School for a Culture of Peace

2015 yearbook of peace processes

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Icaria editorial
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Introduction

This tenth edition of the Yearbook on Peace Processes\(^1\) analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

The organisation of the analysis of each conflict follows a similar pattern in most cases: 1) a brief synopsis of the context of the conflict, with a small description of the armed groups and the main actors intervening in each conflict, 2) the background to the peace process, 3) the events that happened in 2014, 4) a table with the most significant events in the year as a summary, 5) a selection of websites where you can monitor the conflict and 6) a table illustrating the relationships among the primary and secondary actors in each conflict, highlighting the spaces of intermediation in each case.\(^2\) At the start of every country, there is a small box with basic statistics on it. The government armed forces are not included in the section of the box called “Armed actors”.

The author of this yearbook has tried to stay within the bounds of mentioning new deeds, events, successes, failures or proposals in an attempt to limit personal opinions on these events to the extent possible.

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<th>MODALITIES OR STAGES IN PEACE PROCESSES</th>
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By **negotiation** we mean the process through which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal actors within the same country) agree to discuss their differences in an agreed-upon setting to find a solution that will meet their demands. This negotiation can be either direct or through third-party facilitation. Formal negotiations usually have a prior, exploratory, phase, which enables the framework (format, venue, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future negotiations to be defined. By **peace process** we mean the consolidation of a negotiation scheme

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\(^1\) The yearbook expands on the information provided by the *Escola de Cultura de Pau* through its annual publication “Alerta 2015” (Icària Editorial, 2015), which is updated quarterly through the electronic publication “Baròmetro” (http: escolapau.uab.cat).

\(^2\) This “space of intermediation” includes not only the more formal “facilitators or mediators” (which are indicated by letter size or bold face), but also other institutions or individuals that have somehow intervened. Obviously, facilitation efforts that were not made public are not included, even if the author is aware of some of them.
once the thematic agenda and the procedures to follow have been defined, along with the calendar and the facilitators. Therefore, negotiation is just one stage in a peace process.

By **ceasefire** we mean the military decision to halt any combat or use of weapons during a specified period, while **cessation of hostilities** includes not only a ceasefire but also the commitment not to engage in kidnapping, harassment of the civilian population, threats, etc.

Depending on the ultimate goals sought and the dynamic of the different phases in the negotiation process, the majority of peace processes can be categorised into one of these five **categories or models**, although some cases may combine two categories:

a) Demobilisation and reinsertion  
b) Sharing of political, military or economic power  
c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.)  
d) Trust-building measures  
e) Formulas for self-governance or “intermediate political architectures”

The model of peace process is usually related to the kinds of demands presented and the actors’ capacity to exert pressure or demand (level of symmetry between the military, political and social spheres), although mentors and facilitators, the weariness of the actors, support received and other less rational factors related to leaders’ pathologies, imagined events or historical inertia also come into play. In some cases, though not many, especially if the process has lasted a long time, it might begin in one of the above categories (demobilisation and reinsertion, for example) and then the demands expand to situate the process in another more complex category. It is also important to recall that not all processes or their previous phases of exploration, dialogue and negotiation are undertaken with true sincerity, as it is common for them to be part of the actor’s war strategy, either to win time, to internationalise and gain publicity, to rearm or for other reasons.

Finally, I wanted to note that what we commonly call a “peace process” is actually nothing other than a “process to put an end to violence and armed struggle”. The signing of a cessation of hostilities and the subsequent signing of a peace agreement are nothing other than the start of the true “peace process”, which is linked to stage called “post-war rehabilitation”. This stage is always fraught with difficulties, but it is where decisions are truly taken and policies are truly enacted which, if successful, will manage to overcome the violence (both structural and cultural) that will ultimately enable us to talk about truly having “achieved peace”. This yearbook, however, with the exception of a few appendices, shall limit itself to analysing the efforts made in the early stages of this long pathway, without which the final goal would be impossible to reach.

**The main stages in a peace process**

All peace processes require a huge time investment, and this is proven by the many years that must usually be spent for one to begin and bear fruit. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, peace processes follow a pattern with more or less known phases in which the most time is spent on negotiations. They work with an initial exploratory or testing phase, also called pre-negotiation, in which the actors intervening in the process (explorers) calibrate the conviction of the parties, that is, whether they are truly convinced that they are going to launch a negotiation process in which they will have to give up something. This stage is decisive, since negotiations are often held without true conviction by one of the parties, either the government or the armed group. In this case, the negotiations are destined for failure. The exploratory phase is when the terms of complete and absolute security for the future negotiators are tested, since there is a history of murders or attacks against them and nobody dares to embark on talks without full guarantees of their safety. This safety must be established with very clearly defined rules. Likewise, certain guarantees are sought for compliance with the agreements reached in this early stage; in
In this case, timelines and methodologies to be followed are recommended; the pre-agenda or initial agenda is set; the terms of a tentative roadmap are agreed upon; and the conflictive aspects of the basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the meta-conflict) are clarified. In short, in this stage, the goal is to generate trust in the process itself: the role played by potential third parties is agreed upon, the imposition of plans (the very cornerstone of the negotiations) is discarded, and the adversary is recognised, giving him the legitimacy needed to engage in dialogue. Once this exploratory work has been completed, an “agreement on what must be agreed upon” is reached in order to then proceed to determining “how to do it”. The sum of all these steps is what sometimes makes up the “roadmap” or initial framework of what must be done to ensure that the process fares well. The roadmap is nothing other than a working schema, often a diagram, in which the steps to follow, which will guide the process, are outlined.

Once the negotiations have started, the parties ascertain whether the interlocutors are valid, that is, whether they are the representatives of the primary actors with the capacity to take decisions. Third-ranked actors have no place at the negotiating table, so it is always necessary to start with an inclusive approach which gives a voice to the actors, even if they are unwanted, who are the keys to resolving the conflict. Although it is unquestionably more comfortable, it makes no sense to invite friendly actors to the negotiating table; rather the true adversaries must be invited. The reason for this negotiation is for the opposing parties to sit down to talk under the mindset of achieving mutual benefit through an “everyone wins, no one loses” or “I win, you win” scheme, thus discarding zero-sum approaches in which one party wins and the other loses.

If the negotiation proceeds satisfactorily, the issues on the substantive agenda can be discussed (the ones on the procedural agenda will have already been agreed upon). At that point, given the fact that trust will have been established, personal relationships will develop, which will make it easier to reach an agreement, or at least partial agreements, with their respective protocols, which in turn lead to the final agreement which outlines how it will be implemented and who will implement it. This finally leads us to implementation agreements, including the forms of verification and resolving any potential disagreements that might arise in the final stages.
Usual stages in negotiation processes

The times of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities vary and are part of the negotiation process
Main conclusions of the year

• Of the 112 conflicts analyzed in the last 30 years, 39.3% ended in a peace agreement. Those that have not been resolved and are still active account for 47.3% of the total, while it is highly significant that only 9.8% of these conflicts have been brought to an end with a military victory by one of the sides; in other words, the vast majority of these conflicts are resolved only through negotiations, by launching some kind of process that leads to a final agreement, and not by using military force. This does not lessen our concern over the high number of conflicts that are still unresolved.

• Of the conflicts that have come to an end over the last thirty years (59), 44 have been achieved through peace agreements (74.6%), 4 without any formal peace accord (6.8%) and 11 were achieved with a military victory (18.6%), which confirms that negotiation is the best path for resolving conflicts.

• 34% of the current conflicts are not in a negotiation phase.

• Three peace agreements were signed in 2014: South Sudan (SSDM-Cobra faction), Mozambique and the Philippines (MILF).

• In 2014, 15.1% of the negotiations went well, 24.2% experienced difficulties and 57.6% went badly, so the final result is not very positive, although in several countries negotiations are expected to resume in 2015. In the six-year period from 2008 to 2013 the average percentage of negotiations that had ended badly by the end of the year was 17.3%.

• 79.4% of all negotiations use external mediation.

• If we look at the frequency of the meetings, the negotiations in Cuba between the Government of Colombia and the FARC are the fastest moving talks in the world.

• The Mali peace talks began in Algiers, with Algerian facilitation and an international team. The National Assembly overwhelmingly passed a motion to create a 15-member Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission with a three-year mandate to clarify the crimes that occurred during the 2012-2013 crisis. A year later the first draft agreement was signed.

• In Senegal, a government delegation and representatives from the MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio met in Rome, with the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio, and signed a commitment backing confidence-building measures.

• The Government of Mozambique and the main opposition party RENAMO reached an agreement on August 24 to end the political conflict that had confronted the two groups for two years.

• Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, said that the Somali Government had opened the doors to talk with members of the armed group al-Shabaab, which had opened unofficial channels for these conversations. The president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, extended to the end of the year the amnesty that the Government had offered to all of the members of al-Shabaab who wished to surrender their weapons.

• In the context of efforts to resolve the different conflicts in Sudan, an 8-point Agreement for National Dialogue and Constitutional Process was signed in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), with the AU as observer.

• The Berghof Foundation organized a meeting with the leaders of armed groups in Darfur (Sudan) that were part of the SRF coalition, including the president of one of the JEM factions, Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the SPLM-N, Malik Agar, and the president of the SRF, Minni Minnawi. The leaders pledged to participate in any political process that would lead the country
to peace. At the end of the year a meeting was held between the Government and the JEM-Gibril Ibrahim faction, but the government delegation only wished to discuss security issues.

- Talks that had been at an impasse for almost a year were resumed between Sudan and the SPLM-N, which operates in the regions of Kordofan and Blue Nile. Both sides met again in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the AU. AU mediator Thabo Mbeki said Sudan was using "a two-track process" referring to the parallel negotiations being held in the Sudanese region of Darfur, and that both negotiations should be "synchronized". In December the negotiations broke down because of the many differences in the proposals made by both parties. At the third meeting the leader of the SLPM-N signed the Geneva Call to destroy its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines or the willingness by both sides to participate in a large-scale operation to release all prisoners of war.

- In South Sudan, the Government and the SPLM / A-IO began peace talks in early January in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). It also signed a peace agreement in the Ethiopian capital with the South Sudan Democratic Movement--- Cobra Faction (SSDM-Cobra faction) led by David Yau Yau. The accord would establish a special territorial administration in Pibor County based on the principle of decentralization. The parties agreed to continue negotiations in Arusha (Tanzania), complementing the efforts of IGAD, although under the facilitation of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) from Finland.

- In the Central African Republic (CAR) conflict, a forum for reconciliation and political dialogue was held in Brazzaville (Congo). It was facilitated by the Gabonese president Denis Sassou, with the participation of different armed groups from the CAR and the thirty countries and international organizations that make up the International Contact Group on the CAR. The groups reached an agreement to end hostilities. At the end of the year there was a serious diplomatic incident that could have an impact on the peace process. A meeting was held in Nairobi (Kenya) between the leaders of the Séléka coalition and heads of the anti-balaka movement, without previously informing the CAR Government.

- In DR Congo, the Mai Mai Simba militia (from the Ituri region) surrendered to the Congolese Armed Forces. In April the FDLR announced a voluntary disarmament, although there were some doubts regarding the real extent of the process. They held talks with the Congolese Government in Rome under the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio. The head of MONUSCO asked members of the FDLR to return to Rwanda, their country of origin, or otherwise the military option would become inevitable in 2015.

- In Libya, there was an attempt to form a diplomatic pole between Algeria, Qatar and Turkey. The Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, was able to get all of the factions at war to accept Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s proposal of peace and reconciliation, while UN envoy Bernardino León prepared a second meeting with all parties in the conflict. The Libyan Supreme Court, dominated by the Islamists from Tripoli, ruled that the parliamentary elections that had been held in the summer by the House of Representatives in Tobruk were illegitimate.

- The Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara met with the working groups set up by the parties in Rabat and Tindouf to present them with a series of confidential questions formulated specifically for each group. The questions were deliberately tough and had been created to force the parties to rise above the issues that were easy to deal with, to introduce conversations that were different from those in the past, and to encourage them to show flexibility. The POLISARIO Front criticized the methodology.

- In Colombia, the Government and the FARC reached an agreement on the fourth agenda item regarding the solution to the problem of illicit drugs. Both parties caused surprise when they publish a 'Declaration of Principles for the discussion of agenda item 5: Victims', in which they recognized their responsibility in the conflict and pledged to give a voice to the victims. A 12-member Historical Commission of Conflict and its Victims was created. An "End of Conflict"
A subcommittee was also created, with up to 10 members from each of the delegations, which would deal with the surrender of weapons, the ceasefire and the end to bilateral hostilities. They also created a gender subcommittee. President Juan Manuel Santos announced on June 10 that since January the Government had been holding exploratory talks with the ELN, after some initial contacts in late 2013.

- **In Afghanistan** the High Peace Council acknowledged that a meeting had taken place with a Taliban faction in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. In December President Ashraf Ghani initiated contacts with the insurgency with the hope of resuming peace negotiations in Qatar. By year's end there were two possible mediation paths. One was the tripod made up of China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second was the so-called "6 + 1" group, with the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

- **In Nagaland (India)** the new Indian Government led by the BJP party resumed the peace talks with the NSCN-IM, while the NSCN-K rejected any agreement. At the end of the year the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Nagaland with the intention of bolstering the dialogue with the NSCN-IM.

- **In relation to the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir,** the Prime Minister of Pakistan requested the good offices of the U.S. President, who will visit the region in January 2015. In the second half of December delegates from both countries met during the India-Pakistan Bilateral Dialogue and they requested that talks be launched during the upcoming SAARC summit to be held in the Nepalese capital. The UN Secretary General offered his good offices.

- **In April the peace process between the Government of Pakistan (Waziristan) and the TTP armed group completely broke down.** The tribal jirga wanted the Mehsud Taliban to reach an agreement with the Pakistani Government as part of the measures that the Government had tried to put in place to negotiate an end to the armed conflict. In December the TTP carried out a terrorist attack on a school. 141 people, most of them children, died in the assault, which ended any possibility of negotiating with the group.

- **One of the most controversial issues in the negotiations in Burma (Myanmar),** and which was therefore left out of the ceasefire talks, was the integration in the Armed Forces of the insurgency and the Government’s demand that the armed groups provide information on the number of troops, weapons and ammunition under their control. Finally a compromise was reached, and a National Ceasefire Agreement was achieved at Christmas.

- **In the Philippines** the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed. The agreement was described as historic because it culminated 17 years of negotiations and should bring to an end more than four decades of armed conflict in Mindanao. The MILF announced that it had practically completed the process to formalize the creation of a new party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, with the intention of participating in the elections scheduled for May 2016. The Government and the MILF decided to implement the provisions of the “normalization” Annex which included creating a Joint Committee for Normalization, a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, a Joint Committee on Peace and Security, and an Independent Decommissioning Body for the surrender of weapons. The disarmament process will take place gradually (in three stages) and will depend on the degree of compliance with the commitments contained in the peace agreement.

- **As for the negotiations with the NDF,** both the Philippine Government and the Norwegian facilitators changed their negotiating teams, which opened the possibility of resuming the negotiations at the beginning of 2015 with a new methodology. There was a strong possibility that a meeting could be held between the president of the Government and Sisón, the leader of the NDF.
• In Thailand (south) the strategy of the military authorities focused on encouraging combatants to defect and surrender, and to minimize or ignore the demands by armed groups for greater autonomy or even independence. The Government stated that it wanted to expand the number of armed groups in the dialogue and, where possible, include in the peace process local organizations and communities. At the end of the year the Government proposed a new three-phase negotiating framework, with three panels.

• In Cyprus, the parties agreed that the settlement will be based on a united Cyprus, with a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation model, with political equality, single citizenship and a single international legal personality. The federation should be the result of a solution approved in separate simultaneous referenda. The president of the Greek Cypriot community, Nicos Anastasiades, left the talks after a Turkish seismic survey ship began exploring for gas in waters that are part of Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone, which is under dispute by the two communities. At the end of the year the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece concluded that they should jointly use the natural resources of Cyprus. The year ended, however, with no immediate prospects of resuming the peace process.

• The Government of Turkey introduced a bill that sought to give legal guarantees to the members of the administration involved in the dialogue process with the Kurds from the PKK. The bill also authorized the Government to take action on the political, cultural, legal and socio-economic fronts, in addition to the steps necessary to facilitate the return of the PKK combatants to society and their reintegration. The ruling party, the AKP, announced that the Government was about to complete a roadmap to end the conflict and the details were being shared with the Kurdish party. The ‘exploratory talks’ would then become ‘formal negotiations’. In late November Öcalan said that a major democratic solution could be reached in 4 or 5 months. At the end of the year Öcalan submitted a draft negotiating framework, which included sections on methodology, philosophy, agenda and action plan.

• In Ukraine, Kiev’s central Government and the Eastern separatists signed in Minsk (Belarus) a 12-point protocol for peace, including a ceasefire, which in the early days was only partially observed. Days later Ukraine and the rebels signed an agreement to create a 30-km wide demilitarized zone, which required that heavy weapons be pulled back at least 15 km. These agreements were constantly violated. In a meeting with President Putin in December French President François Hollande offered to act as a mediator and said that it was necessary to begin a process of detente, verbal de-escalation and to limit movements in Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian separatists exchanged prisoners of war. Ukraine reaffirmed its wish to join NATO and thus drop its official status of neutrality.

• Abkhazia demanded changes in the format and the agenda of the Geneva Talks, although it stated that it was in favour of continuing the dialogue with Georgia. In November, Russia and Abkhazia signed a ‘strategic partnership’, which meant a greater reliance of Abkhazia on Russia. Ossetian leader Leonid Tibilov said he had asked Moscow to consider the possibility of a full accession of South Ossetia to Russia.

• During the second quarter the contacts between Palestinians and Israelis under the auspices of the U.S. Government were suspended after nine months of attempts at dialogue. Negotiations between Hamas and Israel resumed in the form of indirect contacts in late September in Cairo. Jordan, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, introduced a draft resolution on behalf of Palestine and the Arab countries that established a one-year period to conclude peace negotiations with Israel that fulfils the vision of two ‘democratic and prosperous states’ and set 2017 as the deadline for completing the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. The United States vetoed the proposal at the end of the year. The president of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, signed Palestine’s request to join the International Criminal Court, plus applications to join 22 other international organizations.
Peace processes in 2014

This yearbook analyzes 36 contexts of negotiation or exploratory talks, including three cases of sporadic rapprochement (Ethiopia ONLF, Somalia / al-Shabaab, and India (Assam). In addition, five special cases are briefly discussed (Eritrea-Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Syria and Yemen). During the year three groups laid down their arms after reaching a peace agreement with their respective governments.

| Status of the negotiations at the end of 2014 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Going well (2)   | In difficulty (8) | Going poorly (19) | In exploratory stages (1) | Resolved (3) |
| Senegal (MFDC)   | Mali             | Sudan (SPLM-N)   | Colombia (ELN)       |
| Colombia (FARC)  | Sudan (National Dialogue) | Sudan (Darfur) | Mozambique (RENAMO)       |
|                  | India (NSCM-1M)  | Sudan – South    | Sudan (SSDM-Cobra faction) |
|                  | Burma            | Sudan           | Philippines (MILF)      |
|                  | Thailand (south) | South Sudan     |                  |
|                  | Kosovo           | RDC (FDLR) (* )  |                  |
|                  | Turkey (PKK)     | RCA             |                  |
|                  | Armenia – Azerbaijan | Libya        |                  |
|                  |                  | West Sahara     |                  |
|                  |                  | Afghanistan     |                  |
|                  |                  | India-Pakistan  |                  |
|                  |                  | Pakistan (TTP)  |                  |
|                  |                  | Philippines (NDF) |                  |
|                  |                  | Philippines (MNLF) |                  |
|                  |                  | Cyprus          |                  |
|                  |                  | Moldova (Transnistria) |            |
|                  |                  | Ukraine         |                  |
|                  |                  | Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) |        |
|                  |                  | Israel-Palestine |                  |

(*) The negotiation with the FDLR, through the DR Congo and with mediation by the Community of Sant'Egidio, is not using a conventional negotiation scheme in the sense that the Government of Rwanda, which is where the members of the FDLR are originally from, is not participating in the process at present.

15.1% of the negotiations went well, 24.2% experienced difficulties and 57.6% went badly, so the final result is not very positive, in spite of the fact that negotiations are expected to resume in 2015 in several countries. In the six-year period from 2008 to 2013 the average percentage of negotiations that ended badly by the end of the year was only 17.3 %.

Other attempts at negotiation not covered in the “countries” section below

In mid-January Sudan offered to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia. According to Sudan’s Ambassador in Asmara, Abdul Rahamn Sir Alkahtim, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had launched indirect talks between Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. Al-Bashir had even suggested to both leaders the possibility of conducting a summit in Khartoum on a date to be agreed.

With regard to the impasse in Mozambique, the Government and RENAMO, the main opposition party, finally reached an agreement on August 24 to end the political conflict that had confronted the two groups for the last two years. The conflict had included sporadic episodes of armed
violence that had sparked fears of a resurgence of the armed conflict the country had suffered from its independence in 1975 until 1992. The two forces agreed to a ceasefire, to integrate RENAMO fighters into the Mozambican Armed Forces and an amnesty for violent acts beginning in 2012. This ceasefire agreement paved the way for a meeting in Maputo between President Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO) and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama to sign the peace agreement ratifying the integration of RENAMO militants into the security forces. A few days later Parliament ratified the agreement, which signalled the start of the campaign for the October 15 legislative and presidential elections. In the weeks leading up to the signing of the ceasefire agreement the Government had released several RENAMO militants who had been arrested in recent fighting as a measure of goodwill to facilitate a rapprochement with the group.

In October there was an encouraging ceasefire agreement in Nigeria with the radical Islamist group Boko Haram. The group had become famous in 2014 for the kidnapping of 200 schoolgirls and in September the Government had tried to secure their release through the International Red Cross. The agreement, signed in Saudi Arabia with the intermediation of Niger and Chad, raised many doubts among the people who had previously contributed to a rapprochement with the group, which was apparently divided. Thus, the ceasefire may have been reached with the faction led by Ahmadu Danladi, which was not controlled by the group’s top leader, Abubakar Shekau. Moreover, the Nigerian Army claimed that it had killed Shekau. In November, however, Boko Haram continued its attacks and kidnappings.

In late December the Syrian regime expressed its willingness to participate in a preliminary meeting with the different opposition factions in Moscow in early 2015, after a previous meeting of those factions in Egypt. The initiative had been launched by Russia. Both the Syrian Government and the opposition also discussed the peace initiative proposed by the UN envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, to achieve a ceasefire in the city of Aleppo, as a first step to a broader ceasefire.

As for Yemen, in January the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) ended the working sessions that had began in March 2013 with a series of recommendations on the future of the country, including an agreement regarding the implementation of a federal system. The NDC delegates failed to reach an agreement on the number of regions that the country’s new federal system should have and they asked the Yemeni president to create a commission to make the decision. After two weeks of work the committee approved converting Yemen into a federal system with six regions. This agreement will become part of the new Constitution that should be drafted in 2014 and approved by referendum as a step required before general elections can be held. The passing of the new federal framework was met with widespread resistance in parts of the south, where they either preferred a two-region solution or aspired for southern independence. In late September the Houthis—who had extended their control over the regions of northern Yemen during the last year—took control of the capital, set up checkpoints in the city, surrounded the main government buildings and forced the Government to resign. President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi—who had described the Houthis offensive as an attempted coup—accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Basindwa, which preceded the signing of a peace agreement promoted by the UN special envoy for Yemen, Jamal Benomar. The deal—the Peace and National Partnership Agreement—was signed on September 21 and established a reduction in fuel prices, demanded the election of a new prime minister and the formation of a new inclusive government in one month. It was thus expected that the Houthis would have a greater influence in the Administration. The Houthis were reluctant to sign an annex which established that the parties must disarm, that the Government would regain its authority in the areas controlled by the militias, and that weapons confiscated during the fighting would be returned. The five-point annex which committed the conflicting parties to bring violence to an end—including clashes in the provinces of Maarib and al-Jawf—was signed a week later, but it did not stop the incidents. Analysis and observers felt that the peace agreement would only temporarily reduce the risk of civil war in the country and warned that the crisis could make it easier for al-Qaeda to gain ground in southern Yemen. In October there were numerous clashes between the different armed
groups and hundreds of people were killed, which lead to serious instability and brought the country to the brink of a civil war. Despite the commitment by the Houthis to retreat from the capital, Sanaa – as part of the UN sponsored agreement in September to overcome the political crisis that had led to a change of government – militias from the group continued to patrol the streets of the city and they advanced to other areas. During the month, and as part of the agreement promoted by the UN, Hadi appointed a new prime minister, Khalid Bahah. He was considered a technocrat and was accepted by the Houthis, who had rejected the first candidate proposed by the president. The different armed conflicts affecting the country, and which are interrelated, killed more than 1,500 people in 2014, the worst toll since Ali Abdullah al-Saleh’s regime was overthrown, according to press reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflicts that have ended in recent years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Burundi, Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>DR Congo, India (BLTF-BLT, DHD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Indonesia (Aceh), Northern Ireland, Sudan (South), India (NLFT), Iraq (Kurdistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Sudan (East), Sudan (Darfur - SLA Minawi), Nepal (CPN), Israel-Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mali (ADC), Benin-Burkina Faso, Burundi (FNL), CAR (various), Kenya, Colombia (ERG), Sri Lanka (TMVP), Georgia-Russia, Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Mali (ATNM), Niger, Chad (National Movement), Central African Republic (FDPC, MNSP), DR Congo (CNDP), Somalia (ARS), India (DHD-J), Myanmar (KNU - KNLA Peace Council), Thailand- Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Nigeria (MEND), Niger (MNJ), Chad (UFCD faction, UFR; UFDD, CDR, UFDD/F), Ethiopia (UWSLF, ONLF faction), Eritrea-Djibouti, Somalia (ASWJ), Sudan (JRM, SLA-FREES), India (KNF, KNLF, KCP-MC Lallumba faction), Myanmar (SSA-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Sudan (LJM), Chad (FPR), Central African Republic (CPJP), DR Congo (FRF), India (UPDS), Myanmar (NDAA, KHB), Spain (ETA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>CAR (CPJP), India (DHD, APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, IKDA, KRA), Nepal (SKTMMM), Myanmar (KNPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Sudan (JEM-Bashar), South Sudan (SSLA), India (UPPK, faction KCP-MC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>South Sudan (SSDM-Cobra faction), Mozambique, Philippines (MILF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROLONGED OR “UNTREATABLE” IDENTITY CONFLICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Start of negotiations</th>
<th>Years elapsed</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Identity, security, self-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Identity, territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Identity, security, territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Identity, territory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Using Edward Azar’s terminology.
## Conflicts and Peace Processes at the End of 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Conflicts Underway</th>
<th>Conflicts and Peace Processes Ending with a Peace Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With a Consolidated Peace Process</td>
<td>South Sudan (SSDM-Cobra faction), Mozambique, Philippines (MILF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Interruptions in the Process</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan, Colombia (FARC), Burma (NCCT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Negotiations in Recent Years</td>
<td>Mali (north), Ethiopia (ONLF), Sudan (Kordofan-Blue Nile), Libya, RCA, RDC (east), Afghanistan, Philippines (NPA), India (Assam), Thailand (south), Turkey (PKK), Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Yemen (Houthis).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Unresolved Armed Conflicts That Still Require Negotiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With a Consolidated Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Interruptions in the Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Negotiations in Recent Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Total**

- Ended: 3
- With a Consolidated Peace Process: 12
- With Interruptions in the Process: 18
- Without Negotiations in Recent Years: 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Notes:**
- This table is a snapshot of the situation at year’s end and does not reflect how things progressed over the course of the year.
- A “consolidated process” means that the parties have agreed on a negotiating methodology, possible mediation, the schedule and the format, regardless of whether the talks are going well or badly, which is indicated in the table on page 19.
- “With interruptions in the process” means that the peace process has been interrupted for long periods or due to a specific event or situation at the end of the year.
- “Without formal negotiations” includes exploratory talks, the negotiations do not take place within a formal framework.
Conflicts and peace processes in recent years

Most of the armed conflicts analyzed in this 2015 Yearbook began in the period spanning from the 1970s to the 1990s. Over the years several armed conflicts have come to an end, either with the signing of a final peace agreement (regardless of its value) or by reaching a provisional cessation of armed hostilities. In any case, if we look at most of the conflicts from the 1980s and the fact that some are still underway, we can draw some initial conclusions regarding the way these conflicts were managed from the perspective that thirty years of history provides. It should be noted that some of these conflicts have moved from an armed phase to an unarmed phase, although this section considers them all.

Of the 112 conflicts in the table below, 39.3 % ended in a peace agreement. Those that have not been resolved and are still active account for 47.3 % of the total and what is most significant is that only 9.8 % of these conflicts have been brought to an end with a military victory by one of the sides; in other words, the vast majority of these conflicts have been resolved only through negotiations, by launching some kind of process that leads to a final agreement, and not through military force. This does not diminish the concern regarding the high number of yet unresolved conflicts.

Regarding the conflicts that have come to an end in the last thirty years (59), 44 have been achieved through peace agreements (74.6 %), 4 without any formal peace accord (6.8 %) and 11 were achieved with a military victory (18.6 %), which confirms that negotiation is the best path for resolving conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>89-….</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola – FLEC</td>
<td>75-….</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola – UNITA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia-Azerbaijan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burma – CNF</td>
<td>88-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma – KNU</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Burma – Shan</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td>Lebanon – Fatah al-Islam</td>
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<td>Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>89-...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka – LTTE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Sudan (SLA)</td>
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<td>Sudan – SPLA</td>
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<td>Sudan – east</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan – Southern Sudan</td>
<td>09-12</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Thailand (south)</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey – PKK</td>
<td>74-...</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>14-...</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda – LRA</td>
<td>89-...</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen North-South</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Military victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (AQPA)</td>
<td>09-...</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (Al-Houthists)</td>
<td>04-</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Status of armed conflicts studied**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ended with peace agreement</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently being resolved</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military victory</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conflicts ended**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By peace agreement</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>74.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without peace agreement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By military victory</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Duration of conflicts that ended by a peace agreement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52.3% of the conflicts ended in less than 10 years, while 11.4% lasted more than 25 years.
Special topic: NEGOTIATING CITIES IN 2013 AND 2014

For various reasons most of the negotiations dealing with armed conflict or former conflicts that are yet unresolved require help from outsiders that provide locations where talks can be held. Thus, a large number of governments exist around the world that have created a true “city diplomacy” network, either because they are in countries acting as facilitators in the negotiations, or exiles with decision-making power over specific armed groups live in the city, or they host regional organizations, etc. This diplomacy is sometimes very public and other times it is concealed, but it is always there to facilitate the smooth operation of peace processes and, most especially, to bring together the warring parties in times of crisis. In 2013 and 2014 we have recorded a minimum of 125 cases where cities around the world have acted as “hosts”. Nearly two thirds of these cities (64.8 %) are the capitals of their respective countries, so there is a certain degree of centrality, but the remaining third are cities that, for various reasons, offer advantages when holding these meetings. Obviously, the thousands of events related to the existing conflicts that take place around the world to support peace are not considered here. Getting an accurate count is impossible, but their impact is critical to building awareness with regard to the seriousness of war.

Of the 125 cases analyzed, only 39 (31.2 %) are meetings held in the same country; the remaining 68.8 % are held abroad, hence the concept of “municipal diplomacy”. By geographic region, Africa ranks first in terms of conflicts that require host cities (49 cases), of which 71.4 % are African cities. Asia ranks second, with 40 cases, but with a higher percentage (87.5 %) of meetings held on the same continent. In Europe, with the negotiations of several conflicts at a standstill and an armed conflict that needs a great deal of outside support to attain peace (Ukraine), there are 24 cases, but almost all of the meetings (95.8%) were held on the same continent. The Middle East, with the Israel-Palestine and Syria conflicts, is the area that needs the most extra-regional support, with half of the meetings taking place in Europe or the United States. In Latin America the only conflict active is in Colombia, which has required external support in 75% of the negotiations.

The countries with the most negotiating cities are Myanmar (11 cases), due to the large number of armed groups; Ethiopia (7), due to the fact that it is where the African Union headquarters is located and also that it has had to manage multiple negotiations for conflicts in Sudan; India (6), which also has many armed groups in different states, and finally, France (5), where several leaders of Sudanese armed groups currently live. One can easily deduce the conflicts that have needed the greatest number of host cities: Myanmar (with 16 cases, all of them in Asia), Sudan (15 cases, but split between Africa and Europe), Philippines (8 meetings in Asia and 3 in other continents) and Ukraine (7 meetings in Europe). They are followed by India and Moldova (Transnistria).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City where the meeting was held</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country of conflict and reason for the meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>In June 2014, the SRF armed group met with the Sudanese government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Meeting of different leaders from the Sudanese group SRF, organized by the Berghof Foundation in October 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>In July 2014 the regional organizations SADC and ICGLR met in Angola to agree on a common position with regard to the disarmament of the Rwandan FDLR militias, based in DR Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Meetings between the Malian Government and various armed groups were held in June and July 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>In July 2014 a meeting was held between the leaders of the JEM Sudanese group, Gibril Ibrahim faction, and the SLM-MM, M. Minnawi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ougadougou</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Contacts between the Malian armed group MNLA and the AU’s special envoy in Mali, Pierre Buyoya, in March 2013, and subsequent negotiations with the MNLA and MAA under the mediation of the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, and delegates from the EU and the UN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazzaville</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Ceasefire agreement in July 2014 between the armed groups from the Central African Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>In March 2014 a meeting was held between the presidents of Sudan and Chad to activate the political dialogue in Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Meetings of the Government of Southern Sudan with the SPLA-IO in September 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>In September 2014 a peace conference on Libya was held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In September 2014 an agreement was signed between the Sudanese Government and the opposition to hold a National Dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In November 2014 peace talks were held between the Sudanese Government and the Darfur insurgency (JEM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In 2013 several armed groups from Darfur (Sudan) that had not signed any peace agreements met under the mediation of UNAMID to discuss the humanitarian situation and the possibility of beginning peace negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In 2014 the negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In May 2014, the Government of Southern Sudan signed a peace agreement with the armed group South Sudan Democratic Movement-Cobra faction, under the auspices of the Church Leaders Mediation Initiative of South Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In January 2013 peace talks were launched between the president and the vice president of South Sudan and they continued in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>In February 2013 11 African countries signed a peace agreement to bring stability to eastern DR Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>In July 2014 the Sudanese Government and the opposition parties agreed to a roadmap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>In July 2014 the President of Chad met with the Sudanese group JEM (Gibril Ibrahim faction) to analyze the situation in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>In April 2014 the Chadian president and the leader of the Sudanese group JEM (Gibril Ibrahim faction) held a meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>In July 2014 several groups from Sudan held meetings with groups from the European Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Meeting facilitated by the NGO Guinea-Bissau Mon ku Mon between the Senegalese armed group MFDC and the Senegalese Government in January 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>In September 2013 a meeting was held between the leader of the MFDC armed group from Senegal, César Badiate, and the former mayor of Ziguinchor (capital of the Casamance region of Senegal), Robert Sagna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.....</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Cadres from the Malian armed group MNLA received negotiation training courses in Italy, with funding from Switzerland in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Negotiations between the northern front of the MFDC armed group, from Senegal, with the Government of Senegal, under the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio, throughout 2013 and 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>In June 2014 a meeting was held between the Community of Sant’Egidio and the Rwandan FDLR militia based in DR Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Meetings between the Government of Ethiopia and the ONLF armed group in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Sudan and South Sudan met several times in 2014 to begin peace talks, with the mediation of IGAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Meetings in 2014 between Sudan and the SPLM-N armed group under the auspices of the AU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Meeting of members of the Ogadeni community of Ethiopia with the ONLF armed group in October 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghadames</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>First contacts between rival Libyan groups in September 2014, under the mediation of the UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidal</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Meeting between the Malian armed group MNLA with the special UN representative in Mali, David Gressly, in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamako</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Reconciliation ceremony at the Presidential Palace between different rival military factions in Mali in June 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Peace agreement in August 2014 between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Negotiations in 2013 between the JEM-Bashar armed group from Darfur (Sudan) and the Sudanese Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Peace agreement in January 2013, which was not honoured, between the Government of the Central African Republic and the Séléka armed group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goma</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>In November 2013 a ceremony was held to destroy the arms of former combatants from the M23 armed group in DR Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitogo</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>In the second quarter of 2014 several rebels of the Rwandan FDLR armed group surrendered their weapons to the MONUSCO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>In February 2013 the leader of the Senegalese armed group MFDC (North Front), Salif Sadio, secretly met with Senegalese President Macky Sall at a meeting facilitated by the mayor of Ziguinchor, the capital of the Casamance region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>In 2013, there was a meeting between Robert Sagna, former mayor Ziguinchor, capital of the Casamance region (Senegal), with several military leaders of the armed group MFDC (South Front).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Meeting of the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan in September 2013 to resolve the oil pipeline conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Meeting of the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan in September 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Meeting of the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan in October 2013 to discuss the status of the Abyei border region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>In August 2013 several armed groups from Darfur (Sudan) that had not signed any peace agreements met under the mediation of UNAMID to discuss the humanitarian situation and the possibility of beginning peace negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>The president and former vice president of South Sudan agreed to start negotiations in October 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istambul</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turkey celebrated the plenary session of the Ethiopian armed group ONLF in June 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>In April 2013 Turkey hosted and facilitated talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Exploratory contacts between the Government of Colombia and the Brazil government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Celebration in 2013 and 2014 of citizens’ forums to discuss topics for negotiation with the Colombian guerrilla group FARC, organized by the UNDP and the National University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habana</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the FARC in 2013 and 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbabura</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Exploratory meetings between the Government of Colombia and the ELN guerrilla group in January 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otavalo</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Exploratory meetings between the Government of Colombia and the ELN guerrilla group in August 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangin (district)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Local level meetings with the Afghan Taliban in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>In June 2014 three of the four factions of the Philippine armed group MNLF met in an attempt to achieve reunification under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Agreement between the Philippine armed groups MILF and MNLF, under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to revive the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Meeting between the Philippine government, the MNLF rebel group and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in November 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myitkyna</td>
<td>Burma (Kachin)</td>
<td>In May 2013 a meeting was held in which the Burmese Government and the KIO armed group reached a seven-point agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myitkyna</td>
<td>Burma (Kachin)</td>
<td>Leaders of 18 ethnic armed groups from Burma met in October 2013 to discuss the government’s proposal for a ceasefire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hpa-on</td>
<td>Burma (Karen)</td>
<td>In 2014 negotiations were conducted between the Government of Burma and nine armed groups from the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myawaddy</td>
<td>Burma (Karen)</td>
<td>In June 2013 representatives of the KNU met with officials from the Burmese government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naypydaw</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>In June 2013 a delegation of the armed group SSA and the president of Burma, Thein Sein, met for the first time in the Burmese capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naypydaw</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>In 2013 a delegation of Burmese insurgent group leaders visited for the first time the current capital and the former one, Rangoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>In 2013 a delegation of Burmese insurgent group leaders visited for the first time the current capital and the former one, Rangoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>After meeting in 2013 with the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the UNFC asked to play a more active role in the peace process in Burma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Meeting in June 2014 between the government-affiliated Myanmar Peace Center and the coalition of ethnic opposition groups Federal Democratic Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Negotiation in May 2014 between the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team of Burma and the country’s insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>In November 2013 a meeting was held between the Government of Burma and the Union National Federal Council (UNFC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangoon</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>In September 2014 a round of negotiations was held between the Government of Myanmar, the Armed Forces and the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team, which represents the majority of the armed groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruili</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Talks in February and March 2013 between the Government of Myanmar and the KIO armed group, with China as mediator or witness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dubai    | United Arab | In early 2014 a meeting was held between the Afghan High
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Visit in May 2014 by a delegation of parliamentarians and the Philippine Government’s panel in charge of negotiating with the MILF guerrillas to gain a better understanding of Spain’s autonomy model. In 2012 the MILF negotiating delegation visited Barcelona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago de</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Visit in May 2014 by a delegation of parliamentarians and the Philippine Government’s panel in charge of negotiating with the MILF guerrillas to gain a better understanding of Spain’s autonomy model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compostela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato City</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>In September 2014 the activities of the Committee on Transitional Justice, made up of members of the Philippine Government and the MILF guerrilla group, is launched in the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Meeting of the Philippine Government with the MILF in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Preparation, in 2014, of a new round of talks with the NSCN-IM from Nagaland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Conversations in June 2013 between the Indian Central Government and the ULFA PTF armed group from the region of Assam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>In January 2013 a meeting was held between the Interior Minister of India and the NDFB (Progressive) armed group from Assam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkata</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>In March 2014 three Indian organizations from Nagaland signed an integration agreement to foster the reconciliation of the Naga people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kailhipara</td>
<td>India (Assam)</td>
<td>In 2013 talks continued between the Government of India and the leader of the Bodo group faction NDFB (RD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imphal</td>
<td>India (Manipur)</td>
<td>Meetings between the Indian Interior Ministry and leaders of the armed groups from the region of Manipur, KNO and UPF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>In February 2014 meetings were held between the Philippine Government and the MNLF armed group to finalize the negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Meeting in the second quarter of 2014 between the President of the Philippines and the leader of the MILF armed group, after a peace agreement had been reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Exploratory talks between the Government of Thailand and the BRN armed group in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the NPA guerrilla group in 2013 and 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Afghan border)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>In March 2014 the first direct contact took place between the Pakistani Government and the TTP armed group from Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>In March 2013 the president of Afghanistan met with the Government of Qatar to explore the possibility of talks with the Taliban groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>In February 2013 a round of talks was held between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan together with the British Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Meetings between the Government of Thailand and the leaders of PULO in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Sot</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Meeting in July 2014 between the Government of Burma and the UNFC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>In 2013 a process of political dialogue was launched with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), an umbrella group for various armed groups in Burma, with seven meetings in 2013 and another in April 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Mai</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>In November 2013 the Myanmar Peace Centre (Burma)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organized a two-day meeting between eleven leaders from Burmese political parties, the UNFC coalition of armed groups, and civil society to discuss how to structure a future army that would incorporate members from the ethnic armed opposition groups.

**Conflicts in Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Boisto</td>
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<td>Meeting in late August 2014 of experts from the U.S. and Russia to develop a peace plan for Ukraine, with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow.</td>
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<td>Johannesburg Cape Town</td>
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<td>Visit by the two communities in Cyprus in April 2014, sponsored by UNDP and funded by USAID to study South Africa’s peace experience.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geneva</td>
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<td>Meetings in 2013 and 2014 between representatives of Georgia, Russia and the self-proclaimed independent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with facilitation by the UN, the OSCE and the EU.</td>
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<td>Geneva</td>
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<td>Meeting in September 2013 of the Prime Minister of Moldova and the leader of Transnistria (Moldova).</td>
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<td>Diyarbakir</td>
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to the president of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Massoud Barzani, in the Kurdish capital of Turkey. Erdogan visited the local city hall for the first time.

Lviv, Ukraine: Meeting in February 2013 between representatives from Moldova and from the region of Transnistria (Moldova).

Odessa, Ukraine: Meetings in May 2013 between representatives from Moldova and the region of Transnistria in the 5 + 2 format.

Kyiv, Ukraine: Meeting in September 2014 with members of the civil society and Ukrainian political parties.

### Conflicts in the Middle East

Berlin, Germany: Meetings between Israel and Palestine in August 2014.

Cairo, Egypt: Meetings between Israel and Palestine in August 2014.

Washington, United States: Negotiations in September 2014 between the Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas.

Roma, Italy: Meeting in 2013 of the Friends of Syria Group.

Doha, Qatar: Meeting between the Palestinian factions of Hamas and Fatah in the first quarter of 2014.

Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva II meeting in February 2014 to find a solution to the crisis in Syria.

Vatican City, The Vatican: Meeting in July 2014 between the President of Israel and the President of Palestine, under the auspices of Pope Francis.

Analyses by countries
AFRICA

a) Western Africa

MALI (Tuareg)

Context of the conflict

Independent from France since 1960, Mali has witnessed several rebellions by its Tuareg people, nomads who make up around 10% of the population, mostly live in the north of the country and are politically, economically and socially different from the peoples of the south. In 1916, the Tuareg staged a major revolt that was crushed by France. The conflict was compounded by natural events such as the harsh droughts in 1972 and 1983, which especially affected the north of the country, but also by the attempt to build a unified, single-party country after independence, resulting in the first internal clashes in the early 1960s that were aggravated by the traditional sub-development of the north. Gold mining in the country has not improved the living conditions of the local population. Mali, the third-largest gold producer in Africa, which exports 94% of its production, does not have the means to control production of the precious metal or the impact of the environmental pollution caused by mining operations. In the 1980s, the north of Mali was influenced by the expansionist policies of Libya, a country where, like Algeria, many Tuareg took refuge in the 1970s, receiving military instruction at the time. However, the most significant clashes between the Tuareg and the Malian government took place between 1990 and 1996, which in the end claimed the lives of more than 2,500 people, was muddled by incursions into Mali by the al-Qaeda-linked Algerian Islamist group GSPC and led to the deployment of US and French anti-terrorism units in the Sahel in 2004.

The rebellion began in June 1990, with the rise of the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA) (Tuareg movement created in Libya in 1988) and the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA), which in 1991 reached an agreement with the government in Tamanrasset (Algeria) that was hotly contested in the south. This agreement stipulated that the populations of the three regions of northern Mali would freely manage their local and regional affairs through their representatives. In April 1992, a national pact was signed between the government and the political movements of the north grouped together as the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA) that gave a certain degree of autonomy to these regions, though key parties to the conflict did not participate in the agreement, so the banditry and criminality rife in the region could not be stopped. The agreement did not receive the necessary funding, and the MPA split along clan lines and began a period of infighting, making the conflict worse. The rebels divided into four groups: the aforementioned MPA and the FIAA, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLPA) and the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA). In 1994 the MPGK was created, a militia composed of members of the Songhai ethnic group, which received arms from Songhai communities living in Nigeria and Ghana. The Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) appeared in 2006 and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was formed in 2011. Other armed parties to the current conflict include the group Ansar Dine, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), led by Alghabas Ag Intalla, and the groups MUJAO, AQMI, the HCUA (High Council for the Unity of Azawad), created in May 2013 when it broke away from the jihadist group Ansar Dine, and the MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad), created in early 2012. In the last year several armed groups have proclaimed the independence of Azawad (the name the Tuaregs use to designate northern Mali).
Background to the peace process

During the second quarter of 2006, there was a minor conflict in the region of Kidal in the north, one of the poorest parts of the country, when hundreds of Tuareg banding together under the name Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) assaulted some military bases, captured arms and vehicles and headed for the mountains bordering Algeria, the country that mediated the group’s first negotiations with the Malian government, which resulted in the Algiers Accords, signed in July, and the “Agreements on peace, security and development of the region of Kidal”, the implementation of which provides for disarming the 3,000-man-strong group. However, the first delivery of arms did not take place until March 2007. After a year of sporadic clashes, the government and the ADC reached a cessation of hostilities agreement in late July 2008 through Algerian mediation. The first meeting in Mali took place in November 2008 (until then they had always been held in Algeria). At the meeting, ADC representatives and Malian ministers sought calming measures that would allow for the disarmament of the Tuareg group to continue.

