter's intervention in Haiti in 1996 was carried out in the full awareness of the public and the media, whilst his go-between role in the North Korean- U.S. conflict in 1994 was private. The Sudan-Uganda mediations that were undertaken by the Carter Center from 1999 to 2003 were mostly private and confidential, except for the agreement signing ceremony in Nairobi. The decision to have a private or public Track One and a Half process cannot be prescribed, but is determined by the situation and the people involved.

### **Characteristics of Track One and a Half Third Parties**

The uniqueness of Track One and a Half Diplomacy necessitates a close examination of the characteristics of the third parties who practice this type of peacemaking. The most notable characteristic of these third parties is their international political visibility. Former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Jimmy Carter are people of great visibility because of the political posts they held. The Carter Center's International Council for Conflict Resolution (ICCR) roster is composed of similar eminent persons who are very suitable for Track One and a Half activities (Carter, 1995). This characteristic carries with it influence and perceived power that enhances their leverage capabilities during negotiations. However, this characteristic does not automatically translate into effectiveness because of other variables such as personality of the third party, characteristics of the parties, and the situation.

Another characteristic is academic visibility. Well known scholar/practitioners such as Bill Ury and others are also members of the ICCR, and have been involved in Track One and a Half Diplomacy efforts with The Carter Center. Even though professors employed in the field of conflict resolution have worked extensively at a Track Two level, they have the potential to operate at a Track One and Half level on their own or, if assisted by politically eminent persons, to secure access to high level parties. Also indirectly, academic/practitioners have for a very long time advised the politically eminent peacemakers in their peace efforts.

Another very important characteristic of Track One and a Half third parties is national and international respect. Again, to use former President Carter and Nelson Mandela as examples, these former presidents command international respect among both politicians and ordinary citizens. It is this respect that facilitates their access to other world leaders or important players in conflicts around the world.

Related to respect is the importance of trust. Most people involved in conflict resolution know that trust of the third party is the cornerstone of every conflict resolution intervention. The continued involvement of the Carter Center in the Sudan conflict is a sign of trust between the Carter Center and the conflicting parties. This trust is not limited to third parties only, but also other stakeholders, who have an interest in the outcome of a peace process. These former presidents' well-known record for reliability enables serving presidents and rebel leaders to trust that the third party will facilitate the attainment of common interests among the parties without bias (Hoffman, 2006).

The last characteristic is that Track One and a Half interveners whether they are individuals or organizations have reasonable resources to carry out peace initiatives. It is due to their reputation that third parties are more likely to get funding from private and public organizations than most Track Two practitioners. This is facilitated by the fact that former high-level politicians and leading scholars interact with highly influential and powerful people who have personal or public funds. However, it is important to mention that these third parties whether they are former presidents, scholars or organizations, can never have unlimited funding or resources because of the numerous conflicts that require their attention. The characteristics of

Track One and a Half actors mentioned above are also important to the third parties' entry into the peacemaking process.

### **Entry into Process**

There are three ways through which Track One and a Half third parties can gain entry into peacemaking processes. These are invitation by one or both parties, requests for intervention by other concerned outsiders, and initiation by third parties themselves. Regardless of the secrecy surrounding the way Track One and a Half actors enter into conflict situations, there are a few documented examples that can be cited.

Former President Carter's intervention in the North Korean-US standoff was based on President Carter's longstanding invitation to visit the country from Kim Il Sung and their personal relationship. As a concerned citizen, Carter informed President Clinton of his desire to visit North Korea and talk about the situation. By giving due respect to both President Clinton and the Great Leader Kim Il Sung of North Korea, President Carter gained entry into the peacemaking process and finally defused the situation (Carter, 1995).

Unlike the North Korean-US intervention in which President Carter initiated, his involvement in Haiti was based on an invitation by the Commander in Chief of the Haitian military, General Raoul Cédras. "The United States and a large international force were on the verge of invading the island when I was called by the [C]ommander in [C]hief of the Haitian military, General Raoul Cédras, who asked for my help...I was willing for the Carter Center to serve as a channel for communication" (Carter, 1995, pp. 176-177). With these few examples, it is clear that Track One and a Half actors are flexible like any other conflict resolution actors in the way they enter into conflict situations. The conduct of Track One and a Half Diplomacy, the characteristics of the Track One and a Half actors, and their flexible entry tactics, all roll into a number of advantages discussed in the next section.

**Strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy** - The first strength of Track One and a Half Diplomacy is that it complements Track One and Track Two and its actors fill in the gap between the two tracks. "Because of his prominence as a former president, Carter is able to serve as a bridge between Track One and Track Two diplomacy" (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 43). The second advantage of Track One and a Half is that it directly influences the power structures, yet it is not driven by governmental political agendas. It has been noticed that some Track One and a Half officials get into conflict situations in which their governments may not be interested because of antagonistic relations. A good example is the Carter Center's 1995 Guinea-Worm Ceasefire negotiations in Sudan. "The United States had branded Sudan a supporter of world terrorism, and accusations of religious persecution were a major issue in the civil war" (Carter, 1995, p. 184). Regardless of the enmity between the U.S. government and Sudan, the Carter Center never stopped attempts to pursue peace in Sudan (Carter, 1995). In its peace interventions the Carter Center engaged President Museveni of Uganda and President Bashir to resolve the bilateral dispute between them. Also, The Carter Center attempted to solve the civil war between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan on one hand, and the civil war between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda on the other hand. Given the current violent situation in Sudan, Track One and a Half

involvement could complement ongoing traditional diplomacy interventions. For example, former President Jimmy Carter's involvement could be helpful given his longstanding relationship with President Bashir of Sudan. Carter's inability to impose solutions through political power makes him less threatening to Bashir and he could thus be viewed as a more trusted facilitator.

Another advantage of Track One and a Half is its diplomacy agility. When a direct high-level approach is not possible, a Track One and a Half intervener can reach out to lower-level indirect approaches to peacemaking such as the use of humanitarian interventions to gain the trust of the parties. Health programs such as the guinea-worm eradication program in Sudan is a good example. Therefore, Track One and a Half interventions can be applied at different stages of a conflict such as prevention during the latent stage, mediations during war, and other interactive conflict resolution techniques during the peacebuilding stages (Mitchell, 1997; Lund, 1997; Fisher, 1997). Theoretically, the ICCR has the capacity to intervene at various levels of a conflict because of the expertise it carries such as Former President Carter, Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Harold Saunders, Ambassador Bethune Kiplagat, and professors Vamik Volkan, Christopher Mitchell, and William Ury, just to mention a few (Carter, 1995). Very few organizations can match the combined peacemaking talent of these people.

Track One and a Half Diplomacy also helps world leaders who are stuck in difficult situations by providing them with an honourable way out of their problems. This face saving ability of Track One and a Half diplomacy is facilitated by the characteristics of the third parties such as nonpartisanship, political prominence, trustworthiness, lack of real political power, respect for and by both parties, and honesty. To summarize this capability President Carter (1995) wrote,

In Sudan, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, the Carter Center persuaded peace by giving people a chance to choose an honourable alternative to war. We talked to everyone, including some leaders whom many consider to be in the wrong... We argued simply that everyone had more to gain from resolving their conflicts peacefully than by trying to resolve them through war (p. 186).

Track One and a Half efforts can facilitate communication between leaders whose communication has been severed by conflict. In international conflicts, countries involved in a conflict normally cut diplomatic relations to indicate that formal communication is no longer appreciated between the two nations. Once this has happened, the situation deteriorates between the two nations, possibly leading to war or serious antagonism. The same can be said for intrastate conflicts where the sitting government refuses to talk to the resistance movement as a sign of power and pride.

In both cases, Track One Diplomacy is ineffective because the involvement of sitting heads of state or UN officials can be undermined by various political agendas. In internal conflict, the sovereignty clause makes Track One less effective because nations try to respect each other's sovereignty. Track Two as well can be too risky to carry out because citizens are discouraged from talking to each other. If they do, they may risk being killed. It is at this point



that Track One and a Half can be used to bridge the communication gap, as what happened during the North Korean-U.S. standoff.

As mentioned previously, President Carter visited North Korea in 1994 as a private citizen to help resolve the tension between the US and North Korea. The North Korean government had withdrawn its membership from the International Atomic Energy Agency raising suspicion by the US that North Korea “had developed nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (Carter, 1995, p. 172). President Carter’s visit to North Korea in his unofficial capacity ended the crisis between the U.S. and North Korea. In his own words President Carter said:

My meeting with Kim II Sung ended the immediate crisis. I did not make any concessions to him. I simply gave the highest leader of the country the opportunity to talk with me and to know that his words would be communicated directly to the president of the United States. Negotiations resumed on a lower level to work out technical issues. These issues included matters of national pride... This is another example of how difficult it is for people in a conflict to overcome their hostility. Yet, with good faith and perhaps a trusted mediator, it is the kind of issue that can be overcome (Carter, 1995, pp. 175-176).