In mid-2007, part of the ADC split off under the name Alliance Touareg Niger Mali (ATNM) or “23 May”, led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who announced an alliance with the Tuareg of Niger. Through the mediation of the Gaddafi Foundation, in April 2008 the ATNM reached a cessation of hostilities agreement with the government of Mali and also signed the 2006 Algiers Accords, for which the government proposed investing in the region of Kidal. However, the group did not begin to disarm, which prompted the Malian President to call for peace and the disarmament of all Tuareg groups. In 2009, Ag Bahanga asked to resume negotiations with the government after the Malian Army attacked the ATNM’s main training base in January, causing it to flee to Libya. Faced with the Malian’s government’s insistence on ending the Tuareg rebellion by force, Ag Bahanga requested intermediation from Algeria, the country that is still the chief mediator of the conflict. In July, representatives of the ATNM and ADC met with the government to resume talks under Algerian mediation. However, it was Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi that announced that Mali and Niger had reached a peace agreement with their respective insurgencies in October, praising Ag Bahanga’s attendance of the ceremony celebrated by the official announcement. The Mali authorities launched a campaign to encourage Tuareg combatants to lay down their arms two weeks after signing the new peace agreement. The governor of the region of Kidal, the stronghold of armed Tuareg groups, stressed the need to make people aware that carrying arms did not promote security, but actually made it worse. Furthermore, the director of the Northern Mali Development Agency, Mohamed Ag Mahmud, said that fighting against the propagation of arms was also key to stopping drug trafficking taking place in the region. Meanwhile, representatives of the communities of northern Mali, specifically Arabs, Fula, Tuareg and Songhai, met for the first time in ten years in Kidal to sign a peace and reconciliation agreement. One of the decisions adopted at the meeting was to create a permanent structure for dialogue among communities that came together on various occasions throughout 2009. In August, the pro-government militia Ganda Koy announced that it would transform into a development association. This step would allow it to benefit from social integration projects and credit offered as part of the peace agreement signed with armed Tuareg groups in 2006. In this vein, in July the government sent 1.3 million CFA to the Northern Development Agency to begin the socioeconomic reinsertion programme written into the agreement’s framework of effective application.

In early January 2010, the leaders of the political wing of the Tuareg ADC met in Algeria to evaluate the implementation of peace agreements reached in 2006 in which the government pledged to develop northern Mali and especially the Tuareg community. Its spokesman, Hama Sid Ahmed, highlighted that the deterioration of the road security situation in northern Mali resulting from the activity of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) made this meeting necessary so they could agree on a joint strategy for dealing with the group. Faced with the government’s ineffectiveness in addressing the activity of AQIM, an organisation they have accused of being complicit with the Malian authorities, in October the Tuareg of the ATNM decided to reorganise...
to pacify the northern region, sorry that the call made by the ADC in January had been ineffective.

The armed Tuareg rebellion that began in January 2012 sprang from the destabilisation of the central government, which resulted from a military coup that overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in March and led to the growing control of the northern part of the country by rebel forces that in April proclaimed the independence of Azawad (name that the Tuareg give to the northern area of Mali). The armed conflict was characterised by the growing strength of jihadist armed groups (Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM) that ended up displacing Tuareg insurgents to control the area. Alongside these developments, throughout the crisis initiatives were implemented by different regional and international stakeholders, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, to re-establish institutional order and restore the territorial integrity of Mali.

The regional organization ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States, CEDEAO in its French acronym) decided to intervene to bring about the return to constitutional order and launched a mediation process led by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. Compaoré's mediation and the sanctions levelled against Mali by ECOWAS were instrumental in the April 6 agreement with the leader of the Military Junta, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, to return power to the civilians and smooth the way for the departure of ousted President Touré. At the same time, after the MNLA lost control of the north to the jihadists it toned down its demands and in October decided to drop the declaration of independence.

With the help of African troops the French army launched a military campaign in early 2013 and regained partial control of the north of the country, despite the advance of Islamist armed groups. In this context, a faction split off from the armed group Ansar Dine and announced itself as the Islamic Movement of Azawad (IMA). In a statement the group said that it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism and was ready for dialogue. This faction, led by Alghabass Ag Intalla and with only Malian citizens in its ranks, denied any links with AQIM or MUJWA. The group proposed to the French and Malian authorities a cessation of hostilities in the areas under their control in Kidal and Menaka with the purpose of discussing an inclusive political agreement. Ag Intalla was the representative of Ansar Dine during the mediation attempts and contacts that took place between the Malian government and the group in Burkina Faso in 2012.

Three weeks after the start of the French offensive, the armed group MNLA, which had offered to help Paris in its fight against the radical Islamists, announced that it had regained control of the areas of Kidal and Tessalit, the two main towns in the north. The Tuareg movement announced that it would not accept the presence of Malian troops in the area, that it would not hand over its weapons because they were needed to maintain its ability to react against any retaliation by the Malian Army against the Tuareg people, and that it was in favour of sending a UN peacekeeping mission to the area. The AU special envoy to Mali, the Burundian Pierre Buyoya, had contact meetings with members of the MNLA in Ouagadougou in early March, while at the end of the month leaders of the group received the special UN representative in Mali, David Gressly, in Kidal.

During the second quarter of 2013, after a series of contacts and the implementation of initiatives for reconciliation, the Government of Mali and the Tuaregs of the MNLA armed group signed a peace agreement that would make it possible to hold elections in the country in late July. In the early part of the quarter discussions focused on establishing a dialogue and reconciliation commission, led by former Defence Minister Mohamed Salia Sokona. According to press reports, MNLA cadres also began a training course in Italy in negotiation techniques, with funding from Switzerland.

Following the initial contacts with the MNLA it became clear that one of the Government’s first objectives was to re-establish the central Administration in Kidal (the region that the Tuareg had gained control over beginning in February after the withdrawal of Islamist armed groups from the area) and hold elections. In June, after two weeks of negotiations in Ouagadougou with the
mediation of the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, and delegates from the EU and the UN, a deal was reached that included an immediate ceasefire between the parties, allowed Malian troops to return to Kidal and made holding elections possible. The agreement between the authorities and the Tuareg groups made it possible to hold elections that took place as scheduled and that led to the triumph of Ibrahim Boubakar Keita in the second round runoff in August. The pact also culminated in the deployment of military forces in the region of Kidal and the return of the MNLA militia to their bases nearby, after an agreement reached in early July by a joint committee with the participation of the Malian army, Tuareg groups, representatives of Operation Serval, led by France, and the regional organization ECOWAS. Nevertheless, following violent clashes between the Malian military and Tuareg fighters in September, the MNLA and two other Tuareg groups announced their withdrawal from the peace process saying that the authorities had not fulfilled their commitments, including the release of prisoners. In recent years, Switzerland has provided discreet mediation between the Government and the MNLA.

In early October, however, three rebel groups, including the MNLA, returned to the negotiating table and demanded disarmament, the cantonment of combatants and the release of prisoners. The EU, meanwhile, pledged 615 million euros to support the peace process and development in Mali.

The peace process in 2014

At the beginning of the year representatives of the MNLA repeated their accusations against the Malian authorities for not complying with the June 2013 Ouagadougou agreement, which included the establishment of an inclusive dialogue to resolve the conflict. Algeria intervened in the dispute and was able to organize a meeting between representatives of armed groups and the Malian administration. However, the MAA and the MNLA decided not to attend the meetings of a bilateral committee on northern Mali, arguing that Algeria had invited the “wrong” pro-government MAA representatives. Nevertheless, an agreement for the cantonment of the rebels was reached during talks in mid-February between the Government and armed groups from the north. In March the dialogue was once again jeopardized because groups such as the MNLA and the MAA refused to participate in the working groups co-organized by MINUSMA and the Ministry of Reconciliation. These groups argued that the Malian authorities were not meeting their commitments to release prisoners and allow freedom of movement for the armed rebels under the Ouagadougou Agreement. During the first quarter the African Union also called on Mali to negotiate with the armed groups to find a sustainable solution to the chronic instability in the North. The National Assembly overwhelmingly passed a motion to create a 15-member Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission with a three-year mandate to clarify the crimes that occurred in the 2012-2013 crisis.

The dialogue between the Government and armed groups operating in the north went through some difficult moments during the second quarter and it was affected by renewed violence between the parties. If the dialogue between Bamako and the Tuareg organizations made little progress in May partly due to coordination issues and overlapping attempts to supply external facilitation the contacts were directly affected by the fighting in Kidal between security forces and the MNLA with the support of other Tuareg organizations, with dozens of deaths. Given the situation the external mediation efforts focused on securing a ceasefire, which was signed by the parties in late May after the insurgent organizations were able to gain ground. The truce was signed by the Government and three Tuareg groups, the MNLA, the HCUA and the MMA, at the request of the head of the UN mission in Mali, Albert Koenders, and the chairman of the AU and president of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz.

During the second half of the year four rounds of contacts were held (July, September, October and November) as part of a dual process between the Government and two coalitions of armed groups in the north: first, the Coordination group – that brings together the MNLA, MAA and HCUA- and, second, the Platform –including the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and
Forces for Resistance (CMFPR), the Coalition of the People for Azawad (CPA) and a faction of the MAA. Beginning with the second round of contacts new organizations began joining these umbrella groups, including the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies (GATIA), a pro-government militia that began its activities in northern Mali in 2014.

Before the escalation of violence and subsequent ceasefire the authorities in Bamako, such as the Minister of Reconciliation, had expressed the Government’s willingness to engage in talks, but warned that the negotiations must respect the territorial integrity of the country. After the events in Kidal, Mali’s president said he did not understand why France was pressing Bamako to negotiate with the MNLA. The HCUA, meanwhile, stated that it preferred the contacts take place outside of Mali. Hence, in June several meetings were held in Algeria. In mid-June, the MNLA, the HCUA and the MAA agreed to start peace talks with the Government and signed the "Declaration of Algiers". In the agreement the Tuareg organizations pledged to engage in dialogue in exchange for the release of prisoners and better conditions for the return of refugees. The head of the MINUSMA warned that the region was in danger if steps were not taken towards peace in northern Mali. The Tuaregs demanded autonomy for the north. In mid-July in Algiers a new international effort to achieve peace was launched. Six armed groups, including the MNLA, negotiated the conditions for a ceasefire with the Malian government. ECOWAS, the UN and the EU participated in the conversations.

In July the Government of Mali and six armed groups (Tuareg and Arab separatists) began peace talks in Algiers with facilitation by Algeria, the AU and an international team. The special adviser to the head of the AU mission, Issaka Souaré, said he was optimistic about these contacts, which also included the participation of ECOWAS, the UN and the EU. The radical Islamists did not take part in the process. The Malian government said it was willing to negotiate but only if territorial integrity, national unity and the republic as the form of government were maintained. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and two other rebel groups that wished to negotiate with the Government announced that they would abandon their demands for independence. In the weeks before the talks in Algeria began, and in a show of good faith, the parties agreed to release prisoners. On July 24 the Government and the armed groups thus signed a ceasefire agreement and a roadmap that included the withdrawal of the armed organizations to specific areas and a commitment to avoid hostilities. The roadmap, which established the steps in the negotiation that should lead to a final agreement, was signed by representatives of the MNLA, HCUA, MAA, dissident MAA, CPA, CMFPR and the Administration. At a meeting held in August in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, (prior to the new round of talks with the government), the MNLA and MAA accepted to end their fighting, that Azawad would remain part of Mali and to support a secular government.

The peace talks began again on September 1 in Algiers. About forty Malian civil society organizations and associations participated in a demonstration that brought together two or three thousand people in Bamako to protest against any initiatives to divide the country that could result from the peace talks in Algiers. Other similar protests took place in Gao and Timbuktu to show their opposition to a possible fragmentation of the country as part of the negotiations. Representatives of the Tuareg community said that a federal system could be a possible solution to the conflict, while the president of Mali proposed regionalism and decentralization.

In parallel with the UN General Assembly, a high-level meeting was organized by the UN to discuss the political process in Mali. The meeting was attended by the president, several ministers and high-ranking officials, members of the Algerian mediation team participating in the peace talks in Algiers, and the UN Security Council. Representatives from Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, the World Bank, the IMF and the Islamic Development Bank were also present as observers of the process. The agreement established that in 2017 the state would give one third of the income to local authorities, with special attention to the north, and that a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program would be created. The document was criticized by the coordinating committee of the Azawad movements, which felt that the agreement did not represent their positions, so they drafted a counterproposal. It was also
highlighted that the people did not so much want a greater presence of the State, but a different form of governance and presence of public authority. The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report that underlined the risks of not inviting all of the radical groups to the negotiating table, the need to reconcile the complex and competing interests affecting the security of the Sahara, the nature of the Malian state and the local balance of power between divided communities and the temptation to sign an agreement that only considers the short term while forgetting the divided communities in the north. The report also talked about the risk of not having sufficient national and international guarantees for an equitable distribution of the resources and responsibilities for their management. It was also in favour of establishing a mechanism of popular consultations to endorse the final agreements.

The peace talks will continue in January 2015, after three attempts in November 2014. Although the responsibility of mediation corresponds to Algeria, MINUSMA, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, OIC, the EU, Mauritania, Niger and Chad are also part of the international team.

### Most significant events of the year

- In mid-June, the MNLA, the HCUA and the MAA agreed to start peace talks with the Government and signed the "Declaration of Algiers".
- The National Assembly overwhelmingly passed the creation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.
- Peace talks were initiated in Algiers, with facilitation by Algeria and the AU.
- On July 24 the Government and several armed groups thus signed a ceasefire agreement and a roadmap that included the withdrawal of the armed organizations to specific areas and a commitment to avoid hostilities. The roadmap was signed by representatives of the MNLA, HCUA, MAA, MAA-dissident, CPA and CMFPR, as well as by the Administration.
- In parallel with the UN General Assembly, a high-level meeting was organized by the UN to discuss the political process in Mali.
- A year later the first draft agreement was signed.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- The existence of multiple armed groups and two parallel negotiation processes.
- Disagreement over the participation of other groups in the negotiation.
- The Government's failure to honour its commitment to free prisoners.
- Lack of coordination and overlapping attempts to provide external facilitation.
- Escalation of violent clashes.
- Pressure from third countries.
- Request by an armed group to conduct the negotiations abroad.
- The lack of participation of some armed groups in the negotiation.
- Federalism vs. Decentralization.
- Risk of wishing to quickly reach an agreement.

**End result:** The first framework agreement to resolve the conflict in 2015.

### Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
- Insight to Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- SIPRI (www.sipri.org)
Main parties involved in the process

**Mali**
- **Government**
  - President: Ibrahim Boubakar Keita
  - Ministry of National Reconciliation: Oumar Diarrah
- **France**

**International Team:**
- **Algeria**
- AU (Pierre Buyoya)
- UN (MINUSMA)
- SRSG: David Gressly
- SE: Bert Koenders
- ECOWAS
- UE
- ICO
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Chad

**Coordinator:**
- MNLA
- MAA
- HCUA

**Platform:**
- CMFPR
- CPA
- MAA faction

**Space of intermediation**
SENEGAL (Casamance)

Context of the conflict

Discovered in 1445, Casamance became the first Portuguese colony. It was transferred to French control in 1908 as part of what was then the Federation of Mali, and remained so until Senegal’s independence in 1960. Since 1982, the MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance) has been waging an armed rebellion through its military wing, Atika, to achieve independence for Casamance, a region in the south of the country which is virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia. Casamance is also the only place in Senegal where an area of tropical jungle remains, with large trees, rivers and wildlife. With 3.5 million inhabitants, Casamance is one of the most important tourist hubs in Senegal, and therefore, tourists have been the target of MFDC actions on several occasions.

Offshore the subsoil in this region is rich in oil, while the region is also relatively rich in rice and cashews. The rebellion is led chiefly by people from the Diola ethnic group, a minority compared to the majority Wolofs running the government. The Diola are also present in Guinea Bissau and Gambia, which explains the support that the independence movement receives from these two countries, depending on the situation and the makeup of the dissidences within the MFDC. The Diola, a farming people, founded a kingdom called Gabu in the early 18th century. They feel economically and politically marginalised by the central power, which looks down on the other minorities, and are unfavourable to the colonisation of people from the north of the country. The main languages in Casamance are Diola and Portuguese Creole. The USA and France support Dakar in its bid to defeat the MFDC. The conflict has become regionalised and is affecting Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, triggering the exodus of thousands of people. The historical leader of the MFDC was Abbot August Diamacoune, who died in 2007. Diamacoune offered ceasefire proposals several times (1992, 1995 and 1998), but the peace talks between the MFDC and the government were postponed repeatedly for various reasons (clashes, disagreement about the venue or facilitators, etc.). The Church has played an extremely important role in this region, which has very particular social and religious structures. The conflict has caused around 5,000 deaths. The MFDC has representatives in Switzerland, Portugal, France and Gambia. Both of the factions currently keeping the conflict alive, the Northern Front (led by Salif Sadio) and the Southern Front (led by Cesar Atoute Badiate), earn a living from the illegal trade in cashews and other natural products, giving a more economic than political dimension to the resolution of the conflict. The conflict went through two negotiation phases: the first at the beginning of the 21st century, and the second in 2012, with the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio, with headquarters in Rome. In recent years the proliferation of government initiatives has been a problem, especially those led by Robert Sagna (Mayor of Ziguinchor for 24 years), the Boubacar Diouf group, which has been involved in the release of several hostages, and the group led by Amsa tou Sow Sidibé, current advisor to the President on Human Rights and Peace.

Background to the peace process

The first peace initiatives date back to 1990 when the first contact with the Community of Sant’Egidio was made, and 1991, when the government first undertook a reconciliation measure and released many prisoners. Likewise, a first ceasefire was declared at that time. The first splinter within the MFDC between Sidi Badji’s Northern Front and Diamacoune’s Southern Front came in 1992. In 1999, there was a historical encounter in the capital of Gambia between the president of Senegal, A. Diouf, and Abbot Diamacoune, the leader of the MFDC, launching what
was called the “Banjul process”, which culminated in a ceasefire. Elections were held in January 2000 with A. Wade declared the winner. He changed the negotiation strategy by eliminating Gambia’s mediation and assigning the entire responsibility to a ministerial team. In 2001, the MFDC reached an initial peace agreement with the government of Senegal, although Diamacoune recognised that he did not have control over several dissident sectors. In late December 2004, the government and the MFDC finally signed a general peace agreement in the town of Ziguinchor, which theoretically put an end to 22 years of conflict. The MFDC gave up its claims for independence and focused more on developing Casamance. The agreement was signed by the Minister of the Interior and the founder of the MFDC, A. Diamacoune, and it stipulated an end to the use of violence, amnesty for members of the group and their voluntary integration into the country’s security forces, the start of a demining process, the return of thousands of displaced persons and refugees, and the reconstruction of the region of Casamance. However, the agreement was only partial, since both factions of the group remained active.

In February 2011, the National Conference presented the president of Senegal with a peace plan for Casamance. The proposal included two phases: the creation of a national contact group and the launch of a national commission to supervise the negotiations. The National Conference is a forum for debate in which representatives from the different political parties and civil society took part in an attempt to respond to what are considered questions of state and offering proposals to resolve them. In December, the secretary-general of the MFDC, Jean-Marie François Biagui, announced that during the meeting held in Casamance, his movement’s intention was to become a political party and proposed that a federal system be developed in Senegal, thus giving up his pretentions for independence.

In early 2012, President Abdoulaye Wade said that he had requested the intermediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio to establish dialogue with the MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio, considered the most belligerent. In April, the MFDC welcomed the decision of new President Macky Sall to involve Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the search for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Casamance. In June, Salif Sadio proposed a negotiated exit to the crisis in Casamance through the mediation of the Community of Sant’Egidio. The positive signs of a possible establishment of talks between the government and the armed group in Casamance, the MFDC, were confirmed with the official announcement that negotiations would take place between the parties over the course of the third quarter. Meetings were held between the parties in Guinea-Bissau in July. A month and a half later, Senegalese Prime Minister Abdoul Mbaye confirmed the establishment of discreet negotiations with the MFDC, which would be extended to other stakeholders interested in the crisis in the future. Notably, in September, two rival factions of the MFDC led by Ousmane Niantang Diatta and César Atoute Badiate entered a reunification agreement. In mid-October, a government delegation met with an MFDC delegation in Rome to discuss a peace agreement. The meeting took place in the Community of Sant’Egidio. Alongside the talks in Rome, the Archbishop of Dakar was ordered by President Macky Sall to maintain contacts with César Atoute Badiate, the military leader of an MFDC faction. The Gambian president also joined the process and, together with the former Mayor of Ziguinchor, promoted a meeting between representatives of the Sadio and Badiate factions to find common ground.

In 2013, the Community of Sant’Egidio continued behind the scenes with the negotiations, but some media organizations warned that the organization was focusing its efforts on the northern front of the MFDC, the most operational one lead by Salif Sadio. This annoyed the leaders of the southern front, Ousmane Niantang Diatta and Cesar Atoute Badiate. Although it had in recent times been less confrontational, the southern front retained a strong military capability, especially after its reunification since it was believed to have 80% of its fighting forces and they were well armed.

Earlier in the year the representatives of the southern front had reaffirmed their willingness to make peace and bring together all the guerrillas groups. On January 18 an important meeting, facilitated by the NGO Mon ku Mon from Guinea-Bissau, was held between six members of the
Northern Front and six members of the Southern Front in Guinea-Bissau. An ad hoc committee was formed to take the message to the whole armed group. Moreover, on February 22 Salif Sadio secretly met with the Senegalese President Macky Sall in Dakar. The meeting was organized discreetly by the former mayor of Ziguinchor and the director of the mediation group for lasting peace in Casamance, Robert Sagna. The President of Gambia, Yaya Jammeh, also played an important role. Sall and Sadio discussed the rumour that weapons from Casamance were present in northern Mali. Other peace initiatives launched by civil society organizations in the region continued, such as, for example, the inauguration of the Peace House by a youth group in Ziguinchor, the capital of Casamance. In May Cardinal Theodore Adrien Sarr had a discreet meeting with MFDC leader César Atoute Badiatte. Meanwhile, former minister and former mayor of the capital of Casamance, Robert Sagna, also met with several military leaders of the MFDC’s northern front who are supporters of Badiatte.

In September a meeting took place between MFDC leader Caesar Badiate and Robert Sagna in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. U.S. diplomat James Bullington also participated in the peace process discussions. In June the president of the United States said that his government was committed to supporting the efforts to achieve lasting peace in Casamance. In this context the U.S. adviser to Casamance, Sue Ford Patrick, completed a three days visit to Gambia in September to discuss the Casamance conflict with government officials of the country and with non-governmental organizations, according to a press release from the American Embassy in Banjul. It should be noted that in July the Gambian President Yahya Jammeh announced he would not intervene to resolve the conflict in Casamance unless he was specifically asked by Senegal to do so. The president of Gambia also said he was willing to help Senegal provided Dakar change its attitude towards Banjul. In early November a second meeting was held in Rome between the Community of Sant’Egidio and S. Sadio’s faction of the MFDC. In December the organization Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), with support from the World Bank and the EU, organized a conference for women in Senegal and neighbouring countries to promote peace in Casamance.

The peace process in 2014

In the first months of the year contacts continued between the Senegalese government and the MFDC on the Casamance conflict. The Catholic community of Sant’Egidio, which is mediating in the dispute, confirmed in February that a government delegation and representatives of the MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio had met in Rome and signed an agreement on confidence building measures. This included a written statement from Macky Sall’s government that no arrest warrant had been issued for Sadio, the military leader of the most radical faction of the MFDC and considered in some quarters to be an obstacle to the unification of the various factions of the armed group. It was reported that Sall’s government had also agreed to guarantee the free movement of Sadio and his subordinates as part of the negotiations. The parties also agreed to conduct themselves in a way that was favourable to peace talks. Sadio ordered his fighters to observe a unilateral ceasefire as part of the commitments. President Sall made his first visit to Casamance from March 17 to 19. During the trip Sall called for a "peace of the brave" with no winners or losers, and based on respect for the territorial integrity of Senegal. The president also announced a 35 million euro development plan for the region through the Casamance Development Pole Project (PPDC), on the understanding that negotiations should be accompanied by economic measures.

Following a meeting with the U.S. special adviser for Casamance, Mark Boulware, the leader of one of the major factions of the MFDC, César Atoute Badiatte, considered a moderate figure in the organization, rejected Sall’s idea of a "peace of the brave", but reiterated his willingness to participate in talks. Badiatte called on the authorities in Dakar to hold frank and sincere negotiations and suggested that the talks be held in the U.S. A government spokesman responded to this message saying that the administration was willing to negotiate, but that Senegal’s sovereignty over Casamance was a line that could not be crossed. At the end of the first quarter
Boulware confirmed that he had met with Badiate, with Sadio's faction and with members of the Government and concluded that conditions were right for peace in Casamance. During the quarter some voices - including the Bishop of Ziguinchor - warned that too many intermediaries were involved in the conflict in Casamance. In April presidential advisor Amsatou Sow Sidibé proposed the creation of a Space for Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation (EDVR). An MFDC spokesperson, however, criticized Sow Sidibé for launching initiatives on her own, without consulting with the armed group.

The most important development during the second quarter was the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire on April 29 by Salif Sadio, one of the main leaders of the MFDC. The leader of the MFDC, Salif Sadio, said that he wanted to give the peace process promoted by President Macky Sall's government a chance. Sadio told a local radio station that the decision to declare the truce came after discussions between the Government and the MFDC in Italy as part of a process that is being mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio and that also has the support of the U.S. In this context the UN congratulated the Community of Sant'Egidio for its efforts in creating the right conditions to achieve a peaceful solution to the Casamance conflict. On February 22, in Rome, delegations from the different parties agreed to adopt a series of mutual trust building measures and conduct themselves in a way that would facilitate negotiations. Towards the end of the quarter the mediators indicated that the process was far from reaching a conclusion, but considerable progress had been made in the negotiations. According to one of the mediators, the parties maintained the political determination to take advantage of this historical opportunity to resolve a conflict that had lasted for over three decades. Press reports also highlighted initiatives by women to promote the peace talks. These include traditional ceremonies to bring together civilians and members of the MFDC to create an environment that would contribute to forgiveness and peace.

In the third quarter, contacts between the Government and representatives of the MFDC group continued in an attempt to find a negotiated solution to the conflict in Casamance. Spokespeople from the Community of Sant'Egidio, which was acting as a facilitator of the talks, reported that representatives from both sides had met again for three days in Rome in July. Sources close to the mediation efforts acknowledged that important differences continued to exist between the Government and the MFDC in some areas. However, they said that the parties had the awareness and willingness necessary to handle this historic moment. In this sense they were optimistic about how the negotiations were going and highlighted some of the progress that had been made to date, including the MFDC's decision to free a group of soldiers, the unilateral ceasefire ordered by Salif Sadio's faction, and the general climate of calm in Casamance. The peace process has also prompted a significant degree of mobilization by the civil society. In the most recent quarter initiatives led by women were especially noteworthy. On the occasion of the commemoration of the International Day of Peace, Senegalese women organized a meeting with different civil society actors to discuss the current state of the conflict and gauge its chances for success. Thus, the Women's Platform for Peace in Casamance (PFPC) sought to encourage the coordinated efforts of many groups committed to peace in the region and to provide support for the talks between the Government and the MFDC. Another women's organization, USOFORAL, announced its own program of actions in 2015 to bring together women from all over Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau, so they can provide ideas for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Previously, women's organizations had promoted other similar initiatives, such as secret meetings with delegates of the MFDC and the Senegalese authorities, a commitment to peace by the presidential candidates (before the election in which Macky Sall was elected) and symbolic actions in support of peace. In November the Senegalese President, Macky Sall, visited the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome and was received by its founder, Andrea Riccardi, president Marco Impagliazzo, vice president Kpakilé Felemou, Father Angelo Romano and the head of the Department of International Relations, Mauro Garofalo.
### Most significant events of the year

- A government delegation and representatives from the MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio met in Rome, with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio, and signed a commitment backing confidence-building measures. Sadio imposed a unilateral ceasefire on his fighters.
- The leader of one of the MFDC factions, Badiate, called on the authorities in Dakar to begin frank and sincere negotiations and proposed that the talks be held in the U.S.
- Senegalese President Macky Sall visited the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Divisions in the armed group.
- Proliferation of internal intermediaries.
- Request by a faction of the armed group to conduct the negotiations abroad.

**End result:** No significant changes.

### Websites of interest

- Africa Time (www.africatime.com/senegal)
- Afrol News (www.afrol.com)
- Comunnunity of Sant' Egidio (www.santegidio.org)
- Government (www.gouv.sn)
- Le Soleil (www.lesoleil.sn)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Rewni (www.rewni.com)
- www.homeviewsenegal.sn
- www.rfi.fr/tag/casamance)
Main parties involved in the process

**SENEGAL Government**
(Macky Sall)
Peace Adviser:
Amatou Sow Sibidé

- **USA**
  (James Bullington)
  (Sue Ford Patrick)
  France

- **Community of Sant'Egidio**
  (Angelo Romano)

- **Robert Sagna**
  (Government Delegate)

- **CRAES**
  (M.J. Diop)

- **Presidential Envoy**

- **ANRAC**

- **The Gambia**
  (Y. Jammeh)

- **Council of Elders for Peace in Casamance**
  (L. Cissé)
  (M. Bassene)

- **Catholic Church**
  Bishop of Zinguinchor
  Cardinal Sarr

- **Mon Ku Mon**
  (NGO in Guinea Bissau)

- **Women’s groups**

- **USA**
  Mark Boulware

- **Ivory Coast**

- **MFDC Northern Front**
  Salif Sadio

- **MFDC Southern Front**
  Cesar A Badiate

- **Diopopa**
  Switzerland
  Portugal
  France
  Gambia

- **Guinea-Bissau**

- **CRAES SWITZERLAND**

- **ANRAC**

- **Presidential Envoy**

- **Space of intermediation**
b) Horn of Africa

ETHIOPIA (Ogaden)

Context of the conflict

The region of Ogaden is part of what is called the Somali Region in Ethiopia. It covers an area of around 200,000 km², and is divided between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as part of Kenya and Djibouti. The region was annexed to Ethiopia in the late 19th century. In the late 1970s there were military clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of this region, and this culminated in 1978 with the Somali regime seriously debilitated. The Ogadeni/Somali population practices a tolerant form of Islam.

Since 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has been fighting for the independence or autonomy of the region of Ogaden, a desert area bordering on Somalia. The ONLF was part of the transition government from 1991 to 1995, after the Communist regime, but thereafter it withdrew from government to fight for the independence of what it views as the Ogadeni people. It has a major diaspora in the United States (with numerous pro-peace civil organisations), Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands. It calls for the independence of the Ogadeni/Somali people, an ethnic group 27 million people strong. In 1994 the ONLF called for a referendum on self-rule in Ogaden, an initiative which met with a large-scale military attack by the Ethiopian government. Given this situation, the “elders” in the region called on the government to take up talks to resolve the conflict. In 2007 the ONLF launched attacks against Chinese oil and natural gas facilities (China Petroleum Chemical Corporation) operating in the region of Ogaden, an area where the Malaysian company Petronas also has facilities.

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) is a rebel group that fought in eastern Ethiopia to create an independent state. It played an important role in the 1977-78 Ogaden war.

Background to the peace process

Kenya is the only country in the region that has conducted facilitation work with the ONLF. In late 1998, the government and the ONLF held secret meetings to find a solution, but the meetings ended when the ONLF asked that another organisation participate in the negotiations as a witness. The government also killed one of the negotiators and captured another, who died in prison. In 2007, the ONLF issued a call for international mediation which would help to open up negotiations with the Ethiopian government. In October 2010, part of the ONLF reached a peace agreement with the government which put an end to the armed struggle that it had been waging in the region of Ogaden for decades. The agreement stipulated an amnesty for the imprisoned members of the group and the conversion of the group into a political party. However, a part of the ONLF led by Mohamen Omar Osman kept up the armed struggle, and both factions considered themselves to be the main core of the ONLF, accusing the other part of being insignificant.

In April 2010, the armed group United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), a wing of the former Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI) which operated in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, agreed to turn its weapons in to the Ethiopian government and return to legal status after decades of guerrilla warfare. The WSLF signed a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa on the 29th of July. Amnesty had previously been granted to the
members of the group, and the agreement signalled the launch of development projects in the Ogaden region.

During the third quarter of 2012, contacts took place between the government of Ethiopia and the armed opposition group active in the Ogaden region, the ONLF. Both parties met in Nairobi, Kenya in early September for preliminary talks in which they agreed on a negotiating framework to put an end to the 28-year-old insurgency. In October, the peace talks stalled. According to the Foreign Secretary of the ONLF, Abdirahman Mahdi, the talks ran aground when the government demanded that the ONLF recognise the Ethiopian Constitution. Mahdi said that they had been fighting with Ethiopia since 1984 and that the current Constitution only dated to 1994, so they could not force the group to recognise it.

In late June of 2013, the ONLF’s Executive Committee held its plenary session in Istanbul (Turkey). In July, meetings were held with Western diplomats to speak about political and human rights issues. The ONLF expressed its willingness to solve the conflict through dialogue. In August, an International Crisis Group report recommended that Kenya act as a guarantor and that technical support be channelled through the IGAD. In October, the ONLF met in Nairobi with members of the Ogaden community. In late October, a former US Ambassador to Ethiopia said that US policy was aimed at promoting a peace process and stabilising the region.

### The peace process in 2014

During the first quarter there was no information concerning the beginning of a peace process between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF armed group, but something did happen to indicate that there was movement in this direction. At the end of January two ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden region, Sulub Abdi Ahmed and Ahmed Ali Husseinan, were illegally arrested outside a restaurant in the Kenyan capital, which interrupted the contacts that had taken place to date, with the aim of setting up a peace process between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF, with the mediation of Kenya. Two policemen were allegedly involved in the arrest, according to several witnesses, who said that the total number of people involved were six. The chief negotiator of the ONLF, Abdi Rahman Mahdi, confirmed that the two missing Somali’s were ONLF representatives in Kenya for the peace talks. Mahdi said that they had been taken to Moyale, on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia, and had been picked up by helicopters. Ethiopian government spokesperson Shimelis Kemal said that he did not have any information about the alleged kidnapping. In an interview with the Associated Press, Mahdi said that if the two members of the ONLF negotiating team were not released unconditionally the peace talks with Ethiopia would not continue and Kenya would not be considered a safe country to celebrate peace talks. The Kenyan government launched an investigation of the incident and at the beginning of February arrested the two police officers who could have been involved in the operation, according to several witnesses. The officers will be brought to trial for the kidnapping of the two Ogadeni representatives.

In the second quarter ONLF sources confirmed that two members of the ONLF kidnapped on January 26 in Nairobi were in the Kenyan capital to participate in the third round of talks between representatives of the Ethiopian government and the ONLF, with mediation by the Government of Kenya. These same sources told the BBC service in Somalia that it believed that Ethiopia was behind the detention, which several analysts confirmed was highly likely. However, since the detention of the two leaders of the armed group, no new information has become available with regard to their whereabouts or in connection with the peace negotiations, which seemed to have come to a halt, at least officially given the secrecy that enshrouds these contacts. The ONLF called on the international community to condemn Ethiopia for its attitude, which was boycotting the peace talks. Various analysts suggested that this incident would not affect relations between Ethiopia and Kenya, but it could affect the ONLF’s perception of Kenya as a neutral sponsor for these negotiations.
Most significant events of the year

- Two Somalis that had disappeared at the hands of the police in Nairobi turned out to be ONLF representatives for the peace negotiations taking place in Kenya.

Reasons crisis during the year

- Arrest of two negotiators in the mediating country.

End result: Unresolved.

Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
- All Africa.com (allafrica.com)
- Etiopian News Agency (www.ena.gov.et)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Ogaden Human Rights Committee (www.ogadenrights.org)
- Ogaden News (222.ogadennews.com)
- Ogaden News Agency (www.ogadennet.com)
- Ogaden Online (www.ogaden.com)
- Ogaden Today Press (www.ogantoday.com)
- Ogaden Voices for Peace (www.ogadenvoice.org)
- ONLF (onlf.org)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)

Main parties involved in the process

- USA
- China
- Malaysia
- Ethiopia (Government, Meles Zenawi)
- Somalia, Eritrea
- Kenya
- WSLF
- Salahdin Abdurrahman Maow
- ONLF (Mohamed Osman, Abdirahman Mahdi)
- Diaspora
  - USA, Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands
- Turkey

Space of intermediation
SOMALIA

Context of the conflict

Somalia is a country that is homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. However, it is separated into five main clans, which are in turn divided into sub-clans. In 1969 General Siad Barre led a coup d’état and established a dictatorship. This lasted until he was overthrown in 1991 after three years of armed conflict in the country. The coalition of opposition groups that overthrew the general began an armed struggle for power resulting in the wholesale destruction of the country and the death of hundreds of thousands of people since 1991. This situation brought about US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the establishment of a United Nations mission (UNOSOM) in 1992. The mission failed and withdrew from the country three years later. Despite these precedents, the UN Secretary General recommended establishing a peacekeeping mission on the basis of the communities’ proposals. This mission would be focussed on the tasks of disarmament and demobilisation. Some of the country’s regions have declared their independence or have agreed to a certain level of autonomy (Somaliland and Puntland).

The al-Shabaab group arose in 2006 as an Islamist resistance organisation that later became linked to al-Qaeda and at certain times has controlled large parts of the country. For the time being, negotiations with this radical group have not been established. However, negotiations continued among various regions of the country for the purpose of building a federal state.

Background to the peace process

In spring 2000, the new President of Djibouti, who is also president of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD (a regional organisation made up of the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda), organised a reconciliation conference in the city of Arta in his country. A Transitional National Assembly was elected, despite the fact that many clan leaders were absent. In January 2001, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed. However, the TNG was not supported by all of the groups and only controlled part of the country and the capital. At the end of this year, a round of talks between the TNG and opposing factions was held in Kenya and an initial agreement was reached. Finally, in late 2002, a round of peace talks was held in Eldoret (Kenya). They were organised under the auspices of IGAD and led to an agreement to cease hostilities and begin a negotiation process on a range of issues.

The Transitional Federal Parliament was formed in 2004. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in January 2007. That same year, the peace and reconciliation conference called the National Governance and Reconciliation Commission (NGRC) was held in the outskirts of the capital. The conference was boycotted by the Islamists from the UTI, who demanded that it be held in a neutral country. Parallel to the conference, around 400 opposition figures who gathered in Eritrea agreed to create an alliance opposing the TFG, adopting the name Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS), which later came to be called the ARS. In 2008, the peace talks were resumed in Djibouti between the TFG and the moderate faction of the ARS, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheik Ahmed, under United Nations mediation, which resulted in an agreement on the 26th of October. This agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, the radical militia Al-Shabaab, headquartered in Eritrea, announced that it would not heed the agreement and would instead continue to fight against the moderate ARS militia headquartered in Djibouti. In the second half of February 2010, the TFG signed an agreement with the Islamic group Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama’a (ASWJ) with the goal of creating an alliance with the groups and factions that opposed the presence of extremist groups in the country.
In February 2011, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) approved the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for another three years. This mandate was about to conclude in August, when a new constitution was to be adopted and the first elections in the country held. In June, the president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reached an agreement with the president of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in which they pledged to postpone the legislative and presidential elections for a one-year period after the date on which the transitional federal institutions were to be renewed, so the elections had to take place before the 20th of August 2012 at the latest. Worth noting is the roadmap reached by the National Consultative Conference held in Mogadishu in early September which stipulated a series of tasks that would have to be completed before August 2012, including improvements in security, the writing of a draft constitution, national reconciliation and good governance.

In January 2012, the leaders that met in Puntland reached an agreement on the peace process road map for the country. Representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), of the region of Puntland, of Galmudug and of the group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa signed the Garowe Principles at the Constitutional Conference held there. According to the new agreement, Somalia will have a bicameral Parliament with an upper chamber of federal state representatives. This federal bicameral Parliament will take effect in June 2016. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Augustine Mahiga, established her office in Mogadishu 17 years after the UN left the country. In February, the UN Security Council approved an increase in the AU mission in the country, AMISOM. The provisional Constitution was approved by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), composed of 825 members elected by a group of 135 elders (senior Somali leaders with traditional authority in the country). This federal Constitution draft must be approved via a national referendum that will be held once the security situation improves. On 10 September, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was appointed the new President of the country to mark the end to the transition period. In October, the Federal Parliament approved the appointment of Abdi Farah Shirdon (known as Saaid) to be the country’s new Prime Minister. Both leaders had serious disputes with each other in the final months of the year.

In 2013 no agreement was reached with the armed group al-Shabab. Earlier in the year the process to form the state of Jubaland began, which created tension between the federal government, which sought to monitor the process, and the leaders and authorities in the region who wanted the process to take place without Somali government interference. Between July 7 and 9 talks were held between the Federal Government and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, in which the Turkish government played an important role. For the second time since April Turkey hosted and facilitated these talks which finally led to an agreement. This agreement was seen by many analysts as a victory for Somaliland and was in line with the stance taken by the UK at the London conference in February 2012 in which the British government showed its continued support for a “two-state” solution. The federal organization of Somalia was welcomed by the various entities and regional governments since it involved the creation of a national entity with power being shared between the federal states and the government, and would offer an Administration that is closer to the citizens and would have greater respect for the majority and minority clans in the country. Nevertheless, while the anti Federalists were pushing for the existence of two states, Somaliland and Somalia, the current Constitution also recognizes Puntland and Jubaland. On August 28 the federal government and local militias in Jubaland reached an agreement that recognized Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as leader of the interim government of Jubaland for the next two years, after months of tension and sporadic fighting. In December President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud forced his Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon (Saacid), to resign in a vote of no confidence in the lower house of the Somali Federal Parliament.
The Somali Compact

This is the result of an inclusive process for determining Somalia’s priorities for the 2014-2016 period. ONLF sources confirmed that two members of the ONLF kidnapped on January 26 in Nairobi were in the Kenyan capital to participate in the third round of talks between representatives of the Ethiopian government and the ONLF, with mediation by the Government of Kenya. This process, based on the principles of the Busan New Deal, was launched by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the international community in December 2012. In March 2013 the FGS and representatives of the Somali Federal Parliament, the civil society, the UN and the EU, in representation of the donors, established the International High Level Task Force (HLTF), to guide and support this goal.

The peace process in 2014

In October Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, said that the Somali Government had opened the doors to talks with members of the armed group al-Shabaab, and unofficial channels had been created for these conversations. At the end of this month the UN Secretary General and the president of the World Bank visited the capital, Mogadishu, to analyze the possibilities for peace and development. The president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, extended to the end of the year the amnesty that the Government had offered to all of the members of al-Shabaab who wished to surrender their weapons without fear of reprisal. In late December, however, the armed group attacked the African Union base in the capital, Mogadishu, killing four people. Also, in October Denmark hosted the International High Level Partnership Forum on Somalia, a ministerial meeting co-organized by Somalia and the United Nations to promote peace, stability and democracy in Somalia. The Somali diaspora attended the meeting and 335 people participated. Several Somali refugee groups criticized the Somali Government for impeding the participation of more people.

As part of the ongoing political crisis in the country, the Federal Parliament, after a month of impasse, decided on December 6 to approve the removal of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, the third prime minister under the presidency of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in two years. The disputes between the prime minister and the president had been constant, which had brought the Somali Government to a practical standstill. Days later, on December 24, Omar Abdirashid Ali Shamarke, the former prime minister of Somalia and former Somalian ambassador to the U.S., was elected unanimously to the post. In parallel, one of the leaders of the Islamist group al-Shabaab, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, surrendered. Hersi had contacted the Somali authorities and AMISOM. His surrender was the result of serious internal tensions in the armed group in recent months in the aftermath of the execution of Godane.

Most significant events of the year

- The Somali Government opened the door to talks with members of the al-Shabaab armed group. Apparently unofficial channels were opened for the discussions, but no progress was made.
- The president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, extended to the end of the year the amnesty that the Government had offered to all of the members of al-Shabaab who wished to surrender their weapons. The group responded with an attack on the AU base in the capital.
- One of the leaders of the al-Shabaab Islamist group surrendered.
## Reasons crisis during the year

- Somali Government at a practical standstill.
- Constant disputes between the prime minister and the president.
- Internal tension in the al-Shabaab armed group.

## Websites of interest

- AMISOM (amisom.au.org)
- IGAD (www.igad.int)
- Insight to Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org)
- International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding (www.psbdialogue.org)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- ONU (www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- SoMali Peace Line (www.tubta.org)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org/fast)
- UNPOS (unpos.unmissions.org)
- UNSOM (unsom.unmissions.org)
Main parties in the process

Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
President: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

AU → AMISOM
UNPOS → UN → UNSOM
SRSG: Agustine P. Mahiga

Turkey
Somaliland
Puntland
Jubaland
al-Shabaab

IGAD
Special Envoy: M. Abdi Afey

EU
Special Envoy: Alexander Rondos

International High Level Partnership Forum on Somalia
High-Level Task Force -HLTF-

Space of intermediation
**SUDAN (National Dialogue)**

**Context of the conflict**

Independent since 1956, several conflicts have overlapped in Sudan in recent years. First, the conflict in the south that began in 1983. It came to an end with peace agreements signed in January 2005, which led to South Sudan’s independence in 2011, although some tensions persist. Second, the conflict that took place in the western region of Darfur, which began in early 2003 and has declined in intensity but has not been concluded. Third, a smaller conflict in the east of the country, which erupted in 2005 and ended in late 2006, and, finally, the dispute that has affected the regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile since 2011. Several of these conflicts are analyzed in other sections. This section looks at recent attempts to establish a national dialogue between the different regions of modern day Sudan that are in conflict. Since 1989, the country is under the authoritative rule of Omar al-Bashir, who rose to power in a military coup.

**The proposal for 2014**

In late January the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir called for a "national dialogue", both in his name and his party's, to address the political and economic problems that will allow the country to deal with poverty, war and political instability. He announced that the dialogue would have four goals: to achieve peace, protect constitutional rights, reinvigorate the economy and restore the national identity. He also stated that the proposal did not exclude anyone and that, after 25 years of rule it was time for reforms. From the outset the former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) were involved in the proposal to promote peace negotiations and democratic transformation. Initially, the proposal was rejected by some of the opposition parties, who complained that some of their leaders had been arrested and that the Government had refused to delay the elections originally scheduled for April 2015. It did however receive initial support from the National Umma Party (NUP). The 7 + 7 Committee, which included equal numbers of opposition and governmental political parties, subsequently met to discuss the proposal. In May, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM), Minni Minnawi, criticized the Government for not wanting a national transitional government. Other parties such as the NUP, led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was arrested on May 17 and the Reform Now Movement (NRM), led by Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Attabani, suspended their participation in the national dialogue, in addition to the opposition alliance National Consensus Force (NFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front guerrillas (SRF), which operated in the regions of Darfur and South Kordofan. At the end of that month the EU Delegation and Ambassador of Norway in Sudan released a statement offering to provide technical support for the dialogue, especially for constitutional reform and the establishment of confidence-building measures among the stakeholders.