This shows the effectiveness of Track One and a Half in opening channels of communication between conflicting nations, and its face saving role for sitting heads of states. Regardless of these strengths, Track One and a Half has its own weaknesses.

**Weaknesses of Track One and a Half Diplomacy** - The first disadvantage of Track One and a Half mediation or facilitation is that the mediator is sometimes viewed by the parties as representing his/her home country’s foreign policy. Such an attitude may jeopardize the process if the home country has an aggressive foreign policy towards one of the parties. Another disadvantage is that Track One and a Half mediators have limited ability to use inducements and directive mediation techniques because they do not have the political power to command resources. Track One and a Half actors have no technical, financial, and military resources needed either to encourage an agreement or to support or enforce agreement implementation. Moral authority is one of the major strengths of Track One and a Half actors such as Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela and others, and yet it is one of the biggest weaknesses of their organizations. Successes driven by moral integrity of the mediator cannot be duplicated by others in the same organization because such successes depend on a particular individual’s personality. Last, Track One and a Half interveners’ activities may run contrary to their country’s foreign policy; this may undermine their peace efforts. However, one of the most effective ways of reducing the impact of the weaknesses of the three forms of diplomacy on peacemaking is by the complementary application of the various diplomatic activities (Nan, 1999).

## **COMPLEMENTARY APPLICATION OF TRACKS OF DIPLOMACY**

The development of several tracks of diplomacy demonstrates that conflict is a complicated phenomenon, requiring a multi-dimensional approach if it is to be effectively managed and resolved. Since each track of diplomacy has its own strengths and weaknesses, it is


important to find a way by which the weaknesses of each can be reduced in order to improve the chances of resolving conflicts without loss of life and material (Ziegler, 1984; Volkan, 1991; Montville, in Volkan, et al, 1991). However, in practice not all institutions or organizations have the capacity to utilize or apply all forms of diplomacy in resolving conflicts (Nan, 1999). These limitations arise from the specialized nature and resources available to individual institutions/organizations. This then calls for the “complementarity of conflict resolution efforts” (Nan, 1999, p. 4).

The need for joint efforts using different types of diplomacy has been frequently noted in recent conflict resolution literature. Speaking of preventive diplomacy, Bercovitch (1993) writes that early deployment of economic, diplomatic and military tools could be effective at preventing or even resolving conflicts before they escalate. The Oslo Accord signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was the result of joint efforts between Track Two institutions that facilitated and enhanced Track One initiatives (Rupesinghe, 1995; Agha, et al, 2003). In Volkan et al (1991), Sanders writes that private citizens know how things should be done, and officials develop and widen these ideas. Nan (1999) demonstrates through field research that Track Two efforts prepare the ground for Track One by enabling ideas to be tested before official negotiations. James Traub (2000), in his article *Inventing East Timor*, discusses the United Nation’s ‘nation-building’ efforts, which include both military and civilian resources in developing a state as a way of providing a lasting solution to what was an intractable conflict. The authors mentioned are only a few of the many who have identified and written on the need for complementarity of conflict resolution efforts.

A body of research exists on the different stages of conflict and possible interventions for each stage. Mitchell (1989), Kriesberg (1998), Lund (1997), and Fisher (1997) separately discuss in detail how conflict develops and the possible interventions. Although attempts have been made to discuss how a type of diplomacy is suitable for a particular stage of conflict, there has not been a model that identified the gap left by the separate application of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy by different actors. The identification of this gap and how it can be filled by the application of Track One and a Half Diplomacy is crucial to the positive complementarity of the tracks of diplomacy and that of different actors in the conflict resolution field (Nan, 1999). This will also help state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) think systemically because resolving a conflict is composed of many different but related elements. Playing an isolated role to resolve a conflict without realizing how other people’s efforts influence, or are influenced, by this role leads to over expenditure of time, and resources. Figure 1 shows how actors with different levels of specialization or in different fields can enhance the efficiency of the three tracks in resolving conflicts through their combined efforts to address issues at different levels of leadership (Lederach, 1997) with the aim of reducing the impact of their weaknesses.