Members of the SRF and the NUP met in Paris on August 8 and signed the “Paris Declaration”, which was rejected by the governing NCP party. On September 4 an 8-point Agreement for National Dialogue and Constitutional Process was signed in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) by the presidents of the National Umma Party (NUP), the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), the observer of the AU, Thabo M. Mbeki, and representatives of the 7+7 Committee. The agreement included the following points:

1 – Comprehensive political settlement is the ideal option to resolve Sudan’s problems.
2 - Stopping the war, reaching cessation of hostilities and dealing with the humanitarian situation should be priorities for confidence-building.
Ensuring freedoms and basic human rights, the release of political and sentenced detainees should be priorities for confidence building.

The beginning of the dialogue and the constitutional process should start once an agreement has been reached on the procedures.

All participants in the dialogue and the constitutional process should be free to express their views and positions.

Los dialogues should be conducted in accordance with the agreed timeframes.

The necessary guarantees should exist to conduct and implement the constitutional dialogue process.

The inclusiveness and participation of all stakeholders should be guaranteed to obtain a national consensus.

On September 18 the members of the Troika on Sudan (made up of the United States, United Kingdom and Norway) issued a joint statement on the Sudan Dialogue, in which they reiterated their support for the mediation architecture that facilitates both resolution of conflict and a comprehensive process of national dialogue under the following principles:

- There is no military solution to the conflicts in Sudan.
- A compartmentalized and regional approach to peacemaking cannot yield a solution to grievances that are national in character.
- A sustainable peace and genuinely representative political system can best be achieved through a comprehensive national dialogue that addresses fundamental issues of governance, political inclusiveness, resource-sharing, identity, and social equality at a national level.
- A comprehensive dialogue should be broadly inclusive and include civil society representatives.
- A comprehensive dialogue can succeed only in an environment that permits the meaningful participation of the country's diverse constituents, free from any restrictions to the right to assembly or the right to freedom of expression.
- The dialogue might best serve Sudan by upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, yielding an inclusive and participatory governance arrangement and, if an agreement is reached, to hold elections.

Following a meeting held by the Berghof Foundation, Germany announced in early October that it would cooperate with the Sudanese stakeholders to facilitate a peace process in the country with the goal of achieving peace. Berghof organized a meeting in Berlin with the various leaders of the armed groups that make up the SRF coalition and they made a pledge to participate in any political process leading the country to peace. The German Foreign Ministry said it was willing to facilitate those goals. During the seminar the SRF said that it was necessary to bring together the armed groups, political parties and civil society organizations. The Berghof Foundation announced that it was willing to contribute to this goal. After the seminar in Berlin, the SRF announced plans to form a strategic alliance with the umbrella group of opposition parties, the National Consensus Forces (NCF), and other opposition parties. In parallel, several opposition parties accused the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of deliberately delaying the national dialogue until after the April 2015 elections, when the process would be restarted. The opposition parties demanded the elections be delayed until the process of national dialogue had been finished. However, the Government rejected these accusations and underlined its commitment to the process, which it said should not exceed three months. The co-spokesperson for the 7+7 Committee, which is another name used for the national dialogue committee, said that the head of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Thabo Mbeki, would travel shortly to Khartoum to make sure that the dialogue would offer all of the guarantees required by the armed groups. A government delegation and the armed groups from the two Areas (Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) and Darfur were supposed to have met in separate encounters between October 12 and 16 to discuss a ceasefire, but this was finally suspended because Khartoum asked to postpone the meeting to celebrate the national convention of the NCP ruling party. During its fourth convention, held on October 23, President Omar al-Bashir said he was committed to national dialogue and stated that positive developments would occur, such as the presence of
opposition leader Hassan al-Turabi, from the PCP, who had decided to participate in the dialogue and called for the unity of the Sudanese. Several analysts said the slow progress of the dialogue, the Government’s desire to implement confidence-building measures with the opposition and its refusal to postpone the elections seemed to be government ploys to divide the opposition and ensured that it remained in power.

In early November a delegation of the AUHIP (African Union) visited Khartoum to prepare an inclusive meeting in Addis Ababa. Halfway through the month the Troika held the negotiations between the Government of Sudan with the SPLM-North and the SRF Darfur, and recalled the key issues that the AU for Peace and Security Council on Sudan had identified in September, namely a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout the country, the preparation of a meeting with all political parties, the need for confidence-building measures, and humanitarian assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The president called for a &quot;national dialogue&quot; to address the political and economic problems that need to be resolved to cope with poverty, war and political instability, with the participation of former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP).</td>
</tr>
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<td>On September 4 an 8-point Agreement for National Dialogue and Constitutional Process was signed in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), with the AU as observer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Berghof Foundation organized a meeting in Berlin with the various leaders from the armed groups that make up the SRF coalition.</td>
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<td>The opposition parties demanded the elections be delayed until the process of national dialogue had been finished.</td>
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<td>The opposition leader Hassan al-Turabi, from the PCP, decided to participate in the dialogue.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple armed and political actors in the dialogue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The arrest of opposition leaders.</td>
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<td>Unwillingness of the Government to delay elections.</td>
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<td>Criticism against the Government for not wanting a Transitional National Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Government’s demand that the &quot;National Dialogue&quot; not last for more than three months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delay in signing a ceasefire agreement due to partisan needs of the Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible government ploys to divide the opposition.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**End result:** unresolved, but with possible progress in 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Websites of interest</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union (<a href="http://www.africa-union.org">www.africa-union.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan Democracy First Group (<a href="http://www.democracyfirstgroup.org">www.democracyfirstgroup.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Tribune (<a href="http://www.sudantribune.com">www.sudantribune.com</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

- **SUDAN Government**
  - President: Omar al-Bashir (CNP)

- **AU**
  - Thabo Mbeki
  - AUHIP

- **Troika:**
  - USA
  - U.K.
  - Norway
  - Germany
  - (Berghof Foundation)

- **Sudan Democracy First Group**

- **Arms groups and parties opposition**

**Space of intermediation**
a) (Darfur)

Context of the conflict

Several different conflicts have been superimposed in Sudan in recent years. The first of these, in the south of the country, began in 1982 and ended with the peace agreements signed in January 2005, despite some persisting tension. The second, located in the western region of Darfur, began in early 2003. This conflict has only intensified over the years and is the situation analysed in this chapter. In addition, there is a third, lesser conflict in the east of the country, which erupted in 2005 and ended in late 2006.

In February 2003, while talks between the government and the SPLA were progressing in the south of the country, a new armed group arose in the Darfur region. Known as the SLA, it would subsequently split into many factions. After months of confrontation with the government, both parties agreed to a ceasefire in September. However, there were many violations of this agreement. The government of Chad offered to mediate in the conflict. In October, a new armed group called the JEM emerged in the region. This group initially refused to negotiate with the government and criticised the Chadian mediation. The group went through several splits, which affected the negotiating process in Doha (Qatar). Ultimately, the JEM (Bashar) and the JEM led by Gibril Ibrahim were the only groups left at the table. In February 2010 the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) was formed. It was a small group that brought together the Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Force (SLRF), known as the Tripoli Group, and the Addis Ababa Group. This group signed a peace agreement with the Government in 2011. In December 2011 an alliance was created of the various groups opposed to the Sudanese government, JEM (Gibril Ibrahim), SLM (al-Nur), SLM (Minnawi) and SPL. It was named the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which initially had the support of the SPLM-N.

Background to the peace process

In February 2004, the SLA and the JEM attended a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. The aim of this meeting was to guarantee humanitarian access to the affected people. In April 2004, a temporary ceasefire agreement was reached in Chad, and both armed groups demanded an end to the region’s marginalisation and its inclusion in the peace process that the government was carrying out with the SPLA in the south of the country. This agreement led to the creation of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). In May 2005, under the auspices of Muammar al-Gaddafi, both parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Libya, which would facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Subsequently, in mid-June, the government and the two armed groups met in Abuja (Nigeria) to begin a new round of direct contacts (after a six month break), with mediation from the AU under the leadership of its special envoy, S. Ahmed Salim. Towards the end of July, the SLA and the JEM signed an agreement in Tripoli (Libya) pledging to end the confrontations between the two groups, to release prisoners and to restore trust and coordination. On the 5th of May 2006, the Sudanese government and the majority faction of the SLA led by M.A. Minnawi signed a peace agreement in Abuja (Nigeria) under the auspices of the AU. Minnawi was appointed chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and Senior Assistant to the President of the Republic.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 dated the 31st of July 2007 authorised the establishment of a hybrid operation run jointly by the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur (UNAMID) which was authorised to take any measures needed to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its staff and civilians.
without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent upon the government of Sudan. In 2008, the JEM expressed its willingness to discuss the peace proposal for Darfur promoted by Qatar, and it stated that it would send a delegation to Doha to hold consultations with Qatari leaders. In the second half of February 2010, the Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement facilitated by the president of Chad, and they presented a framework for a future peace agreement. In June, the JEM accused the government of having violated the ceasefire agreement by bombarding its positions in northern Darfur. The surge in skirmishes and military operations in Darfur during the month of May led the armed group to withdraw from the negotiations, as it deemed that the agreements reached with the government had been violated by the renewed outbreaks of violence. In December 2010 the SLM (Minnawi) withdrew from Darfur Peace Agreement and returned to the armed struggle. In March 2011, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the coalition of armed groups Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella organisation for small factions led by El-Tijani El-Sissi (a member of the Fur ethnic group and former governor of the region) in Qatar. In July, two rebel groups from Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army-FREES (SLA-FREES) and the Justice and Reform Movement (JRM), signed a peace agreement mediated by a reconciliation committee of local leaders and native administrators, with UNAMID as the observer. On the 27th of April, the mediators gave to the armed groups LJIM and JEM a draft peace agreement with six points for their consideration. While the LJIM stated that it was in favour of the agreement, the JEM expressed reluctance and asked to discuss several aspects with government representatives. The main points of contention referred to the section on human rights and freedoms, as well as to the administration of Darfur and the vice presidential posts offered within the central government. The government and the alliance of armed groups LJIM signed a peace agreement in Doha (Qatar) in July with the goal of putting an end to the armed conflict in Darfur. In September, a new JEM faction, Democratic Change Forces, headed by the vice president of the group and the leader of the forces in Kordofan, Mohamed Bahr Ali Hamdein, announced its intention to reach a peace agreement with the government as part of the Doha process. At the end of the year, the top JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, died during an attack by the Sudanese army.

A split occurred in the armed group JEM in the third quarter of 2012. The new faction, led by commander Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim (“Dabajo”), indicated its willingness to negotiate with the Sudanese government and appointed Mohamed Bashar to be the new leader of the armed group JEM-Bashar. In October, representatives of the government and the dissident JEM faction signed a cessation of hostilities agreement and announced that they would sit down for peace talks.

In 2013 negotiations between JEM-Bashar and the Sudanese government continued in Doha (Qatar) during the entire first quarter. In January an agreement was reached regarding the agenda for the negotiation, at the beginning of February a ceasefire was signed and talks began on issues such as power and wealth sharing, compensation and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, justice and reconciliation, and final security provisions based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). In late March several pacts were signed and the process concluded in an official ceremony on April 6 in Doha. JEM-Bashar agreed that some of its fighters would join the Sudanese army and the rest would be demobilized. In addition, JEM members would be present in the national government, in the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) and in the executive and legislative bodies of the five states of Darfur. The two sides also agreed to create three new bodies: one to deal with nomads and pastoralist affairs, a social care fund, and a credit bank for small businesses. On April 6, during the donor conference for Darfur, the negotiations between JEM-Bashar and the Government were sealed with the signing in Doha of a peace protocol based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, when the JEM-Bashar delegation was travelling through Chad on its return to Darfur it was attacked by members of the JEM faction led by Jibril Ibrahim. Mohammed Bashar, his right hand man, Suleiman Arko, and five other members were killed. The international commission overseeing the implementation of the DDPD remarked that "it is not only an act of vengeance but a calculated and deliberate move to dissuade others who may be willing to join the peace process."
In October the Government of Sudan and the JEM faction (Bashar) led by "Dabajo" signed an agreement to implement the peace accord. The pact was based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur of 2011 and stated that both parties would abandon hostilities and initiate a peace process. According to the spokesperson of the faction, Ali-El-Wafi, the key issues identified to be included in the negotiation were security, power sharing and the future of refugees. "Dabajo" returned to Khartoum in mid-November and was received by the Sudanese authorities. At that time, the main JEM group, led by Jibril Ibrahim, and other groups in the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), the SPLM-N and two of the main SLA groups, led by Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLA-AW) and Minni Minnawi (the SLA-Minnawi, which had signed a peace agreement in 2006 and withdrew in 2011), maintained their refusal to establish partial peace negotiations and proposed a global solution to eliminate the regime and establish a democracy that would respect the rights of the different regions. In November several armed groups that had not yet signed any peace agreement held a second meeting (the first had taken place in Tanzania in August) in the Ethiopian capital, with the mediation of UNAMID, to discuss the humanitarian situation and the possibilities of beginning peace negotiations. These groups believe that democratization of the country and a new constitution are needed.

The leader of the LJM coalition that signed the DDPD in 2011 said that Khartoum was delaying the implementation of the security agreements and was not fulfilling its obligation to move LJM members into the civil service. In November 2013 the Sudanese government and Tijani El-Sissi’s LJM signed a security agreement which would place between 2,000 and 3,000 members of the LJM in the Army and police. The agreement was signed with UNAMID intermediation. Moreover, at the end of the year the vice president of Sudan, El Haj Adam Yousif, proposed an "action plan" that would involve members of Parliament, the State Legislative Councils and the Darfur Regional Authority, in addition to civil society organizations. In mid-December a meeting of the Committee for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement (DDPD) was scheduled to take place in Cairo (Egypt) and would be attended by the Government, the LJM, JEM-Bashar, the AU, the Arab League, Burkina Faso, Chad, Qatar, Egypt and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

**The peace process in 2014**

In March a meeting was held in Chad between the Presidents of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, and Chad, Idriss Deby, to activate the political dialogue in Sudan. In April the Chadian president met in Paris with the president of the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the JEM to discuss the situation in Darfur. In early July the Chadian President Idriss Deby met again with the leader of the faction of the JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, also in Paris, and in response to a petition made by Zaghawa tribal leaders. A few days earlier during the EU-Africa Summit Ibrahim met in Brussels with the leader of the SLM-MM, Minni Minnawi, who is also from the Zaghawa ethnic group. In 2010 Minnawi pulled out of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. Ibrahim said he did not want partial peace, but agreements with the entire SRF (Sudanese Revolutionary Front) alliance, including a ceasefire and discussion of political issues, with international mediation.

In July the president of the opposition group, the National Umma Party (NUF), and the leader of a faction of the JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, who was also secretary for foreign relations of the SRF, held meetings at the headquarters of the European Parliament in Strasbourg to achieve support for the peace process and national dialogue in Sudan. In late August members of the SRF, including Gibril Ibrahim, met in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) with the African Union, the Sudanese Government mediator for Darfur and the UN special envoy for Darfur.

During October several things occurred that could help build peace in the country. First, following a meeting held by the Berghof Foundation, Germany announced in early October that it would cooperate with the Sudanese stakeholders to facilitate a peace process in the country with the goal of achieving peace. The Berghof Foundation organized a meeting with the leaders of armed groups that were part of the SRF coalition, including the president of one of the JEM factions,
Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the SPLM-N, Malik Agar, and the president of the SRF, Minni Minnawi. The leaders pledged to participate in any political process that would lead the country to peace. The German Foreign Ministry said it was willing to facilitate those goals. During the seminar the SRF said that it was necessary to bring together the armed groups, political parties and civil society organizations. The Berghof Foundation announced that it was willing to contribute to this goal. After the seminar in Berlin, the SRF announced plans to form a strategic alliance with the umbrella group of opposition parties, the National Consensus Forces (NCF), and other opposition parties. Some media organizations said the Egyptian Government was interested in mediating in the peace process. In late October Minnawi's SLM-MM announced it would soon begin peace talks with the Sudanese Government in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), with the mediation of the AU.

In early November a delegation of ambassadors from EU countries visited Darfur to gather information on the political, development and humanitarian situation in the region. Italy, France, Sweden, UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain took part in the mission. At the end of that month talks were held in Addis Ababa with Gibril Ibrahim's JEM and they continued until early December. The delegation for the Sudanese Government arrived at the meeting without an agenda and only wanted to discuss security issues, while the JEM wanted to address a long list of more structural issues (compensation for the impoverished population, return of the displaced population, the development of Darfur, farming and land ownership issues, security, the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, and justice and reconciliation programs). The mediator, Mbeki, asked the Sudanese Government to grant its negotiating delegation more power and he travelled around Europe asking for the Sudanese debt to be cancelled as an incentive to begin negotiations that produce results. The meeting in Ethiopia ended without any advances.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>• The Chadian President, Idriss Deby, met with the leader of the faction of the JEM, Gibril Ibrahim, in Paris.</td>
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<td>• The president of the Gibril Ibrahim faction of JEM said he did not want partial peace, but agreements with the entire SRF alliance.</td>
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<td>• The Berghof Foundation organized a meeting with the leaders of armed groups that were part of the SRF coalition, including the president of one of the JEM factions, Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the SPLM-N, Malik Agar, and the president of the SRF, Minni Minnawi. The leaders pledged to participate in any political process that would lead the country to peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Egyptian Government’s interest in acting as mediator in the peace process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• At the end of the year a meeting was held between the Government and the JEM-Gibril Ibrahim faction, but the government delegation only wished to discuss security issues.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• At the year-end meeting between the Government and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the JEM the Government delegation only wanted to discuss safety issues, while the JEM presented a broader agenda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Insufficient capabilities of the AU negotiation team.</td>
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</table>

End result: unresolved.

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<tr>
<td>• IGAD (<a href="http://www.igad.org">www.igad.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Incore (<a href="http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries">www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

- **SUDAN**
  - Government (Omar al-Bashir)
  - DDPD Follow-up Office (Amin Hassan Omer)

- **UNAMID**
  - AU-UN Joint Mediator (Mohamed Ibn Chnabas)

- **JEM**
  - Jibril Ibrahim
  - Bashar Abdel Karim “Dabaja”
  - (Jibril Ibrahim)

- **SLM**
  - Sudan
  - Chad
  - Qatar

- **African Union**
  - Thabo Mbeki

- **UNAIDS**
  - Germany
  - France
  - Belgium

- **Berghof Foundation**

- **Space of intermediation**

- **SRF**
  - Chad
  - LJM (Tijani el-Sissi)
  - Hassam al-Turabi (Sudan)

- **JEM (Giibril Ibrahim)** (jem.knowprocess.com) (www.JEMSudan.org)

- **SLM-MM**
  - M.A. Minnawi

- **SLM (al-Nur)**

- **SPLM-N**

- **ONU** (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)

- **Reliefweb** (www.reliefweb.int)

- **Small Arms Survey**

- **Sudan Tribune** (www.sudantribune.com)

- **UNAMID** (www.un.org/es/peacekeeping/missions/unamid)

- **Unión Africana** (www.africa-union.org)

- **UNMIS** (www.unmis.org)
b) South Kordofan and Blue Nil

**Context of the conflict**

The situation in Sudan took a turn for the worse after the April 2010 general elections, when several members of the military who had presented themselves as candidates or supported political opponents of the presidential party, the SPLM, failed to win. They refused to recognize the election results and decided to take up arms to demand access to the institutions, where the Dinka dominated and the other communities were underrepresented, and to accuse the Government of South Sudan of corruption.

After South Sudan became independent in July 2011 tensions emerged between the Sudanese Government and the non-Arab border regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which had been assisting South Sudan in its struggle for independence. The conflict has produced large numbers of displaced persons (nearly one million in the first year), and hundreds of people have died. The government of South Sudan is backed by the Popular Defence Forces paramilitary group. Humanitarian negotiations began so that the AU could gain free access to the zones in conflict and an agreement was signed in August 2012 with the AU, the Arab League and the UN. The **Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)** emerged in 2011 as a subsidiary of South Sudan's SPLM and mainly operated in the oil rich Sudanese states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile on the South Sudan border. The group struggles against the Government of Sudan and defends the region's religious, gender or ethnic differences. The SPLM-N has a humanitarian arm called the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. South Sudan accused Sudan of supporting the SPLM-N in the two border states.

**Background to the peace process**

Since November 2012 Sudan has demanded that the demilitarized zone between Sudan and South Sudan be extended by 50 km so that it would include the border it shares with South Kordofan, where the SPLM is fighting against the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In June 2013 the SPLM-N once again requested talks with the Government to negotiate humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile for a polio vaccination campaign, but the Government said that before it would negotiate any humanitarian issues a political agreement had to be reached. In May both sides expressed their disagreement on this issue. The SRF said that aid workers had to enter the areas under their control from Ethiopia and Kenya, while the Government said it had to be from Sudan. In July and September the Sudanese government tried to establish contact with the SPLM-N through three countries to resolve the conflict in South Kordofan. The new governor of South Kordofan, Adam al-Faki, also tried to establish relations with the movement in mid-July. However, the SPLM-N rejected calls for negotiations and called for a comprehensive solution covering both the Blue Nile and South Kordofan areas and Darfur.

However, it did agree to a 15-day humanitarian ceasefire so that the polio vaccination campaign could be conducted. In late November the SPLM-N negotiator did not oppose the proposal to resume negotiations in December in Ethiopia, with AU mediation. Also of interest was the work performed by some community mediation associations, such as Justice Confidence Centres (JCC) and the Joint Conflict Programme (JCPR). In December members of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) stated that the SPLM-N would only accept a global solution that involved a regime change.
The peace process in 2014

After being on hold for nearly 12 months, at the beginning of the year talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N began once again. On February 13 the parties met again in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the AU. On February 18 the AU mediation team, the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), headed by Thabo Mbeki, proposed that the two sides should implement an immediate ceasefire and allow access to humanitarian aid organizations. Aid for a million people was being blocked by conflict and had caused a humanitarian crisis. The AU said it would appoint a third party to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire. Despite this, the parties began exchanging accusations again and interrupted the talks. The head of the SPLM delegation, Yasir Arman, said that Khartoum wanted to put the war on hold without providing solutions to either the humanitarian or the political situation, and he accused the SPLM-N of bringing to the table issues that were not related to the war affecting South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The Sudanese Defence Minister said that the Kordofan rebels were not interested in peace. Ibrahim Ghandour, external relations secretary of the ruling party (NCP) who headed the delegation, said at the start of the talks that they should focus on security, and political and humanitarian aspects in a single package, while the rebel group stated that humanitarian issues should be dealt with first, and second, the war should be stopped and a national constitutional conference held to resolve the root causes of conflict. After several days of negotiations, no progress was made, but one source close to the talks said the two sides had stopped studying the draft agreement proposed by the AU. While the talks were supposed to restart on February 28, they were finally put on hold.

Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N armed group, launched unsuccessfully in February, were resumed in April and interrupted again in May. The armed group announced in late April that it had agreed to negotiate a framework agreement with the Sudanese government, although officials in Khartoum played down the importance of the agreement. Both sides resumed peace talks on April 22 at the request of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) with the aim of bringing to an end the conflict that had affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile for over the last three years. Previously, the AU mediation team led by former South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki had suspended the process after the SPLM-N rejected a draft framework agreement. The group decided it wanted to return to an agreement reached on June 28, 2011 that had never been applied, but could serve as a starting point for the new framework agreement. The mediators had proposed the establishment of four panels to negotiate security agreements, humanitarian access, the two regions' political problems and the process of national dialogue. SPLM-N delegation spokesperson Ardol Mubarak announced that the two parties had agreed to the need for a new framework agreement based on AU Peace and Security Council resolution 423 and UN Security Council resolution 2046, and that the agreement of 2011 would be used as reference.

During the third quarter the AU mediation team attempted to reactivate the peace process with the SPLM-N. In late August the Government announced that the rebel group had rejected an invitation from the AU to resume peace talks on the two areas, and said it was concerned that the talks had been suspended for such a long time. One member of the Government’s negotiating team, Kershom Hussein, said the AUHIP, led by Thabo Mbeki, had proposed to resume the seventh round of the South Kordofan and Blue Nile peace talks in Addis Ababa on August 28. However, the negotiator SPLM-N leader, Yasir Arman, dismissed the comments made by the Sudanese government with regard to resuming the peace talks in the Ethiopian city saying that the AU mediation team had invited them to hold consultations on the national dialogue that the Government was promoting. The talks between the two sides were postponed until October.

In mid-November negotiations resumed in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), although they were subsequently postponed for a few days. AU mediator Thabo Mbeki said Sudan was using “a two-track process” referring to the parallel negotiations being held in the Sudanese region of Darfur, and that both negotiations should be “synchronized”. The conflict in Kordofan and Blue Nile had
already caused 650,000 displaced persons. In December the negotiations broke down, after a three-week ceasefire, because of the many differences in the proposals made by both parties. On the one hand the SPLM-N wanted a global agreement, while the Government was interested in a partial agreement. The Government wanted the rebels to disarm and declare a ceasefire before addressing political issues, which was not accepted. The guerrillas were also in favour of achieving a "synchronized agreement" with the Darfur armed groups before they participated in the National Dialogue. The SPLM-N also rejected Islamic law, called for the dismantling of the national Police, the Army and the security bodies. Moreover, there were indications that conditions for new negotiations had been established, such as the commitment made at the third meeting of the Geneva Call by the leader of the SLPM-N to destroy its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines or the willingness by both sides to participate in a large-scale operation to release all prisoners of war.

The talks could be resumed in January 2015.

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<td>The facilitator, Thabo Mbeki, suspended the process after the SPLM-N rejected a draft framework agreement. It was decided to return to an agreement reached on 28 June 2011, although never implemented, but which could serve as a basis for the new framework agreement.</td>
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<td>AU mediator Thabo Mbeki said Sudan was using &quot;a two-track process&quot; referring to the parallel negotiations being held in the Sudanese region of Darfur, and that both negotiations should be &quot;synchronized&quot;, which did not please the Government of Sudan.</td>
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<td>In December the negotiations with the SPLM-N were suspended due to the profound differences in the proposals made by the different sides.</td>
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<tr>
<td>At the third meeting of the Geneva Call the leader of the SLPM-N made a commitment to destroy its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines or the willingness by both sides to participate in a large-scale operation to release all prisoners of war.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Government was accused of not wanting to end the humanitarian or the political crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The armed groups were accused by the Government of bringing to the table issues that were unrelated to the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government mistrust of AU mediation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences with the Government on whether a ceasefire in the regions should be established before beginning the 'National Dialogue'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government was in favour of achieving partial solutions, while the SPLM-N wanted a comprehensive agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SPLM-N also wanted a peace agreement in Darfur to be reached before participating in the National Dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SPLM-N criticized the Government for demanding the surrender of weapons before a political agreement was reached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**End result:** unresolved.
### Websites of interest

- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Relief Web (reliefweb.int)
- Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurveysudan.org)
- Sudan Tribune (www.sudantribune.com)
- Unión Africana (www.africa-union.org)

### Main parties involved in the process

**SUDAN**
- **Government**
  - President: Omar al-Bashir
  - South Kordofan Governor: Adam al-Faki
  - Negotiator: Ibrahim Gandhour

**African Union**
- AUHIP
  - Thabo Mbeki

**SPLM-N**
- Yasir Arman
  - Malik Agar

**South Sudan**

**Space of Intermediation**
SOUTH SUDAN

Context of the conflict

After years of conflict between the central Government of Sudan and the south, led by the SPLM rebel group, a peace agreement was reached in 2005, mediated by IGAD, that provided for a referendum on southern independence to be held in 2011. The vast majority of the population voted for independence, which came into effect shortly after, but the tensions did not diminish either between the two countries (Sudan and South Sudan) or within South Sudan, where disputes broke out over control of land, livestock and political power. In the 2010 general elections several soldiers, mostly from the Nuer ethnic group, did not accept the results and they took up arms to demand a place in the institutions dominated by the Dinka. In late 2013 there was an escalation in the fighting between supporters of President Salva Kiir and those who backed former Vice President Riek Machar (the SPLM/A-in-Opposition), which were made up of different ethnic groups. The personal ambitions of the two opponents are thus an important dimension in the conflict. The conflict caused about 10,000 deaths and 1.8 million displaced persons.

Background to the peace process

In April 2013, the president offered amnesty to the leaders of six rebel groups. Initially it was only accepted by the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army armed group (SSLA). According to local sources, the 3,000 member group crossed the border from Sudan with a hundred trucks and delivered weapons to the authorities in South Sudan. In June the leader of another militia fighting in Upper Nile State, Johnson Uliny, also accepted the amnesty offer. Uliny was the new leader of South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/SSDA) that had signed a peace agreement with the Government in February 2012 under the leadership of Peter Kuol Chol Awar, after the death of George Athor. In early July the Government of South Sudan announced that peace talks were beginning with the leader of the Murle Militia, David Yau Yau. Previously the country’s president, Salva Kiir, had asked the elders of the Murle community to persuade Yau Yau to respond to the amnesty proposal.

At the end of April 2013 the president offered amnesty to six leaders of rebel groups. Initially it was only accepted by the SSLA armed group. According to local sources the 3,000 member group crossed the border from Sudan with a hundred trucks and delivered weapons to the authorities in South Sudan. In June the leader of another militia fighting in Upper Nile State, Johnson Uliny, also accepted the amnesty offer. On December 14, 2013 there was a coup attempt that President Salva Kiir managed to quash, although one thousand people were killed in heavy fighting. Kiir accused former Vice President Riek Machar of orchestrating the coup and ordered his arrest, but he denied any involvement. Forces loyal to Machar took control of Unity State, an important oil region, and Bor, capital of Jonglei state. Bor was the scene of a massacre in 1991 between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, that Kiir and Machar belong to respectively. Both sides continued fighting for the control of other important towns in clashes that took place in different parts of the country. There was a growing concern that a new conflict was in the making and the UN announced that it was sending more peacekeeping forces. Riek Machar’s forces became known as the SPLM/A-in-Opposition. A series of visits were organized by delegations from different organizations and key countries in the region, especially the leaders of Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya, in an attempt to get the parties to reach an agreement. IGAD, which played an important role in the 2005 peace agreement, also facilitated talks between the two conflicting sectors in South Sudan, although the mediation was often called into question and led to a profound crisis in 2014 due to the Prime Ministers lack of confidence in the process.
The peace process in 2014

In early January, the Government and the SPLM/A-in-Opposition, began peace talks in Addis Ababa that included negotiations for the release of prisoners and agreements to implement a ceasefire, which was reached on January 23, although it was violated systematically by both sides. The Government announced that it would consider releasing prisoners only when investigations into their activities had been concluded and the necessary legal procedures had been followed. For their part, the rebels declared that the arrest by the Government of senior officials remained an obstacle to peace negotiations. Despite joint efforts to reconcile the differences between the leaders of the SPLM, which included support from the countries in the region, international partners and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan, they were unsuccessful, according to a statement by the UN secretary General in March. At the same time political opposition parties and civil society organizations said they were interested in participating in the possible future national dialogue, one of the items that came up during the peace talks.

Fighting continued throughout the first quarter as the peace talks went on, with facilitation by IGAD and support by the AU and the UN. The second round of peace talks held between the Government and the Machar faction on February 11 ended without agreement on March 3. The Government continued to demand the return to Juba of the seven ex-political detainees (out of 11) that were released in January (the so-called Third Platform). The Government says that they could be judged for their possible links to the alleged coup, while the opposition continued to demand the withdrawal of the Ugandan Armed Forces and other foreign forces that supported the Government. The seven politicians from the Third Platform are in Addis Ababa and are trying to act as a channel for dialogue between Kiir and Machar. Their proposal was that Kiir continue to be president of an interim government and that the party in power, the SPLM, be completely reformed. During this round of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the mechanisms for the monitoring and verification of the cessation of hostilities and they discussed the next steps regarding national dialogue and issues that affected the SPLM. On March 19 the U.S., UK, EU and Norway threatened both sides with targeted sanctions. The third round of negotiations began on March 26 with both sides threatening to boycott the process and unable to reach an agreement. IGAD requested a one-month suspension of the talks. According to Africa Confidential, the opposing parties were not in agreement with IGAD’s role, especially the plan to send in a stabilization force, since both sides believed that the other side would benefit from the presence of foreign troops.

In May the Government of South Sudan signed a peace agreement in the Ethiopian capital with the South Sudan Democratic Movement—Cobra Faction (SSDM-Cobra faction) led by David Yau Yau. The accord would establish a special territorial administration in Pibor County based on the principle of decentralization. The agreement was reached under the auspices of the Church Leaders Mediation Initiative of South Sudan (CLMI). At the beginning of January the two sides had already signed an agreement to cease hostilities and declared the area under the armed group's control a “Zone of Peace”. This group had joined forces with the SPLM in 2011, but in April 2012 it split away.

In the second quarter there was a serious escalation of violence in South Sudan and large scale human rights violations. The countries in the region and regional and international organizations stepped up their diplomatic efforts to try to stop the fighting and get the two sides to sign a peace agreement. IGAD’s chief mediator for the peace talks in South Sudan, Seyoum Mesfin, along with other special envoys, held talks with both sides and visited the regional capitals to discuss with the leaders of IGAD member countries, the AU, the UN and other partners to marshal support for the process. Discussions also included operations of IGAD’s Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the deployment of a regional protection force.
Several rounds of talks took place in Addis Ababa between supporters of President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. Two peace agreements were reached in May and June, which were violated by both sides. After the May 9 ceasefire, representatives of the Government led by Salva Kiir and the rebel faction SPLA-in-Opposition led by former Vice President Riek Machar committed once again on June 11 to cease the fighting and to create a transitional government within 60 days, after meeting on the sidelines during the regional IGAD summit. The agreement was reached in Addis Ababa after the IGAD regional organization had threatened to impose sanctions if both parties did not commit to the peace process. Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stated that the full battery of sanctions had been put on the table since both sides continued their attacks. The May 9 agreement had been systematically violated, according to IGAD, which expressed its frustration with the constant fighting. Kiir said he would remain in the transitional Government. Different issues were still unresolved, such as Salva Kiir’s resignation, the creation of a federal system of government and constitutional reforms. However, despite pressure by different international actors, the peace talks following the agreement were boycotted by the Government because the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, had called the Government and the opposition "stupid". President Salva Kiir demanded a formal apology. The talks were also subsequently boycotted by the opposition in late June because the civil society organizations selected to participate in the talks were aligned with the government. 14 African elder statesmen, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu from South Africa, called for an immediate end to the violence. In late May the conflict had displaced 1.2 million people and tens of thousands had died. According to the FAO a third of the population was experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity. The UN mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, continues to have 8,500 peacekeepers deployed in the region.

On August 10 the parties in conflict missed the deadline to establish a unity government. The AU, the UN Security Council and IGAD threatened once again to impose sanctions against those who boycotted the process. On August 25 both the Government and the rebel faction SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), led by former Vice President Riek Machar, met again in an attempt to end the devastating war that had begun in December 2013. As a result of the meeting the parties signed a new ceasefire agreement with the mediation of IGAD, which again threatened to impose sanctions if this new agreement failed. This agreement also established a protocol for the formation of a national unity government, including a prime minister from the opposition, transitional justice mechanisms, financial management and humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, on September 2 President Kiir began the preparations for elections in 2015. Just like the previous ones the agreement at the end of August failed and IGAD restarted the talks with both sides on September 22. A delegation of the SPLA-IO visited Beijing and held talks with the Chinese government. On September 21 China stopped arms sales to the Government and said it would deploy 700 soldiers to the UNMISS to help protect civilians.

In October the IGAD chief mediator, Seymour Mesfin, announced that negotiations had been broken off and the Government of South Sudan criticized the three countries of the Troika (the U.S., the UK and Norway) for attempting to force a regime change and for being responsible for the current crisis. The Government also demanded that the negotiations be moved from Ethiopia to Kenya. In the second half of the month the parties agreed to continue negotiations in Arusha (Tanzania), complementing the efforts of IGAD, although under the facilitation of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) from Finland and coordinated by Itonde Kakoma. The CMI had been working in South Sudan since 2011, and in 2014 supported the Intra-SPLM Dialogue, hosted by the Government of Tanzania. In October it got all parties to sign the so-called Arusha Communique, in which all parties recognized their collective responsibility in the conflict. At the beginning of November, however, President Kiir left the negotiating table and accused the former vice president of opting for a military solution. In December the Electoral Commission in South Sudan announced elections for June 2015, although the date could change if the Sudanese Government reached a peace deal with the rebellion led by the former vice president, Riek Machar. However, in the final days of December the special envoy of the regional organization IGAD, Seyoum Mesfin, said that the negotiations had been postponed during Christmas.
specific date had been set for the renewal of the talks and no convincing progress had been made due to the growing rumours that both sides were preparing new attacks.

## Most significant events of the year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>The Government and the SPLM/A-I0 began peace talks in early January in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia).</td>
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<td>After the agreement was signed the Government decided to boycott the talks due to declarations by the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub Maalim, who called the Government and the opposition “stupid”.</td>
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<td>A delegation of the SPLA-I0 visited Beijing (China) and held talks with the Chinese government.</td>
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<td>The Government of South Sudan criticized the three countries in the Troika (the U.S., the UK and Norway) for trying to force a regime change.</td>
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## Reasons crisis during the year

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violations of the ceasefire.</td>
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<td>Disagreement on the release of prisoners.</td>
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<td>Arrest of senior members of the armed group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differences between the leaders of the armed group and the IGAD mediation team.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand that foreign troops be withdrawn.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escalation of violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differences in the creation of a federal system of government and constitutional reforms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insult of the Government and the armed group by the IGAD facilitator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threats of sanctions by the mediating body.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of the mediation host country (Tanzania replaced Ethiopia) and reinforcement of the mediation by Finland and the organization CMI.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mutual accusations by the armed groups of not wanting peace.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**End result:** change in mediation.

## Websites of interest

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union Peace and Security (<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en">www.peaceau.org/en</a>)</td>
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<td>All Africa (allafrica.com/southsudan)</td>
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<td>BBC (<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news">www.bbc.co.uk/news</a>)</td>
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<td>Crisis Management Initiative (<a href="http://www.cmi.fi">www.cmi.fi</a>)</td>
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<td>Enough Project (<a href="http://www.enoughproject.org">www.enoughproject.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gurtong (<a href="http://www.gurtong.net">www.gurtong.net</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (igad.int)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

- **SOUTH SUDAN Government**
  - President: Salva Kiir (SPLM) (dinka)
  - Negotiator: Nhial Deng Nhial

- **Tanzania**
  - CMI (Finland) (Itonde Kakoma)

- **AU (AUHIP)**
  - China

- **Ethiopia**
  - IGAD Seyoum Mesfin

- **Former Vice-president:**
  - Riek Machar (SPLM/A-in-Opposition) (nu'er)
  - Negotiator: Taban Deng Gai

- **SSLA**
  - Johnson Uliny

- **CLM** (Paride Taban)
  - Troika: USA (D. Booth) United Kingdom Norway

  - UNMISS

  - South Africa (C. Ramaphosa)

  - **Space of intermediation**
SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN

Context of the conflict

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA in the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese Armed Forces, which were opposed to southern independence advocated by the SPLA. The conflict caused the death of more than a million people. In 2005, a peace agreement was signed that granted independence to South Sudan in 2011. However, both countries had to continue negotiating to clarify some points, especially the future of the city of Abyei, located in an oil-rich area. The challenge is to avoid escalation of violence for control of the region, and tensions between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka communities.

Background to the peace process

The first explorations were made in 1988 and the following year, the government and the SPLA signed a first Declaration of Principles by the IGAD, the mediating body, to hold a referendum on self-determination for the southern part of the country.

The beginning of an agreement was reached in July 2002 under the auspices of the IGAD that established autonomy for the south before holding a referendum in 2011. The first direct meeting also took place between the Sudanese President and the leader of the SPLA. Various rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya from 2002 to 2004, in which progress was made on a wide array of issues. These rounds allowed the parties to reach a final peace agreement on 5 January 2005, by which the north and south would keep their Armed Forces separate, a joint force would be formed for the most controversial areas, a six-year autonomy period would be established, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, oil profits would be shared fairly and a national unity government would be formed with a member of the SPLA as Vice President. In addition, it was agreed to not apply Islamic law in the south of the country and each side was allowed to use their own flag. In 2011, a referendum was held and South Sudan became an independent country. The process took 13 years in total and seven years until the peace agreement was signed.

The end of the war with the north and subsequent attainment of independence by South Sudan in 2011 was not enough to bring stability to the southern region. Disputes over territorial control, livestock and political power increased across many communities in South Sudan, raising the number, seriousness and intensity of the clashes among them. The situation worsened still after the general elections in April 2010, when various military figures that had run as candidates or supported political opponents of the ruling party, the SPLM, were not victorious. These military figures refused to recognise the results of the elections and decided to take up arms to back their claim to the right to govern, denounced the dominance of the Dinka and the under-representation of other ethnic groups in the government and described the government of South Sudan as corrupt. Juba's offers of amnesty did not put an end to the insurgency, which has been accused of receiving Sudanese funding and logistical support.

In June 2011 the UN Security Council authorized the creation of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to observe and verify the withdrawal of military forces by both countries from the area of Abyei, to protect civilians from physical violence and to establish a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. During the 2011, two important armed fronts formed in

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Population: Sudan: 38.8 million
South Sudan: 11.7 million

Surface area: Sudan: 1,886,681 km²
South Sudan: 619,745 km²

HDI: Sudan: 171 (of 186)
South Sudan: ---

GDP: Sudan: 66.566 million USD
South Sudan: 11.804 million USD

Per capita income: Sudan: 1,550 USD; South Sudan: 950 USD

Armed groups: the Armed Forces of both countries
Facilitators: African Union (Thabo Mbeki), UN (Francis Mading Deng)
the Greater Upper Nile region: the South Sudan Liberation Army, under the command of Peter Gadet, in Unity state, and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army, led by General George Athor, in Jonglei state. Both groups share the aim of overthrowing the government of South Sudan, led by President Salva Kiir, whom they brand as corrupt and accuse of poor governance, while also accusing the main party, the SPLM, of monopolising political power within institutions and of marginalising the rest of the non-Dinka parties and communities (mostly in the SPLM). They also say that the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) and police are poorly equipped and incapable of ensuring the population’s security, despite the fact that they receive large amounts of resources from the government.

The attacks of the SSLA and the SSDM/A, together with the militias led by Gabriel Tang-Ginye (Upper Nile), Gatluak Gai (Unity) and David Yau Yau (Jonglei), caused thousands of fatalities over the course of the year in the Upper Nile region. One of the most serious attacks in terms of the number of victims was perpetrated by the SSDM/A in Fangak county (Jonglei), where 300 people were killed in February and March, according to government sources. The government’s response to the insurgency took two forms: a renewal of the offer of amnesty for its leaders, which included having its troops rejoin the Army, and direct combat carried out by the Armed Forces. The military operations aggravated the situation on many occasions when soldiers were accused of attacking, assaulting and killing civilians they had accused of colluding with insurgents. The Army’s burning of at least 7,000 homes in Mayom county (Unity state) in May was a clear example of these kinds of actions.

In September and October, the SSLA warned NGOs and UN agencies to abandon the states of Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap, as it aimed to launch powerful attacks there. George Athor (SSDM/A) took advantage of the amnesty in January, but continued fighting and expanded his attacks in later months. Athor died in December in a military ambush on the Sudanese border. Similarly, military rebel Gatluak Gai agreed to an amnesty with the government in July, but was killed in mysterious circumstances later in the month in Koch county (Unity). David Yau Yau and Peter Gadet availed of the amnesty in June and August, respectively, but Gadet’s group (SSLA) refused to give up the armed struggle. Furthermore, the rebel Gabriel Tang-Ginye remained under arrest in Juba since April. Repeatedly throughout the year, the South Sudanese government accused Khartoum of providing assistance and arms to the military rebels. In this regard, various reports published during the year by Small Arms Survey, which identified and evaluated the material seized from Athor and Gadet’s forces by the Army, corroborated suspicions that both groups may have been receiving outside support.

During the third quarter of 2012, various meetings and rounds of negotiation took place between Sudan and South Sudan, and it was not until 27 September that a partial agreement on security and economic relations was reached under the auspices of the AU’s High-Level Implementation Panel. In addition to the AU’s official mediator, Thabo Mbeki, the United States and China had considerable influence in the peace talks. The agreement led to the resumption of oil exports and an agreement to demilitarise the shared border and thereby avoid a military conflagration of major consequence. However, many key points remained unresolved, including the status of the disputed Abyei region and several border areas disputed by both countries.

In October, the AU’s Peace and Security Council unanimously approved to prepare mediation efforts aimed at resolving the dispute over Abyei, which pits Sudan against South Sudan. The AU’s proposal called to hold a referendum in October 2013 in the disputed region, and only members of the Misseriya community residing in Abyei would be eligible to vote. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and the EU expressed their support for the referendum proposal, while Russia said that Abyei should be partitioned, which is also Khartoum’s position.

In March 2013 the Governments of both countries agreed to implement the September 2012 accord that established a 10-kilometers demilitarized zone on each side of the border and that would allow South Sudan to export its oil through Sudanese pipelines once again. The central banks of the two countries agreed on a methodology to facilitate the collection of oil revenues by
Khartoum. In late March the U.S.-based Carter Center, in collaboration with the Sudanese Future Studies Center and the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies in South Sudan, agreed to implement a one-year project aimed at creating a discussion forum for practical ideas to consolidate peace.

In South Sudan at the end of April the president offered amnesty to the leaders of six rebel groups. Initially it was only accepted by the SSLA armed group. According to local sources the 3,000 member group crossed the border from Sudan with a hundred trucks and delivered weapons to the authorities in South Sudan. In June the leader of another militia fighting in Upper Nile State, Johnson Uliny, also accepted the amnesty offer.

In April the two countries reached an agreement. The main points on the agenda were to open ten corridors on the border, establish a Joint Security Committee, and deal with rebel demands. Oil production was resumed and the oil reached Sudan on April 7, following the agreement reached in March. However, Sudan’s decision to close the pipeline again increased the tension between the two sides. In June the two countries agreed to AU mediation to resolve disputes.

The presidents of both countries met in Khartoum in early September to begin discussions on the pipeline crisis. As a result, the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, announced on September 4 that his Government would not prevent South Sudan from transporting oil through its facilities. In early July the Government of South Sudan announced that peace talks were beginning with the leader of the rebels, David Yau Yau. Previously the country’s president, Salva Kiir, had asked the elders of the Murle community to persuade Yau Yau to respond to the amnesty proposal.

In October the presidents of Sudan and South Sudan, Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, respectively, held a meeting in Juba to discuss the status of the Abyei region. The two presidents reached an agreement on the terms and conditions for its administration. Decisions were taken on issues such as the Abyei Council and Police organs in addition to payment to the Abyei Administration of 2% of the oil revenues, including payments due. The definitive status of the region has been disputed since 2005. Currently it is under UN administration, which has deployed 4,000 peacekeepers in the area. Khartoum had opposed a referendum because the ethnic Misseriya nomads, Sudanese citizens and those in favour of the region joining Sudan could not vote. In late October thousands of people returned to the region to vote in an unofficial referendum and the voters, mostly Dinka, were in favour of becoming part of South Sudan. The two countries involved in the dispute and the AU considered the referendum illegal. During preparations for the referendum the UN Security Council issued a statement calling on the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to refrain from any illegal actions that could increase the tension between the two countries. For its part, the AU announced it would send a mission to Abyei on November 5 and 6 to mediate in the negotiations on the region’s status, reduce tensions in the area and prevent any unilateral actions.

The peace process in 2014

No new progress had been made in the implementation of the Agreement signed on June 20, 2011 between Sudan and South Sudan to resolve the dispute over Abyei, according to a statement by the UN Secretary General in February. No progress was made in the establishment of joint provisional institutions, namely the Administration, the Council and the Police of the Abyei region. Due to the total absence of local governance and public order, UNISFA (the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei) continued to fulfil its mandate, with a complete absence of local governance and public order. In its report at the end of September, the Secretary General also expressed concern over the proliferation of small arms among the local population. At the end of the year UNISFA had 4,045 staff members, mostly from Ethiopia, and an annual budget of $318 million. Also in September, the National Elections Commission in Sudan announced that the Abyei region would be included in the 2015 elections, which prompted a protest by the authorities in South Sudan. In October the special envoy of the UN Secretary General, Francis Mading Deng,
proposed a new agreement for Abyei that would declare it to be a neutral region. He stated that each of the affected countries needed to resolve their internal conflicts and provide guarantees to the Misseriya community. At the beginning of November the presidents of the two countries met in Khartoum to try to resolve the border disputes.

### Most significant events of the year

- The National Elections Commission in Sudan announced that the Abyei region would be included in the 2015 elections, which prompted a protest by the authorities in South Sudan.
- The special envoy of the UN Secretary General, Francis Mading Deng, proposed a new agreement for Abyei, which would be declared a neutral region.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Proliferation of small arms.
- Protest by South Sudan over the decision that the Abyei region would be included in the 2015 elections.
- Lack of local governance and public order.

**End result**: unresolved.

### Websites of interest

- All Africa (allafrica.com/southsudan)
- BBC (www.bbc.co.uk/news)
- Naciones Unidas (www.un.org/es/sc)
- Sudan Tribune (www.sudantribune.com)
Main parties involved in the process

- **Russia**
- **SUDAN Government** (Omar al-Bashir)
  - **Future Studies Center**
  - **Carter Center**
  - **USA**
  - **China**
- **High-Level Implementation Panel**
- **Ethiopia**
- **Kenya**
- **SOUTH SUDAN Government** (Salva Kiir)
  - **Center for Strategic Studies**
- **UN**
  - **UNISFA**
  - **SESG: Francis Mading Deng**
- **Former Vice President Riek Machar**
- **African Union** (Thabo Mbeki)
C) Great Lakes and Central Africa

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Context of the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR) won independence from France in 1960. For the first six years of its independence it was governed by the dictator D. Dacko. Dacko was later overthrown by his cousin J. B. Bokassa, who set up an eccentric military dictatorship. Later France backed a coup d'état that reinstated Dacko, until he was once again overthrown in 1981, this time by Ange Félix Patassé, who took over ownership of the companies exploiting the country’s natural resources. The country suffered from several military mutinies in the 1990s because it failed to pay the soldiers’ salaries, and there was a coup in 2003, when the current president François Bozizé came to power. Despite the fact that the country is rich in diamonds, gold, uranium, wood and coffee, the CAR has been suffering from political instability, ineffective governance, insecurity, banditry and deterioration in its economic situation for twenty years, while half of its population remains illiterate. With the economic recession in Europe and the United States, the diamond industry entered into a deep-seated crisis and most companies closed. In the words of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to this country, the roots of the conflicts in the CAR lie in the collapse of its socioeconomic structures and the absence of political dialogue. Since 2003, the conflict between the government and several armed groups has been closely linked to the situation in Darfur (Sudan), which shares a border with the CAR, since the armed groups from both countries take refuge in refugee camps on both sides of the border, generating serious tensions between the two countries. The majority of the conflict is thus centred in the northern region of Vakaga, whose capital Birao has been controlled by the rebel groups on several occasions. 2005 saw the creation of the armed opposition groups the Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), and the Union des Forces du Renouveau (UFR), headed by F. Njadder-Bedaya. Another armed group, the UDPR (Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement), led by Michel Djotodia, is a coalition between three groups (GAPLC, MLCJ and FDC), and the Front Démocratique pour le Peuple Africaines (FDPC), led by Abdoulaye Miskine, who was close to former president Patassé. New President Michel Djotodia was Muslim, though only 15% of the population follows Islam. In January 2014, he had to flee the country.

Background to the peace process

After the country experienced three mutinies in its armed forces in 1996, in January 1997 the Bangui Agreements were signed between the forces loyal to then-president Patassé and the rebel groups. These agreements called for an inter-African force, called MISAB, whose 800 soldiers would be in charge of demobilising the combatants and ensuring compliance with the agreements. In 1998, after intervention by French troops, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping mission (MINURCA) to protect the capital of the country and replace MISAB. Since 2007, the government has been signing peace agreements with the different armed groups. In February 2007, the government and the FDPC led by Abdoulaye Miskine signed a peace agreement in Syrte (Libya) under the mediation of Muammar al-Gaddafi. In April, an agreement was reached with Damane Zakaria’s UFDR, with a joint call for a cessation of hostilities and the offer of amnesty for the members of the group. In May 2008, the government signed an agreement with the APDR, run by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who was in exile in France, in Libreville with the
mediation of the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo. Later, in December 2008, the government and several armed opposition groups reached an Inclusive Political Agreement (IPA) with the mediation of the archbishop of Bangui, Paulin Pomodimo, forming a joint government and calling free elections in 2010, which were postponed until 2011. The dialogue was co-facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. Two former presidents also participated in it, André Koulpingba and Ange-Félix Patassé, as well as Jean Jacques Demafou’s APRD, Damane Zakaria’s UFDR, Florent N’djadder’s UFR and Abakar Sabone’s MLCJ (a faction of the UFDR). Months later, in July 2009, Abdoulaye Miskine’s FDPC joined (Miskine was in exile in Libya) with mediation by Libya, and in October 2009 Hassan Ousman’s MNSP (a faction of the MLCJ) also adhered to the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD). The only rebel group that remained on the margins of the peace process was Charles Massi’s Convention des Patriots por la Justice et la Paix (CPJP). In July 2011, the government and a dissident faction of this armed group, which is made up of around 500 combatants, signed a peace agreement in the town of Nzako in the east, after they had reached a ceasefire agreement in June.

Notably, a peace agreement was signed with the armed group CPJP and the government on 25 August 2012. The CPJP was the last armed Central African group active in the country, as the four main armed groups signed various peace agreements in 2008. However, an alliance of different armed groups called Séléka started a rebellion on 10 December 2012, took control of various parts of the country and threatened to overthrow President François Bozizé if he did not implement the peace agreement made in 2007. This alliance, a union of different factions and breakaways from the armed groups CPJP, UFDR and CPSK active in the northern part of the country, and which had reached various peace agreements with the government in recent years, demanded payment of the stipends resulting from the peace agreement and the release of political prisoners. However, it later increased its demands and at the end of the year it said that Bozizé had to step down before any negotiations could begin.

The different parties in the conflict did not comply with the peace agreement reached in early January 2013 in the Central African Republic and the fighting started again. The rebellion in December 2012 that was launched by the Séléka rebel coalition succeeded in forcing the Government led by François Bozizé, who was cornered by the insurgents, to accept peace talks. Moreover, the international community put pressure on the Government to accept peace talks in Libreville, Gabon, on January 10. Both sides agreed to pursue these contacts in Gabon with the aim of reaching an agreement. ECCAS facilitated peace talks that led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the parties, with Bozizé staying in power until the end of his mandate in 2016. The agreement also included the creation of a national unity government responsible for organizing early elections within one year after the National Assembly was dissolved. This Government should be inclusive, with the participation of the political opposition and a prime minister that would also be from the opposition. The ECCAS (MICOPAX) peacekeeping mission should be reconfigured and its goal should be to implement the agreements. In addition, foreign forces should withdraw from the country. However, violence by some groups in Séléka opposed to the agreement continued and, in February the rebels accused Bozizé of not complying with the agreements and threatened to return to arms. In late March the group made good on its threat and launched an offensive against the capital, Bangui. The Central African president was forced to flee with his family and sought refuge in the DR Congo. In August the leader of the rebellion, Michel Djotodia, became the country’s new president, and Nicolas Tiangaye was reconfirmed as prime minister. Tiangaye appointed a new government with 34 ministers from different political tendencies, as established in the Libreville Agreement: nine from the rebellion, eight from the former opposition, a former collaborator of Bozizé and the rest from the civil society.

In late 2013 the situation deteriorated when fighting broke out between the Christian community’s anti-balaka militia, which had traditionally held political power, and the Muslim community, which caused hundreds of deaths and triggered a serious humanitarian crisis. In response France sent a detachment of 1,200 troops to restore order and force the Séléka to
withdraw. A resolution by the UN Security Council in early December authorized intervention to end human rights abuses in the country and restore order. France complained that the EU was providing very little military support.

The peace process in 2014

In January President Djotodia was forced to leave the country after Séléka was defeated. After Djotodia's departure the mayor of the capital, Catherine Samba Panza, was named interim president of the country. The UN Security Council approved the creation of an EU mission (EUFOR RCA), that mid-year included 700 soldiers and gendarmes – from France, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland and Romania. This mission would be a first step to transforming MISCA into a UN mission and the EU would provide about 500 soldiers to support the 5,000 African and 1,500 French soldiers already on the ground. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) also announced its support for the deployment of a UN mission. In April the Security Council decided to establish the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), consisting of 10,000 troops, which would replace BINUCA.

In July a forum for reconciliation and political dialogue was held in Brazzaville (Congo), facilitated by the Gabonese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso, with the participation of different armed groups and thirty countries and international organizations that make up the International Contact Group on the CAR. The groups reached a ceasefire agreement that was signed by both Mohamed Moussa Dhaffne, the Séléka representative, and Patrice Edouard Ngaissona, national coordinator of the anti-balaka militias. It was also signed by the archbishop of Bangui, Dieudonné Nzapalainga, and the Imam Layama Kobine, the president of the country's Islamic community. However, the ceasefire agreement was not accompanied by a disarmament plan. The low level of the representatives from the armed groups and divisions within both insurgencies could be clearly seen in the struggles to appoint their representatives for the negotiations. The political class and civil society organizations were also divided over their participation, and not everyone was present at the Forum. In addition, various political and religious leaders demanded that the peace talks take place in the country. The Forum was jeopardized by the boycott of several armed groups and Séléka's threat that it would not participate unless the principle of dividing the country was accepted. This proposal was rejected outright by all parties. Several analysts highlighted the difficulty of implementing the ceasefire due to strong internal divisions within Séléka and the fact that the anti-balaka militias were a movement with no centralized organization and coordination. Subsequently, the fighting resumed and the agreement became worthless.

In October, the anti-balaka Christian militia maintained its position in favour of the resignation of the country's president and the prime minister. Nonetheless, they met with her and presented five demands: the release of all of the group's members under arrest, their participation in the National Transitional Council, the rehabilitation of their cadres in the public administration, and the resignation of Mahamat Kamoun's Government. At the end of December the official facilitator of the peace process, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, in an attempt to revive the process asked Uhuru Kenyatta, his Kenyan counterpart, to hold contacts between the leaders of the Central African armed groups in Kenya. Although the Congolese president sent two emissaries to the Central African president to report on the content of the talks, which were intended to bring the peace process closer to the two former Central African presidents and current insurgent leaders, François Bozizé and Michel Djotodia, his Central African counterpart believed that the initiative was a plot because the results of the talks included a ceasefire and a review of the transition process, which called into questioned Catherine Samba-Panza's Government. A day after the agreement was announced, January 28, 2015, Denis Sassou Nguesso disavowed the agreement, saying that the talks, despite being necessary, should not include the option of a new transition process in the country with new institutions, in an attempt to calm down his Central African counterpart.
### Most significant events of the year

- The UN Security Council approved the creation of an EU mission (EUFOR RCA).
- In July a forum for reconciliation and political dialogue was held in Brazzaville (Congo), facilitated by the Gabonese president Denis Sassou, with the participation of different armed groups and thirty countries and international organizations that make up the International Contact Group on the CAR. The groups reached a ceasefire agreement.
- The UN, through MINUSCA, took over the responsibilities for the peacekeeping operation in the country from MISCA, the AU force.
- Divisions surfaced in the Séléka group.
- At the end of December the official facilitator of the peace process, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, in an attempt to revive the process asked Uhuru Kenyatta, his Kenyan counterpart, to hold contacts between the leaders of the Central African armed groups in Kenya.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- The low rank of the representatives of the armed groups.
- Internal struggles to represent the armed groups.
- A divided civil society.
- Lack of agreement over whether the national dialogue should be held in the country or abroad.
- Condition established by one armed group that it would join talks only if the country was divided.
- Internal divisions within one of the armed groups.
- Doubts about the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations.
- Change of mediator, including a last minute diplomatic crisis between the RCA and Kenya, for holding meetings with the conflicting militias in the Kenyan capital without informing the Government of the CAR.

**End result:** Uncertainty regarding the immediate future.

### Websites of interest

- Agence Centrafrique de Presse, LNC (www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info)
- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
- All Africa (allafrica.com)
- Alwihda (www.alwihdainfo.com)
- BINUCA (www.operationspaix.net/BINUCA)
- Centrafrique Presse (www.centrafrique-presse.com)
- Enough Project (www.enoughproject.org)
- (www.bruxelles2.eu/tag/eufor-rca)
- Euronews (fr.euronews.com)
- Foundation Hirondelle (www.hiroldelle.org)
- Gobierno (www.centrafricaine.info/fr.html)
- ICG (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Jeune Afrique (www.jeuneafrique.com)
- Le Confident (www.leconfident.net)
- MINURCAT (www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/minurcat) (minurcat.unmissions.org)
- MINUSCA (minusca.unmissions.org)
- Naciones Unidas (www.un.org/spanish/docs.sc)
Main parties involved in the process

International Contact Group
- AU
- UN
- MISCA
- MINUSCA

CAR
- Government
  - President: Catherine Samba Panza
  - PM: Mahamat Kamoun

Gabon
- Denis Sassou-Nguesso

ECCAS
- MICOPAX

Kenya
- K. Marende

France

Gabon
- ECCAS

Congo
- EU
- EUFOR (CAR)

Séléka
- (Muslims)
- Michel Djotodia
- Noureddine Adam

Anti-balaka militia
- (Christian)
- François Bozizé

Gabon
- Denis Sassou-Nguesso

Kenya
- K. Marende

Space of intermediation
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (east)

Context of the conflict

During the 20th century, the DR Congo was immersed in a situation of despotism, with an absence and disintegration of the state. In addition, the country’s natural resources were plundered. This situation began during the Belgian colonial period, and except for a brief interval after independence in 1960, it continued for over 30 years under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. This dictatorship was characterised by the repression of political dissidence, serious human rights violations and a situation where the Mobutu elite amassed wealth by plundering the natural resources for their own benefit. The 1994 Rwanda genocide caused over half a million deaths. Most of the victims were from the Tutsi minority, only 15% of the population, who died at the hands of the Hutu militias. In response to the massacre, the RPF Tutsi military forces, trained in Uganda, attacked and gained control of the country, forcing over 1.5 million Rwandan Hutus to leave the country and settle in DR Congo, which was under the control of the Interahamwe militias. In 2000 they joined together under the acronym FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda).

In 1996 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), led by Laurent Desiré Kabila and supported by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, began an uprising against Mobutu which culminated in Mobutu ceding power in 1997. In 1998 Kabila lost the support of his old allies, neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, who invaded the DR Congo under the excuse that they were guaranteeing the security of their borders. These countries supported different armed groups (Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda, the MRC) fighting against Kabila’s government. The government was supported by different countries in the region (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad) in a war that has caused around three and a half million deaths through combat, hunger or illness. Plundering the natural resources (gold, diamonds, wood and coltan) has become the driving force behind both the war and the prolonged presence of foreign armed forces in the country. Several neighbouring countries and western multinationals have profited from this enterprise, according to the United Nations. This chapter only discusses the processes related to the Rwandan FDLR group installed in DR Congo since the 1994 genocide, and with the M-23, an armed group from North Kivu that appeared in 2012. It was led by Sultani Makenga and Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero and was made up of Tutsis.

Background to the peace process

The first stage in the RD Congo peace process was the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, which was signed in July 1999 by the different countries and armed groups involved in the conflict. This agreement was reached with the facilitation of the regional organisation SADC (the Southern Africa Development Community) and primarily South Africa. It enabled the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in November 1999 (UN Security Council Resolution 1291) to monitor the ceasefire and promote the disarmament of the militias. Its mandate is divided into four phases: enforcing the ceasefire agreements signed in Lusaka; monitoring any violation of the agreements; organising the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the combatants; and facilitating the transition in order to organise credible elections. Its mandate is governed by Chapter VII of the charter, which authorises it to use force if necessary.

Nonetheless, the conflict continued in the east of the country. Laurent Desiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001, and his son Joseph Kabila took over power. It was only then that J. Kabila revitalised and promoted the Inter-Congolese Dialogues (ICD) held in South Africa. The ICD led
to negotiations between the belligerent parties in Sun City, which led to the signing of an agreement at the end of these negotiations, known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement. This was signed in Pretoria in December 2002. The Sun City Final Agreement was reached in April 2003, bringing together and summarising the previous agreements. The Sun City Final Agreement led to the integration of the government and the armed opposition groups into the Transitional National Government (TNG). Joseph Kabila kept his office as president of this government and four vice-presidents were appointed, representing the government, the MLC, the DRC/Goma and the unarmed opposition. The agreement called for a two-year transitional phase, after which general elections would be held and new Congolese armed forces would be formed, which would be made up of the different armed opposition groups.

In early 2005, 6,000 troops from one of the six armed groups in the region, the FAPC, were demobilised. In late July 2006 some of the main militias operating in the eastern region of the DR Congo, within the armed opposition coalition MRC, decided to lay down their weapons, to facilitate the free movement of displaced people in the area in order to exercise their right to vote in the elections. They also agreed to join the country’s armed forces gradually in exchange for amnesty for all their members. The agreement was reached through mediation by the UN peace team in the region. One of the demobilised members was a leader of the FNI militia, Peter Karim. In March 2005 the FDLR announced that it was abandoning the armed struggle against Rwanda and condemned the 1994 genocide. The group was based in DR Congo and had been launching regular attacks on Rwanda. The announcement came after the Community of Sant ‘Egidio began to act as mediator. The agreement sparked internal divisions within the group.

In late November 2006 the last three armed groups operating in Ituri signed a Framework Agreement for Peace in Ituri with the government, meaning that they agreed to lay down their weapons and join the DDR process. All told, the groups had 6,000 troops: 3,500 from “Cobra” Matata’s FRPI, 1,800 from Peter Karim’s FNI (some of which, however, were opposed to demobilising and continued fighting) and 500 from Mathieu Ngoudjolo’s MRC. In early December the Congolese government accepted the demand to hold direct peace talks with Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP militia under the auspices of the United Nations and its Special Envoy, Olusegun Obasanjo, in Kenya. In 2008 the FDLR called on the Rwandan Government to begin talks. A faction of the FDLR with 300 troops, called RUD-Urunama, surrendered their weapons to MONUC and showed their willingness to be repatriated to Rwanda. Early January 2009 witnessed a major division within the Congolese Tutsi group CNDP, as the military leader (Chief of Staff) of the rebellion, Bosco Ntaganda, announced the expulsion of General Laurent Nkunda as the leader of the group for reasons of poor governability. Shortly thereafter, Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda in a joint military operation between the Rwandan and Congolese armed forces. Furthermore, the faction of the Tutsi armed opposition group CNDP led by General Bosco Ntaganda, alias “Terminator”, and ten other senior leaders of the rebellion, who just days earlier had stated that they had deposed General Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the movement, issued a declaration on the 16th of January in which they announced that they were putting an end to the hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces. After the agreement this faction announced that it would join the Armed Forces, and was willing to help in the offensive against the Rwandan Hutu armed opposition group, FDLR.

In late May 2010, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1925 extending MONUC’s mandate until the 30th of June. It also decided that in view of the new phase that the country had reached, the United Nations’ mission in this country would be called the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) starting on the 1st of July. MONUSCO was to be deployed until the 30th of June 2011 and it would have at most 19,815 troops, 760 military observers and 1,441 police officers. It would also be supplied with the corresponding civilian, judicial and penitentiary members. The Security Council also authorised the withdrawal of at most 2,000 United Nations troops by the 30th of June 2010 at the latest in the zones where security conditions allowed it. It further authorised MONUSCO to not only concentrate its efforts on the eastern zone of the country but also to keep a reserve force with rapid deployment capacity in any other part of the country. Finally, the Security Council
stressed that the Congolese government was the main body in charge of security and protection of the civilian population. In June, the UN Secretary General appointed Roger Meece, the US ambassador in the DR Congo between 2004 and 2007, as the new UN Secretary General Special Representative to replace Alan Doss.

In August, at least 400 former members of armed groups from North and South Kivu proceeded to be demobilised. From 2009 until August 2010, 4,178 former combatants had laid down their weapons. The event also included a call for the members of the groups Mai Mai Kifuafua, Pareco-FAP and APCLS to disarm and reintegrate into the Congolese armed forces. In late December, a government delegation and a MONUSCO delegation held talks with a delegation of the Mai-Mai militia regarding the possible demobilisation of this group.

The Congolese armed forces and the armed group Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF) reached an agreement in February 2011 after intense negotiations that led to the group’s joining the army. The FRF is made up of people from the Banyamulenge community located in the Haute Plateau zone between Uvira and Fizi in the province of South Kivu. The group, led by self-proclaimed Generals Venant Bisogo and, Michel Rukunda, has never posed a military threat, and its membership currently fluctuates between 50 and 500 combatants. However, the army’s operations against them led to numerous civilian deaths and had a heavy impact on the humanitarian situation in the region. One of the key issues in the negotiations, the status of the region of Minembwe, was postponed. The Banyamulenge people advocated on behalf of creating an autonomous Banyamulenge entity for the people with its own services and administration, as well as a separate election district. One of the prime leaders of the armed Hutu Rwandan group present in the east of DR Congo, the FDLR, namely Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Bisengimana, also known as Sam Mutima-Kunda, abandoned the armed group and joined the DDR programme being conducted by MONUSCO. Mutima-Kunda had been an officer in the former Rwandan army, a company commandant, and his current responsibilities were to mobilise civilian support of the FDLR and facilitate recruitment. In 2010, 1,681 members of the FDLR, including 64 officers, decided to surrender and begin the DDR process. In this regard the Secretary General’s Special Representative in the country, Roger Meece, said that the FDLR, the main existing armed group in eastern DR Congo, was weakening as a result of military action and desertions and the threat it poses could disappear. The 15,000 members it had in 2001 had dropped to about 6,000-7,000 by the end of 2007 and in 2011 it was estimated that it had 3,500 fighters.

In 2012 the armed group M23 arose in North Kivu, led by Sultani Makenga and Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero and formed by Tutsis. At first it rose up in arms against the government’s alleged breach of the March 2009 agreement, although it later said it was fighting to liberate the entire country and oust Kabila. In July 2013, Rwanda and DR Congo agreed to create a regional force to combat the M23, with the support of the Great Lakes Initiative. In December, peace talks facilitated by the Ugandan government began between the M23 and the DR Congolese government, which allowed for the liberation of the city of Goma.

The peace process in 2013 with the M23

The negotiations between the Congolese government and the armed group M23, facilitated by Uganda in Kampala, underwent moments of crisis with continuous mutual accusations of lacking the political desire to participate in the negotiating process, which ended with French military intervention at the end of the year. The divisions that took place within M23 at the start of the year and the delivery of Bosco Ntaganda to US authorities in Kigali helped to keep the dialogue process suspended. However, mention must be made of the progress obtained at the regional level between the governments of DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. In late February, 11 African countries signed a peace agreement in Addis Ababa to stabilise eastern DR Congo and the Great Lakes region. The signatories pledged not to interfere in conflicts that take place in the countries neighbouring them and to abstain from supporting rebel groups, a specific reference to Rwanda, which was accused of giving military support to the M23. This agreement opened the door to
intervention by the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of soldiers from countries of the region under the command of the MONUSCO.

However, it was not until late March, after many regional talks were held, that the UN Security Council approved the deployment of the FIB, which it allowed to take defensive measures and fight armed groups in the eastern part of the country. The Congolese Army enjoyed the support of the FIB in various operations. By mid-October its 3,000 troops coming from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi had fully deployed in rebel areas.

Between April and June, no progress was made in the peace talks taking place in Kampala between representatives of the government of DR Congo and the armed group M23, supported by Rwanda. The leader of the M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, had proposed an amnesty for the M23’s combatants, but the government refused to offer it, which the group interpreted as a rejection of peace. The government denied a lack of commitment to the process and, regarding the amnesty, said that the soldiers could avail of it and rejoin the Army, but not the commanders. Nevertheless, in early June, Bertrand Bisimwa declared his intention to resume peace negotiations. The Congolese government accepted the offer, but stressed that it would not let the talks drag on forever.

Meanwhile, the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), charged with dealing with the armed groups in the east of the country, began patrolling the streets of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, which some analysts said may also have prompted the M23 to accept restarting peace talks. The M23 had indicated its disapproval of the creation of the FIB and accused the United Nations of choosing war instead of promoting peace. Alongside these developments, the debate on Congolese citizenship started up again, which is one of the deep causes of conflict in the country and in the region, since Rwanda wanted the Rwandan refugee population in the rest of the world to return to the country or be naturalised by their host countries. In 2011, the UNHCR and countries hosting Rwandans said that on 30 June 2013, the Rwandan refugee population that fled before 31 December 1998 would lose its refugee status. The most important case was the Rwandan population in DR Congo, where giving Congolese citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Rwandans living there would cause a demographic shift in an area where this issue was already a source of conflict in the 20th century. Finally, it is worth mentioning that representatives from the different communities of North Kivu province supported the initiative of Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete to ask Uganda and Rwanda to begin peace negotiations with their respective rebellions. The President of Intercommunity Coordination for North Kivu, Jean Sekabuhoro, stated at the end of June that both countries must negotiate with their respective rebellions and accept the democratic process like the rest of the African countries. He also welcomed the presence of the Tanzanian component in the UN Intervention Brigade (FIB).

The peace negotiations resumed in September due to the military pressure of the UN Force Intervention Brigade and the DR Congolese Armed Forces and to the diplomatic pressure exerted by the countries of the region. The heads of state of the Great Lakes region met in Kampala on 5 September in an attempt to find solutions to the conflict ravaging eastern DR Congo and called for a resumption of peace talks between the DR Congolese government and the armed group M23 and for these negotiations to last a maximum of 14 days. The talks finally resumed on 10 September, one day after the deadline set by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) expired. The paralysis of the peace negotiations between the government and the M23, supported by Rwanda, led to the resumption of hostilities in August. Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo were at the most serious point in recent years, with minor skirmishes and some exchange of gunfire on the border between both countries.

Thus, negotiations started again on 10 September, potentially leading to most of the rebels rejoining the Congolese Army, from which they had deserted in 2012. However, after days of negotiations, the positions remained deadlocked since the government refused to guarantee an amnesty for 100 M23 officers, leaving open the possibility that these commanders could be prosecuted even after peace talks had ended. The rebels that might not be covered by any amnesty
were those that participated in multiple rebellions, were included on lists of international sanctions or had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. Government spokesperson Lambert Mende said that reintegrating these individuals would legitimise the use of armed violence. The rejection of a general amnesty was backed by the UN’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mary Robinson. The two main conditions established for disarming the M23 were the neutralisation of the armed group FDLR and the return of Tutsi Congolese refugees.

In October, the peace process between the Congolese government and the armed group M23 was suspended again despite international pressure and the progress made to reach a final agreement. Mary Robinson informed the UN Security Council that the parties had come to an agreement on eight of the 12 articles of the draft peace agreement. The parties agreed on the issues of releasing prisoners; the dissolution of the M23 as an armed group and its transformation into a political party; the return and resettlement of the displaced refugee population; the return of property looted during the capture of Goma in November 2012; the establishment of a national reconciliation commission; reforms in the government and the financial sector; and the implementation of the 2009 peace agreement and of the current agreement pending finalisation. However, they agreed to return to the negotiating table to try to overcome their differences. The main disagreements between the parties hinged on amnesty for the combatants, disarmament and integration and security agreements for the M23. With regard to amnesty, the government repeated that it would not accept measures involving total impunity or which failed to comply with the Constitution and international commitments. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative Martin Kobler expressed his disappointment that an agreement had not been reached, despite the four intensive days of negotiations and pressure. Alongside Robinson and Kobler, envoys from the AU, the EU and the US also participated in the negotiations. Kobler asked for the UN Security Council’s full support for the negotiating process. The UN and the US were concerned about this new hiccup in the process. Chrispus Kiyonga, a Ugandan government minister in charge of mediating the talks, asserted that he believed a final agreement would be reached soon. The M23’s Deputy Chief of Communications, Lawrence Kanyuka, said that the Congolese government negotiators withdrew from the talks after demanding that the group expel Roger Lumbala from the M23 negotiating team for having insulted Congolese President Joseph Kabila a month earlier in Burundi.

In late October, the Congolese Army took control of the town of Bunagana, the main base of the armed group M23, marking a turning point in the conflict. The United Nations and Uganda called for a pact to end the conflict. Martin Kobler said that the M23 was about to vanish as a threat after the Congolese Army took back five towns controlled by the M23, including Rumangabo, where the group had a large military training base. More than 900 combatants died in the clashes that took place between the Congolese Armed Forces and the M23 in the eastern part of the country between 20 May and 5 November, according to military sources. Violent battles broke out on 25 October, after weeks of relative calm and attempts to restart the peace process in Kampala. On 5 November, the M23 capitulated before the Congolese Army’s large military offensive backed by the UN Intervention Brigade (FIB). That same day, hours after the capture of the final hills of Chanzu and Runyonyi, controlled by the M23 along the DC Congolese border with Rwanda and Uganda, the head of the M23 said in a statement that he was ending the rebellion according to the recommendations of the talks in Kampala. A governmental delegation and a rebel delegation were supposed to sign a political agreement on 11 November to put an end to the conflict, but after the military victory, Kinshasa refused to sign the agreement and preferred to call it a ‘declaration’, which would resolve the issues of the combatants’ quartering, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Kinshasa rejected a general amnesty for pardons on an individual basis. Combatants that were not guilty of war crimes could rejoin the Congolese Army or police. On 20 November, a ceremony to destroy the weapons of former combatants was held in Goma. It is estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 former rebels from different groups could join the security forces, some of them unconditionally. Other self-defence groups of the Rutshuru region said that they would not demobilise at least until they receive some form of financial compensation in addition to being allowed to rejoin the Army for their efforts in the fight against M23. President Joseph Kabila began a tour of the eastern part of the country after
the M23’s defeat. The UN Security Council was satisfied with how the situation had developed. The UN Secretary-General said that “the Kampala talks came to an official satisfactory conclusion on 12 December. The government and the M23 each signed a separate declaration that reflected the agreement reached during the talks”. Some armed groups (like the APCLS, Nyatura militias) demobilised as part of the dissolution of the M23.

The peace process in 2014

In application of the amnesty law passed in February, was mainly targeting members of the M23 that were in Uganda, but during the year the terms of this amnesty were not clarified and most of the members of M23 were thus not included. Several members and rebel groups began to surrender during the second quarter and discussions were held with M23 representatives over which people from the group were eligible for the amnesty and which ones would have to stand trial on charges of crimes against humanity. In this regard, a major controversy erupted following the death of Paul Sadala, alias Morgan, the leader of the Mai Mai Simba (from the Ituri region). He had surrendered to the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and had stated he wished to be included in the amnesty with 42 of his combatants. The FARDC handed over the lifeless body of the leader to MONUSCO, which launched an investigation. The Congolese Interior Minister Lambert Mende said that the Government intended to grant amnesty or prosecute rebel leaders, but not murder them. In April, the FDLR announced a voluntary disarmament, although there were some doubts regarding the real extent of the process. A process thus began whereby the Rwandan armed group voluntarily surrendered its weapons and demobilized its combatants. In Kitogo, South Kivu province, 83 fighters surrendered in May to the MONUSCO under the supervision of the SADC regional organization. However, this announcement was questioned by Rwanda, arguing that it was a cosmetic operation to earn the trust of the international community, but that it was not irreversible.

In June, the FDLR continued its disarmament and held talks with the Congolese government in Rome with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio. MONUSCO announced that it had received 200 combatants and 500 civilian dependents, although there were still some 1,400 fighters to disarm. The demobilized soldiers were assembled in a transition camp located in Kisangani (Orientale Province). In August Russ Feingold, the U.S. special envoy for the Great Lakes region, said that the armed group should demobilize before the end of the year or it could face a military option. Feingold, who had assumed the official line of the Rwandan government, said there was no justification for the group's demands for a political negotiation. The SADC and the ICGLR regional organizations met in Angola to establish a common position with regard to the security situation in the east of the country and the disarmament of the FDLR. The EU insisted on unconditional voluntary disarmament of the FDLR. The ICGLR and the SADC attempted to find a common position on the FDLR armed group. The Community of Sant'Egidio tried to facilitate a dialogue between representatives of DR Congo, the UN and the armed group with the aim of promoting disarmament. Although MONUSCO acted as a facilitator for these contacts the Sanctions Committee of the UN did not agree to allow the Deputy President of the FDLR in DR Congo, Gaston Rumuli Iyamuremye, alias Victor Rumuli Byiringiro, to travel to Rome for a meeting. The FDLR has not been involved in any major action on Rwandan territory for years, and the purpose of these contacts was to see if the Rwandan government wanted peace by proposing to begin talks with Kigali, which was categorically rejected. In December the head of MONUSCO asked members of the FDLR to return to Rwanda, their country of origin, or otherwise the military option would become inevitable in 2015. Since 2000, 11,000 combatants from this group have returned to their country of origin. As a result, the January 2, 2015 deadline came around and the group had not yet disarmed. This prompted the UN Security Council to back all the steps necessary to disarm the FDLR, making the short term future look very difficult.

In DR Congo, with respect to the M23, the ICGLR said that the Congolese government had until October to provide the organization with a precise roadmap for amnesty and the repatriation of the members of the former insurgency. Uganda, which was hosting 1,430 former M23
combatants, threatened to withdraw their refugee status if they did not return to the DR Congo and accept the terms of the peace agreement signed in late 2013. The refugees in Uganda included rebel leaders Kanyuka and Sultani Makenga.

<table>
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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• An amnesty law was approved in January.</td>
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<td>• The Mai Mai Simba militia (from the Ituri region) surrendered to the Congolese armed forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In April the FDLR announced a voluntary disarmament, although there were some doubts regarding the real extent of the process. They held talks with the Congolese Government in Rome, with the mediation of the Community of Sant'Egidio.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The UN Sanctions Committee did not lift the travel ban on the leader of the FDLR in DR Congo, Gaston Rumuli Iyamuremye, alias Victor Rumuli Byiringiro, so he could go to a meeting in Rome.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<td>• Distrust caused by the unresolved death of the leader of an armed group.</td>
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<td>• Doubts about the real intentions of an armed group to disarm.</td>
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<td>• Demands by one of the Governments that an armed group should not require a political negotiation before disarming.</td>
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<td>• The leader of one of the armed groups was banned from participating in negotiations held abroad.</td>
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End result: unresolved.

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<th>Websites of interest</th>
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<tr>
<td>• All Africa (allafrica.com)</td>
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<td>• CIRGL (<a href="http://www.icglr.org">www.icglr.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Congo Daily (<a href="http://www.congdaily.com">www.congdaily.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• Congo DR News (<a href="http://www.drcnews.com">www.drcnews.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• Dialogue Advisory Group (<a href="http://www.dialogueadvisorygroup.com">www.dialogueadvisorygroup.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Insight to Conflict (<a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org">www.insightonconflict.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• MONUC (monuc.unmissions.org)</td>
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<td>• MONUSCO (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/monusco">www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/monusco</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• OCHA (<a href="http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net">www.rdc-humanitaire.net</a>)</td>
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<td>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• SADC (<a href="http://www.sadc.int">www.sadc.int</a>)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

**DR CONGO**
Government  
President: Joseph Kabila

**Uganda**
Negotiator:  
(Chrispus Kiyonga)

**International Neutral Force**

**MONUSCO**

**UN**

**UN Envoy:** Mary Robinson  
**UN Special Rep:** Martin Kobler

**M23**
(Christwande Bisimwa)

**Tanzania**  
(Jakaya Kikwete)

**FDLR**
Victor Rumuli  
Byiringiro

**Sant’ Egidio Community**

**CIRGL**

**Rwanda**

*El espacio de intermediación*
d) Maghreb

Libya

Context of the conflict

In 1912 Italy invaded what is present day Libya, a vast desert area that was populated by only about a million inhabitants, but the country’s significant energy resources, estimated at 47,000 million barrels, were then unknown. In 1951 the country achieved independence and came under the rule of King Idris I. Idris was overthrown in 1969 by Muammar al-Gaddafi, who installed an authoritarian, populist and personalistic regime. The country has many tribes, about 140, which control various regions or cities (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Sirte, Fezzan and Kufra). Most of the population is Arab or a mixture of Arabs and Berbers.

During the 2011 popular revolts in several Arab countries, known as the “Arab Spring”, several cities in eastern Libya, with Benghazi taking the lead, launched an initially peaceful revolt against the autocratic government of al-Gaddafi, who had been in power since 1969. After the regime launched a military offensive to quell the riots, which included bombing cities and civilians, there was a coordinated international military intervention by NATO in support of the rebels, sanctioned by UN Security Council resolution 1073 (March 17, 2011), which at that point had become militarized forces. In October the rebels, which included African mercenaries, were finally able to free much of the country from the control of forces loyal to Gaddafi, who was captured and killed. At the end of February 2011 the rebels announced the creation of a National Transitional Council (CNT). It was initially recognized by the international community, including the UN, and was operational until August 2012. However, the large number of local or regional militias that participated in the offensive until Tripoli was captured were not disarmed at that point. Many parallel structures sprang up and there was a proliferation of armed groups with different agendas trying to maintain their share of military control. Clashes between them were frequent and the country was plunged into a situation of almost feudal instability for several years, with each militia initially taking charge of security in a specific city or region. However, torture, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations perpetrated by all sides were reported by several international organizations that pointed to a situation of growing insecurity in the country. In the first few months of the conflict in 2011 an estimated 15,000 people died. In March 2012 the leaders of the Cyrenaica region, in the east of the country, demanded greater autonomy for the region. The area is rich in energy resources and had previously been ignored during Gaddafi’s long rule. The Government opposed these demands. A few months later, against a backdrop of fighting between tribal groups and Government’s inability to control them, the leaders of the Cyrenaica region demanded a more equitable distribution of seats in the future parliament.

Some of these groups worked to provide security and ensure ceasefires in some areas of the country, others have acted in their own interest, for revenge, as part of power struggles, or to gain control over oil flows, irregular immigration routes or drugs in border areas. On the political front, during the third quarter of 2012 the first free elections in 50 years were held, with former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance (NFA) winning. A large number of seats in Parliament were reserved for independent candidates. After the August 2012 election the National Transitional Council handed over power to the General National Congress (GNC), based in Tripoli. Mustafa Abushagour, with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, was appointed prime minister.
In March 2014 the New York Times estimated that in the previous two years the internal conflict had caused 1,200 deaths. Militias loyal to retired Gen. Khalifa Haftar launched an attack on the parliament building in Tripoli and ordered it to dissolve. Haftar and federalist leader Ibrahim Jedran, among others, refused to recognize the Government of the new Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq, which had been ratified by the GNC. Maiteeq replaced Al-Thani who had replaced Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March. Maiteeq resigned in June after the Supreme Court decided that his appointment was illegal. Al-Thani resumed power once again. In August Al-Thani resigned in an attempt provide a way out of the crisis, but the House of Representatives reinstated him to his position and passed a decree which called for international intervention to deal with the crisis. With the support of Libya Dawn (or Fajr Libya) former GNC legislators based in Tripoli appointed the Islamist political veteran Omar el-Hassi as prime minister. Fajr Libya is an Islamist militia that distanced itself from the terror of Ansar al-Sharia, akin to Al Qaeda. The group stated that it was in favour of a peaceful transfer of power, although in September 2014 it did not accept the ceasefire called for by the UN. In this rapidly changing context the UN mission in Libya, UNSMIL, created in September 2011, was unable to promote political dialogue to replace the chaos.

In May 2014 Haftar went up against several Islamic jihadists groups, including Ansar al-Sharia, in Benghazi and the east of the country in an offensive called 'Operation Dignity'. At the same time the Islamist militias from Misrata (Libya Dawn), which have ideas close to those held by the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Justice and Construction Party, attacked the Zintan militia, which are more liberal and followers of General Haftar. The Zintan militia had refused to hand over Gaddafi’s son and took control of the capital. In June the Libyan Parliament elections were held in which the supporters of General Haftar and the Zintan brigades won the most seats. In August the House of Representatives was formally established in Tobruk. It had 200 elected members and Aguila Issa was declared president. This marginalized the Islamist majority from the previous parliament, controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and supported by Qatar. The Islamists refused to leave their posts and proclaimed the General National Congress in Tripoli, which also had 200 members, 120 of whom were supposed to be independent. They declared their support for the Islamist militias of Misrata and Benghazi (east), and the jihadists of Ansar al-Sharia. The country was divided between two opposing political alliances. Both sides received international support. Qatar was accused of defending Islamist forces from Misrata (Libya Dawn), while the UAE supported the Zintan militia, a regional and tribal force present in Tripoli. In August the United Arab Emirates bombed the Islamic militias. According to some sources Egypt supported the attack, but this was denied by the Egyptian government. Saudi Arabia also supported Egypt and the Emirates. The U.S., UK, France, Italy, Germany, Egypt and Malta are among the countries that openly support the anti-Islamists who dominate the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the Government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani.

In late August, the Government announced that it had lost control of the capital. The militia coalition known as Libya Dawn, which has a significant number of Islamists and links to armed groups from Misrata, took control of the city after the Zintan militia withdrew. Libya Dawn demanded the restoration of the previous Parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), where there was a greater presence of Islamist forces, as opposed to the new legislative body elected in June and based in Tobruk, which was dominated by liberal and federalist forces and had greater international recognition. In October General Khalifa Haftar said he was going to free Benghazi, the second largest city of the country, which had been under the control of the Islamist militia Ansar al Sharia. Several analysts said that the fighting between the militias was not so much an ideological issue, but more a question of economic control of the airports and trafficking in arms, drugs, gold and other contraband.

In October 2014 UNHCR recorded 287,000 persons displaced from 29 Libyan cities. In 2014 many peace initiatives were launched, although none of them were inclusive, a necessary requirement to achieve lasting peace. These initiatives should strive for a single inclusive government (including moderate Islamists), a single parliament, a plan for transitional justice, reform of the security apparatus, one army, a new constitution, the rebuilding of damaged
infrastructures and reconciliation of the country. In addition, it would be necessary for third States to refrain from taking military action in favour or against any of the parties, and an agreement to stop supplying arms to any of them. Libya needs to be demilitarized, and all parties must be legitimized through a process of internal Libyan dialogue.

Background to the peace process

The UN does have a mission in the country, UNSMIL, which was created in September 2011 by a Security Council resolution. It was given a mandate to support the political transition of the new government that was in power at that time. In May 2012 a group of UN experts visited Libya to discuss the use of mercenaries. In August 2013 Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced the beginning of a national dialogue.

On February 12, 2013 a Conference to Support Libya in Areas of Security, Justice and Rule of Law was held in Paris. The attending diplomats focused their attention on the deteriorating security situation and the lack of a unified command over the different military forces in the country. This conference was the continuation of a previous meeting held in London on December 17, 2012, and the Regional Ministerial Conference held in Tripoli on March 11-12, 2012, which addressed the problem of border insecurity.

The peace process in 2014

The fragile and turbulent situation in Libya was examined by several Western countries during an international conference on Libya held in Rome (Italy) on March 6, with the presence of the Secretary of State, John Kerry. The delegates warned that there was a risk of the country becoming totally out of control in the absence of an effective political system and due to the lack of dialogue between the Government and rival factions. The conference highlighted the division that exists in the Government of Libya. There was a great amount of confusion since both the President of the General Congress, Nouri Abusahmain, and the Prime Minister, Ali Zidan, were present and each had a separate delegation. On March 14 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2144, which “supports the timely establishment of a single, inclusive and transparent national dialogue in Libya and an inclusive and transparent constitutional drafting process, and reiterates the need for the transitional period to be underpinned by a commitment to democratic processes and institutions, good governance, rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people in Libya”. It also extended the mandate of UNSMIL, in the following terms:

“the mandate of UNSMIL as an integrated special political mission, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, shall be to support Libyan government efforts to:

a) As an immediate priority, ensure the transition to democracy, including through promoting, facilitating and providing technical advice and assistance to a single, inclusive and transparent national dialogue, to Libyan electoral processes and to the process of preparing, drafting and adopting a new Libyan constitution, promoting the empowerment and political participation of all parts of Libyan society, in particular women, youth and minorities, and through the provision of good offices to support an inclusive Libyan political settlement and to promote a political environment for the integration of ex-combatants into Libyan national security forces or their demobilization and reintegration into civilian life;

b) Promote the rule of law and monitor and protect human rights, in accordance with Libya’s international legal obligations, particularly those of women, children and people belonging to vulnerable groups, such as minorities and migrants, including through assisting the Libyan government to ensure the humane treatment of and due process for detainees, including children, and to implement fully its transitional justice law, and reform and build an independent judiciary and transparent and accountable law enforcement and correctional systems;

c) Control unsecured arms and related material in Libya and counter their proliferation, by working to arrange access, ensure proper management, safe storage and, where appropriate, effective disposal of arms and related material, to support coherent partner efforts in this regard, including the
coordination and facilitation of international assistance, and to strengthen border security, the development of capable Libyan institutions and effective national security coordination;

d) Build governance capacity, as part of a coordinated international effort and drawing on the comparative advantage of the United Nations country team, by providing support to ministries, the national legislature and local government, with the aim of improving service delivery, transparency and coordination across government."

On June 25 elections for the House of Representatives were held, with voter participation only reaching 18% and an Islamic representation that was symbolic. On 14 August Spanish diplomat Bernardino León was appointed special representative of the UN Secretary General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. Since 2011 ambassador León had been serving as Special Representative of the European Union for Libya. In late August Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani resigned, but was reappointed to the office a few days later by the House of Representatives. Despite receiving international recognition, al-Thani does not control a large part of the country. The other government, with headquarters in Tripoli, is headed by Omar al-Hassi, who was commissioned by the General National Congress to form a "national salvation government". On 27 August, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2174, which, among other things, "calls on all parties to agree to an immediate ceasefire and an end to fighting, and expresses its strong support for the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in this regard".