Figure 1 synthesizes Lederach’s (1997) three levels of leadership, types of diplomacy including Track One and a Half, and shows the type of actors found at different diplomacy levels and the levels of leadership on which they can exert influence. Figure 1 shows that different levels of diplomacy target different social structures of conflict. In addition, the diagram shows the position of Track One and a Half Diplomacy and presents the Carter Center as an example of a Track One and a Half actor.

Figure. 1  
 Complementarity of Tracks of Diplomacy



The Track One level includes actors such as the UN, regional organizations, heads of state, and government representatives. The major task of these actors is to facilitate negotiations at the top level leadership in order to influence change or the resolution of a conflict. The reason for working with top leadership is that these actors believe that problems emanating from a faulty political structure can best be resolved if those in political power are involved at the negotiation table. It is those people at the highest political level that have the power and authority to change the political structures and bring peace to the nation.

At a Track Two level, we have two major groups of actors, those that deal directly with conflict resolution and those that deal with humanitarian issues. Private and public organizations that deal with conflict resolution commonly operate at a Track Two level where they facilitate

negotiations or workshops for mid-level leadership people such as religious, tribal, political and business leaders (Lederach, 1997). As mentioned earlier on, these are people who have the trust of their groups and who can influence the top leadership. The Track Two players at this level aim at influencing the attitudes of the conflicting parties by focusing not only on the substantive issues of the conflict, but also on the day-to-day socio-economic issues affecting the population as a result of the conflict.

Organizations that provide humanitarian assistance to people affected by conflict form the second group of Track Two players and operate at the grassroots level (Lederach, 1997). The aim of these organizations is to save lives and restore hope in the communities devastated by violent conflict, or by poverty. Where there is no war, the organizations help to improve people's socio-economic lives through a variety of projects, such as agricultural and entrepreneurial projects. These organizations can provide an early warning function by providing organizations that specialize in conflict resolution with information about indicators of potential conflict such as unfair distribution of resources, corruption and systemic injustices.

Finally, at the Track One and a Half level, we have organizations such as The Carter Center, the Crisis Management Initiative, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Sant' Egidio, and others whose activities have already been discussed earlier in this paper. These actors can deal with both top and middle level leadership. Given adequate resources some of the Track One and a Half actors such as The Carter Center can reach out to grassroots peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts as shown in the diagram. In most of its interventions, The Carter Center not only communicates what it is doing at the grassroots level to government official and the president, but also operates as a communication link for other smaller Track Two actors with limited access to the political elite. If well coordinated within a strategic framework for peace, these levels of diplomacy can have a quick and direct impact on conflict. This is why this paper argues for the acceptance of Track One and a Half Diplomacy as a link between Track One and Track Two conflict resolution efforts.

## **CONCLUSION**

The main reason for introducing Track One and a Half Diplomacy is not just to enrich conflict resolution vocabulary, but to highlight its theoretical and practical utility in resolving interstate and ethno-political conflicts by bridging the gap between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy. For many years Track Two actors have been stuck in their position unable to move their initiatives up the chain of leadership, blaming the arrogance of official diplomacy. Similarly, diplomats have for many years been frustrated by the naivety of Track Two actors who through their lack of political sophistication interfere with national interests. Track One and a Half, as operationalized by The Carter Center, reduces the limitations of the other two by its demonstrated understanding of both official diplomacy and the strengths of Track Two actors. It has been noted that diplomatic agility and nonpartisanship are some of the main strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy. Political, academic, and situational visibility, are some of the main characteristics of individuals that practice Track One and Half Diplomacy. Regardless of its advantages it has also been noted that limited inducements and interference with foreign policy are some of the weaknesses of Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

In summary, Figure 1 depicts the interconnectedness of tracks of diplomacy, leadership levels and the activities of the actors at different levels of diplomacy. The most important function of the diagram is to show other conflict resolution practitioners, academics, and conflict resolution organizations that there is another form of diplomacy that can help to fill in the gaps left by Track One and Track Two Diplomacy. With good and timely collaboration, Track One and a Half actors can facilitate communication between Track One and Track Two. In addition, the diagram illustrates how organizations can compensate for some of their weaknesses by realizing that their activities can be augmented by other organizations through cooperation and coordination. Therefore, the introduction of Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the complementarity of tracks and organizations will effectively equip the peace community with the tools needed to intervene at any given stage of a conflict.

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