On 17 September a Conference on Stability and Development in Libya was held in Madrid (Spain), under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The conference was attended by the 5 + 5 (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia); members of the Med 7 group (Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece), and Libya's neighbours (Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia). Representatives from international organizations such as the Arab League, European Union, African Union, the Union for the Mediterranean and the United Nations also participated, including the Secretary General's special representative for Libya. The conclusions of the Conference were:

**Ministerial Conference "Stability and Development in Libya", Madrid, September 17, 2014.**

CONCLUSIONS

Four elements of concern:
1. The situation is extremely serious and urgent.
2. Two main risks should be avoided: the risk of civil war and the risk of fragmentation.
3. The situation poses a threat to the Sahel, Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe as a whole, in terms of security, economic development and illegal trafficking, including trafficking in human beings.
4. Libya should not become a new scenario for violent extremism.

Four elements of hope:
1. The Libyans are moderate people who reject extremism and violence.
2. Libya is a country rich in natural resources.
3. Libya has legitimate institutions that have been recognized by the international community.
4. Libya has the solidarity of its neighbours and partners, as shown in today's conference.

In order to find a solution to the current crisis, there are:

Three prerequisites:
1. The immediate cessation of violence, including the implementation of an arms embargo.
2. The adoption of a comprehensive action plan by all of the parties involved.
3. Time is of the essence.

Nine assumptions underlie the solution:
1. Libyan unity, sovereignty and democracy must be preserved.
2. The solution must come from the Libyans themselves. All forms of international interference must be firmly rejected.
3. The international community has the right and obligation to assist the Libyans in finding a solution.
4. There is no military solution to the current crisis.
5. National dialogue and reconciliation must be inclusive and political actors, tribal leaders and other prominent personalities must participate. Only those who practice violence and do not reject using terror may not participate in the national dialogue.
6. The agreement of all of the parties should be reflected in the new Libyan constitution. We welcome the inclusiveness of the National Constituent Assembly which is in charge of drafting the constitution.
7. The Libyan crisis must remain a priority on the international agenda.
8. Closer coordination between the various international initiatives and stakeholders is required: the UN and neighbouring countries, the Mediterranean, the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union and the Union for the Mediterranean. A strong message of support was sent to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya.
9. There is a humanitarian crisis unfolding and it must be urgently addressed.

On September 22 Algeria hosted in Algiers a meeting of countries committed to peace in Libya, the first of several, in an inclusive dialogue. The U.S., Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Qatar, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the European Union participated. The recommendations were called the "Algeria Initiative". A few days later the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), which had appointed a special envoy for Libya, the former Prime Minister of Djibouti between 2001 and 2013, Dileita Mohamed Dileita, said the dialogue should be based on three principles: respect for the August 2011 constitutional declaration, the commitment to a democratic process, and unambiguous rejection of terrorism and violent extremism. In coordination with the United Nations the Council decided to establish an International Contact Group on Libya (ICG-L), comprising neighbouring countries and bilateral and multilateral organizations. It also created a high-level Committee of Heads of State and Government to allow the AU to more effectively support peace and efforts to rebuild Libya. Both groups will be coordinated by Egypt and Algeria.

Algeria's bid to lead the process of internal dialogue in Libya received the endorsement of the UN Secretary General during the annual meeting of the General Assembly. Ban Ki-Moon said that "Algeria had a vision, knowledge and initiative that were the best for a solution in Libya". Algeria also sought the support of Tunisian Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi to ensure the presence of Libyan Islamists in future meetings, especially Abdel Hakim Belhadj, head of the Libyan political party Al-Watan, and those groups close to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, several Libyan leaders, including Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani, said they had not been invited by Algeria to discuss a peace process in Libya since at that time did it was not planning on inviting armed groups. The special representative of the secretary general, Bernardino León, was received in Algiers by Abdelkader Messahel, Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs. The Algerian government said it was preparing a "roadmap" that would propose a comprehensive program of spokespersons that would be inclusive. Algeria insisted that the crisis was only political and that the solution could not be a military one. It also insisted on the full implementation of the arms embargo on Libya, included in UN Security Council resolution 2174. In mid-October the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, emphasized that there was no solution to the conflict without the direct participation and involvement of the Libyan groups.

On September 29, a dialogue was held in Ghadames, western Libya, with support from the local City Council. The dialogue took place between some of the conflicting parties (12 people per side), with the presence of Bernardino León, representatives of the United Kingdom and Malta, and with an initial commitment to a second conference in Madrid in November, proposed by the secretary of State, John Kerry. Eleven members of the House of Representatives in Tobruk attended the meeting in Ghadames, but members from the different militias that had taken over control of the country's major cities, including the capital, did not participate. In fact, in late September, the coalition of Dawn militias that controlled Tripoli rejected the ceasefire required by the UN, and instead demanded that their opponents lay down their arms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26-2-2011</td>
<td>Demands an immediate end to violence; respect for human rights, guarantees for the departure of those wishing to leave, referral of the case to the International Criminal Court, arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze for a list of individuals, a new Sanctions Committee, and to facilitate the return of humanitarian agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>17-3-2011</td>
<td>Ceasefire, compliance with international law, protection of civilians, no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo, ban on Libyan flights, asset freeze, creation of a Panel of Experts, coordinated by Salim Raad, to assist in the implementation of the agreed measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16-9-2011</td>
<td>Need for a transitional period, recommendations for the National Transitional Council, establishment of UNSMIL, arms embargo, asset freeze, no-fly zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>27-10-2011</td>
<td>Looks forward to the establishment of an inclusive and representative transitional government, urges the Libyan authorities to refrain from reprisals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>31-10-2011</td>
<td>Prevent the proliferation of all arms, destroy chemical weapons, assess the threats of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2-12-2011</td>
<td>Extension of the UNSMIL mandate, with new powers over the control of arms proliferation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>12-3-2012</td>
<td>Looks forward to elections in June 2012 to establish a Constituent Assembly, protection of human rights, extension and amendment of the UNSMIL mandate, asset freeze, extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2095</td>
<td>14-3-2013</td>
<td>Welcomes the establishment of the National General Council and the peaceful transfer of authority from the National Transitional Council to the first national unity government, drafting the Constitution, protection of human rights, cooperation with the International Criminal Court, revises and expands the UNSMIL mandate, arms embargo, asset freeze, tasks of the Panel of Experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2144</td>
<td>14-3-2014</td>
<td>Supports a national dialogue, protection of human rights, regional cooperation, extends UNSMIL mandate, arms embargo, asset freeze, Panel of experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2146</td>
<td>19-3-2014</td>
<td>Condemns attempts to illegally export crude oil from Libya, authorizes member states to inspect vessels on the high seas designated by a committee, increasing the Panel of Experts to six.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2174</td>
<td>27-8-2014</td>
<td>Calls on all parties to agree to an immediate cease-fire, condemns the use of violence against civilians, calls on the House of Representatives and the Constituent Drafting Assembly to carry out their tasks in a spirit of inclusiveness, ban of attacks on airports, ports or facilities or institutions of the Libyan state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early October the United Arab Emirates and Italy said that they backed Algeria in its peace efforts. In this regard, it should be noted that every year thousands of refugees from Libya and other countries in conflict reach the Italian coast, which is why Italy has a special envoy to Libya, Giuseppe Buccino Grimaldi, and is particularly interested in stabilizing that country. On October 11 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a surprise visit to Tunisia and Libya with his representative to Libya, Bernardino León, and called for a ceasefire and dialogue. In addition to Tripoli the secretary general visited Misrata, the stronghold of one of the most powerful militias, and Tobruk, on the Egyptian border, where a group of parliamentarians elected in the June elections of had taken refuge. At the meeting with parliamentarians in Tripoli León denounced the institutional chaos and said a ceasefire was a precondition for successful political dialogue. He said that only one Parliament should exist (the current House of Representatives), but that it must strive to be inclusive. On October 20 Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani visited Malta, which Libya wants as an intermediary with the EU. The next day the Turkish special envoy
for Libya, Emrullah Isler, visited Malta. At the same time Gaddafi’s cousin Ahmed Gaddafi al-Dam, living in exile in Egypt, said he was willing to work with the Libyan authorities for the reconciliation of the country and would use his influence over tribes loyal to Gaddafi, most of which are in the south. The same day, a three-day meeting organized by The Cairo Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Africa was held in Cairo with Libyan tribal leaders.

At the end of October the special envoy of Turkish President Emrullah Isler visited Libya and met with the self-proclaimed prime minister of the Islamist government, Omar al-Hasi. In early November he met with the internationally recognized Government in the city of Bayda (NE of the country). Meanwhile, the Algerian Government continued to confer with all parties in order to organize a “reconciliation dialogue” in Algiers, although the date was pushed back several times because it was difficulty of bring all of the parties together. The Algerian Prime Minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, visited Doha (Qatar) in an attempt to put together a “diplomatic pole” between Algeria, Qatar and Turkey. The Islamist Government of Tripoli declared Bernardino León persona non grata and banned him from entering its territory. The Security Council, meanwhile, put the Islamist groups Amsar Al Sharia Benghazi and Ansar Al Sharia Derna on the list of terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda, which in principle make it impossible for them to participate in an inclusive negotiation.

At the beginning of November the Libyan Supreme Court, dominated by the Islamists from Tripoli, ruled that the parliamentary elections held in the summer by the House of Representatives in Tobruk were illegitimate. In response Bernardino León said that the Europeans could host a meeting of “good willing Libyan lawmakers” that through consensus could put together a new roadmap and select a government of national unity. León was in favour of preserving the neutrality of certain Libyan institutions, such as the National Oil Company and the Central Bank, of avoiding the partition of the country and of reaching a ceasefire. Surprisingly there was news on November 10 that the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, had gotten all the warring factions to accept Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s proposal for peace and reconciliation and that a meeting could be held in the Sudanese capital with Libya’s neighbouring countries. In October the Prime Minister of the internationally recognized Libyan Government, Abdul al-Thani, visited Sudan and accepted Sudanese mediation. Also in November, radicals close to the Islamic State (ISIS) set off two car bombs in the Libyan capital near the embassies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which had opposed the Islamist Government that is ruling over part of Libya. ISIS launched other attacks in various parts of the country, included one that targeted the diplomat Bernardino León.

On December 9 León was supposed to begin a second attempt to open talks with all stakeholders except Ansar al-Sharia, declared a terrorist group. The goal was to de-escalate the conflict, launch a dialogue based on mutual respect and create a national unity government, after achieving a ceasefire, but the talks were postponed at the last moment. In parallel, the UN special envoy for the Sahel, Hirotue Guebre Sellassie, said she was concerned about the impact that Libya’s deteriorating security situation was having on this African region, and she described Mali as the first victim. She also said that southern Libya was becoming a haven for terrorist groups. Later in the month the United Nations announced a new attempt to begin talks in early January 2015, in which issues such as a national unity government, a ceasefire plan and the withdrawal and disarmament of all militias would be discussed. She also said she was concerned about the large number of weapons in the country, despite the embargo. The United Nations postponed once again the peace talks between the rival factions in Libya, without announcing a new date, according to Libyan media organizations.

In early January 2015 the warring factions in Libya agreed to hold a new round of negotiations backed by the United Nations to try to end the conflict. The meeting, announced after UN envoy Bernardino León met with both groups in Libya, should be held in mid-January in Geneva.
### Most significant events of the year

- An international conference on Libya was held in Rome (Italy).
- The Spanish diplomat Bernardino León was appointed special representative of the UN Secretary General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL.
- In September a Conference on Stability and Development in Libya was held in Madrid (Spain). In the same month Algeria hosted a meeting in Algiers for countries committed to peace for Libya.
- In coordination with the United Nations the Security Council decided to establish an International Contact Group on Libya (ICG-L), comprising neighbouring countries and bilateral and multilateral organizations. It also created a high-level Committee of Heads of State and Government to allow the AU to more effectively support peace and efforts to rebuild Libya. Both groups will be coordinated by Egypt and Algeria.
- On September 29 a dialogue was held in Ghadames in western Libya, with the support of the Municipality of that city, between the parties in conflict (12 people on each side). Bernardino León and the representatives of the UK and Malta were also present.
- On October 11 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a surprise visit to Tunisia and Libya with his representative to Libya, Bernardino León, and called for a ceasefire and dialogue.
- The special envoy of Turkish President Emrullah Isler visited Libya and met with the self-proclaimed prime minister of the Islamist government, Omar al-Hasi.
- There was an attempt to form a diplomatic pole between Algeria, Qatar and Turkey.
- The Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, was able to get all of the factions at war to accept Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s proposal of peace and reconciliation.
- In December a second round of talks, sponsored by the United Nations, was scheduled but it had to be postponed twice, with the hope that it will be held in mid-January 2015.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Lack of dialogue between the country’s two Governments and Parliaments.
- Parliamentary elections with very low voter turnout.
- Rivalry between countries interested in acting as facilitators.
- Military clashes in the middle of negotiations.
- The inclusion of some armed groups in the UN list of terrorist groups.
- The Supreme Court’s decision to declare the parliamentary elections illegal.
- Attack by an armed group against the United Nations representative.
- Constant cancellations of talks organized by the United Nations.

**End result:** unresolved.

### Websites of interest

- Al Arabiya News (english.alarabiya.net/en)
- Al Jazeera (www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast)
- Al Monitor (www.al-monitor.com)
- Carnegie Endowment (carnegieendowment.org/regions/?fa=147)
- Chatham House (www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/mena-programme/libya-working-group-project)
- El País (www.elpais.es)
- El Watam (www.elwatam.com)
- Libya Herald (www.libyaherald.com)
- Middle East Eye (www.middleeasteye.net/news)
- Naciones Unidas (www.un.org/es/sc/documents/resolutions)
Main parties involved in the process

- RFI (www.rfi.fr/afrique)
- UNSMIL (unsmil.unmissions.org)
- USIP (www.usip.org/category/countries/libya)
- Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (www.wrmea.org)
WESTERN SAHARA

Context of the conflict

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when a referendum on self-rule was held. In the same year the territory was invaded by Morocco. As a result, almost half the population fled and settled in the Algerian area of Tinduf, close to the border with the Western Sahara. This incident led to the breaking off of relations between Algeria and Morocco. From then until 1991 there has been an open military confrontation between Morocco and the Saharan people led by the POLISARIO Front. In 1991 some of results of the negotiations begun by the United Nations back in 1988 were put into effect, leading to a ceasefire and the deployment of a United Nations mission (MINURSO). However, since 1991 Morocco has encouraged the colonisation of the Sahara by Moroccan settlers. Morocco was ready to create an autonomous region in the Sahara, while the POLISARIO Front called for the referendum promised, with the option of choosing independence.

Background to the peace process

Since the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front was reached in 1991, the United Nations has been working through diplomatic channels to reach a satisfactory agreement between both parties. However, to date the desired results were not obtained in any stages of the process. The government of Morocco has limited itself to offering autonomy, while the POLISARIO Front is demanding that a referendum be held with the option of independence. The so-called Settlement Plan from 1991, which called for a referendum to be held in the short term, was blocked shortly thereafter due to the allegations levelled by Morocco and despite the fact that in 1997, through the Houston Agreements, which were signed by both parties, it seemed that negotiations could be fruitful. The fact is that the new roadblocks put up by Morocco distorted what had been signed in Houston, which required the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, James Baker, to submit a new balanced proposal, or framework agreement, which gave Morocco's demands a considerable advantage, given that it suggested an autonomous regime for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The POLISARIO Front roundly rejected this plan. Furthermore, starting in 2000 the UN Security Council resolutions stopped mentioning the word “referendum”. In 2003, James Baker presented a new, more balanced proposal known as the Baker Plan II, which was accepted by the POLISARIO Front as a starting point for negotiations. However, this time the proposal was rejected by Morocco.

In 2007, Morocco submitted its proposal for regional autonomy for Western Sahara to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. The proposal states that this region would be autonomous in its administration, economics, taxation, infrastructure, culture and environmental issues. The state of Morocco, in turn, would keep exclusive jurisdiction over matters of national sovereignty (the flag or national currency), the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, religious and constitutional matters and any matter related to the figure of the king, national security, defence, territorial integrity, foreign relations and judicial power in the kingdom. In early January 2009, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, named diplomat Christopher Ross as his Special Envoy for Western Sahara. Ross is the former US ambassador to Syria and Algeria, and in February he visited the region for the first time and declared his support for finding a solution to the conflict that takes into account the Saharan people’s right to self-determination. In early January 2010, the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced the creation of an Advisory Committee on Regionalisation (ACR), which was to lay the groundwork for the country's process of regionalisation, which would begin in the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara).
In 2011, it should be noted that the USA stated its support for Morocco’s autonomy plan, which it described as “serious, realistic, credible and using an approaching that may satisfy the aspirations of the Saharan people”. In July, Morocco and the POLIARITO Front persisted in their differences over the future of Western Sahara. However, according to UN sources, at the meeting held in July in Manhasset, the parties seemed to have listened to the recommendations of the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and begun talks to include representatives of the Saharan people in the negotiation process. This would facilitate the debates on issues like education, the environment and healthcare.

In April 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon accused Morocco of spying on the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In a report submitted to the Security Council, Ban warned there were indications that the confidential communication between the mission in El Aaiún and the UN headquarters in New York had been intercepted. Ban Ki-moon also complained in the report that MINURSO’s access to the population was being controlled by Morocco and that the Moroccan security forces posted outside the entrance to the mission’s headquarters discouraged people from approaching it. In May, Morocco withdrew its confidence from the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy for the Western Sahara, US diplomat Christopher Ross. In mid-September, representatives of the MINURSO, the POLISARIO Front and Morocco met in Geneva (Switzerland) to jointly evaluate implementation of a series of confidence-building measures. In December, Christopher Ross said that he did not favour holding new rounds of informal talks between the POLISARIO and Morocco given that the meetings since August 2009 had not produced any results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latest rounds of negotiation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Dürnstein (Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Armonk (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<td>4th</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<td>6th</td>
<td>Mellieha (Malta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Manhasset (New York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Manhasset (Nueva York)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
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</table>

In 2013 no formal negotiations took place. The UN secretary general special envoy travelled to Mauritania and from January 28 to February 15 visited the capitals of the members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (Madrid, Moscow, London, Washington and Paris) in addition to Germany and Switzerland. Ross also met with the leader of the Polisario Front, Mohamed Abdelaziz. In a statement in mid-March Abdelaziz said that the Sahrawi people would continue with their peaceful struggle, but if necessary would resume the armed struggle to achieve independence. According to press reports, after Palestine was recognized by the United Nations the leader wants the Polisario to set a similar goal which would lead to SADR’s presence in the UN.
In late March and early April UN special envoy Christopher Ross made a return visit to the region, visiting the Saharawi territory for the first time since his appointment in 2009. Ross called on both sides to be flexible and creative in finding a solution to the conflict and, at the same time, tried to promote a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, the main ally of the POLISARIO front. Ross met with both the President of Algeria and the King of Morocco during his tour of the area.

The personal envoy proposed three ideas for the negotiation with modest goals that would be presented to the parties and the neighboring States. First, he would hold bilateral consultations with each party and ask each to acknowledge that negotiations imply give and take and that the spirit of compromise must prevail. On this basis, he would ask each of the parties to offer specific ideas to him about the nature and elements of a compromise settlement. That could lead to a period of shuttle diplomacy and eventually enrich the negotiating process. Secondly, he would ask each party to begin thinking about how to present its proposal in a new way when a further face to face meeting is held. That is, by explaining the benefits and advantages of that proposal for the other party. Finally, he would ask the parties to accept that they will not reach an agreement on the final status of Western Sahara in the short term and to agree that they can discuss practical aspects of governance of the Territory in a systematic way without prejudice to its final status at such time as a further face-to-face meeting is held.

With regard to the climate surrounding the negotiation process, he presented three additional ideas. First, he would renew his efforts to encourage Algeria and Morocco to develop their bilateral relations further, building on the ministerial visits to date and on the priority sectors identified in exchanges of messages between the two leaders and during his most recent visit to the region. Second, he would encourage UNHCR to expand its programme of seminars to accommodate the yearning for more contact between Saharans in the Territory and in the refugee camps, in particular among women and young people. Third, as the members of the Arab Maghreb Union continue their efforts to revitalize the regional organization, he would encourage them to explore the role that it might be able to play in helping to find a solution to the Western Sahara conflict, which remains the major conflict of the region.

During the first week of April Ban Ki-moon stated that the climate of instability and insecurity in the Sahel requires an urgent settlement to the dispute over Western Sahara. He urged the parties to engage in genuine dialogue and stressed the importance of independent, impartial, comprehensive and sound monitoring of the human rights situation in both Western Sahara and in the refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front in Tindouf in southern Algeria. Similarly, the report of the secretary general stressed that representatives of civil society in these areas, especially women and youth, had shown a growing appetite to broaden direct contacts. In this sense Ban proposed bringing these groups together under an expanded trust building program under the auspices of UNHCR. The U.S. proposed an extension of the MINURSO mandate to include the monitoring of human rights. However, Morocco strongly rejected this initiative and launched a lobbying campaign to stop it. Finally, the Security Council voted to extend the MINURSO mandate for another year without including the human rights issue.

During the second quarter there were some indications that a rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria could be possible. Following a meeting in Rabat on regional security issues Algerian Foreign Minister Dahou Ould Kablia stated in late April that the closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border –closed for more than two decades due to differences between the two countries over the Western Sahara– could be resolved soon if the negotiations on the border issues were sped up. Previously, his Moroccan counterpart, Mohand Laenser, had visited Algiers to meet with Kablia, in a meeting that the local press described as "favourable".

Despite a deadlock over the key points of the conflict, in August representatives from both sides met again in Geneva at the headquarters of the High Commissioner for Refugees and in the presence of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Sahara, Christopher Ross. During the meeting, which was also an attempt to strengthen trust between the parties, an
agreement was reached over a new schedule for visits in 2014 and to celebrate cultural seminars. During the period several sectors continued to call for MINURSO's mandate to include monitoring of human rights. In October the President of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, Nizar Baraka, presented to King Mohammed VI the final Council report on a new development model for the so-called "southern provinces", which includes the Western Sahara but also extends to some areas north of the territory. The report noted that "The return of people from the Tindouf camps should also be anticipated and prepared to ensure their integration into the economic and social fabric of the Kingdom (Morocco). This would be based on a per-family approach... An interregional fund dedicated to social assistance and the integration of returnees from the Tindouf camps will be set up". At the end of the year the Council stated that over the next six years it would invest 12.5 million euros in the so-called "southern provinces" to enhance sea transport and agricultural and industrial activities.

The peace process in 2014

During the year the United Nation's strategy was to continue bilateral consultations with the possibility of shuttle diplomacy. The parties also agreed to a code of conduct in which their conversations with the Personal Envoy would be considered confidential unless they expressly agree that something specific can be made public.

During the first quarter, the UN special envoy for Western Sahara made a new visit to the region in an attempt to revive the dialogue between the Polisario Front and Morocco. Christopher Ross met in January with the leader of the Polisario Mohamed Abdelaziz in the Tindouf refugee camps; with Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal; with Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar; and with the Prime Minister of Mauritania, Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf. After the last round of visits to the region in October 2013 the UN special envoy said that a new round of contacts between the parties would not be organized until there is some hope that the talks can make some progress. The U.S. diplomat asked the parties to be flexible in their positions and creative when it comes to finding a solution. In January the Personal Envoy met with the working groups that had been recently created by the parties in Rabat and Tindouf to confidentially submit questions formulated specifically for each one. The questions were deliberately challenging, designed to push the parties outside their comfort zone, introduce them to conversations different from those of the past, and prod them to demonstrate flexibility as they began to consider alternatives to their initial positions and to search for elements of compromise. At the beginning of March Ross returned to the area and met with senior representatives of the parties in dispute. In this context it was announced that flights to reunite Saharawi families would be resumed. The flights had been suspended since August 2013 and were part of the Confidence Building Measures between the parties. To allow the parties ample opportunity to engage, the Personal Envoy planned to hold bilateral discussions with them and with the neighbouring States about once a month in the intervening period. A face-to-face meeting of the parties and the neighbouring States will be convened only if enough progress has been made in the bilateral consultations to warrant one.

During the second quarter UN Special Envoy Christopher Ross continued his efforts to unblock the dialogue between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. However, the confidentiality of the most recent contacts made it difficult to gauge their success. Still, it is noteworthy that in his April report on the situation in Western Sahara, UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon assessed the strategy deployed by Ross beginning in March-April 2013, following the failure of 13 rounds of direct talks based on the two proposals made by the parties in April 2007. Ross's new approach included bilateral consultations between the parties and neighbouring States to determine how willing they were to be flexible in finding a political solution to the dispute, the application of the principle of confidentiality during the talks, and the use of shuttle diplomacy, which led Ross to make numerous visits to the region. The report of the UN Secretary-General reviewed the consultations by Ross in 2013, both in the region and in member countries of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, as well as those in the first quarter of 2014. With the past experience
in mind, Ross met with the working groups established in Rabat and Tindouf and presented them a series of questions in January 2014. He returned to the area in February for the answers to those questions, which at this stage should be very much in line with the respective formal proposals of the parties. Ross hoped to hold monthly consultations with the parties until October and would then make his first assessment of this new approach to the negotiations. The plan was to hold a meeting between the parties only if the bilateral consultations made enough significant progress to justify direct contact between representatives from Morocco and the Sahrawis from the Polisario Front.

As in previous years the mandate of the UN MINURSO mission was renewed during the quarter. Although the Polisario Front, Algeria and human rights groups had demanded that the mandate include responsibility for human rights, the Security Council once again decided not to include it. In resolution 2152 approving the extension of MINURSO until April 2015, the Security Council stressed that improved cooperation between the states in the Arab Maghreb Union would contribute to a political settlement of the conflict over the Western Sahara and would also favour greater stability and security in the Sahel region. In addition, the text raised the possibility of refugee registration in the Tindouf camps. Saharawi Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Omar held a disconcerting press conference in which he expressed his satisfaction with the UN resolution, despite the fact that MINURSO was not given responsibility to monitor human rights. The resolution called on the parties to show political will to make progress in the preparation for a fifth round of contacts and begin an important phase of the negotiations. Finally, in late June the former Mozambican President, Joachim Chissano, was appointed African Union special envoy for Western Sahara.

During the third quarter no progress was made in the Western Sahara negotiations. The period was marked by the Moroccan decision to implement an autonomy plan that would be achieved through an advanced regionalization process and would begin in the Western Sahara. King Mohammed VI made the announcement in late July, coinciding with the 15th anniversary of his inauguration, in a move that was criticized by the Polisario Front. In late September the Moroccan Interior Ministry presented a bill for consideration by the political parties. Sources close to the POLISARIO front stressed that holding a new round of negotiations would depend on the visit by the UN special envoy Christopher Ross to the area. According to some media reports which quoted sources close to the POLISARIO leadership, The Sahrawi organization was disappointed with Ross’s mediation efforts and would criticize the American diplomat’s methods. During a meeting with Polisario leader Mohamed Abdelaziz and senior members of the group in the town of Rabouni, the Sahrawi leadership expressed their frustration at the departure of the German diplomat Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber as head of the UN mission for Western Sahara (MINURSO), who they considered had supported their position. Weisbrod-Weber was replaced by Canadian Kim Bolduc.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The United Nation’s strategy was to continue bilateral consultations with the possibility of shuttle diplomacy.</td>
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<td>• The special UN envoy stated that a new round of contacts between the parties will not be organized until there are reasonable expectations that progress can be made.</td>
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<td>• The Personal Envoy met with the working groups that had been created by the parties in Rabat and Tindouf to confidentially submit questions formulated specifically for each one. The questions were deliberately tough and had been created to force the parties to rise above the issues that were easy to deal with, to introduce conversations that were different from those in the past, and to encourage them to show flexibility.</td>
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<td>• Ross hoped to hold monthly consultations with the parties until October and would then make his first assessment of this new approach to the negotiations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Security Council raised the possibility of refugee registration in the Tindouf camps.</td>
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<td>• Morocco decided to implement the autonomy plan by way of an advanced regionalization process that would begin in Western Sahara.</td>
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- Apparently, the POLISARIO Front was disappointed by Ross’s mediation efforts and was critical of the methodology used by the American diplomat.

<table>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<td>• Possible disappointment of one of the parties with the United Nations’ mediation.</td>
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**End result:** unresolved.

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<th>Websites of interest</th>
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<td>• Afrol News (<a href="http://www.afrol.com/es/paises/Sahara_occidental">www.afrol.com/es/paises/Sahara_occidental</a>)</td>
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<td>• ARSO (<a href="http://www.arso.org">www.arso.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Gobierno de Marruecos (<a href="http://www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/S%C3%A1hara">www.mincom.gov.ma/french/reg_vil/regions/Sáhara</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• MINURSO (<a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso">www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso</a>)</td>
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<td>• Sahara Libre (<a href="http://www.saharalibre.es">www.saharalibre.es</a>)</td>
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<td>• Sahara Press Service (<a href="http://www.spsrasd.info">www.spsrasd.info</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Social and Economic Council (Morocco) (<a href="http://www.ces.ma">www.ces.ma</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• United Nations (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc">www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc</a>)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

- Morocco Government
  - CESE
    - Nizar Baraka
  - Consultative Committee for Regionalisation (Omar Azziman)
  - France
  - USA

- UN Envoy: Christopher Ross
  - UN Spec. Rep.: (Wolfgang Welsbrod-Weber)
  - Kim Bolduc

- Switzerland
  - Julian Hottinger

- MINURSO

- UN
  - Group of Friends: US, France, Spain, UK and Russia
  - Security Council
    - African Union (Joachim Chissano)

- POLISARIO Front
  - Algeria

Space of intermediation
COLOMBIA

Context of the conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has very deep roots that go beyond the emergence of the present guerrillas in the 1960s. Violence characterised the relations between liberals and conservatives from the 19th century to the National Front regime (1958-1978). In addition, any alternative political option has been repressed. Therefore the emergence of various guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s can be explained by politics that serve the interests of the elite, social exclusion and the lack of democratic opposition parties. Among the guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both of which were formed in 1964. They currently have 10,000 and 3,000 fighters respectively. The violence increased when paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) emerged in the early 1980s to fight against the insurgents. Within this environment of violence, the production and export of drugs and the recent emergence of new paramilitary structures linked to drug trafficking are other factors that make the conflict more complex. The civilian population is the main victim of the conflict.

After five years of investigation, the consulting firm Cifras y Conceptos calculated that 39,000 Colombians were victims of kidnapping in 40 years, with an impunity rate of 92%. Thirty-seven percent of the abductions were attributed to the FARC and 30% to the ELN. Finally, a UNHCR report indicated that there have been 4.7 million forced displacements in Colombia since 1997. Moreover, a report released by the organisation Somos Defensores said that 37 human rights defenders were killed in the first half of the year. It also revealed the conclusions of the report on Historical Memory after six years of work. In late July 2013, after the release of the Centre for Historical Memory’s ¡Basta ya! report, President Santos said that “the state had to recognise its responsibility in the conflict so that we can turn over a new leaf for a Colombia without fear”. He added that government players that allied with illegal groups to sow violence in the country had to be tried. As such, he admitted that “through omission or the direct action of some of its members, the state has been responsible for serious human rights violations”. The report indicated that between 1958 and 2012, the conflict caused the death of 40,787 combatants and 177,307 civilians. The number of people missing from 1981 to 2010 was 25,000, with 27,023 kidnappings and 150,000 murders. Of the killings, 38.4% were the responsibility of paramilitary forces, 16.8% were caused by guerrillas and 10.1% were came the hands of the security forces.

Background to the peace process

Since the 1980s, many efforts have been made to build peace by both actors involved in the conflict and by Colombian society. The FARC’s position is to achieve structural changes, especially in agricultural matters, while the ELN has shown its desire to develop a participative mechanism in society to achieve the democratisation of the country. In 1982, President Betancur appealed to the guerrillas to reach a peace agreement. Two years later, the FARC ordered a ceasefire that formally lasted until 1990, when president Gaviria ordered an attack on FARC’s command centre. In 1990, after lengthy negotiations, the third guerrilla group in the country, M-19, was demobilised, resulting in the approval of a new constitution in 1991 that formally consolidated the rule of law. In 1991, too, other groups (EPL, PRT, MAQL) were demobilised, followed by CER in 1992, CRS, MPM, MMM and FFG in 1994, and finally MIR-COAR in 1998.
With regard to the guerrilla groups that were not demobilised then, in 1991 and 1992, meetings were held in Caracas and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between the government and the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator group, whose members include the FARC, the ELN and the EPL. However, the 1992 talks were suspended when the FARC assassinated a minister they had kidnapped. In January 1999, the United Nations’ Secretary General appointed Jan Egeland as his special advisor for Colombia. Three years later, J. Egeland was replaced by James Lemoyne.

FARC

International support for the peace process with the FARC reached a high point during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana. This president believed that negotiations could take place in the middle of the conflict without a ceasefire agreement. In late 1998, President Pastrana allowed an extensive swath of the country to be demilitarised in order to negotiate with the FARC, with whom he reached a 12-point agenda (Common Agenda for Change towards a New Colombia, or the La Machaca Agenda from May 1999). However, in February 2002 there were several crises and the FARC hijacked an aeroplane, bringing the talks with the FARC to an end. After negotiations with the FARC were broken off, the situation changed dramatically. A new president, Álvaro Uribe, was elected. He introduced a programme of “democratic security”, which was based on the militarisation of the civilian population and military combat against the guerrillas. This programme was supported by the USA through the Colombia Plan. Since then, negotiations with the FARC have not resumed beyond attempts to reach a humanitarian agreement. In February 2005, the UN Secretary General suspended his mediation mission to seek rapprochement with the FARC after six years of efforts, acknowledging the impossibility of continuing this mission and maintaining direct contact with the guerrilla leaders. In his investiture speech on the 7th of August 2010, the new president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, stated that “the doorway to dialogue is not locked”, and he added: “During my government, I aspire to sow the seeds for a true reconciliation among Colombians. To the illegal armed groups that cite political reasons and today are speaking once again about dialogue and negotiation, I say that my government will be open to any talk that seeks to eradicate violence and build a more prosperous, equitable and fair society.” In early November 2011, after an air attack, the top leader of the FARC, Alonso Cano, died, which opened up a period of uncertainty as to the future of the organisation and a stage of temporary peace talks. He was replaced by Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, alias ‘Timochenko’. In the second half of November, the president Juan Manuel Santos claimed that he was ready to open the door to dialogue with the FARC guerrillas when he stated that he was convinced that the end to the conflict in Colombia had to come via a political solution. “The key is in my pocket and I am willing to open the doors because I believe that the end should be via a political solution, but I need clear signs that these people are not going to betray the trust of the Colombia people,” Santos stated.

The most striking feature of the first few months of 2012 was the information coming from different sources indicating that exploratory talks were taking place abroad between the Colombian government and the FARC, which were confirmed by the President in August, who said that the approaches would be subject to the following guiding principles: 1) to learn from the mistakes of the past so as not to repeat them; 2) any process must lead to ending the conflict and not to prolonging it; and 3) Colombian military operations and presence would be maintained over every centimetre of national territory. The President of Venezuela used his good offices in all these first contacts, in which it was decided that Norway would act as an observer. Later, it was decided that Chile and Venezuela would accompany the process and that Cuba would be a guarantor country like Norway.

At a solemn ceremony in early September 2012, President Santos (in Bogota) and the FARC (in Cuba) announced the beginning of a serious, dignified, realistic and effective peace process and presented a five-point road map: 1) comprehensive agricultural development policy; 2) political participation; 3) an end to the conflict; 4) a solution of the illicit drug problem; and 5) victims.
The negotiations were raised under the principle that nothing would be agreed on until everything was agreed on. The rules established for the negotiations were as follows:

- Each negotiating team may have 30 members.
- Up to ten people per delegation may participate in each table session and a maximum of five will be plenipotentiary, meaning able to make decisions.
- The table will invite experts at different points on the agenda; these thematic advisors will not be a permanent part of the negotiations.
- The agreement provides for the publication of regular reports.
- The agreement includes a mechanism for receiving suggestions from the public and organisations regarding the items on the agenda.
- The table is autonomous; nothing that happens in the outside world, including events of the war, can affect the discussions.

The FARC raised the issue of a ceasefire at the start of the talks, but President Santos rejected such a possibility and said it could only be discussed at the end of the process. For the moment, public participation would be directed through the Regional Working Tables, which would encourage the different social stakeholders participating in them to present their proposals on thematic issues of the general agreement to end the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace. On 19 November, talks on the agreed agenda began in Havana. The FARC unexpectedly announced a unilateral two-month ceasefire to give the talks a positive atmosphere. At the end of the year, the heads of the ELN and the FARC decided to form a united front to negotiate an end to the conflict. In October, the Senate approved a law that would permit a referendum to be held on the day of the presidential elections on whether to approve or reject the peace agreement if such an agreement is eventually reached with the rebels. Furthermore, the United States pledged 68 million USD for the land restitution process. According to some analysts, this would include the massive granting of deeds to prevent the killing of peasants that might dare to trickle back and reclaim their land.

During 2013 negotiations with the FARC continued. Meanwhile, the leaders of the ELN and the FARC decided at the end of the year to present a united front to negotiate an end to the conflict. In October the Senate approved a bill that would allow, in case of a peace agreement with the guerrillas, a referendum on the day of the presidential election to vote either in favour or against the accord. The United States pledged 68 million U.S. dollars for the land restitution process. For some analysts, it would be necessary to issue an enormous amount of land titles to prevent the peasants from being murdered as they dare to return, little by little, and reclaim their land.

At the beginning of February, and after six rounds of talks in Havana, the Colombian government and the FARC reached a deal on various agricultural issues, which was the first item on the agenda. This agreement improved trust between the parties and their willingness to deal with the remaining topics and begin with the second item, political participation. A congressional delegation travelled to Cuba to discuss this point with the guerrillas and also the treatment of victims, which, although it was the last item on the agenda, would require significant consideration by the two delegations. With regard to the land issue, agreements were reached on access and use of land, unproductive land, formalization of property, recovery of land that was obtained illegally, access for farmers without land by creating a 400,000-500,000 hectare land bank, update of the cadastre, agricultural frontier and protection of reserves. According to some media outlets, the parties were negotiating so that the FARC would agree to stay in the areas where they are currently located, to eradicate crops, and to replace or surrender laboratories including the illicit drug routes. The possibility of issuing titles to some of the guerrillas for the land they occupied was on the table providing they committed to making them productive again. Moreover, the FARC proposed creating a high-level commission to study those cases where the guerrillas had allegedly taken land. The commission would include former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, along with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Government, peasants and FARC representatives.
In other matters, the Congressional Peace Commissions promoted the creation of Regional Peace Tables to help bring the conflict to an end, specifically with regard to the issue of victims. The proposals were systematized by the United Nations, which, together with the National University of Colombia’s Center for Thought and Monitoring of the Peace Process, directed by Professor Alejo Vargas, was responsible for organizing various public forums to discuss the issues on the agenda. The conclusions of these meetings were taken to Havana. President Santos said he was in favour of holding a referendum at the end of the process to endorse the agreements with the FARC. Beginning in April regional meetings were organized across the country. They were led by the Congressional Peace Commissions and were responsible for collecting the opinions of victims to bring them to the negotiating table in Havana. In addition, Congressional Peace Commission meetings were held in various European cities to gather input from Colombian immigrants and exiles. There was also a confrontation between the Attorney General, Alejandro Ordóñez, and the Director of Public prosecutions, Eduardo Montealegre. Ordóñez was against negotiations with the FARC, while Montealegre defended the process and was in favour of establishing alternative formulas for the guerrillas. Instead of going to prison once the peace agreement was signed he said that demining the country could be an alternative punishment for the FARC. On April 7 "Pablo Catatumbo", member of the Secretariat of the FARC, joined the negotiating team. The High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, said in a convention that the implementation of all of the parts of the negotiating agenda could take ten years. On May 26 the tenth round of negotiations concluded and both sides issued a statement on the land agreements that had been achieved.

Discussions of the second item on the agenda, political participation, began in June. The FARC asked that elections be postponed for one year to allow time to negotiate all the points on the agenda. The proposal was not accepted by the Government. One of the most difficult points was the FARC's proposal to create a National Constituent Assembly that would act as a peace treaty and a new social contract. This was strongly rejected by the government delegation. As they did with the first point on the agenda, a centre of the National University and the United Nations organized in Bogotá a forum for political participation where different sectors of society could make proposals to be considered in the negotiations in Cuba. The FARC also proposed constitutional changes to the legal and economic order, the tax system and the role of the Bank of the Republic (they asked for popular representation on the board); the restructuring of the army and changes to the national security doctrine; and a territorial chamber to replace the current House of Representatives, in an attempt to consolidate its power on the local and regional level in its area of influence. With regard to their arms, in late June FARC commander "Pablo Catatumbo" said that they are not willing to “put down” their weapons, but that they are willing to “give them up” so that the weapons are no longer used for war. The FARC showed interest in the process used in Northern Ireland regarding the destruction of the arsenal of the IRA and Loyalist paramilitary groups, which was done without the presence of cameras and reporters. In November 2012 a group of Irish parliament members visited President Santos and members of the Government’s negotiating team. At the beginning of June 2013 the London-based human rights organization Justice for Colombia (JFC) organized a visit to Havana for a group of politicians from the major parties in Northern Ireland and they met with the FARC negotiating team. In other matters, there was speculation that the political priority of the FARC was the 2015 local and regional elections, more than the 2014 elections to Congress.

At the beginning of August the FARC delegation in Cuba requested ownership and participation in the state media, including its programming, with state funding. Specifically, they requested a newspaper, a theory and policy analysis journal, a radio station and a television channel. Santos asked the UN to actively participate in the post-conflict consolidation. For his part, the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) announced that if the negotiations with the FARC were successful, the bank "could make investments in areas where the State did not have the presence that it could have had." Days later the Government and FARC delegations reported that after discussing and exchanging views, positions and proposals on the second item on the Negotiating Agenda regarding Political Participation, they began to build agreements on rights and guarantees for the political opposition in general and, in particular, for new movements that
could arise after the final agreement is signed. In mid-August the FARC leader "Timoshenko" said that "if we achieve a peace deal that is socially just, you can be sure that the weapons will remain in the background", which does not imply surrendering the weapons to the State. Meanwhile, the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Colombia, Fabrizio Hochschild, said that the UN could assist in the verification of the peace agreements. Also in August, the FARC acknowledged for the first time since the beginning of the talks in Havana its share of the responsibility for the thousands of people that had been killed in the armed conflict. The FARC leaders also said that cruelty and pain had been caused by their ranks. They also recognized the need to approach the issue of victims, their identification and reparation, with complete loyalty to the cause of peace and reconciliation. Pablo Catatumbo also expressed the need to immediately create a "commission of national and international experts to do historical research to establish the truth about what happened during the partisan violence of Colombia." In a written statement the FARC also highlighted the need for "collective forgiveness." In the final paragraph of the press release they once again made a public invitation to the national government to sign a special agreement to regulate the conflict, while at the same time honouring the proposed bilateral truce.

In August the Colombian President proposed holding a peace referendum in March or May 2014, which would coincide with the elections. The Colombians would be called to the polls to decide whether they wanted a negotiated settlement to the conflict or continue with the war. To be valid, voter turnout would have to be at least twenty five percent and at least half would have to vote in favour. The talks were suspended for a few days while the two delegations in Cuba held consultations on the president's proposal. The FARC insisted that the mechanism used to approve an eventual peace agreement should be a national constituent assembly. In a separate statement, the FARC asked the Government to implement a special information and communication program aimed at reconciliation and peace with social justice for the general population once an eventual agreement bringing the conflict to an end is signed.

The State Council restored the legal status of the Patriotic Union (UP) political party. The organization was founded by the FARC in the eighties and between 1986 and 1994 many of its members were exterminated by paramilitary and security forces. Several analysts believed that the Council’s decision was an endorsement of the FARC’s possible return to politics after a peace process including disarmament. On August 21 the FARC presented in Havana its initiatives to stimulate social and political participation in the cities. According to some media outlets the existence of special peace circumscriptions that would allow the FARC to play an active role in politics without resorting to weapons could not be ruled out. At the same time the FARC insisted on creating a committee of national and international jurists with the participation of all of the communities that would study the extent of State’s responsibility for the internal conflict of the last decades. In late August, and after six months of intense legal debates, seven of the nine judges on the Constitutional Court approved the Legal Framework for Peace, the Colombian State’s roadmap in its negotiations with the rebel groups. The judges said that it did not go against the Constitution and that the State must make investigating and punishing the major crimes committed during the conflict a priority. The Court did, however, set clear limits to the scope of a peace negotiation. Those who wish the benefits of alternative punishments should meet requirements such as bringing the war to an end, laying down arms for once and for all, surrendering any minors in its ranks and handing over the bodies of their victims. The Court also noted that transitional justice measures were needed. The next steps would be for Congress to conduct the rulemaking for the law and the Attorney General to rank or select the punishable crimes and determine who is responsible for them.

Meanwhile, in a letter sent to the Constitutional Court the ICC argued that sentences that are too lenient or a pardon of certain crimes in any agreements reached with the FARC would allow the court to exercise its jurisdiction in the country. The head of the FARC, Timoshenko, rejected the government’s decision because it had been taken without consulting the guerrillas. The FARC negotiating team in Cuba said that the group would not accept any legal framework that had been designed unilaterally. In addition, the 4000 proposals made by thousands of victims in the nine Regional Peace Tables, from May to August, were officially presented to Congress. A group of
victims of the conflict travelled to Havana to deliver to the parties the proposals collected from different regions of the country. The victims said there was a need to truly clarify what had happened during the armed conflict and, to that end, demanded the creation of a truth commission, which the FARC had also requested. The guerrillas asked those responsible for drafting the Historical Memory Report to meet in Havana with the delegations participating in the peace talks, in order to make it more complete and establish links with the negotiating table.

In September a civic forum on illegal drugs, which was the fourth point of the peace agreement, was held in Bogotá. During the month a crisis erupted between the FARC and the Government, since the latter took several unilateral decisions, such as a referendum to approve the agreements with the FARC and the rejection of the request by the FARC to convene a national constituent assembly at the end of the peace process. Later in the month FARC leader “Timoshenko” denied that he had threatened to breach the confidentiality of the process. In this regard it is worth mentioning that to date the FARC’s usual procedure has been to make almost daily statements and make all of their proposals public. Conversely, the Government has decided to be more reserved and discreet. President Santos reshuffled his government in late September and appointed a peace cabinet, a team of trusted people to help implement the rural development agreements that had been reached with the FARC.

In the middle of the discussion on the second point of the agenda, political participation, the FARC approved a document entitled “Guarantees for political and social participation of peasant, indigenous and afro-descendant communities, as well as other excluded social sectors”, which implies that the group is not only trying to obtain guarantees for themselves. A few days later they released another document entitled “Nine minimum proposals on political culture for participation, peace and national reconciliation, the right to protest and social and popular mobilization”. They also called on the Government to create a Commission of Revision and Clarification of the Truth of the History of the Internal Conflict in Colombia to complement the report prepared by the Historical Memory Group and other major initiatives that already existed or were under way.

Already in October pressure on the FARC delegation was stepped up to accelerate the pace of negotiations because there was concern that there would not be time to sign a final agreement before the elections. Thus, a discussion began over whether it was better to temporarily suspend the talks during the 2014 election period or, conversely, continue the negotiations right up to the last moment. The FARC said that if a pause was proposed it should be tied to a bilateral truce, which President Santos rejected. This debate came with other complaints by the Government that the FARC want to consider items in the preamble (the whereas clauses) as part of the Agenda, which would mean having to discuss structural issues that were not included in the agenda itself. In relation to social movements the FARC also proposed a national event where the most representative social organizations could reach a democratic and binding agreement on a regulatory framework that would guarantee their existence.

In November President Santos approved changes to the methodology being used in the negotiations with the FARC, with longer rounds of discussions and shorter breaks. He also included two women in the Cuban talks, Maria Paulina Riveros (former director of Human Rights of the Interior Ministry) and Nigeria Renteria, a lawyer. It was also made public that the Government would create Special Peace Circumscriptions in the House of Representatives, not with the idea of guaranteeing a seat in Parliament for the FARC leaders, but so that the inhabitants of the areas that had suffered the most during the conflict could run for office, and also so that the social movements, victims’ organizations and human rights organizations in these regions could compete democratically with the political parties. Mid-month the Government and the FARC announced from Havana a 15-point agreement on political participation. With regard to the third item on the Agenda, which began in November and dealt with illegal crops, the head of the FARC delegation in the Cuban negotiations, “Iván Márquez”, said that they should consider legalizing drug use. This would mean that the coca leaf could be sold freely, but not cocaine, he
said. The technical committees on both sides worked separately on the issue of illicit crops and presented reports to the negotiators that would act as a basis for the talks.

In December 2013 the FARC declared a truce (ceasefire and end to hostilities) from December 15 to January 15. The statement came after the chief negotiators of the Government and the FARC met behind closed doors to analyze the tension created by a FARC attack. At the end of the year the FARC also released a twelve-point plan to create a Constituent Assembly that would have 141 members and would approve the agreements reached in the peace process.

ELN

Regarding the ELN, the first negotiations between the government and this guerrilla group date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid, in which they agreed to hold a National Convention. That same year, ELN negotiators met with members of civil society in Mainz (Germany) and signed the “Puerta del Cielo” agreement, which was focused on humanitarian issues. In 1999, the government and the ELN met again in Cuba. The following year, the government authorised the creation of an encounter area in the south of the Bolívar region. Representatives of the Friendly Countries were involved in this process (Cuba, Spain, France, Norway and Switzerland). In June 2000, president Pastrana deemed that attempts to reach an agreement with this group were over. In 2005, the government reached an agreement with this guerrilla group to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba during December with the involvement of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. These talks are known as the “external rapprochement process”.

In August 2007, the government and the ELN began the eighth round of peace talks in August in Havana without achieving results or signing the so-called Base Agreement, since they were unable to agree on how to concentrate and verify the guerrilla troops. The government insisted on demanding that they be located in one or several points, including abroad, but at previously determined locations and with the names of all the guerrillas concentrated there; these names would then be given to an international verification commission. However, this was rejected by the ELN, which was not prepared to reveal the identity of its members or gather together in conditions which they perceived as putting them at a military disadvantage. In June 2008, the ELN stated that it did not consider rapprochement with the Colombian government useful, so it did not envisage holding a new round of talks. In early August 2011, the ELN sent a letter to Piedad Córdoba in which it stated that “the ELN has publicly and repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in bilateral talks without conditions; the agenda and rules should be determined by the parties to these talks [...] A government and insurgency committee is the best pathway today, and we are making every effort to achieve it.” In the letter, they also expressed their compliance with international humanitarian law.

In early November 2012, the ELN proposed a bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. A few days later, in its magazine, it announced that the ELN delegation for exploratory talks with the government was formed and ready to deliver for Colombia. At the end of the month, there was speculation that the ELN and the government could begin exploratory talks in Cuba and that the guerrilla group’s representative would be “Pablo Beltrán”.

In January 2013, however, President Santos terminated the talks and withdrew the ELN delegates’ right of safe passage. Apparently exploratory contacts were held at the end of last year, but without results. Representing the government were Frank Pearl and Alejandro Eder, while the ELN delegation consisted of “Gabino” and “Antonio García”. A senior German official served as the point of contact between both parties. One obstacle for future negotiations was the ELN’s demand to participate in civil society, at which the government demurred. The ELN’s agenda could not be different from the one mandated by the communities in the various events held in recent years. A great national peace movement was urgent for the ELN, which would bring together popular and social organisations, parties and other groups. As pointed out by Commander Gabino, in April the ELN assumed the mandate for peace as a strategic objective. A result of the National Convention, this political agreement should end in endorsement by a
national constituent assembly. Meanwhile, the Civil Society Facilitation Committee made arrangements to possibly begin negotiations with the ELN. Another roadblock was the ELN’s practice of kidnapping.

At the end of June 2013 the top FARC and ELN leaders issued a public statement for peace. In the not too distant past both guerrilla groups had been in favour of closer military collaboration, but this time they made a statement in favour of peace, defined as "the most noble, just and legitimate aspirations of our people [...]. The political solution to the social and armed conflict, which implies an end to the dirty war and aggression against the people, is part of our strategic horizon for peace in Colombia [...]. The political solution cannot be understood as the mere demobilization and disarmament of the guerrillas, with no structural changes and with everything continuing as usual. It has to be the road leading to the solution of the causes that led to the war and towards full democratization [.....]. A Constituent National Assembly would be the ideal mechanism because it would forge a new and genuine consensus built on the most comprehensive and full participation of society [...]. (The Assembly) must include representative participation of the insurgency and a democratic participation of all the sectors that make up the nation". This joint statement was seen as a move by the FARC to open parallel negotiations with the ELN. President Santos had said that talks would be possible if the ELN freed a Canadian it was holding hostage, which the ELN did. At the same time the ELN released an army corporal who it was also holding. But this may not be the only hurdle that needs to be overcome. The nature of the ELN and its emphasis on popular participation in any potential negotiation made it difficult to reach an agreement with the Government. As the academic Carlos Medina noted, "the operational emphasis of the ELN appears in organizational aspects, in the construction of a political imaginary and its focus on militant social practices in its relationship with grassroots movements. This often carries more weight than operational military aspects." The ELN wanted the excluded majorities to become the lead players in future talks, which made it more difficult to successfully conduct the negotiations. In early July more than a hundred civil society members signed a letter in favour of negotiations between the Government and the ELN.

In late August the ELN released a Canadian that it was holding hostage. Immediately afterwards the president of the Government said he was ready for talks. The guerrilla group stated that it was part of the millions of Colombians who categorically opposed the Government’s mining and energy juggernaut because it provides more benefits to foreigners than to Colombia, it is squeezing out agriculture and industry and destroying the environment and biodiversity. The ELN also noted that a genuine peace process is one that understands that the mandate should be based on the nodal issues, expressed in different contexts and during protests, affecting large groups of people that are marginalized from power, in order to find solutions in a true democratic and participatory process. In addition it said that ‘we understand that setting conditions to launch or conduct a dialogue between the insurgents and the Government only adds hurdles to these processes. We have a lot of experience with the positions of different governments that have repeatedly breached agreements, including the current government, which will be made public in due time. The resulting distance and distrust makes it hard to make progress on the path of peace in Colombia.’

In late September Norway offered its good offices for the talks with the ELN. The ELN Central Command, meanwhile, said that negotiations with them would be to discuss the major economic, political and social problems that had led to social and armed conflict. They also emphasized that time could not be a straitjacket, and that the agenda in any kind of dialogue should include the petitions and demands of the communities, and mechanisms that allow for their participation in both the process and in defining the issues. The ELN stated that it doubted that the agreements would be finally implemented, since they are frequently violated. However, in October the ELN repeated that it was ready to start talks with the Government, and it created a five-person delegation for exploratory talks. In the same month the Congress of the Peoples, close to the ELN, issued a statement with the five following requests:
1. Political recognition of the peasants and the black and indigenous peoples.
2. Property for the people that work the land and care for it.
3. Oil for a decent life.
4. Mining for good living.
5. Autonomous and concerted substitution of illicit crops.

In November the ELN accepted the challenge of beginning negotiations without a bilateral ceasefire. Soon after the group freed a kidnapped engineer, which was one of the Government’s conditions to launch a dialogue with the guerrillas.

Peace process in 2014

In April Congress passed a bill to create a Peace Chair, led by the former governor of Tolima, Ariel Arnel Arenas, in all of the educational institutions in the country. According to a report by the Center of Historical Memory, only 35 convictions had been handed down out of 26,000 cases of forced disappearances. In the Justice and Peace unit, which received confessions of 3,551 cases of forced disappearances, only five members of the paramilitary were convicted. In 2013, the Historical Memory Group published the "Basta Ya! Colombia Report: memories of war and dignity." This document, under the direction of historian Gonzalo Sanchez, accounted for 50 years of armed conflict. According to the report, between 1958 and 2012 the conflict caused 218,000 deaths, 81% were civilians, and 27,000 kidnappings. In December the Unit for Attention and Reparation of Victims stated that there were a total of 6.8 million victims in Colombia. 86% were displaced and the remaining 14% were victims of threats, killings, enforced disappearance, abduction, sexual violence, deprivation of property, injury, torture, forced recruitment of children and attacks as a result of 30 years of conflict. The Unit also announced that the period of subsidies and direct aid to the displaced population would be finalized and efforts would immediately begin to reintegrate these people into normal life and society. According to the Unit, around 49,000 households had received free housing, another 63,000 were accompanied during returns and relocations, more than 482,000 victims had been compensated and 54,000 had received psychosocial care since 2011. With regard to identifying those responsible, in the case of 2.9 million people no one had been identified as the author, 2.7 million corresponded to the guerrillas, 1.3 million to paramilitary groups, and 28,833 to the security forces.

On June 15 President Santos won the second round of the presidential election with nearly 51% of the vote, compared to 45% for the other candidate, Zuluaga. Voter turnout was below 50%. With his victory Santos guaranteed that the negotiations with the FARC would continue.

In September the Colombian Agency for Social Reintegration reported that the annual cost of providing care for demobilized guerrillas was 150,000 million pesos (58 million euros), and if the FARC demobilized the cost could go as high as 600,000 million pesos a year (232 million Euros). After eight years of investigation the Public Prosecutor’s Office announced in October that 40,000 crimes had been revealed, but only 16 sentences had been handed down. 2,670 confessions were obtained, mostly from former members of paramilitary organizations and some from former guerrillas. The data included 1,000 massacres, nearly 25,000 murders, 11,000 cases of forced displacement and 3,400 forced disappearances. According to the Public Prosecutor's Office 17.3 million euros in reparation payments had been made. On a separate issue, the National Peace Council was also set up in October to promote post-conflict reconstruction in regions and enhance opportunities for participation in society. This Council is a body that brings together representatives from the unions, the Government and civil, political, academic and ethnic sectors, among others. In addition, the general manager of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, Alejandro Eder, resigned and was replaced by Joshua S. Mitrotti.

Meanwhile, in December the Government extended for three years the mandate of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA in its Spanish acronym). According to its
director, Roberto Menéndez, its primary purpose is to provide support during the post-conflict phase and for any other aspects agreed to by the parties during negotiations. Menéndez distinguished between the mission’s future work and its previous role, which was to verify the demobilization of the AUC. Meanwhile, UNDP produced several documents with analyses of the conflict and peacebuilding efforts in various departments in the country, with a view to the post-conflict stage.

**FARC**

During the first quarter the discussions on illicit crops continued in Havana, where the negotiations with the FARC were being held. The FARC delegation was joined by "Fabian Ramirez", head of the Southern Bloc, which meant that all of the blocs had representatives in Havana. In March the FARC leader "Timoshenko" called on the Government to sign a mutual ceasefire and make peace, to avoid permitting impunity for acts of war. Also in March the FARC relaunched their proposal to create a Commission of Revision and Clarification of the Truth of the History of the Internal Conflict in Colombia, which would go back to 1936. The Government commission in the Havana peace talks said that there would be a Truth Commission after the peace agreement was signed, but not before. The ELN guerrillas, meanwhile, said that if a peace process were launched it would also include reparation for victims. A short time later former Senator Piedad Cordoba, the representative for the organization Colombians for Peace, launched an initiative to establish a Reconciliation Committee made up of military personnel and guerrilla fighters in prison. The proposal was endorsed by the Government.

In mid-May, after five months of negotiations, the Government and the FARC reached an agreement on the fourth item on the agenda dealing with the problem of illicit drugs. The parties agreed to discuss at a later date six sub-items related to this discussion point, which included the extradition of FARC members for drug trafficking. The agreement included measures such as the presentation of alternatives that lead to improving the welfare and well-being of the communities living in the areas affected by illicit crops, dealing with drug abuse using a public health focus, public participation in community meetings to solve the problem, creating a new Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops, manual crop substitution in those cases where growers decide not to participate in the replacement program, ensuring that mines are cleared from coca-growing areas, the creation of a National Program for Comprehensive Action against Illicit Drug use, strengthening the institutional presence and effectiveness in the investigation and punishment of crimes associated with the drug trade, fighting against the corruption associated with drug trafficking, and promoting an International Conference within the UN framework to review the fight against drugs. A few days earlier the FARC and the ELN issued a joint statement declaring a unilateral ceasefire for eight days during the presidential campaign. During a forum for peace in Bogota indigenous Colombians asked the Government and the guerrillas to declare a bilateral ceasefire and to allow ancestral authorities to participate in the Havana negotiations with the FARC. They also proposed activating a National Indigenous Peace Council to enable their participation in the negotiations. Also in May the Government of Chile, which was acting as an 'accompanying country' in the peace process with the FARC, appointed the socialist Luis Maira as a delegate for Chile in the negotiations.

In late May, after President Santos came in second in the presidential election and a second round of voting was needed, the Government launched the National Peace Council to begin a national education campaign on the end of the conflict. This was done in close collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace and was organized on the department level and not centrally. President Santos also said that in the future they would analyze the way in which the National Peace Council could participate in a possible dialogue with the ELN. On the same day a surprising statement was made by presidential candidate Óscar Iván Zuluaga, who won in the first round. He said that if he became president he would continue the talks in Cuba with the FARC, under conditions and terms that would guarantee visible progress. He said specifically that the FARC should bring an end to child recruitment and make a solid commitment to participating...
in demining activities. Until then he had strongly opposed continuing negotiations with the guerrillas, so this new approach was thought to be an election stunt. A week before the second round, and with the polls running against President Santos, the Government and the FARC surprised everyone by releasing a ‘Statement of Principles for the discussion of item 5 of the agenda: “Victims”, in which they recognized their responsibility in the conflict and pledged to let the victims have a voice in the discussions. At the same time, the FARC announced a unilateral ceasefire during the last week of the election campaign.

JOINT STATEMENT
Havana, June 7, 2014

The National Government and the FARC-EP have agreed to the following

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEM 5: "VICTIMS".

The National Government and the FARC-EP,

Which reiterate, as stated in the Havana General Agreement, that "Respect for human rights in every corner of the country is an aim of the State that should be promoted", and that point 5 of the agenda states that "compensating victims is at the heart of the agreement";

And also acknowledging that victims caused by serious human rights violations and the infringement of International Humanitarian Law during the conflict are entitled to truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition;

Convinced that ensuring the rights of the victims is an essential part of the guarantees needed to achieve peace, and bringing the conflict to an end will contribute significantly to ensuring those rights, we declare that the discussion in Section 5 will be based on following principles:

1. Recognition of the victims: We need to recognize all victims of the conflict, not only as victims, but especially in their capacity as citizens with rights.

2. Recognition of Responsibility: Any discussion regarding this point must begin by acknowledging our responsibility towards the victims of the conflict. We are not going to exchange one impunity for another.

3. Ensuring victims' rights: The rights of the victims of the conflict are not negotiable; the idea is to reach an agreement on the best way to ensure rights in the framework of the end of the conflict.

4. Participation of the victims: The discussion about ensuring the rights of victims of serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law during the conflict requires the necessary participation of the victims, by way of different channels and at different times.

5. The establishment of the truth: Clarifying what happened during the conflict, including its multiple causes, origins and effects, is a key part of ensuring the rights of victims, and society in general. Rebuilding trust depends on the full clarification and recognition of truth.

6. Reparation for victims: Victims are entitled to be compensated for damages caused by the conflict. Restoring the rights of victims and transforming their lives in the context of the end of the conflict is a fundamental part of building a stable and lasting peace.

7. Guarantees of protection and security: Protecting the lives and personal integrity of the victim is the first step to ensuring their other rights.

8. The guarantee of non-repetition: The end of conflict and the implementation of reforms arising from the Final Agreement are the main guarantee that this will not happen again and the best way to make sure that a new generations of victims does not arise. The measures agreed to in item 5,
as well as the rest of the items on the Agenda, should aim to ensure non-repetition so that no
Colombian will ever again be a victim or at risk of becoming one.

9. Principle of reconciliation: One of the objectives of ensuring victims’ rights is the
reconciliation of all Colombian citizens to achieve civility and peaceful coexistence.

10. Focus on rights: All of the agreements we reach on the agenda and specifically on point 5
‘Victims’ should contribute to protecting and ensuring that everyone will enjoy rights equally. Human
rights are inherent to all human beings equally, which means that they have those rights simply by
being humans. Their recognition is thus not something that is granted, they are universal, indivisible
and interdependent, and must be considered globally and in a fair and unbiased manner. Consequently,
the State has the duty to promote and protect all fundamental rights and freedoms, and everyone has
the duty to not violate the human rights of their fellow citizens. Following the principles of
universality, equality and progressiveness, and for purposes of compensation, the violation of
economic, social and cultural rights caused by the conflict shall be taken into consideration.

Furthermore, we report that:

1. We agree to create a technical sub-committee, made up of members from both delegations,
to begin talks on item 3 of the General Agreement, ‘End of the conflict’.

2. In the next round we will begin discussions on point 5 from the Agenda of the General
Agreement ‘Victims’, for which we agree that:

a. In order to guide and contribute to the discussion of Item 5, the parties have decided to set
up an expert commission on the history of the conflict and its victims, which will not replace the
mechanism for the full clarification of the truth that must include everyone and in particular the
victims.

b. We call on the Office of the United Nations in Colombia and the National University’s
Center for Thought and Monitoring of the Peace Process to organize Forums on item 5 from the
Agenda of the General Agreement ‘Victims’: three regional forums beginning with one in Villavicencio
on July 4 and 5, followed by one in Barrancabermeja and Barranquilla, and a national forum in
Cali.

c. We will receive a first delegation of victims who will attend the talks to present their
expectations and peace building proposals for the territories and to ensure the rights of victims (to
truth, justice, reparation), including guarantees of non-repetition.

This delegation will be created in a way that guarantees the plural and balanced
representation of the different victims and the victimizing incidents, without pretending that a
delegation can represent the millions of victims caused by the armed conflict.

We thank the victims and victims’ organizations that have sent their proposals to the
negotiation table and those that participated in the regional forums organized by the Congressional
Peace Commissions, and we encourage them to continue to participate through the established
channels and the forums that will soon be held.

3. We agree to establish a gender subcommittee, made up of members of the delegations and
with support from national and international experts, to review the partial agreements and a future
final accord to ensure that they adequately take into account the gender perspective.

In late June Assistant Ombudsman Esiquio Manuel Sánchez Herrera confirmed that a meeting of
the National Victims Roundtable had been held the previous week in the capital of the Republic,
with the Ombudsman acting as Technical Secretariat. As a result of the meeting the leaders of the
victims’ organizations chose the first group that would go to Havana to participate in item 5 of
the agenda in the talks between the Government and the FARC. In early July, Archbishop Luis
Augusto Castro, a devoted backer of the peace negotiations, was named president of the
In the second half of the month the FARC and ELN issued a joint statement to Congress saying that what was agreed at the negotiating table should "be included in a grand peace treaty and it should be set in stone by the sovereign decision of the people so that it would endure for generations to come." The fact that the statement was signed by Timoleon Jimenez "Timoshenko" head of the FARC, and Nicholas Rodriguez "Gabino", maximum leader of the ELN, gave the impression that the Government was trying to get the ELN to accept everything that had been agreed so far with the FARC.

In early August the Constitutional Court ruled on the second and final lawsuit against the Legal Framework for Peace, and left it to Congress to define what would be considered political crimes. The Framework is a constitutional amendment passed in 2012 that allows some of the thousands of crimes committed during the armed conflict to not be prosecuted, and make a priority the selection of only the worst crimes to bring to trial. On day 5 the FARC and the Government issued a joint statement (number 40) with measures for the successful visit to Havana of the victims, the Commission on the History of the conflict and its victims, the "end of conflict" sub-committee and the gender sub-committee. Thus, in the second half of the month the Commission on the History of the conflict and its victims was created. It included 12 experts (six appointed by the Government and six by the FARC) and two rapporteurs; only one woman was elected. The Commission was given four months to draft a report that would serve as a tool for the future Truth Commission, which would be created at the end of the negotiations. The first face to face meeting also took place between the 12 people representing the victims and the two delegations negotiating in Havana. The list of participants was put together by the National University, the Episcopal Conference and the United Nations (UNDP), following previously agreed criteria. In turn, president Santos appointed retired general and former police chief Oscar Naranjo as Minister-Counsellor of Post-Conflict, Security and Human Rights. Naranjo will be responsible for creating, organizing and coordinating post-conflict policies and programs through the Ministry of Public Safety and will act as an advisor to modernize security, demobilization and reintegration models. The appointment stirred controversy as some sectors suspected that in the future the police would not be part of the Ministry of Defence, which is common in most countries. At the end of the month the National Federation of Departments (FND) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) signed a cooperation agreement to provide information about the agreements finally reached at the negotiating table with regard to land and rural development. Citizens from all regions will thus have a clear and direct understanding of the country's post-conflict agricultural roadmap.

In September the FARC proposed creating a comprehensive victim's compensation fund, consisting of 3% of the country's GDP. Moreover, a public debate was sparked by the decision by the negotiating parties to establish a "Subcommittee on Laying Down Arms and Incorporation into civilian life", with up to 10 members from each of the delegations, which would deal with the issues such as surrendering weapons and a bilateral ceasefire. The Government announced the creation of the "Strategic Transition Command", made up of active military personnel and police officers. The Command would be headed by General Javier Flórez and would be responsible for all of the technical issues surrounding the disarmament. In response to the Government initiative the FARC said they would be willing to create a guerrilla "Normalization Command", which would study how to restore the insurgent force to its constitutional role and dismantle the counterinsurgency battalions. They also proposed creating a Committee for the investigation of paramilitary groups, which should not be confused with the Truth Commission. Before these proposals President Santos had stated that the security forces would not be reformed as a result of the negotiations. This is never the case after a peace agreement is signed, since security system reform is always necessary. President Santos also said that the FARC would not surrender their arms to the national Army, but they would lay down their arms", which implies that a classic DDR program (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) would not take place and raises the possibility that the weapons could be surrendered to an international commission.

The second group of victims travelled to Havana in the second half of September. Meanwhile, the victims of the FARC declared they would create their own historical commission. A few days
earlier the Government and the FARC created a gender subcommittee in the context of the talks (provided for in the June 7 agreement). This is the third subcommittee to be created, along with the subcommittee for disarmament and the panel of experts on the history of the conflict. Also in September, during the General Assembly of the United Nations, the President of Colombia met with the UN Secretary General who expressed his willingness to provide assistance in the post-conflict stage in areas such as economic cooperation, verification of the agreements and the return to civilian life by those who lay down their arms. Any involvement by the UN must be approved by the FARC. In mid-September simultaneous "International Victims' Forums" were organized in cities around the world. This initiative was supported by UNHCR, the Government of Colombia, the FARC and the ELN. At the end of the month, and to counter some criticisms and malicious rumours from sectors that are opposed to the talks, the Government and the FARC decided to make public all the agreements reached to date. Around the same time the country was concerned with the rise in the number of threats against human rights defenders, left-wing politicians, demobilized guerrillas and social leaders, in an attempt to defy the sectors in favour of the negotiation with the insurgents. In addition to all of these problems it was discovered at the end of September that the phones and email accounts of the head negotiators, the Government's chief envoy Humberto de la Calle and the head of communications for the FARC, had been illegally intercepted, probably by members of sectors opposed to the smooth progress of the negotiations.

In October it was reported that the leader of the FARC, "Timochenko", was given authorization to travel to Cuba for a meeting with the FARC negotiating team. At the end of that same month new members of the FARC delegation travelled to Cuba. These were all members of the military structures that were going to hold talks with the Colombian military related to the ceasefire and laying down arms, among others issues. FARC spokesman "Iván Márquez" said that "laying down arms" was understood by the FARC as 'not using them in politics', which seemed to indicate that for the time being the group had no intention of 'surrendering' its weapons, but simply 'silencing them', which raised serious concern in those areas of government involved in the talks. While discussions continued with the victims who had travelled to Havana, the FARC suggested that both the guerrillas and members of the security forces should be recognized as victims if they had suffered the consequences of violations of international humanitarian law. Moreover, the FARC negotiators proposed the creation of a special commission to study the situation of political prisoners, and a census of victims of the conflict that would be conducted in the eighteen months following the signing of an eventual peace agreement with the Government. At the end of October the FARC’s "Pablo Catatumbo" admitted the damage that the 50 years of conflict had caused Colombians. He said that "it is clear that we have actively intervened in the conflict, we attacked the enemy and in some ways affected the population that has been immersed in the conflict ... We explicitly recognize that our actions have affected civilians at different times and under different circumstances throughout the war, and that because it has lasted for so long it has caused greater and multiple impacts, but it was never the reason for our existence".

An incident occurred in November that threatened to destabilize the situation when the FARC captured a Colombian Army general who appeared, in plain clothes and without much protection, in a town of Chocó controlled by the FARC. Both the Government and many media outlets described it as a 'kidnapping'. The general was held for two weeks, during which the Government temporarily suspended the Cuban talks. The crisis ended after the FARC unilaterally released the general and his two companions. When the talks resumed the two delegations agreed on some new rules, including that no one would leave the negotiating table no matter what happened in Colombia, and the guarantor countries would play a more active role as mediators if a new crisis arose.

At the beginning of December the International Criminal Court (ICC) said that an eventual peace agreement with the FARC should be compatible with the Rome Statute and legal proceedings that do not comply with this condition and are described as "not authentic" or "not genuine" could come under ICC jurisdiction. Meanwhile, in Havana the immediate goal was to reduce the impact of dispute by following the recommendations made by Professor Carlos Medina, who suggested a
"de-escalation" of the conflict. In turn, the leader of the FARC sent a message to the Armed Forces that stated that "the old conceptions of total war must make way for other notions of security that emphasize the true national interests, those of the large majorities, not the wealthy and selfish elites". In response to the debate raging at the time over the uncertain legal future of many members of the military, President Santos said they would have legal certainty in the post-conflict era and that they would have access to transitional justice within the Legal Framework for Peace. Halfway through the month the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the FARC and the end of the conflict that recommended granting the FARC a role in the reintegration, taking advantage of its cohesion, promoting local transitional justice, a bilateral ceasefire that goes into effect immediately after signing the peace agreement preceded by a de-escalation of the conflict, the urgent implementation of development programs in the FARC's areas of influence, establishment of an international commission to oversee the disarmament and ceasefire, security sector reform, a commitment to long-term financing, the transfer of demobilized combatants to assembly zones, storing weapons under international supervision rather than delivering them directly to the state, establishing a detailed schedule for the first phase of the transition, establishing a joint mechanism to monitor the implementation of peace agreements in their entirety, the participation of members of the FARC as a rural police or having them participate in highway construction and demining, the possibility of joining individual or collective integration plans, giving the FARC joint responsibility for managing reintegration programs with adequate gender and ethnic focus and ensuring that transitional justice mechanisms are compatible with reintegration incentives for rank-and-file members.

On December 17 the FARC announced an indefinite unilateral ceasefire and an end to hostilities that would begin on December 20, and which should lead to an armistice. The FARC stated that it wanted UNASUR, CELAC, the CICP and the Broad Front for Peace to provide oversight for the process, which the Government quickly rejected since it wanted no international supervision. The FARC stated that the unilateral ceasefire would obviously be terminated only if its guerrilla organization were attacked by security forces. An additional condition for the ceasefire was the acceptance of international oversight, which, given the Government's response, meant that the proposal was useless. Despite these initial reactions, these institutions finally fulfilled their mission. In a statement to the Colombian military, and using terms from the antiwar school of thought, the FARC said "both sides know the reality of this confrontation and we know that nobody wants to be the last one to die in a war that is drawing to a close. It does not make any sense for more people to die or be injured or affected by the conflict".

At the end of December a public presentation was made of the Popular Mentors for Peace network, promoted by the District of Bogotá and with government support, to train thousands of volunteers that would explain to the public the peace agreements reached with the FARC. "Peace education" was considered crucial before an eventual citizens' referendum of the agreement with the insurgency, and it was also important not to forget the negative experience in Guatemala in this regard. The visits to Havana by a total of 60 victims of the conflict to explain their personal experiences also came to a close. In this regard the apology that FARC commander "Pablo Catatumbo" offered to the victims of the 2002 slaughter of Bojaya (Chocó) was noteworthy for its symbolism. In the meantime another member of the FARC Secretariat, Southern Bloc commander "Joaquín Gómez", arrived in Havana to join the FARC team that will discuss military issues with members of the Colombian Armed Forces. For the FARC this new addition was a sign of its determination to move towards the signing of a final agreement. Also at the end of the year, another FARC commander, "Pastor Alape", said in Cuba that the FARC would be willing to decouple children under age 15 from their ranks and consider demining.

In early January 2015 President Santos met with his negotiating team and their international advisers (William Ury, Harvard University, Joaquin Villalobos, former Salvadoran guerrilla, Jonathan Powell, former chief of staff to Tony Blair, and Shlomo Ben Ami former Foreign Minister of Israel), to review the progress made in 2014 and get ready for the next year, which would include a phase of "simultaneous" negotiations, such as military issues discussed in parallel, or the Government's proposal to create a special commission to expedite the search for
missing persons. He also announced that given the progress made in the negotiations it may not make sense to continue with the principle of negotiating as the conflict rages on, or continuing to conduct offensive operations. “Unlinking” the two had ceased to make sense. Santos started the year with the aim of decreasing the intensity of the conflict (the so called “de-escalation”), which coincided with the position of the FARC, which issued a statement welcoming the Government's new position. A general from the Armed Forces later said that the de-escalation could include the end to the bombings. The president instructed his negotiators to begin as soon as possible the discussion on the bilateral ceasefire and the definitive end to hostilities, which caused considerable confusion in the academic, political and journalistic world. Some wrongly considered that it would imply the automatic surrender of weapons by the FARC. Santos passed the law containing the rules for organizing constitutional referendum to endorse the future peace agreement. The law states that the referenda may coincide with campaign events; it guarantees that the Final Agreement will be adequately publicized; it allows for campaigns calling for a vote in favour, against or for abstention, and guarantees equal access to media by the groups behind these campaigns.

In the second half of January several national and regional organizations, as well as the Government, declared that in general terms the FARC had honoured the unilateral ceasefire. In an interview in El Tiempo, one of the government negotiators in Cuba, General Oscar Naranjo, said that for the bilateral ceasefire agreement to become reality the FARC should suspend the recruitment of children, demine over 650 municipalities (since 1990 11,000 people had died or had been injured by landmines) and reveal the truth about what had happened to thousands of missing people. The FARC had previously stated that they agreed to these aspects. The general did make a surprising statement when he said that 'the guerrillas would have to be located and protected, to verify compliance with the agreement'. A similar condition, which is probably not necessary or essential and would put the FARC in a vulnerable situation, had led to the failure of the negotiations with the ELN in 2007. In any case this issue will be discussed by the two sides in the first two months of the year. Also surprising was the statement 'when we talk about a bilateral ceasefire we are talking about ending the use of arms forever' when historically ceasefires in armed conflicts collapse for various reasons. What everyone wants is not always what ends up happening just because it is the best solution. Finally, it should be noted that Spain, which in 2015 took its seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, proposed that the European Union create a 'peace mission' that will be ready to “accompany” Colombia in the process of "demilitarization" when the Government signs a peace agreement with the FARC. This mission would include the creation of a trust fund to 'finance the post-conflict period', as requested by President Santos in his European tour in November 2014. The Minister said, "Spain will play a major role in supporting the Colombian State in the demilitarization, demobilization and demining tasks."

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**Financing the post-conflict period.**

Beginning in October all the Colombian media organizations published information regarding efforts by the Government and various foreign ministries to raise funds to help implement the peace agreements that may be signed with the FARC, and eventually the ELN, when the time comes. Estimates of the cost varied widely, but commitments were made by some countries and international organizations. According to the newspaper El Tiempo (October 12), General Oscar Naranjo, minister counsellor for the post-conflict period, was putting the final touches on an official report based on the agreements reached in the areas of agriculture, political participation and illicit drugs that will define the projects needed to end the armed conflict. The report will be broken down by regions and sectors and will include an estimate of the costs. Internally, the work was being led by the Planning Department, whose director, Simon Gaviria, met with the negotiating team to calculate the costs. The senators on the Peace Commission mentioned a total cost of 6,500 million dollars, but no breakdown was provided.
In November President Santos travelled to Europe to meet with officials from the European Commission and several diplomatic missions and signed ten contracts worth nearly 12 million euros over the next two years.

Countries that had expressed their willingness to provide funding in the last quarter were the U.S., Germany (which granted a $100 million loan until 2016 to invest in peacebuilding, specifically for prevention, comprehensive aid and compensation for victims, demobilization, rural and agricultural development, as well as to strengthen national and regional capabilities), Belgium, Spain (who promised to lead the contribution by the countries of the European Union), Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, etc.

As for international organizations, the International Monetary Fund said that it would explore mechanisms to fund the peace process and it set up a specific technical group to study this. In November the World Bank approved a multi-donor fund for peace in Colombia, and Sweden made the first payment. Spain, which will be a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2015, said it would work to gain the backing of the Security Council to manage the international support for the post-conflict period. The Spanish Government also stated that it could assist in demining and demilitarization tasks in Colombia, along with other EU countries.

A dissenting opinion
Who has to pay for the post-conflict period?
Vicenç Fisas

Despite the fact that several important and sensitive issues remain to be negotiated in the dialogue with the FARC, there is growing talk of the post-conflict era in Colombia, and there is a certain urgency in this. It is a hot topic, and one that deserves considerable thought because the post-conflict stage is where many peace agreements fail, either as a result of deliberate violations of the agreement or expectations that are too high. We have to be very realistic about what is possible and what is not, and the time needed for each issue. We must also not ever forget that peace accords only end the armed violence that the conflict triggered, but it does not end the conflict itself, which has political, economic, social and cultural aspects that must be managed wisely for years. Great efforts must be made to avoid new incidents of physical violence and homicides linked to rising crime, which is often the case in these contexts. Sooner or later a peace agreement will be signed, but then the energies that both sides have dedicated for so long to violent confrontation must be channelled towards building a more tolerant, caring, just, harmonious, participatory and democratic society.

It seems to me, however, that the approach to one of the issues is somewhat confusing and naïve, and I am sure it is not in bad faith. I am referring to who is going to foot the bill for this supposed post-conflict phase that I would like to call the 'armed post-conflict'. Recently President Santos has toured Europe and met with representatives from several foreign ministries in search of support for this future stage. The foreign minister of Spain has generously volunteered to coordinate the European Union’s contribution to the future of Colombia. The United Nations has also expressed its willingness in this regard, and other international organizations will do so in the coming months. This expression of solidarity must be welcomed and is an indication how much the international community desires peace for Colombia. And here is the big question: Doesn't using external aid to fund the armed post-conflict in Colombia go against the idea that the actors involved one way or the other in the conflict should be held accountable for compensation?

Colombia is a country with natural resources, a growing economy, a substantial GDP and a strong financial system. It cannot be compared to DR Congo, Burundi and other impoverished countries, whose states are not able to subsidize their armed post-conflicts and require the intervention of the World Bank, UNDP, the EU, large development NGOs and other agencies, in addition to individual support from various countries. Colombia has been able to bear most of the cost for the demobilization and reintegration of the AUC and other individual demobilizations, and the number of people involved was much higher than the current count of FARC and ELN members. The country is able to assume this new and future cost on its own. It can be argued, however, that enormous financial resources will be needed to carry out the economic reforms required by the agreements from the Havana Agenda,
especially for agrarian reform. This is true, but that cost should be covered by various internal contributions, such as the so-called ‘disarmament dividend’. This is the savings achieved in military expenditures when a peace agreement is signed, the insurgency is demobilized and the security system is reformed. Based on experiences in other countries, the two main consequences are: a 30 to 50% reduction of troops and military spending, which frees up a huge amount of money for structural purposes, and the dedication of the police to non-military tasks, or what in the context of peace is called ‘community policeman’. But that’s not all. Both the paramilitary and guerrilla forces have taken control of huge amounts of tremendously valuable land, as well as the companies they used for money laundering. These goods must be returned to society and converted into assets that are available for the armed post-conflict period. Finally, there are many large companies, both domestic and foreign, that have benefited from the conflict, and they should contribute their share to the country’s reconstruction. The same applies to the upper class and the rest of the business community, which should contribute to the success of this phase with a “business fund for peace”. If all this is done justice will be served and peace will be reached through a collective contribution made by Colombians, not a handout from the international community. Reparation is better than charity.

(Published in Semana, December 2, 2014)
OUTLINE OF THE METHODOLOGY USED WITH THE FARC, 2012-2014

**Pre-negotiation (exploratory phase)**
(Venezuela, Cuba)
Agenda accord

**Negotiation (Cuba)**
Without initial ceasefire

**Garants**
Norway
Cuba

**Accompanying**
Venezuela
Chile

**Formal Opening (Oslo)**

**Interactiv Web**

**Agenda thematics**
 Forums (Bogota)
 UNDP
 Universidad Nacional

**Regional round tables**

**Presence in Havana by representatives of political parties, woman, victims and military**

**Creating Conflict**
Historical Committee,
Gender subcommittee and
Subcommittee on
Laying Down Arms and
incorporation into civilian life
Four days before the second round of the presidential elections, and immediately after the Government and the FARC had signed a preliminary agreement on the issue of the victims, President Santos announced on June 10 that since January the Government had been holding exploratory talks with the ELN. Initial contacts were made in late 2013 and a 21-day meeting took place in Ecuador in January. A 20-day second round was held in Brazil along with other short meetings. The government delegation was led by Frank Pearl, former peace commissioner and former director of the reintegration program, retired general Eduardo Herrera Berbel, expert in negotiations and peace processes, and Jaime Avendaño, a veteran official of the President's office. Representing the ELN was "Antonio Garcia", commander of the guerrilla group, who had participated in the failed negotiations held from 2005 to 2007 in Cuba, along with four other delegates. The countries acting as guarantors for the talks included Ecuador (represented by Juan Meriguet, adviser to the Chancellor), Brazil and Norway, and as accompanying countries, Venezuela, Chile and Cuba. In a joint statement issued on June 10 by the ELN and the Government, the parties reported that the agenda for the talks would include items related to victims and participation of society. The rest of the topics had yet to be agreed. The exploratory talks were not easy, because the Government did not accept, among other things, the bilateral ceasefire demanded by the ELN. According to some media sources, the formal negotiation would most likely take place in Ecuador, whose president had already offered his country's assistance. Since progress had been made on the agenda with the FARC, in future formal talks the ELN could accept the points already agreed to with the guerrilla group and perhaps, as a first condition, it could renounce its age old aspiration of creating a National Convention. The ELN could continue to focus its main interest on the control of energy resources. President Santos insisted that there should not be two different models for negotiation, only one.

As previously mentioned, in the second half of July the FARC and ELN issued a joint statement to Congress saying that what was agreed at the negotiating table should "be included in a grand peace treaty and it should be set in stone by the sovereign decision of the people so that it would endure for generations to come." The fact that the statement was signed by Timoleon Jimenez "Timoshenko" head of the FARC, and Nicholas Rodriguez "Gabino", maximum leader of the ELN, gave the impression that the Government was trying to get the ELN to accept everything that had been agreed on so far with the FARC. In August "Gabino" wrote an open letter to members of the Colombian armed forces that reiterated the 'urgency of a bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. If an agreement was reached he considered that the parties must be willing to accept oversight by the national and international community so that the commitments are fully complied with." He also said that the way the parties address each other and the language used should change.

In October, in its magazine called Insurrection, the ELN suggested that there might be problems of understanding with the Government in the exploratory phase, since “the purpose of building a country in peace and equality brings together two opposing ways of viewing the conflict and its solution. One thing is the scope of peace proposed by the insurgency, which reflects the feelings of the majority, and the idea that the Government and the ruling elite have is a completely different thing... A real peace process would mean that it is no longer necessary to use arms to defend and fight for the rights of the majority; the struggle could be resolved using democratic channels and there would be guarantees that the leaders of the opposition and social protests would not be murdered, displaced or exiled. Democratic activity can only be undertaken by the majorities and it should therefore be them who in the peace process develop this activity in their daily lives and struggles through direct participation... We launch the idea of "two processes and one goal", but we know that there is only one peace in Colombia. In mid-October Gabino reiterated in a message that the ELN was willing to begin a peace process similar to the Government's talks with the FARC, and he stressed the urgency of a bilateral ceasefire. He also said that agreements had already been reached on two agenda items in the exploratory negotiations with the Government: the participation of society and victims of conflict. At about the same time President Santos said he wanted absolute confidentiality with regard to any contacts with the ELN and asked his
ministers not to make any comments on the process. In this sense the ELN said they would have preferred to provide information at all times on how the discussions were progressing, but the group had decided to relax its position and respect the commitments it had assumed in this regard. At the end of the month there was a setback in the process when the Army captured Wigbert Chamorro, alias "Jairo", the ELN commander in Tolima, who had a role in the exploratory talks with the Government. The judicial system had not issued any arrest warrants against this negotiator.

In December the ELN's magazine complained that the structural reforms already negotiated with the FARC had not been included in the '2014-2018 National Development Plan'. It also stated that the large majority of workers had been absent from the current peace talks and that the regime's idea of peace was a mere distraction. "If it really wanted peace, --the group said-- the Government would have made gestures and launched specific actions to reduce the impact of war, and within this context we propose an agreement for a bilateral ceasefire, which is what society is demanding." Still, "in the midst of the expected mutual distrust, we have responded to the Santos Government's proposal to end the military confrontation, which for us is to attempt to resolve a political conflict... Consequently, in almost two years of exploratory talks the only profound differences we have encountered is when it comes to defining what the Government means when it talks about achieving peace; for the regime peace is demobilization, impunity, pacification and a few changes so that everything remains the same; meanwhile, for the ELN peace is social justice, democracy, equality and sovereignty. These differences make it very difficult to achieve peace."

In mid-December President Santos said the Government would begin the peace process with the ELN only if it stopped kidnapping, and demanded the prompt release of the mayor of Alto Baudo (Chocó), who had been kidnapped a few days earlier. In a letter to both the ELN and the Government a group of prominent politicians, academics and members from the civil society asked the negotiating teams to set up the "formal" negotiating table. In response, the ELN Central Command made several interesting observations to explain the slowness of the exploratory phase and it criticized the negotiating techniques, which are isolated from social dynamics. Thus, "peace must not be understood as an academic exercise between two delegations", since it needs society's involvement. "It would be good if the dialogue process created a new dynamic in the country and included humanitarian actions agreed to by both parties, a bilateral ceasefire agreement and opportunities for participation by society in an open dialogue." "A process that turns its back on society and uses a behind-closed-doors methodology is not right for the Macondian Colombia". "It is inexplicable that the country does not know what is on the table for discussion and that this ignorance is used to manipulate the facts". "It would be best for people to participate in the preparation of the agenda, the topics to be discussed, and the spaces and scenarios to build." This shows once again the ELN's conviction that the group would only participate in the peace process to the extent that it was a process of social participation.

In early January 2015 President Santos called on the ELN to join the FARC's unilateral ceasefire and to make progress in the preliminary discussions that had been launched several months earlier. The ELN then took the political initiative and began to make proposals and public statements. On January 7 the ELN held its 5th Congress and issued a statement that received national and international media attention. The ELN leader, 'Gabino', said 'we are participating in this dialogue to observe the real intentions of the Government and the Colombian state; if we conclude that weapons are not necessary, we would be willing to consider if we should stop using them.' The FARC sent a message of unity to the ELN. In a radio interview, "Gabino" said 'we must eradicate what remains of vanguardism in guerrilla organizations ... because the vanguard is the masses, the popular movements, the social organizations'. In several messages, "Gabino" reiterated that the group's members would remain in the regions to participate in politics'. In an interview, 'Gabino' said that "conflicts within a society will never end due to their human nature; what we need to avoid is that such conflicts lead us to confrontation and violence; they must be resolved through honest dialogue". This is thus assuming a basic principle of education for peace, we must be able to distinguish conflict from the violence in the conflict (which is needed to achieve change), since this is necessary or inevitable for social transformation. In the same interview he stated 'we have always said that if Colombia were ever able to open up democratic
channels so that the majority could use those spaces in their struggles without resorting to the right of rebellion, no one would be forced to take up arms". Halfway through the month the ELN requested a climate of peace to begin discussions and expressed its willingness to address all of the issues related to peace, including the issue of weapons, but it also demanded that the social and environmental conflict be discussed. In the January issue of the magazine Insurrección the ELN said that "peace ... means changes in the economic, social, cultural and territorial structure, and in military matters. Or to put it in more colloquial terms, the issue of weapons and the doctrine of the Armed Forces". And the article asked, quite rightly, 'why not include this issue of vital importance in the national debate when in the continent there are winds of a new sovereign, truly independent military doctrine where people are no longer considered the enemy?', which is in line with what was previously discussed in the section on the FARC, in the sense that all peace agreements involve a reduction in military structures and their budgets, and a change in military doctrine.

Meanwhile, in an interview ELN commander "Antonio Garcia" revealed for the first time some details regarding the progress made so far in the exploratory phase. According to him, "the points that we have been working on and have not yet been completed are:

1- Participation of civil society. The aim of the peace process is to influence or change the very course of the political dynamics that the country is familiar with.
2- Democracy for peace. A discussion and definition of what must be done to make democracy complete and real, a responsibility that society as a whole must take on.
3- Changes necessary for peace (has yet to be discussed). The people must decide what needs to be changed, considering that peace will not suddenly appear the day after the agreements.
4- Victims. It is essential to deal with the full set of issues: displacement and its causes, truth, justice, reparation, no repetition, forgiveness and not forgetting.
5- End of the armed conflict (has yet to be discussed).
6- Implementation of the agreement and referendum of its content."

The specifics of the methodology that would be used when formal negotiations begin had not yet been defined at the start the year. The possibility of changing the order of the six discussion points mentioned to bring them in line with the pace of negotiations with the FARC cannot be ruled out. "Antonio Garcia" explained that it was the Government who had contacted them two years ago, and that the Government of Venezuela facilitated the first meeting (subsequent meetings were held in Ecuador and Brazil). He said that seven months went by before the first meeting was held, and eight months before the second, which gave the ELN the impression that the Government was in no hurry. He criticized the "criteria" that the Government had established as preconditions for these first contacts: "confidentiality, direct dialogue and to be held abroad", although this is quite common in these kinds of preliminary contacts. He also said that all the issues were complex, and that the Government did not want to discuss issues such as the Armed Forces, the economy, the State, national sovereignty and questions regarding the cause of the conflict. He also said that "we demanded immediate, measurable actions. We wanted society to see immediate changes in their daily lives, as a guarantee that change is truly taking place. We did not want often-repeated promises", which could mean that they did not like the principle used with the FARC that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.' The ELN preferred a scheme where steps were applied immediately once they were approved at the table, and said they would only hand over their arms "after the negotiation of the agenda and after confirming that they agreements had been implemented", which the Government did not accept. The ELN's initial impression was that the Government simply wanted to subdue the group and achieve "peace". Given the above "Antonio Garcia" said that in order to address the present and future situation the Government should recognize or comply with the following points:

"1 - The peace agreement will not guarantee that life will be less traumatic.
2 – The political nature of the conflict and changes to the military doctrine.
3 - The state must set aside its idea that the other party (the ELN) will violate any agreement."
The peace negotiating tables must be open and must motivate and involve the whole country, which the Government would surely accept when the formal negotiations begin.

Finally, the ELN demanded a unilateral ceasefire by the State.

**Most significant events of the year**

- President Santos won the second round of the presidential elections and renewed his mandate.
- The Government and the FARC reached an agreement on the fourth agenda item regarding the solution to the problem of illicit drugs.
- The Government and the FARC surprised everyone by releasing a "Statement of Principles for the discussion of item 5 of the agenda: Victims", in which they recognized their responsibility in the conflict and pledged to let the victims have a voice in the discussions.
- A 12-member Historical Commission of Conflict and its Victims was created.
- In the negotiations with the FARC a "Subcommittee on Laying Down Arms and Incorporation into civilian life" was also created, with up to 10 members from each of the delegations, and would deal with the surrender of weapons, the ceasefire and the end to bilateral hostilities. They also created a gender subcommittee.
- "Pablo Catatumbo" admitted the damage the FARC had caused during the 50 years of conflict.
- The negotiations were interrupted for a few days, when an Army general was detained by the FARC, who then released him. Soon after, the FARC announced an indefinite unilateral ceasefire and an end to hostilities, although the Government did not accept international verification.
- President Juan Manuel Santos announced on June 10 that since January the Government had been holding exploratory talks with the ELN, after some initial contacts in late 2013. In October 2014 an agreement had been reached on two points: participation of society and the victims of conflict. At the end of the year the President said that the ELN would have to stop kidnapping as a condition to continue the exploratory talks.
- In January 2015 the ELN took the political initiative during its 5th Congress and stated that it would be willing to lay down arms if certain conditions were met. They also revealed the items on the agenda with the Government, and those where an agreement had been reached.

**Reasons crisis during the year**

- The Government refused to sign a bilateral ceasefire with the FARC.
- It was suspected that in the future the police would no longer report to the Ministry of Defence.
- Statements by the President of the Government that the negotiations with the guerrillas would not lead to a reform of the security forces.
- Doubts about the FARC’s interpretation of the meaning of "laying down arms" and if they would accept being part of a classic DDR process.
- Partisan accusations that secret agreements had been signed.
- Threats against human rights defenders, trade unionists and demobilized forces.
- The interception of the communications between the negotiating delegations.
- The unplanned capture by the FARC of a general, with a debate on whether he had been "detained" or "kidnapped", causing the temporary suspension of the negotiations.
- Warning from the International Criminal Court on the future implementation of transitional justice.
- Refusal by the Government to accept international oversight of the ceasefire and the end to hostilities unilaterally declared by the FARC.
• Excessive duration of the exploratory phase with the ELN and the long periods of time between the initial meetings.
• Differences in the agendas and the definitions of concepts such as "peace" and "social participation" between the Government and the ELN.
• Differences between the ELN and Government regarding the "methodological approaches" to the initial conversation.
• The capture by the Army of one of the members of the ELN negotiating delegation.
• End result: unilateral actions by the FARC, to consolidate the negotiations, and clarifications regarding the progress made in the exploratory phase with the ELN.

End result: progress with FARC.

Websites of interest

• Alto Comisionado para la Paz (www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co)
• Anncol (www.anncol.info) (información sobre las FARC)
• Centro de la Memoria Histórica (www.centrodememorialhistorica.gov.co)
• Centro de Pensamiento y Seguimiento al Diálogo de Paz, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (www.investigacion.unal.edu.co/piensapaz)
• Congreso de los Pueblos (www.congresodelospueblos.org)
• Delegación de Paz de las FARC (www.pazfarc-ep.blogspot.com.es)
• El Colombiano (www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/pd.asp)
• El Espectador (www.elespectador.com)
• El Tiempo (eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/noticias/index.htm)
• ELN (www.eln-voaces.com)
• FARC (resistenciafariana.blogspot.com) (farc-epeace.org)
• Fundación Ideas para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org)
• Indepaz (www.indepaz.org.co)
• Mesa de conversaciones (www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co)
• PNUD (www.undp.org.co)
• Reconciliación Colombia (www.reconciliacioncolombia.com)
• Revista Semana (www.semana.com)
Main parties in the process

**COLOMBIA Government**
- President: Juan Manuel Santos
- Peace Commissioner: Sergio Jaramillo
- Head of the negotiating FARC team: Humberto de la Calle

**ELN exploratory team:**
- Frank Pearl
- Eduardo Herrera Berbel
- Jaime Avendaño

**Norway**
- Cuba (guarantors)

**Venezuela**
- Chile (accompanying)

**UNDP**
- Universidad Nacional

**FARC “Timochenko”**
- Heads of the negotiating team: “Iván Márquez”, “Pablo Catatumbo”

**ELN**
- Negotiator: “Antonio García”

**Norway** (guarantors)
- Ecuador, Brazil

**Venezuela, Chile, Cuba** (accompanying)

*Space of intermediation*
ASIA

a) Southern Asia

AFGHANISTAN

Context of the conflict

A mountainous, extremely poverty-stricken, ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim country that cultivates opium and gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1919, Afghanistan's pre-existing monarchy came to an end with the coup d'état in 1973, when the country became a republic. A few years later, a Communist government came to power. This government became embroiled in fighting with an Islamic guerrilla group, a situation which led to the intervention of Soviet troops in 1979. The Soviets remained in the country with a total of 100,000 troops until 1989, and they only withdrew after negotiations with the United Nations and constant pressure from a coalition of militias (the Northern Alliance) that was supported by the United States. The civil war resumed, and in 1996 the Taliban forces ended up wrestling control of the country. They remained in power until 2001, when an international coalition led by NATO occupied the country ('Operation Enduring Freedom') with a contingent mainly made up of US soldiers. Hamid Karzai became the president of the country. Between 1992 and 1996, the various Afghan militias that were engaged in internecine fighting caused the death of around 50,000 people, most of them civilians. The country lived under constant instability, and the government only controlled the capital. Much of the population are still living as refugees in other countries.

Background to the peace process

As a result of the Bonn Agreement, which was signed in December 2011, the Interim Authority was created, and the process culminated in September with elections for the National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga) and the provincial councils. Since then, NATO has kept a military contingent in Afghanistan called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate from the United Nations. In March 2001, as the outcome of a Security Council resolution, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created with the purpose of implementing the commitments to reconstruct the country agreed to a few months earlier in Bonn. In early February 2007, the Wolesi Jirga or lower chamber of Afghanistan approved a draft law on amnesty for all the combatants who had participated in the 25 years of conflict, including Mullah Omar, the top Taliban authority, as well as individuals accused of war crimes, like the former Mujahedin (Afghan resistance fighters) who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, some of whom now occupy government posts. In September 2007, the Taliban stated that it was willing to start negotiations with the Afghan government, after President Hamid Karzai made a proposal that negotiations get underway. In early October 2008, President Hamid Karzai revealed that he had asked Saudi Arabia to facilitate peace negotiations with the Taliban leaders, and he stated that his envoys had travelled to Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan to start these talks. In 2009, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, stated that reconciliation with the Taliban might be an important initiative in an armed conflict where a US military victory could not be foreseen. In April 2010, a peace conference was held in which an action plan was drawn up for the reintegration of the low- and middle-ranking Taliban insurgents. The plan included job offers, training and other economic incentives. The Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, stated that the Taliban were willing to hold negotiations with Western politicians. The Taliban leader had stated that he was no longer interested in governing the country and that the Taliban’s objectives were to expel foreigners from the country and restore Sharia law and security. The Taliban had set no
preconditions for the talks; instead they had simply stated that they must be honest. In September, 40% of Afghans went to the polls for the legislative elections, and the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, announced the launch of a peace plan for the country. This new strategy, which would be led by a High Peace Council, had a twofold objective: first, to begin a dialogue with the Taliban leaders, and secondly, to remove the combatants from the base of the insurgency.

In January 2011, Afghanistan and Pakistan created a joint commission to draw up kinds of direct negotiations for the possible beginning of peace talks with the Taliban as part of the peace plan for the country launched by President Hamid Karzai in late 2010. In June, the president of the United States, Barack Obama, announced his plan to withdraw from the country, which stipulated the withdrawal of around 33,000 soldiers by September 2012, 10,000 of whom would be repatriated during 2011. In December, US government sources stated that the talks with the Taliban were at a key juncture and that the US was considering the possibility of moving an unspecified number of Taliban prisoners being held in Guantanamo back to Afghanistan. The prisoners would then be under the control of the Afghan government. In exchange, it asked the Taliban to implement some kind of trust-building measures, such as denouncing international terrorism or making a public expression of its intention to embark on formal talks with the Afghan government. The US held several meetings with the Taliban in Germany and Doha, specifically with representatives of Mullah Omar.

In January 2012, the Taliban insurgency announced it was opening a political office in Qatar, a move that would eventually have been accepted by Karzai’s government, which had been extremely reluctant to continue the peace process. However, the Taliban preferred to continue direct negotiations with the US and not with the Afghan government. In February, the US government and Taliban representatives held various meetings in Qatar in which they may have discussed preliminary confidence-building measures, such as a possible transfer of captives, according to the Taliban. However, the Taliban said that this was not linked to the peace process. Nevertheless, in March the Taliban announced that they were temporarily suspending negotiations with the US government. The main point of disagreement between the Taliban and the US was the issue of the prisoners in Guantanamo. Meanwhile, the High Peace Council appointed Salahuddin Rabbani to be its new chair. Rabbani is the son of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Council’s previous chair and former President of Afghanistan, who was assassinated by the Taliban in September 2011. In November, Pakistan released a group of Afghan Taliban prisoners, including the son of a prominent jihadist leader and other Taliban leaders, a move that Afghanistan interpreted as a sign of the neighbouring country’s willingness to facilitate negotiations with the Afghan government and the Taliban insurgency. Also, the efforts exerted by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council made the beginning of talks possible. In December, there was a meeting between leaders of the Taliban insurgency and Afghan government representatives in France organised by the French think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. The Taliban delegation included Shahabuddin Delawar, the representative of the political office in Qatar, and the meeting was also attended by members of the Afghan government, the Northern Alliance, which battled militarily with the Taliban for years, and Hezb-e-Islami, a Taliban ally. Before the meeting, Afghanistan’s High Peace Council proposed a plan to transform the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and other armed groups into political organisations and allow them to participate in all the political and constitutional processes in the country in 2015. According to this plan, Pakistan would replace the United States to lead the peace negotiations.

Both the Taliban and the U.S. denied in March 2013 that they had restarted talks, in response to accusations by Afghan President Hamid Karzai that they were holding “daily negotiations“. He also accused the U.S. of conniving with Taliban violence to justify the presence of soldiers in Afghanistan. According to media sources Karzai travelled to Qatar in late March to meet with the Qatari regime and explore the possibilities of peace talks with the Taliban. In turn, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry who was visiting Afghanistan in March urged the Taliban to begin talks with
the Government. The U.S., meanwhile, stated that they were in favour of the Taliban opening an office in Qatar.

Furthermore, a round of dialogue between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan and British Prime Minister David Cameron was held in February in the UK. It was the third round of talks since David Cameron proposed this trilateral mechanism in 2012. Unlike previous meetings, on this occasion foreign ministers as well as military and intelligence leaders took part. The parties stated that they were in favour of opening an official Afghan office in Qatar and urged the Taliban militias to do the same. In June the Taliban opened an office in Qatar, after years of negotiations, and the United States announced it would immediately hold talks with the Taliban to launch a process to resolve the conflict. The Taliban said it supported a political solution to the Afghan conflict and wished to have good relations with neighbouring countries. The actual opening of a Taliban office in Qatar in June raised concerns and strong criticism from the Afghan government after the Taliban raised a flag with the name of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the symbol and the name used during the time when the Taliban controlled the country. Karzai’s government reacted by suspending talks with the U.S. on its presence in the country after 2014 and on a bilateral security agreement. Finally, the symbols visible on the streets, the Taliban flag and the name, were removed from the office.

During the third quarter, the tension between the Afghan Government, the U.S. and the Taliban largely revolved around the Taliban office opened in Qatar that was closed after major disagreements between the parties. The Afghan government protested against the insurgents’ attempt to portray the office as an embassy of a government in exile with the display of the Taliban flag and a plaque with the inscription of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the country’s name during the Taliban regime), and urged the Qatari authorities to remove these symbols. Following the office closing the Taliban said they were looking at other options for alternative location. Meanwhile, the Afghan government said that it would only accept the negotiations if the office was opened in Turkey or Saudi Arabia. The conditions put forward by the Taliban to accept the negotiations were the release of Taliban prisoners from Guantánamo in exchange for the release of the only American prisoner of war in Taliban hands, the removal of the Taliban insurgents from the UN and U.S. terrorism lists, and recognition by the U.S. of the Taliban as a political and not merely military actor.

Furthermore, as the crisis unfolded some important events took place that could help relaunch the peace process. In September the Government of Pakistan set free Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the four founders of the Taliban in 1994. This leader was in favour of a negotiated political solution to the conflict. According to representatives of the Afghan government, despite having little room to manoeuvre –the Administration said that it would not reform the Constitution, the release could help the process. Along with the Taliban leader the Pakistani Government had in recent months also released 30 other people, including members of the Taliban insurgency. At the same time, in a meeting during the celebration of the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated their support for a peace process in Afghanistan led by the Afghans.

In October the governments of both countries agreed that a delegation of the High Peace Council, which is responsible for leading the peace talks with the Taliban insurgency, meet in Pakistan with the released Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar. Although his release was intended to be a boost to the peace process, Taliban sources said that Baradar remained under house arrest and was not able to hold meetings. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated his interest in a dialogue with the Taliban insurgency and said that the Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, would be in charge of the talks. The insurgency, and in particular its leader Hakimullah Mehsud, said that he hoped a government negotiating team would be appointed. He also demanded an end to the drone attacks.
The peace process in 2014

In the first months of the year some small progress was made. First, the High Council for Peace in Afghanistan acknowledged that a meeting had taken place with a Taliban faction in Dubai, in the UAE. The Taliban delegation was headed by the former Taliban minister Aga Jan Mohtism. The meeting took place without the authorization of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, although Mohtism did add that even though he was not sure if they would receive the leader’s direct support, he had never disowned them. Various Taliban leaders were members of this faction, including several former ministers, diplomats and commanders. Both Mohtism and the High Council for Peace highlighted the cordial atmosphere of the negotiations. This meeting was the most important one held since the failed negotiations in Qatar in June 2013. However, one of the delegates, Maulvi Abdul Raqeeb, former Taliban minister, was shot dead in Peshawar when returning from the negotiations. Nobody claimed responsibility for the action. These negotiations were part of the impetus that President Hamid Karzai had tried to give the peace process prior to the presidential elections, and also responds to his intention to not sign the bilateral security agreement with the U.S., which would regulate the presence of foreign troops in the country after the withdrawal of the international mission in 2014, as long as there is no negotiation with the Taliban insurgency. Furthermore, the U.S. administration was also trying to revive talks with the insurgency to make the exchange of prisoners possible. The U.S. had reportedly met with representatives of the Government of Qatar, where presumably the Guantanamo prisoners would be sent if they were freed in exchange for the release of U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl, captured by the Taliban. A crucial part of the agreement was that the Taliban freed by U.S. could not leave Qatar.

The most significant development during the second quarter was the agreement reached between the U.S. Government and the Taliban insurgency by which U.S. Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl –held as a prisoner of war by the Taliban for nearly five years- was freed in exchange for five Taliban leaders held in Guantanamo who were released and transferred to Qatar. The release was the result of a secret bilateral agreement reached between the U.S. and the Taliban without the intervention of the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as both sides indicated, independent of any negotiation process regarding the armed conflict in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. government said it could perhaps have a positive impact on efforts to achieve peace in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, different analysts were sceptical about the consequences that this agreement could have on the peace process and stated that in any event no progress could be made until the new Administration had been established. The agreement could have strengthened the position of those leaders in favour of negotiations since the U.S. respected the conditions set down by the insurgency so that the exchange of prisoners could take place. The Afghan government filed a protest with the U.S. Embassy stating that the transfer of nationals as prisoners to a third country was illegal, referring to the status that the Taliban will have in Qatar. In parallel to the negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban, the Afghan government said the arrest of a former Taliban leader in the UAE was hindering the peace process because Agha Jan Motasim, a former Taliban minister of finance, would have acted as a mediator between the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership. Afghanistan attributed his arrest to efforts by those who want to hinder the peace process, which could be an indirect reference to Pakistan.

In early September the Foreign Minister of India visited Afghanistan and announced his willingness to assist in the peace process. On the 21st of that month the presidential candidates Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun) and Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik North) reached an agreement to form a national unity government, in which Ghani would be the president and Abdullah would hold the post of chief executive. Both signed a security agreement with the United States that would allow U.S. troops to remain in the country beyond the 2014 deadline. At the same time, in a meeting during the celebration of the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated their support for a peace process in Afghanistan led by the Afghans. In October a meeting was held in China of the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, with the participation of Russia, China and
Iran, among others, and the role these countries could play in the peace process was discussed. The governments of India and Pakistan agreed that a delegation of the High Peace Council, which is responsible for leading the peace talks with the Taliban insurgency, meet in Pakistan with the released Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar. Although his release was intended to be a boost to the peace process, Taliban sources said that Baradar remained under house arrest and was not able to hold meetings. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated his interest in a dialogue with the Taliban insurgency and said that the Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, would be in charge of the talks. The insurgency, and in particular its leader Hakimullah Mehsud, said that he hoped a government negotiating team would be appointed. He also demanded an end to the drone attacks.

In November the new president of Afghanistan visited Pakistan with the hope that cooperation between the two countries could help renew the negotiations with the Taliban. Both countries have plans to double bilateral trade in five years. Pakistan's Advisor on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, said that his country could facilitate negotiations, but it would not take the initiative. In this regard, he said that Qatar, Turkey and especially China could play an important role in the future since a meeting had already been held with the Taliban in Beijing. Qari Din Mohammad Hanif, who had been Planning Minister during the Taliban regime and is based in Qatar, participated in the meeting. In the same direction, at the end of the month the Pakistani Defence Minister said his country wants Russia to become involved in the peace process in Pakistan, since the presence of China and Russia were a source of stability. The Afghan president had already travelled to China to study the role it could play. China has great economic expectations for Afghanistan, a country rich in minerals (such as copper) and oil, and is planning to build a railway line between the Afghan and Chinese capitals and a pipeline that will unite the two countries. Since 2001 China has provided $ 250 million of economic assistance to Afghanistan, part of which was earmarked for training the Afghan police. In October China promised an additional 327 million dollars in aid beginning in 2017. Another country involved in the economic development of Afghanistan is Germany, which in recent years has provided 430 million euros in aid annually for economic and social development and pledged 150 million euros a year to improve the Afghan security forces. In early December a conference on Afghanistan was held in London with the participation of 60 countries. As a trust-building measure Pakistan freed 50 Taliban, 9 of which joined the peace process. Also in December members of civil society from Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Beijing (China) in a "second track dialogue" on security and reconciliation. Among the organizations attending were Pakistan's Regional Peace Institute, linked to the intelligence services, and the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, which has ties to the Chinese Communist Party.

Also in December the NATO mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, came to a close and was replaced by the Resolute Support Mission, which provides support and training to Afghan security forces. In parallel, the U.S. also finalized its Enduring Freedom mission, which was substituted by the Operation Freedom's Sentinel. A total of 10,800 U.S. troops will continue to be deployed in Afghanistan, in addition to several thousand more troops from NATO, which would bring the total to 13,500 foreign troops in the country, although the final figure could be higher. It became public that President Ashraf Ghani had begun contacts with the insurgency in the hope that peace negotiations in Qatar could be resumed and, according to a member of the High Peace Council, a meeting was planned between members of the Council, the Taliban and Pakistan. However, this information was denied by other Council representatives. At the same time the first vice president, warlord and former commander of the Northern Alliance, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who has been accused of war crimes by human rights organizations, travelled to the north of the country to start a negotiation process with the Taliban insurgency at the request of the President, in which at least 500 Taliban would surrender their weapons in exchange for promises of employment. Dostum said that thousands of insurgents were joining this process.

By year's end there were two possible mediation paths. One was the tripod made up of China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second was a group of countries in the region, the so-called "6+1"
group, made up of the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This group has already met twice.

### Most significant events of the year

- The Afghan High Peace Council acknowledged that a meeting had taken place with a Taliban faction in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates.
- The Afghan Government said the arrest of a former Taliban leader in the United Arab Emirates was holding back the peace process since Agha Jan Mutasim, the former Taliban minister of Finance, had been mediating between the Afghan Government and the Taliban leadership.
- The Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, was appointed to lead the dialogue with the Taliban.
- By year's end there were two possible mediation paths. One was the tripod made up of China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second was a group of countries in the region, called the "6+1" made up of the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. China, which allowed the Taliban to visit the country, seemed to be the most well positioned to facilitate future negotiations.
- President Ashraf Ghani had initiated contacts with the insurgency with the hope of resuming peace negotiations in Qatar.
- In December 500 Taliban surrendered their weapons and joined the peace process.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Division in the Taliban.
- Government disagreement with unilateral U.S. decisions.
- Arrest of a Taliban leader who was acting as an intermediary.
- Extremely fragile political context, with difficulties to form a government.
- Insecurity.

**End result:** unresolved, but with possible new mediations in 2015.

### Websites of interest

- Afghanistan Analyst Network (www.afghanistan-analysts.org)
- Eurasia (www.eurasianet.org)
- Human Security Report Project (www.hsrgroup.org)
- Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (www.ipcs.org)
- ISAF (www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.html)
- ONU (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc)
- Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (www.peacebuilding.no)
- PNUD (www.undp.org/afghanistan)
- Presidencia de la República (www.president.gov.af)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- UNAMA (www.unama-afg.org)
Main parties involved in the process

**Pakistan**
In charge of talks: Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan

**AFGHANISTAN**
Government
President: (Hamid Karzai)
Ashraf Ghani
High Peace Council: Salahuddin Rabbani
Negociator: Ch. Nisar Ali Khan

**Qatar**
Dubai
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (France)

**Taliban**
Mullah Omar
Mullah Baradar
Aga Jan Mohtism
Syed Tayyeb Agha

**Hezb-e-Islami**

**USA**
(John Kerry)

**UK**

**Intelligence Services**

**AFGHANISTAN**

**USA**

**UK**

**Intelligence Services**

**Germany**

**UNAMA**

**Saudi Arabia**

**CMI (Finland)**

**China**
(Sun Yuxi)
Russia
India
Iran

**Space of intermediation**
INDIA

With 1.267 billion inhabitants, a surface area of 3.2 million km² and a GDP of 1.8 trillion USD, India is a genuine mosaic with regard to political cultures and traditions, expressed in the many regions inhabited by peoples with aspirations of reunification and self-government, which have led to armed conflict in some of them. This section discusses the processes that have emerged in the regions of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland and deals last with the dispute with Pakistan over the region of Kashmir.

a) Assam

Context of the conflict

Assam is a region in northeast India. Many immigrants from Bangladesh have arrived in this region, and as a result several nationalist groups have emerged calling for the region to be liberated. The main nationalist group is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which was created in 1979 and has Maoist leanings. The ULFA chose to engage in an armed struggle from 1989 onwards. In 1994, 4,000 of its combatants abandoned the group. However, they did not lay down their arms and instead went on to attack ULFA bases in Bhutan. As conditions for talks with the Government, the ULFA requested negotiations abroad in the presence of UN observers. It has carried out attacks against oil company interests and has training bases in Bangladesh. The group underwent divisions that led to the creation of the ULFA-PTF, which was led by Arabinda Rajkhowa and supported the negotiations, and the ULFA-ATF (now called the ULFA-I). This second group, created in 2011, was initially opposed to the negotiations and is lead by the historical figure "Golap Baruah". The other important group is the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), created in 1988, which took up arms in 1992. They also fight against the Bangladesh immigrants, who are Muslims, and strive to create “Bodoland”, an independent state separate from Assam. It has bases in Bhutan and around 3,500 combatants, many of whom are Christians. This group split into three factions: the NDFB-P that backed the negotiations with the Government, the NDFB (RD) led by Ranjal Daimary, and which eventually began a dialogue with the Government, and the NDFB (S) led by IK Singbijit, which was against any dialogue.

There are other groups in the region (BLT, UPDS and DHD) that have reached ceasefire agreements with the government.

Background to the peace process

The first contacts between the Government and the ULFA took place in 1991. In 1996 the ULFA made an offer of peace, but their demand for the independence of Assam was not accepted. In subsequent years the group’s social backing fell significantly due to episodes of extortion and kidnapping and incidents that caused the death of civilians. In 2004, the ULFA approached the government regarding possible negotiations. During 2005, a delegation of eleven trustworthy citizens, the People’s Consultative Group (PCG), was appointed to hold contacts with the Indian government. The contacts were facilitated by writer R. Goswami (who died in 2011) and the former footballer R. Phukan. This consultative group pledge to hold consultations with civil society and to forward the conclusions to the government. The first round of negotiations via the PCG was held on the 25th of October 2005. In 2007, the government noted that the doorway was open to a new peace process, but that the leaders of the ULFA had to be the ones to get in touch with the government, thus leaving behind the formula of negotiating via a third party (namely the
In early January 2009, the Alpha and Charlie companies of the 28th battalion of the ULFA, which had unilaterally declared a ceasefire in June, created a new organisation which they called ULFA Pro-Negotiations, led by Mrinal Hazarika. They also announced that they were giving up on their demand for sovereignty and independence and would work to achieve greater autonomy for the state of Assam. In June 2010, the Indian government gave the green light for the state of Assam to begin a negotiation process with the ULFA and appointed the former head of the intelligence office, PC Haldar, as the interlocutor with the armed group. The Indian government chose not to oppose the requests for release upon bail of the ULFA leaders in order to lay the groundwork for the start of peace talks. In February 2011, the Indian government and the pro-negotiation faction of the ULFA, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, began the first round of formal talks. In August, the ULFA declared for the first time that it did not want to secede from India and that it would accept reaching some kind of sovereignty within the framework of the Indian constitution.

In 2003, an agreement was signed that put an end to 11 years of clashes between the government and the group BLTF-BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers). In 2003, as well, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the group DHD, which had been founded in 1995 and upheld the independence of the Dimasa people. In mid-September 2009, the DHD-J, also known as Black Widow, started a process of surrendering and turning in its weapons after the ultimatum issued by the government in this vein. With regard to the negotiations with the NDFB, in May 2005 talks began which led to a ceasefire agreement. The faction in favour of negotiations is called NDFB-Progressive, and its secretary general is Govinda Nasumatary, alias B. Swmkhwr, who reached a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2005. With regard to the faction of the NDFB led by Ranjan Daimary, which was traditionally against the peace process, in January 2011 it offered the Indian government a unilateral ceasefire with the goal of being able to start talks with the government.

In early 2010, 419 members and leaders of the armed opposition group Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF), which included 22 women, turned in their weapons. The KLNLF emerged in 2004 as a faction of the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). In late October 2011, the government signed a peace agreement with the armed opposition group UPDS after two years of negotiations. The agreement called for the creation of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Territorial Council in that district, as well as its territorial reorganisation.

In January 2012, around 700 insurgents from nine armed opposition groups handed over their weapons to Indian Prime Minister P Chidambaram. The insurgents belonged to the armed groups APA, AANLA, STF, BCF, ACMA, KLA/KLO, HPC, UKDA and KRA. All nine groups belonged to the Kuki community, which inhabits the eastern part of the state, and to the Adivasi community, which lives in the north and west of Assam. Even though the groups have ceasefire agreements with the government, formal peace negotiations had not yet begun. The ULFA facton that supports reaching an agreement with the government (ULFA-PTF) would have accepted constitutional reforms to protect the state’s identity and natural resources, meaning that it was stepping away from its initial claim of sovereignty. This faction asked for a separate constitution, similar to the one in Jammu and Kashmir, which affords complete autonomy to manage economic, forest, land, water and mining resources. In October, the Indian government and the government of Assam signed a peace agreement with both factions of the armed opposition group DHD. Reached after various rounds of negotiations, the agreement provided for the armed group to dissolve within six months and greater decentralisation in the district of Dima Hasao and was approved by both factions of the group, DHD(N) and DHD(J). Thus, the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council will now be called the Dima Hasao Autonomous Territorial Council and there will be administrative reorganisation and social and economic development projects. The Indian government could begin negotiations with the faction led by Ranjan Daimary, of the armed opposition group NDFB, and is reportedly waiting for a formal letter from the government of Assam that endorses the agreement between the leadership of both parties to start talks.
At the beginning of 2013, in the peace talks between the ULFA PTF armed group (the Pro-Talks faction of the ULFA) and the central Government, it became known that the talks were making progress and that they were on track. The group declared that its goal was not to split away from India, but to achieve autonomy for the region within the Indian Constitution. The faction that was in favour of dialogue, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, met with the Government delegation at the beginning of March. The armed group’s delegation also met with Interior Minister Sushilkumar Shinde. In March it was disclosed that the secretary general of ULFA-PTF, Anup Chetia (alias Golap Baruah) could be transferred to India in the near future by the Government of Bangladesh – where he lived and served time after being arrested in 1997 by the authorities of that country – to join the negotiations. According to some sources, Chetia was an influential figure in the ULFA-PTF, even in the faction led by Paresh Barua that continued with the armed struggle and had, until then, been against talks with the Government.

In the second quarter the parties were looking for a solution to three issues where no agreement had been reached: the protection of the political and cultural identity of the native population of Assam, land rights and the issue of illegal immigration. The statements were issued after the sixth round of talks held in June between a 26-member delegation of the ULFA-PTF, led by its leader Arabinda Raikhowa, and the Government. The meeting was presided over by the Minister of Interior, R. K. Singh, who stated that he hoped the secretary general of the armed group, Anup Chetia, in prison in Bangladesh, could be returned to India very soon. Despite the progress made, some mid-level leaders of the ULFA-ATF expressed dissatisfaction at the leadership’s lack of transparency regarding the content of the negotiating process, according to some media sources. Probal Neog, Jiten Dutta, Antu Choudang and Bijoy Chinese were some of the leaders that were critical of the process. In the third quarter, at a meeting between the Government and the Pro-Talks faction the ULFA, the Government agreed to grant Scheduled Tribe status for five ethnic groups – Moran, Motok, Chutia, Koch-Rajbongshi and Tai-Ahom – as requested by the armed organization. This status would help ensure land ownership rights and their presence in certain institutions. Government sources stated that this recognition also sought to prevent Bangladeshi immigrants from purchasing land. The Government could also soon accept other ULFA-PTF demands on issues such as work permits for immigrants from Bangladesh and that citizenship should not be granted automatically to those immigrants’ descendants.

Also, in the Indian state of Assam the seven-year-long dialogue with the faction of the NDFB that had thus far been in favour of negotiations, the NDFB (Progressive), ran into serious difficulties in the first quarter of 2013, to the point that it had come to a standstill. In mid-January, the leaders of the NDFB (P) met with Interior Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde in New Delhi to express their unhappiness with the government representative and former intelligence chief, PC Haldar. They protested for the lack of results in the process and demanded a new government envoy or the start of talks at the political level. They accused the Government of trying to side-track the demand for a separate state under the Constitution. In March the group finally decided to withdraw from the talks until the Indian government was willing to discuss at the political level the demand for the creation of a separate state for the Bodos. The NDFB (P) explained that after the January meeting they had sent a list of written demands to the Minister of Interior. Since there was no response regarding their participation in the negotiations the group decided not to take part in the round on 28 February.

Preliminary talks continued between the Government and Ranjan Daimary, the leader of the NDFB (RD) Bodo faction, who is in prison in Guwahati. According to local media sources, Daimary had expressed interest in conducting peace talks and, once they had begun, the possibility that various leaders could be set free on bail so that they could take part in the process. However, no amnesty for especially serious crimes was planned and the peace talks would thus run parallel to the trials against members of the group that had been charged with such offenses. The conversations with Daimary were held through the government representative PC Haldar.
Ranjan Daimary was released on bail in June to make it possible for him to participate in the talks with the Government. According to a statement at the end of June by the government envoy for the dialogue with the NDFB (R), former head of intelligence PC Haldar, the peace talks could start soon. Informal contacts between the two had taken place over the last year in Guwahati prison to prepare the talks. With the start of formal talks the NDFB (RD) became the second faction of the NDFB to take part in negotiations, since the 7-year-long dialogue between the Government and the main faction of the group, the NDFB (Progressive), was still ongoing. The third faction of the group, the NDFB (S), under the leadership of I. K. Songbijit, was against the dialogue. In late November the Government and the NDFB (RD) signed a six-month ceasefire agreement. The group claimed to have 579 cadres and 40 weapons. The Government prepared two camps to house the cadres. Since 2008 fighting between this group and the Government has caused about 100 deaths.

The peace process in 2014

During the year nothing significant occurred.

b) Manipur

Context of the conflict

Manipur is a small state located in the northeast of India which borders with Nagaland to the north, Mizoram to the south and Assam to the west. It shares a boundary with Myanmar to the east. The state has a high rate of unemployment, and the majority ethnic group is the Meiteis. In 1947, as India awaited independence, Manipur became an independent kingdom. In 1949 it was absorbed by India, and in 1972 it was given the status of a state. There are numerous armed separatist groups that started their actions shortly after the country’s independence, including the PREPAK, the UNLF, the KNF, the KCP-MC, the KCP-Lamphel, the URF, the KYKL-MDF, the UPK, the UPF and the KNO. Most of the groups participate in talks with the Government of Manipur.

Background to the peace process

In 2000, the UNLF set three conditions for negotiating with the government: discussing the issue of sovereignty, demilitarising the region and verification of the negotiations by a third country. These conditions were not accepted by the government. In February 2001 the government offered a one-month unilateral ceasefire to the different groups in the region, all of which rejected the offer. Several groups from civil society, such as women’s organisations, have been very active in promoting peace and human rights in the state. In October 2005 several Kuki groups declared an informal ceasefire with the government. In September 2006 it proposed a plan to resolve the conflict, which included a United Nations plebiscite and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. However, the plan was rejected by the government.

In March 2010 peace negotiations were held between the central state, the government of the state of Manipur and the Kangleipak Communist Party – Military Council (KCP-MC, Lallumba faction), which had been founded in 1980 as a dissident group of PREPAK, in which the members of this organisation turned in their weapons. In order to facilitate the negotiations, the Joint Monitoring Group was created in May. In the past, this organisation sought independence for Manipur. In 1995, after the death of its leader, it was divided into ten factions, one of which is the Lallumba. In March, too, the Secretary of State met with the leaders of the Kuki National Front (KNF), a group formed in 1988 to create the community of Kukiland, to explore the possibilities of opening up peace talks. This group already signed a suspension of operations with
the central government in August 2008, and its ranks were gathered into encampments set aside for this purpose.

The first tripartite meeting between the Indian government, the government of the state of Manipur and the United Naga Council (UNC) was held in September. The three representatives met in New Delhi to discuss the status of the Naga population in Manipur. At the meeting, the Indian government expressed its approval of the UNC’s gesture to suspend the economic blockade, which in the government’s opinion contributed to creating an atmosphere propitious for dialogue.

During the first months of 2013 progress was made on several fronts. On the one hand, the respective governments of India and Manipur were in favour of initiating political dialogues with both of the Kuki insurgent organizations, the KNO and UPF. In December 2012 a team from the Indian Ministry of the Interior travelled to the capital of Manipur, Imphal, and held discussions with leaders of the KNO and UPF for an agreement to suspend operations. In late January it was disclosed that an agreement had been reached between the central Government and the two insurgencies to appoint former intelligence chief PC Haldar as the envoy for the political dialogue. In early March Manipur Governor Gurbachan Jagat issued a statement saying that the Indian and Manipur governments had signed an extension of the suspension of operations with the UPF and he urged the KNO to sign a similar agreement. UPF sources said in early March that the political dialogue could begin shortly, but it had been postponed because of the elections in Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya. Moreover, in mid-February the Indian and Manipur governments and three insurgencies signed a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding to suspend operations. The three groups were the URF, KCP-Lamphel and KYKL-MDF. Official sources stated that peace talks would begin soon. Nevertheless, officials of the three groups warned that they would resume their military campaigns if the Government was not committed to moving forward in the peace process.

In April seven KCP-MC cadres laid down their arms. This faction and the KCP Lamphel and KCP-Pakhanglakpa factions stated their intention to begin peace talks with the Central and State governments. The announcement was made by the secretary general of KCP-Lamphel, Taibang Nganba, in a press conference. The head of the KCP-MC faction, Ningthoujam Romen, was released in June to facilitate the peace talks with the Central and Manipur governments.

A month later the Government of Manipur, the Indian Government and the UPPK rebel group signed a peace accord. 45 members of the UPPK laid down their arms in February. After signing the Memorandum of Understanding the Chief Minister of Manipur, Ibobi Singh, urged other armed groups to lay down their arms.

In the third quarter, the state government signed Memorandums of Understanding with three armed opposition groups, the KCP-N, the KNLF and the KRP. The memorandums committed the rebel organizations to disarm and start peace negotiations. Different media sources said that the signing of these agreements was triggered by the release of Lanheiba Meitei, the leader of the KCP-N who had been arrested in 2011. In the past year seven armed opposition groups agreed to hold peace talks with the Government. The Chief Minister of the State, Okram Ibobi, called on 30 other insurgent groups to join the peace negotiations. Media sources said that the insurgents from the three factions that signed the memorandum would join the Government of Manipur's surrender and rehabilitation policy. Nevertheless, the main insurgent groups operating in the state, PREPEAK, UNLF, PLA and RPF are still active and have not reached any kind of agreement with the Government.

The peace process in 2014

In April the seven armed groups that had signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government (the URFm KYKL (MDF), KCO (Lamphel), UPPK, KCP (Nongdrenkhomba), KCP-MC (Lallumba) and
the UTLA), totalling about 600 members, condemned the Government for not letting them vote. In late November Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a two-day visit to Manipur and Nagaland, as the Naga people is divided between the two States. Modi said the issue of peace was on his agenda, although during the year no progress in this regard was made. In December the United Naga Council (UNC), an umbrella group for the Naga people of Manipur, continued to demand a peace agreement with the NSCN-IM, which acts primarily in the state of Nagaland.

Main parties involved in the process

**MANIPUR**

**Government**

Governor: Gurbachan Jagat

Negotiator: PC Haldar

- URF
- UIPF
- KCP-Lamphel
- KCP-Pakhanglakpa
- KCP-MC
- KCP-N
- KNLF
- KRP
- KYKL-MDF
- UPKK
- UPKK
c) Nagaland

Context of the conflict

The conflict in Nagaland is one of the oldest in India. It involves Christian Tibetan-Burmese tribes who have been fighting for their independence since the 1950s. The main group is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which was founded in 1980. There was a schism in the group in 1988, and it divided into the NSCN (K), which operates in the north of the state, and the NSCN (IM), which is better established in the south. The NSCN (IM) has 4,500 combatants and a strong component of Christian fundamentalists. Its leaders are exiled in Thailand. Many other members live in the Netherlands and Ireland. The region is rich in natural gas resources.

Background to the peace process

Since the first ceasefire in 1997, the NSCN-IM has held more than 80 rounds of negotiations with the government, many of them in Thailand and others in Amsterdam and New Delhi, in which the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire. The government reiterated to the armed group that the issue of sovereignty was totally off-limits for discussion and that any solution to the conflict had to fall within the country’s constitution. The armed group may agree to remain part of India via a special federal relationship with the union. During the second half of February 2010, the central government appointed the former chief secretary of Nagaland, R. S. Pandey, as its interlocutor for the negotiations with the group. The executive noted that it was willing to grant Nagaland the maximum autonomy possible, even if that entailed a constitutional reform. The government and the armed group met once again in Delhi. The armed group was represented by a five-member delegation led by Muivah. The negotiations focused on the 31-point proposal submitted by the armed group, which included the unification of all the districts inhabited by the Naga people, and their own constitution, flag, currency and army. The leaders of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, accepted an Indian passport in February 2011 as a symbolic gesture of their willingness to engage in talks with the government.

In early June 2009, the armed opposition group NSCN-K stated that it was prepared to start formal peace negotiations with the government of India, eight years after having reached a ceasefire agreement with Delhi. The NSCN-K stated that it was willing to set no preconditions for the dialogue and that issues like sovereignty could be discussed at the negotiating table, but without that being an obstacle to starting negotiations. In June 2011, the NSCN-K was grappling with an internal division after the tensions in early May between India-based sectors of the group and sectors operating from Myanmar. Some analysts stated that these tensions might lead to a rapprochement and reconciliation between the India-based sector of the NSCN-K and the NSCN-IM, which is currently involved in talks with the government.

Significant progress was made in the peace process during the third quarter of 2012, after all members of the Nagaland Assembly went to Delhi to meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to tell him that they were ready to give up their seats to make way for a new political agreement emanating from a possible peace agreement between the government and the insurgents ahead of the state elections scheduled for February 2013. After their meeting with the government, the Naga lawmakers held separate meetings with the four main Naga insurgent groups, the NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN (Khole-Kitovi or NSCN-KK) and NNC (FGN). All four armed groups were in favour of reconciliation. However, the NSCN-K stated that they would only accept an agreement that included Naga sovereignty. In October, the Indian government and the armed opposition group NSCN-IM were close to signing a peace agreement. Both parties were
reportedly working on a memorandum of understanding that considered different proposals. The agreement would involve establishing autonomous development councils, a unique flag for the state, more autonomy and a special status, in addition to formal recognition of the Naga people’s unique history. The armed group began consultations with civil society and said that they would not sign anything until these consultations had terminated. The armed opposition group NSCN-K and the government would have begun peace negotiations in November, but there was no official confirmation in that regard. An insurgent delegation had an informal meeting with the government, although the armed group was apparently waiting to receive a formal invitation to start the process after initially getting a verbal one. No peace negotiations had taken place since a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001.

During the second quarter of 2013 the peace agreements with the NNC independence group continued to be suspended by the central Government because of numerous attacks against candidates for the State Assembly earlier in the year. In turn, the NSCN-K agreed with the Government to extend for another year the joint ceasefire accord that expired on April 28. The ceasefire between the NSCN-KK and the Government was also renewed for another year. In turn, it was disclosed in April that the NSCN-IM, in negotiations with the central Government, had submitted a proposal for greater autonomy several months earlier, although the group said in April that it had not given up on its demand for independence and sovereignty. The peace process with this armed group remained at a virtual standstill during the first nine months of the year, with practically no significant progress in the negotiations between the Indian Government and the Naga armed opposition group NSCN-IM. The armed group said that it was the Government’s turn to move the negotiations forward, since it had already taken the necessary steps. One of the proposals of the Government of Manipur referred to the possibility of amending some laws to enable the creation of an organism that would protect the customs and traditions of the Naga population in Manipur. Specifically, the Manipur Hill Areas Autonomous District Council Act should be reformed. This proposal had to be reviewed by the NSCN-IM. In addition, the Government of Manipur stated that it was considering the possibility of giving the autonomous district councils more budgetary independence. At the end of the year the Government’s negotiator, RS Pandey, resigned to take part in partisan politics. The NSCN-IM, after holding 50 rounds of negotiations, proposed a special federal agreement that would allow the Naga people to govern themselves.

The peace process in 2014

Peace talks between the Government and the NSCN-IM continued to be at a complete standstill over the first months of the year. The armed group said that the Government was unwilling to restart the process. The leaders of the group, Isak Chisi Swu and Th. Muivah, who had been in Delhi since November in an attempt to revive the negotiations, returned to Nagaland and accused the Government of deliberately postponing the talks. They also stated that the resignation of the Government envoy, RS Pandey, in December was making the smooth running of the process very difficult. Meanwhile, the Indian Government had proposed two candidates to replace Pandey, N.C. Marwah and R. N. Singh, both retired military officers.

In late March three Naga insurgent organizations, the GPRN/NSCN (Khole Khitovi), NSCN/GPRN (IM) and NNC/FGN, signed the Lenten agreement, in which they once again accepted their previous commitments for the formation of a National Naga Government (NNG). Thus, they were all grouped together in a single insurgent organization. The three groups emphasized the importance of the progress made towards the reconciliation of the different Naga organizations and noted that another objective of the agreement was to reduce the hostilities between factions. In April several meetings were held by the member organizations. The most important was a five-day meeting which took place in the city of Kolkata in an attempt to move forward on the implementation of the Lenten agreement, especially with regard to confidence-building measures. The meeting was facilitated by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation and the main leaders of the GPRN/NSCN and NNC/FGN attended, but not those of the NSCN/GPRN.
(Isak Chisi Swu and Th. Muivah) because they did not obtain authorization from the Indian Government to travel to Kolkata where the meeting took place. However, the Government denied that it had not authorized the trip. The Government Joint Secretary, Shambhu Singh, issued a statement that while negotiations with the NSCN-IM were ongoing conversations with other insurgent groups would not be launched because many of the issues being discussed in this process would affect the rest. Nevertheless, neither the Government or the NSCN-IM provided details on when the formal peace negotiations would resume, although informal meetings between government representatives and the armed group continued to take place. After the elections in April and May the newly formed state government demanded that the newly established Indian government appoint an envoy for the negotiations in Nagaland, although media sources stated that the interlocutor to date, Ajit Lal, could continue with this responsibility. Furthermore, the Government and the NSCN-K and NSCN-KK armed groups renewed their ceasefire agreement.

In mid-July the new Indian government led by the BJP party resumed the peace talks with the NSCN-IM, while the NSCN-K rejected any agreement. A delegation from the NSCN-IM went to Delhi at the invitation of the Indian government to prepare a new round of talks. The delegation was led by the president of the NSCN-IM, Isak Shishi Swu, and the general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah. It was the first direct talks since November 2013, and following the election of the new Indian government, led by Narendra Modi. Different Naga sectors considered that the formation of the new Administration would be positive for the peace process. A crucial point was whether Prime Minister Modi would meet directly with leaders of the insurgency or if a previous encounter would take place with the envoy designated by the Government, RN Ravi. Meanwhile, the chief minister of Nagaland, T.R. Zeliang, said that the new Government will give added momentum to the peace process by establishing a timeframe for negotiations, but stressed that the role of the Naga government was limited to acting as a facilitator since it was not directly participating in the negotiations. In addition, Zeliang said that the Joint Legislators’ Forum (that grouped together all Naga members of parliament to reinforce the peace process) would soon be re-constituted and it would meet with the Indian government, the insurgency and different political parties. Zeliang also stated that if an agreement were reached with the NSNC-IM it should be accepted by the other insurgent organizations, and if the Central Government finally accepted that areas inhabited by the Naga population in the state of Manipur could become part of Nagaland, this should be accepted by the state government.

At the end of November, and after 17 years and 80 rounds of talks with the NSCN-IM, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Nagaland in an attempt to bolster the dialogue with the group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Progress was made in the implementation of the Lenten agreement, especially with regard to confidence-building measures.</td>
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<td>• The Government stated that while the negotiations with the NSCN-IM continued, talks with other insurgent groups would not be conducted.</td>
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<td>• In mid-July the new Indian Government led by the BJP party resumed the peace talks with the NSCN-IM, while the NSCN-K rejected any agreement.</td>
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<td>• The Nagaland Government highlighted that its role was only as a facilitator, without direct participation in the negotiations.</td>
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<td>• At the end of the year the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Nagaland in an attempt to bolster the dialogue with the group.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Resignation of the Government representative in the talks.</td>
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<td>• Hostilities between Naga factions.</td>
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<td>• Government’s decision not to authorize travel by Naga leaders for a unification</td>
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</table>
- Refusal by the Government to negotiate with all groups simultaneously.

**End result:** negotiations only took place with the NSCN-IM.

<table>
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<th>Websites on the peace processes in India</th>
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<tr>
<td>- AlertNet (<a href="http://www.alertnet.org">www.alertnet.org</a>)</td>
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<td>- Andhra News Net (<a href="http://www.andhranews.net">www.andhranews.net</a>)</td>
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<td>- Assam Tribune (<a href="http://www.assamtribune.com">www.assamtribune.com</a>)</td>
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<td>- CDPS (cdpsindia.org)</td>
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<td>- Gobierno de la India (india.gov.in)</td>
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<td>- IDSA (<a href="http://www.idsa.in">www.idsa.in</a>)</td>
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<td>- Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (<a href="http://www.ipcs.org">www.ipcs.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Nagalandia International Support Centre (<a href="http://www.nagalim.nl">www.nagalim.nl</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Nagalandia Post (<a href="http://www.Nagalandiapost.com">www.Nagalandiapost.com</a>)</td>
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<td>- Nagalim (<a href="http://www.nagalim.nl/naga/index-2.html">www.nagalim.nl/naga/index-2.html</a>)</td>
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<td>- North East News Agency (<a href="http://www.nenanews.com">www.nenanews.com</a>)</td>
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<td>- SATP (<a href="http://www.satp.org">www.satp.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- South Asia Analysis Group (<a href="http://www.saag.org">www.saag.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Sentinel (<a href="http://www.sentinelassam.com">www.sentinelassam.com</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process: Assam and Nagaland

**Assam Government**
- Governor: Janaki Ballav Patnaik
- Prime Minister: Tarun Gogoi
- Interlocutor for negotiations: PC Haldar

**Nagaland Government**
- Governor: PB Acharya

**Nagaland Government**
- Governor: PB Acharya

**Nagaland Government**
- Interlocutor: (RD Paudey)
- Ajit Lal
- Central Government negotiator: RN Avi

**Space of intermediation**

**Bangladesh**

**ULFA-ATF**
- ULFA-I (Golap Baruah)
- (A Raikhowa)
- (G Basumary)
- (Paresh Barua)

**ULFA-PTF Pro-Negotiations**
- (Arabinda Rajkhowa)

**DHD (J) Black Widow**

**DHD-N**

**NDFB**

**NDFB-P Progress**

**NDFB (RD) Ranjal Daimary**

**NSCN-IM**
- (T Muivah)
- (I Chisi Swu)

**NSCN-K**
- S.S. Kaplang

**NSCN-KK**
- (Khole-Kitovi)

**NNC (FGN)**
INDIA – PAKISTAN (Kashmir)

Context of the conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir dates back to the partition in 1947, when both countries won independence from the United Kingdom and Kashmir was divided between India (the state of Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan and China. According to the 1947 Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was free to join either India or Pakistan. Its decision to join India was a source of conflict between the two countries, and the clashes began the same year. India laid claim to the territories controlled by the other countries, arguing that those lands had been administrated by the Maharajah of Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan laid claim to part of an area under Indian control for reasons of Muslim identity. Since then, there have been three armed confrontations (1947, 1948 and 1965), and hostilities resumed in 1971. In July 1949, both countries signed the Karachi Agreement, which set a ceasefire line that was to be controlled by observers. As a result, the UN created an observation mission called UNMOGIP. This mission is still active and has international observers on the Line of Control. At the end of the 1980s tension mounted, with the added risk of the nuclear weapons that both countries possess.

The conflict therefore has two dimensions. The first is an inter-state conflict, involving a border dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. This conflict is evident in the continuous infiltrations of Pakistani groups across the border. The other dimension is intra-state, involving the fighting waged by armed Muslim opposition groups within the Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir against India’s central government. Some of these groups are fighting for the independence of a unified Kashmir, while others are fighting for this Indian state’s integration into Pakistan. In 1992 the coalition All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was formed. The APHC demanded an internationally monitored referendum, as mentioned in the Security Council’s first resolutions. Another conflict involves the dispute over control of the Punjab river basins.

Another important armed group is the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), created in 1989 and led by Saeed Salahudeen. This group has been on the EU’s list of terrorist groups since 2005 for having perpetrated numerous attacks against India’s civilian population.

Background to the peace process

India has always refused any international mediation; rather it prefers direct bilateral dialogue. It is not in favour of changing the territorial boundaries and is supported by China. In contrast, Pakistan is in favour of internationalising any peace process, and based on the right of self-determination, it is calling for a referendum to be held under UN control, although lately it has declared that it may give up on this demand. The most noteworthy feature of this conflict is the dynamic of creating trust-building measures on both sides and the model of the process, which has become known as the composite dialogue, which consists of addressing all the disputes in a single process so that headway is made on several matters at the same time. In this process, even though it is difficult to reach agreements, once they are reached it is difficult to renege on them.

In 2005, the Pakistani president stated that the dispute over control of Kashmir may be resolved by greater autonomy for the region, while the Indian prime minister declared that a Kashmir without clearly defined borders and with greater autonomy for the zones administered by India
would be measures that might help to resolve the conflict and to weaken the border demarcation in order to detract importance from it. In turn, the coalition of pro-independence parties, APHC, asked that the armed struggle be abandoned in order to pave the way for peace negotiations which would lead to a sustainable peace agreement. In early November 2009, the central government of India announced that it had prepare a set of political measures for the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. During the second half of February 2010, both countries resumed peace negotiations, which had been formally interrupted since the attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. In February 2011, the leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Shabbir Ahmed Shah, called for a referendum in the state to determine the people’s aspirations.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited India privately in April 2012 and met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state to the neighbouring country in seven years and the first meeting between both leaders since 2009. Singh agreed to visit Pakistan, though a date for the trip was not set. The Indian government authorised direct foreign investment from Pakistan; 600 Pakistani business owners participated in a trade fair in India. In November, the Pakistani government pledged to confer most favoured nation status on India. In June, the Pakistani Foreign Minister invited separatist Kashmiri leaders to participate in negotiations during a trip to Delhi. In the third quarter, India and Pakistan reached an agreement to relax the hitherto restrictive criteria for giving visas to their respective citizens. In October, the Pakistani Oil Minister said that the country was ready to purchase Indian fuel as long as the price was reasonable. He made these declarations while participating in a conference on the petrochemical sector in Delhi. In recent months, India and Pakistan have channelled their relations through economic diplomacy.

In 2013 attempts were made to re-establish the trust-building measures of recent years in order to overcome specific moments of tension and confrontation. Despite the crisis in the first months of the year caused by various acts of violence near the Line of Control, the dialogue process between India and Pakistan did not come to a standstill in the second quarter and the rise to power of the new Pakistani government, led by Nawaz Sharif, created new expectations. In his election program Sharif said he supported relaunching the peace process between India and Pakistan. After his inauguration Sharif said the country’s foreign policy priorities included immediate attention to relations with neighbouring countries. According to Sharif, without peace in the region Pakistan’s efforts for growth and development would not be successful. As part of the new roadmap the new president said that Pakistan wished for a gradual normalization of relations with India and for solutions to the outstanding issues, including the dispute over Kashmir. Sources from the Indian Government also expressed interest in maintaining the process alive and being involved with Islamabad in a broad framework of cooperation. This was also the message sent from the Indian government to Pakistan by way of Prime Minister Satinder Lambah’s Special Envoy. In addition, in mid-June the Indian Union Minister Farooq Abdullah argued for “softening” the borders between the two countries to improve relations and facilitate the meetings of divided families on both sides of the border. In this respect, in June the faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference led by Syed Ali Geelani (APHC-G) came out against a meeting of the leaders of India and Pakistan in Srinagar –the capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir- or Muzaffarabad -capital of the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan. Depending on the platform, India would use dialogue there to justify its occupation. However, the moderate faction of Hurriyat, led by Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, proposed holding an Indo-Pakistani summit on both sides of the border, with leaders from both countries and the local population, to address the resolution of the conflict. Mirwaiz emphasized that the solution to the conflict must be political and not merely a question of economic investment and infrastructures, referring to the visit planned for the end of June by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to inaugurate the Qazigund-Banihal railway line in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Despite incidents of violence on in the border area between India and Pakistan that hurt the peace process during the summer months, at the end of the third quarter there was a rapprochement between the parties as a result of a meeting held between the Prime Ministers of the two countries during the celebration of the UN General Assembly in New York in September. Both
sides said they were willing to improve the situation on the Line of Control (as the border between the two countries is known) and to reduce violence in the area. They also acknowledged that there had been repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement. Senior Indian and Pakistani military officers met for the first time in 14 years to negotiate directly on the situation in Kashmir, which is claimed by both countries. The Directors General of Military Operations gathered at the Wagah border crossing to agree on ways to ensure peace on the Line of Control, the de facto border that divides the two states and that in the final months of the year had been the scene of many violent clashes between the two Armies.

The peace process in 2014: the diplomacy of trade

In the first months of the year no significant progress was made in negotiations between India and Pakistan and relations continued to be marked by rivalry and diplomatic conflict. However, some meetings were held between representatives from both governments that were considered positive. One of the main topics was trade, with the resumption of negotiations between the commerce secretaries from both countries who agreed that the process should continue after the elections in India in late May. Until then there had scarcely been direct trade relations between the two countries and most trade took place with the intermediation of Dubai, which greatly increases cost. In late March it was announced that Pakistan could in the near future grant most favoured nation status to India. Furthermore, in January an agreement was reached on liberalization of the visa system for border trade which facilitated the crossing of trucks and containers. In March the Joint Working Group on Cross-Line of Control Confidence Building Measures met for the first time in 18 months.

In spite of the fact that the two armies continued to exchange fire and violate the ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control (the de facto border between the two countries), there was some rapprochement between the governments after the formation of the new Indian Administration in the second quarter. Specifically, at the end of May the new Hindu nationalist prime minister received his Pakistani Muslim counterpart, and in June there was a positive exchange of letters between the two prime ministers in which both stressed their desire to move forward in the peace process and improve relations between the two countries. The letters were sent after the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attended the inauguration of the newly elected Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, of the BJP party, which had won the Indian elections in May. Modi and Sharif met the day after the inauguration and discussed bilateral issues such as combating terrorism and the trial of those responsible for the attack in the city of Mumbai in 2008. Moreover, Modi condemned the attack on the Karachi airport which had killed 38 people. Modi's invitation to Sharif was interpreted as a gesture of goodwill, although during the election campaign the Indian leader had said talks could not be conducted until all violence had come to an end. Additionally, different Pakistani political and military sectors tried to pressure Sharif into not attending the inauguration and pointed to Modi’s involvement in the deaths of hundreds of Muslims in 2002 when he was the chief minister of Gujarat. Both leaders agreed that a subsequent meeting between the Foreign Secretaries would take place.

The dialogue was affected by a serious crisis during the third quarter. The most serious incident took place in August when the Indian government cancelled the planned meeting between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in Islamabad. The meeting, which had been agreed to after the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attended the inauguration ceremony of his counterpart Narendra Modi in May, was suspended by India after the Kashmiri separatist leader Shabir Shah was received by Pakistan's High Commissioner in Delhi, Abdul Basit. The meetings between Pakistani diplomats and Kashmiri separatist leaders were part of a long-standing practice ahead of any high-level diplomatic meeting between India and Pakistan. However, on this occasion the Secretary of Indian Affairs, Sujatha Singh, had warned Pakistan that dialogue would either be with India or with the Kashmiri separatists. During a visit to Kargil, the scene of an armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999, and before cancelling the meeting, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had accused Pakistan of conducting a proxy war in Kashmir. This
was the first visit by an Indian president to the area since the conflict. In September direct lower-level diplomatic contacts were resumed and the National Security Advisor, Ajit K Doval, and the Foreign Secretary, Sujatha Singh, met with the Pakistani high commissioner. However, the leaders of both countries did not, as they had in the past, hold a meeting during the UN General Assembly. However, in his speech at the United Nations Modi said that his country is willing to engage in a bilateral dialogue with the neighbouring country in the absence of terrorism.

In November the Prime Minister of Pakistan requested the good offices of the President of the United States who was going to visit the region in January 2015. In the second half of the month delegates from both countries met during the India-Pakistan Bilateral Dialogue and requested that discussions be launched during the SAARC summit to be held in the Nepalese capital. At the beginning of December there was a lethal terrorist attack in the Indian region of Kashmir. New Delhi held that the militants had come from Pakistan and the Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh said that the neighbouring country must answer why militants hide in Pakistani territory. The UN Secretary General offered his good offices if the parties so wished, which was welcomed by the Pakistani Government.

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>• The new Hindu nationalist prime minister received his Pakistani counterpart, who is Muslim.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Indian Government cancelled the meeting in Islamabad planned between the Foreign Secretaries from the two countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Meetings were held between Pakistani diplomats and leaders of Kashmiri separatist groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The UN Secretary General offered his good offices.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Violations of the ceasefire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Government of India was deeply upset after the Kashmiri separatist leader was received by the Government of Pakistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Terrorist attack in the Indian part of Kashmir.</td>
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**End result:** unresolved.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Asian Centre for Human Rights (<a href="http://www.achrweb.org">www.achrweb.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Gobierno de la India (india.gov.in)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Gobierno de Pakistán (<a href="http://www.pakistan.gov.pk">www.pakistan.gov.pk</a>)</td>
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<td>• Human Security Report Project (<a href="http://www.hsrgroup.org">www.hsrgroup.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• ICG (<a href="http://www.crisisweb.org">www.crisisweb.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Incore (<a href="http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries">www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries</a>)</td>
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<td>• Insight to Conflict (<a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org">www.insightonconflict.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Reliefweb (<a href="http://www.reliefweb.int">www.reliefweb.int</a>)</td>
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<td>• SATP (<a href="http://www.satp.org">www.satp.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Swiss Peace (<a href="http://www.swisspeace.org/fast">www.swisspeace.org/fast</a>)</td>
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<td>• UNMOGIP (<a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unmogip/index.html">www.un.org/spanish/Depts/dpko/unmogip/index.html</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• United States Institute of Peace (<a href="http://www.usip.org">www.usip.org</a>)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

INDIA
Prime Minister: Narendra Modi
Union Minister: Farooq Abdullah

PAKISTAN
Prime Minister: Nawaz Sharif

UNMOGIP
World Bank
Envoy: (Satinder Lambah)
High Commissioner of India: Abdul Basit

Foreign Ministers
Parliamentary Committee

USA
OIC

APHC Coalition
(M Umar Farooq)
(Tabish Bath)

APHC-G
(Syed Ali Geelani)

Offers of facilitation
Iran, Canada, Russia

Lakshar-e-Toiba
Hizbul Mujahideen
(S. Salahudeen)

Space of intermediation

Iran, Canada, Russia
PAKISTAN (Waziristan)

Context of the conflict

As a result of the anti-terrorist strategy launched after the 9-11 attacks in New York, the United States strengthened its alliance with Pakistan to combat groups with ties to Al Qaeda that had taken refuge in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This led to constant clashes that not only affected the lives of thousands of civilians, but showed how difficult it is to defeat a series of tribal groups that go into hiding and cross the mountains on the border. This conflict was complicated by situations of tension that existed previously in several areas of Pakistan, which led to a broad mosaic of situations, interests, agreements and incompatibilities. In any case, beginning in 2006 several attempts were made to negotiate with some of these groups, which were often fighting each other. In some cases agreements were actually reached, but they were based more on convenience than peace per se. They affected some Pakistani regions bordering Afghanistan such as Bajaur, Balochistan and Waziristan, which however failed to stop the infiltration of Taliban fighters or members of Al Qaeda.

Waziristan is a small area, 11,500 km2, and is divided into two regions or "agencies" (North Waziristan and South Waziristan) that are both on the border with Afghanistan. The region is inhabited by Pashtuns who are governed by the tribal system of Loya Jirga, an assembly of prominent elders from the sub-clans. Waziristan is a “Federally Administered Tribal Area” (FATA), which means it was independent until it became part of Pakistan in 1947, the year it gained its independence. It has a total population of just over 800,000 people united by the same language (Waziri) and a warrior tradition. Its geographical and cultural proximity to Afghanistan explain why this mountainous region has been a haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was created in 2008 and brings together around 30 groups established originally in South Waziristan, which borders with Afghanistan.

Background to the peace process

After two partial agreements in April 2004 and February 2005 in South Waziristan that were mostly not upheld, a peace agreement was signed in September 2006 between the Government of Pakistan and the pro-Taliban tribes in North Waziristan (tribal representatives from North Waziristan, the local Mujahideen NWFP and students from the Utmanzai tribes). The agreement established a commitment to expel any foreign fighters from the area and in exchange Pakistan would reduce the presence of its troops, rebuild the infrastructures damaged by the conflict, and pay compensation to tribal leaders. Some analysts interpreted the agreement as a Taliban victory since they achieved a kind of "Islamic emirate" where they could even carry light weapons, and it was reached despite the huge amount of economic and military support that the United States had offered the Government of Pakistan (4 billion dollars from 2002 to 2006). The accord also banned the creation of a parallel administration.

The different Taliban militias operating in the FATA came together in 2008 in a single organization called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with the commander of South Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, as its leader. Subsequently the warring factions in the Kurram tribal agency (in the FATA) signed an agreement to end the hostilities of recent weeks that had killed 300 people and wounded 500 others. The agreement was signed by 100 elders in the city of Parachinar. In addition, in late January the Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud unilaterally declared an indefinite cease-fire after security forces began their withdrawal from several key positions and said he was ready to start negotiations with the new government. As a gesture of good will and in order to achieving a peace agreement in North Waziristan a few days earlier the
Government had released seven people who were under arrest. The Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud had recently agreed to mediation by a tribal jirga to reach a peace agreement with the government, but he stressed the need for an end to the military operations in South Waziristan and Swat. In line with the strategy of the previous year to achieve a rapprochement with some Taliban groups the Government signed in mid-February 2009 an agreement with the Taliban organization Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi led by Maulana Fazlullah and member of the Taliban coalition TTP by which the Government allowed Sharia law to be imposed in the Malakand region, including Swat. However, in mid-June major clashes between security forces and Taliban insurgents took place. The military launched an offensive in South Waziristan against areas controlled by the Taliban insurgency loyal to Baitullah Mehsud. In mid-August the chief spokesman of the TTP armed group, Maul Umar, who had been captured by security forces, confirmed that the TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud had died in a U.S. missile strike earlier in the month.

In 2012 the second in command in the TTP, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, was demoted from his position. In the first quarter he had expressed his willingness to hold negotiations with the Government and could have even held meetings with the administration without the group’s authorization. Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the armed group, was against an agreement with the Government. In 2013 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited the Taliban to participate in peace negotiations. The invitation was extended during a conference organized by the Government. Leaders from the country’s main political parties were present, including those sympathetic to the insurgency, and Sharif said that negotiations should be the top priority. The Taliban insurgency appeared to be open to the invitation and the leaders of the Taliban armed opposition group TTP reportedly met secretly to assess the Government’s proposal. An exchange of prisoner between the two sides was also announced as a confidence building measure. Six members of the TTP were released plus two members of the Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan. However, at the end of September the continuous stream of armed attacks by various Taliban factions led the Government to reconsider its proposal, especially after an attack on a Christian church in Peshawar that left 85 people dead and an attack in Upper Dir that killed a senior Pakistani army officer. Sharif announced two preconditions for any negotiation: the insurgency must lay down its arms and accept the Constitution. Some experts highlighted that the Taliban insurgency had become highly fragmented, with up to 100 insurgent organizations, after the death of their leader Baitullah Mehsud in a 2009 drone attack. The Pakistani government has banned 60 armed groups.

The peace process in 2014

The first direct meeting between the Government and the TTP took place in March. The meeting took place in a so called “peaceful” area located on the border between the Orakzai and North Waziristan tribal agencies near Afghanistan. As a result of these first direct negotiations the parties agreed to extend the ceasefire that the Taliban had previously announced on March 1. Furthermore, they also agreed to exchange prisoners. Several mediators also participated in the meeting (members of the religious party Jamiat Ulema Islam-Sami and Jamaat-e-Islami). The official representatives travelled to the area by helicopter and confirmed that they were authorized to take decisions. The meeting took place after the Taliban leadership invited the Government in early March to direct talks after several unsuccessful indirect contacts, and the Administration accepted. In the previous months various indirect encounters had been held between a negotiating delegation representing the Government and another intermediary for the Taliban insurgency. The Pakistani Prime Minister announced on January 30 that it had created a committee of four people to carry out peace talks with the Taliban insurgency and, in turn, the political shura (committee) of the TTP armed opposition group designated several intermediaries to negotiate. At that time both parties had agreed to a dialogue within the parameters of the Constitution; that the agreements were applicable only to the tribal areas affected by armed conflict; that both parties would cease any armed activity which could damage the talks although it was not a formal ceasefire; and that the negotiations would not go on for a long period of time.
In addition, they agreed to a higher level direct meeting between the Government committee and the Taliban leadership. However, several Taliban factions claimed responsibility for various attacks, including the killing of 23 soldiers who had been held hostage since 2010 and the Government responded by cancelling the negotiations. In addition to cancelling the talks, after the attacks the Government announced that it was preparing a large-scale military operation in North Waziristan. The negotiating process was reopened in March and many observers noted that the differences between various active Taliban factions could be a serious obstacle to reaching a final agreement.

In April the TTP armed group announced the end of the ceasefire that had began in March and had been extended until April 10, since the Government had ignored the demands presented by the Taliban. Nevertheless, at that time the TTP stated that it was willing to continue the peace negotiations. However, in the weeks following the peace process completely broke down: the insurgency launched various attacks and there was a rise in the number of clashes between different Taliban factions some in favour and some against the negotiations with the Government, and the security forces launched a large-scale military offensive in the tribal areas of the country, particularly in North Waziristan.

The military operation by the Pakistani Armed Forces against the Taliban insurgency in North Waziristan continued during the month of October, causing numerous deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Army sources said that since the beginning of the operation, known as Zarb-e-Azb, 1,100 insurgents had died. The Army also said that it had evidence that the TTP Taliban armed group, the main target of the operation, was setting up new bases in Afghanistan near the border. Also in October, a jirga of elders from the Mehsud tribe met with the commanders of the Taliban factions that were made up of members of this tribe, especially the factions led by Khan Said and Shehryar. The Khan Said faction officially broke away from the TTP in May after its leader was removed from his position in the upper ranks of the Taliban armed group, the result of internal power struggles in the organization after the death of several leaders (Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rahman Mehsud) in U.S. drone attacks. The tribal jirga wanted the Mehsud Taliban to reach an agreement with the Pakistani Government as part of the measures that the Government had tried to put in place to negotiate an end to the armed conflict.

Nevertheless, in December the TTP carried out a terrorist attack on a school. 141 people, most of them children, died in the assault, which ended any possibility of negotiating with the group.

### Most significant events of the year

- The first direct meeting between the Government and the TTP took place in March. During the meeting they agreed to extend the ceasefire and exchange prisoners.
- At the beginning of the year the Government and the TTP agreed to a dialogue within the parameters of the Constitution; that the agreements were applicable only to the tribal areas affected by armed conflict; that both parties would cease any armed activity which could damage the talks although it was not a formal ceasefire; and that the negotiations would not go on for a long period of time.
- In April the peace process broke down completely.
- Internal power struggles took place in the TTP.
- The TTP carried out a terrorist attack on a school. 141 people, almost all of them children, died in the assault, which ended any possibility of negotiating with the group.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- The assassination of kidnapped soldiers.
- Differences between the different Taliban factions.
- The end of the ceasefire.
A terrorist attack against a school. **End result:** unresolved.

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<td>- Asia Times (<a href="http://www.atimes.com">www.atimes.com</a>)</td>
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Main parties involved in the process

PAKISTAN Government

Prime Minister: Nawaz Sharif

“Peace Zone”
Jamiat Ulema Islam-Sami
Jamat-e-Islam

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Maulvi Faquir Mohammad

Space of intermediation
b) Southeast Asia

BURMA / MYANMAR

Context of the conflict

There are two types of conflict in Myanmar: one is related to the fight for the democratisation of the country; the other is linked to the rights claimed by the different ethnic minorities. Having gained its independence in 1947, the country had a democratic government from 1948 to 1962, when General Ne Win led a coup d'état. Ne Win was in turn brought down by yet another military coup in 1988.

Myanmar has a population of 53 million people, divided into 135 ethnic groups and subgroups who practise different religions. The military regime is Buddhist. Many of the ethnic groups have their own military apparatus. The main minorities are the Shan (9%) and the Karen (7%). These ethnic groups still fight against the military junta, although less intensely than in previous decades.

The Karen people are political organised under the KNU (Karen National Union) and are not involved in drug trafficking, unlike many other ethnic groups. Their military activity is via the KNL (Karen National Liberation Army), created in 1947. The group has around 7,000 combatants. In 1995 the Karen reformed en masse in Thailand, with most of these being unarmed. They have stated that they are willing to completely lay down their arms if they obtain political guarantees of a future institutional framework and if they can earn revenues from gas production. The state of Karen covers 28,725 km² and has 1.1 million inhabitants. Even though the majority of Karen are Buddhists, the state also has a high number of Christians (30%) as a result of its past relationship with the British Empire. The Karen have had a ceasefire with the government in place since 2004, and it is currently the oldest conflict in the world (since 1949). The Karen are led by Naw Zipporrah Sein.

The Shan State Army (SSA), created in 1964, reached a peace agreement with the government, but one of its dissidents, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), remained active in pursuing an autonomous Shan state within a federal Burma. In May 2007 the negotiations for a ceasefire agreement were suspended after an agreement could not be reached on the venue where the meeting should be held. The leader of this armed group had agreed to negotiate with the armed forces with mediation by members of the Thai military. In 2009 the government invited them to become border guards, which they accepted in April 2010. However, half of their troops (5,000), led by General Parnfng, were opposed to this agreement. There is also the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), which was declared a terrorist group in 2006. The SSA-S also experienced dissidence this year, and it reached a peace agreement with the government.

The Chin are an ethnic group consisting of more than one million people with their own language and culture divided between Myanmar and India. In India they are known as the Mizo people. The Burmese side is the home to almost half a million people, and they account for the majority of the population in the Chin state of Myanmar, which borders on India and Bangladesh and was created in 1974. The Chin were Christianised in the early 20th century, just a few years after the independent Chinland was annexed by British colonialism, and therefore the majority of the population is Baptist. They have a widespread diaspora in India, Malaysia, Canada and the United States. The military junta has persecuted the Chins, regarding them as pro-Western. Since the 1930s, the Chins have been claiming their rights to self-determination, as a continuation of their claims to independence from Myanmar (formerly Burma) in 1948. Forty years later, in 1998, the Chin National Front (CNF) was created following the military junta’s brutal repression.
of demonstrations by students calling for democracy in the country. This group, which demanded self-rule for the Chin people and the creation of a territory called Gran Mizoram, organised on the border of the Burmese region of Shin with the Indian state of Mizoram (from which they receive support) and with Bangladesh, and has around 200 military troops. The Secretary-General of the CNF is Thang Lian. Since 1989 the CBF has been part of the National Democratic Front of Burma (NDF), and since 2001 it has been a member of the United Nations’ Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The Chin National Council was founded in 2006, and includes the CNF and other Chin organisations.

The Kachin people is a coalition of six tribes that are spread across Yunnan, China, northeastern India and Kachin State, Myanmar. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is the military arm of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The KIA was founded in 1961 in response to a military coup by General Ne Win. At the beginning the group fought for independence, but eventually it began to demand an autonomous state within a federal union in Myanmar. In 1994 the KIA signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese Junta, but the fighting continued. It is estimated that the group has between 4,000 and 10,000 troops.

The production of opium in much of the country has made many of these groups turn to drug trafficking. Such groups fight among themselves and against the government. In parallel to these conflicts, the country is under an autocratic military dictatorship. In 1990, this regime adopted the name SLO RC (State Law and Order Restoration Council). In 1997, it changed its name to the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). Since 1985 the junta has signed agreements with many armed groups. In exchange for renouncing their political and separatist demands, the junta has allowed these groups to control their lucrative activities with total impunity. In 1990 the military junta permitted elections, which were won with a majority by Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD (National League for Democracy) and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was later arrested. At the end of 2010 Suu Kyi was released and in 2011 a process of transition to democracy began.

Background to the peace process

With regard to the process of democratisation and reconciliation channelled through the dialogue with the Nobel Peace Prize winner and the NLD, the first meetings took place in late 2000 with the mediation of Malaysia and the United Nations. During the period 2001-2004, the Military Junta made a series of gestures in what could be called “visit diplomacy”, which translated into the release of political prisoners before and/or after the periodical visits to the country by the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy to the country, a special Rapporteur on human rights and political leaders from several countries, although there were also periods when the Military Junta did not allow these visits. In 2004, the government promoted a national convention to democratise the country, but the NLD conditioned its participation upon the release of its imprisoned members. Many of these diplomatic manoeuvres to resolve the conflict came via the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is headquartered in Geneva but has had an office in the Burmese capital since 2000, which was closed by the Military Junta in March 2006. In 2009, the most noteworthy event was that the new Obama administration gave signs of being in favour of engaging in direct relations with the Military Junta. The Deputy Secretary of State noted the possibility of creating a format similar to the one used in the negotiations with North Korea, via a six-part dialogue in which ASEAN, Japan, China and India would also participate. US representatives from the delegation of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with representatives of the Military Junta. Late in the year, the US government stated that it was hoping to start a dialogue process between the Military Junta and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi after the party she leads, the NLD, had publicised a letter that Suu Kyi had sent to the leader of the Junta, General Than Shwe, in which she expressed her willingness to work with the government to put an end to the sanctions that were harming the country. In 2010, the Military Junta had authorised the reopening of some offices of the main democratic opposition party, the NLD. The opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, met in May with the US Deputy Secretary of
The conflict continued for years, with both sides engaging in sporadic fighting. In 2007, a branch of the KNU/KNLPAC signed a peace agreement with the Military Junta, while another faction, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, reached an agreement with the Military Junta in 2009 which stated that the members of the group could serve as border guards on the border with Thailand.

In April 2011, General Than Shwe officially dissolved the Military Junta, which had been established in 1988 via a coup d’état, after taking possession of the new government of the union, which replaced the Junta. In July, the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi offered to facilitate ceasefire agreements and peace processes between the government and the ethnic insurgency. In parallel, the coalition of ethnic groups United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), established in February, submitted a ceasefire proposal to EU representatives at a meeting held in Bangkok and issued an appeal for the European organisation to facilitate a dialogue between the Burmese government and the ethnic groups. In August, Suu Kyi met with President Thein Sein for the first time. In August, the leaders of the UNFC assembled a team to hold peace negotiations with the government. In turn, the Parliament approved the creation of a peace committee aimed at mediating with the insurgent groups.

In November 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Myanmar and met with President Thein Sein. Clinton announced small concessions from the Burmese regime in response to advances in democracy which had been made, but she asked for more headway. Likewise, five ethnic armed groups met with representatives of the government, and three of them reached informal ceasefire agreements with the Executives. The groups that participated in the negotiations were the KIO, KNP, CNF, SSA-S and KNU.

In 2012, the Burmese government established a strategy for peace with the ethnic groups through a three-stage process. The first stage would include a ceasefire, the opening of liaison offices and freedom of movement when carrying arms, the second stage would entail confidence-building measures, political dialogue and regional development and in the third stage an agreement would be signed before members of Parliament. In January, the armed opposition group KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government. In addition to the ceasefire, both parties agreed to possibly permit unarmed patrols in their respective territories and to let the KNU open liaison offices in land under government control. In the second quarter, a KNU delegation met for the first time with President Thein Sein and with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon. In November, the armed group said they were committed to self-government for the Karen people and the creation of a federal government system that would allow greater autonomy, but did not want to be independent from Myanmar. In December, the KNU elected General Muty Say Poe to be their new leader.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the armed group ABSDF held negotiations with government representatives for the first time on the Thai border and agreed to hold more meetings to reach a ceasefire and peace agreement. In early June, informal negotiations were also held with the KIO, a group that repeated their demand for government troops to withdraw from their area of control. They also said that their goal was to end the conflict, and not to sign a ceasefire agreement. The KIO also requested international observers as witnesses to a potential peace agreement. The KIO said that they would not sign a ceasefire agreement until government troops withdrew. Moreover, the KIO and other Kachin leaders announced the creation of a centre for justice and negotiations intended to gather different views of the peace process and all information about the negotiations.

In February, the government and the NMSP signed a four-point agreement after three rounds of negotiations. The NMSP said that the government only aimed to maintain the ceasefire, and not to move towards any political agreements. In the third quarter, the PNLO signed a ceasefire
agreement with the government and agreed that peace negotiations would be held in the following three months. Moreover, the armed Karenni opposition group KNPP signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in the second quarter that was a result of the negotiations between both parties in Kayah State.

At the start of the 2013, there was a clear push for dialogue between the government and the sole armed group with which it had not reached a ceasefire agreement, the KIO, so the informal talks that began in 2012 continued. Following an escalation of violence between the Burmese Army and the KIO in Kachin State, on 18 January the government declared a unilateral ceasefire around Laiza, the largest city in the state, to pave the way for political talks with the KIO that were supposed to start the day after, although the violence rendered the truce partially worthless. Meanwhile, Parliament passed a motion calling for a ceasefire and peace talks to put an end to 18 months of conflict. Talks between the central government and the KIO finally took place in the city of Ruili, China, in February, under the impetus of China, which, according to some media, acted as a mediator while others described it as a coordinator and witness. These talks addressed issues such as establishing a channel of communication between the parties, reducing tension and inviting observers and witnesses to subsequent rounds.

This round gave way to the beginning of political dialogue with the Union National Federal Council (UNFC), an umbrella for many insurgent groups like the KIO, KNU, KNPP, SSPP, NSMP, ANC and PNLO, among others. Previously, in January, the UNFC released a statement that announced that its member organisations had decided to maintain a ceasefire and hold peace talks with the government and that they would have to be conducted with the UNFC as the sole negotiator and not with the organisations individually. Thus, in late February the government and the UNFC met to talk about political goals, the framework for dialogue and timetables. According to a joint statement released later, the talks were frank and friendly. The government team was led by former general and peace negotiator Aung Min, who pointed out that tension with the KIO had subsided in recent weeks.

There was a new round of talks in Ruili between the government and KIO delegations in March with the participation of four members of the UNFC, two of the SSPP/SSA, two of the RCSS/SSA, two of the NDAA, four of the Kachin State Peace Creating Group, a Chinese ministerial advisor and two Chinese Foreign Ministry officials. The KIO delegation was headed by a member of the Permanent Committee of the Peace Talk Creation Group. The subsequent joint press release said that the talks had been cordial and that a working agreement would not be reached until both parties agreed on a ceasefire based on mutual understanding, respect and trust in order to start a genuine political conversation. Both parties also agreed to continue coordinating with each others’ troops in the conflict zone, in order to reduce confrontation, and to establish coordination and supervision offices if necessary. Furthermore, they agreed to continue to implement the agreements reached in the current round and the one held in February, planned a new meeting for early April and said they would continue coordinating to achieve real political talks nationwide in scope. In March the Government established the Myanmar Peace Center to provide information on and coordinate the peace process. The centre is headed by Aung Ming, the head of the government negotiating team, and has a staff of 120 people. The EU assumed part of the cost.

In May 2013, the chief negotiator of the Burmese government, Aung Min, announced that the government was planning to hold a conference nationwide in scope that would include all the ethnic groups in the country, address the ceasefire issue and give impetus to the subsequent inclusive dialogue. In late May, the government and the KIO reached a seven-point agreement at a meeting held in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, referring to the KIO’s historical demands regarding the need for the separation of forces, the establishment of a monitoring and verification mechanism for the conflict and the start of talks on political issues. The UN Special Envoy for Myanmar, Vijay Nambari, participated in this new round of talks. Observers from China were also present at the meeting, as well as representatives of eight of the armed groups in Myanmar, including some linked to the Wa, Karen, Shan, Karenni and Mon ethnic groups. This
was the first time that the KIO accepted to participate in negotiations in Myanmar; the previous two rounds of talks had taken place in China.

Myanmar also made progress in its talks with the RCSS (and its armed wing, the SSA), an insurgency with which it had already reached ceasefire agreements in 2011 and 2012. A delegation from the group met with Burmese President Thein Sein for the first time on 10 June. The RCSS/SSA delegation was headed by Lieutenant General Yawd Serk and President Thein was accompanied by the chief negotiator for the Burmese government, Aung Min, and by the Minister of the President’s Office, Soe Thane. At the meeting, which was held in the capital, Naypyidaw, both parties agreed to work on relocating troops, reducing hostilities and creating a team to monitor the conflict. Inclusive political talks were planned, according to the road map described by President Thein. The meeting also addressed the internally displaced population, food security, transport issues and the subject of identity cards for the Shan ethnic population. The RCSS/SSA is the second armed group that has met with President Thein since he took power in 2011. Meanwhile, representatives of the Karen National Union (KNU) met with Burmese government officials in Myawaddy in early June to hold unofficial talks on military issues and to develop a “code of conduct” governing how both parties interact.

In July, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) proposed that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi participate as a mediator (or at least as an observer) in the peace talks that the government was holding with it. One of the main blocks to progress in the peace process was the government’s intention to reach a nationwide ceasefire agreement and then address the different armed groups’ political demands, while the UNFC thought that talks on the ceasefire and the political causes of the conflict should be carried out at the same time. In August, the government and the All Burma Student’s Democratic Front (ABSDF) announced the beginning of a truce, considered the first step to beginning talks that could put an end to 25 years of conflict. The agreement would allow four liaison offices to open in Myanmar.

Mention must be made of the process carried out by the government and the different ethnic insurgent groups aimed at achieving a general ceasefire for the entire country for the month of October. Although the government expressed its readiness to achieve the ceasefire, different armed groups were sceptical about it. However, prominent among the initiatives it set out to achieve was the conference on confidence-building measures held in September that enjoyed the participation of more than 300 ethnic group, political party and government representatives. The conference ended with five objectives to explore in greater detail in the peace process: 1) a national ceasefire; 2) the abolition of democratic laws or laws that are problematic in other aspects, including the law of illegal associations; 3) the establishment of a federal union that guarantees equality and autonomy for the ethnic groups or the country; 4) the organisation of a conference like that of Panglong; and 5) the reformation or redrafting of the 2008 Constitution. Meanwhile, some sources said that the National Defence and Security Council (a high-level government body in which the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces participate) would acquire greater weight in the peace negotiations at the expense of the main government negotiator so far, U Aung Min, who may resign.

The leaders of 18 armed ethnic organisations, including the KIO, KNU and SSA-South, as well as the leaders of the umbrella organisation UNFC, met in Kachin State in October to discuss the government’s general ceasefire proposal for the entire country and to agree on positions to take entering negotiations with the government, currently planned for early November. Some leaders pointed out that this meeting was more important than the one for the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which established ethnic autonomy. The armed Wa group UWSA was notably absent, which may have been due to the fact that the group did not feel that its desire to create an autonomous Wa state was sufficiently represented and that had been sceptical that a general ceasefire was possible. However, while this meeting was taking place, clashes continued between the government and the KIO, which caused a large humanitarian crisis because thousands of people were trapped by the armed violence. Days before the outbreak of fighting, the government and the KIO had held talks and reached some partial agreements, but did not sign a ceasefire
agreement. Coinciding with these discussions, the government freed 56 political prisoners, almost all of which had been imprisoned for belonging to different ethnic insurgent organisations.

In November, the government and the main armed ethnic opposition groups agreed to sign a general ceasefire agreement for the entire country, which would establish a framework for conducting and maintaining political dialogue. This decision was made after the armed ethnic opposition groups held another meeting that resulted in 17 armed organisations (out of the 18 participating) agreeing to the general ceasefire as a condition for political talks. Afterwards, a delegation of leaders of the UNFC coalition of insurgent groups visited Rangoon and Naypyidaw for the first time in decades, highlighting the Armed Forces’ need to get involved in peace negotiations to give them a more substantive nature, since even though the government was holding talks, the Burmese Army was still carrying out armed operations in Kachin State. The delegation urged the commander in chief, General Min Aung Hlaing, to get involved in the peace process. In addition, the UNFC asked opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to participate more actively in the peace process after meeting with her in Rangoon, inviting her to the negotiations that would be held with the government at the end of the year. Moreover, representatives from 12 different political parties met with the leaders of the UNFC in Thailand to talk about the peace process. Alongside this progress in the negotiations, clashes were renewed between the Burmese Armed Forces and the armed opposition group KIO, forcibly displacing thousands of civilians.

At a two-day meeting, eleven leaders of Burmese political parties, the UNFC and civil society organisations discussed how to structure a future Burmese Army that includes the armed ethnic opposition groups of Myanmar. Organised by the government agency Myanmar Peace Centre, the meeting was the first formal discussion between the political party representatives and rebel leaders. The discussions focused on the creation of a federal Burmese Army that would integrate the armed groups of the different ethnic minorities. Some challenges included how to make the recruitment process more inclusive, how to build trust among the parties and how to grant a certain degree of autonomy to the regions without dividing the military.

The peace processes in 2014

Several of the country’s most important businessmen acted as mediators to facilitate the negotiations, by way of the Peace Talk Creation Group. These businessmen wanted the negotiations to be mediated by China and Japan. Throughout the first quarter the negotiations continued between the Government and different ethnic insurgent groups in an attempt to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement that was originally planned for late 2013 and had been postponed several times. Different draft proposals were discussed. One of them was presented by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), which represented 16 armed opposition groups. Finally in March an agreement was reached to set up a joint committee to work on the final text of the nationwide ceasefire agreement. The committee had 18 people nine of them members of ethnic groups, three commanders of the Army, three members of parliament and three members of the Government who will draft a single text containing the views of both sides. When the agreement is ready the peace negotiations will resume and will be held in Hpa-an, the capital of Karen state. One of the most controversial issues in the negotiations, and which will therefore be left out of the ceasefire talks, is the integration in the Armed Forces of the insurgency and the Government’s demand that the armed groups provide information on the number of troops, weapons and ammunition under their control. At the same time the other issue where differences existed between the insurgents and the Government had to do with the rebels’ demand for a political dialogue. The Government proposed that the dialogue would start after the signing of the ceasefire, but the insurgencies said they should take place at the same time. Nevertheless, finally the armed groups accepted that the process of political negotiations would begin within 90 days of the signing of the ceasefire.

In the second quarter the peace talks to achieve a nationwide ceasefire agreement continued between the Government and various armed opposition groups, particularly those led by the NCCT, which includes the large majority of the insurgent organizations. One of the most
significant events during the quarter was that the Government and insurgents had agreed in the draft text to include the idea of federalism, although some sources close to the negotiations said that the agreement in this regard had not been completely finalized. In addition, a meeting took place between the government-backed Myanmar Peace Center and the coalition of ethnic opposition parties Federal Democratic Alliance to discuss the framework for the political dialogue after the nationwide ceasefire was signed, although some critics were sceptical about the future of the peace process. The RCSS armed opposition group said the Government had offered to lift the ban on the insurgent groups after the ceasefire was signed. With regard to the negotiations with the KIA armed opposition group, after the serious clashes in April both sides agreed to establish a peace oversight commission to monitor troop movements on both sides to establish responsibilities for the fighting. Nevertheless, the issue of the armed clashes with the KIA was excluded from the negotiations for the nationwide ceasefire agreement.

In August several meetings between the Government and the NCCT were held to discuss the draft agreement and significant advances were made in the negotiations. The Government accepted to include in the text a commitment to implement a federal system in the country, which was one of the main hurdles to reaching an agreement. Other topics of discussion were the list of groups which would be allowed to participate in the signing of the agreement, since the Government recognized as armed groups a much smaller number than what the NCCT proposed, or the process of political dialogue that will follow the signing of the ceasefire. The creation of the Federal Armed Forces, one of the sticking points of the negotiation, will also be addressed during the political dialogue. Moreover, the NCCT have proposed a list of third parties that will participate in the signing of the agreement, with observers from the U.S., UK, Japan, China, France and the UN. In addition, the NCCT asked opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to take on a greater role in the peace process between ethnic insurgents and the Government. The Government that succeeded the military junta that had ruled the country for five decades had signed ceasefire agreements with 14 of the 16 major armed groups in the country, but this was not the case with the KIA in Kachin state and the TNLA in Shan state.

The sixth round of negotiations held in September in Rangoon between the Government, the Armed Forces and the NCCT, which represents most of the armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, ended without an agreement or any significant progress. In the joint statement issued at the end of the five-day round of negotiations, the Government and the NCCT said that a new round of negotiations was planned for October and they announced that they had agreed on a new version of the ceasefire draft, although they did acknowledge that a definitive agreement was still far away and that important sticking points remain. The Government was interested in achieving a historic agreement before November, when many heads of state would visit Myanmar as part of the ASEAN summit. One point of disagreement was the government’s refusal to accept a more inclusive agreement. The Administration had excluded five groups that were part of the United Nationalities Federal Council, a coalition of ethnic organizations. These were small political organizations that represented the Kokang, Wa, Arakanese and Lahu minorities that could have participated as observers, but the Government did not include them in the agreement. Subsequently it was agreed that the UNFC would act as the supervisor of the country’s new Armed Forces, called the Federal Union Army (FUA), in which most of the Burmese armed groups (12 to be exact) would participate.

In December important initiatives were implemented for the future of the peace process, but also a crisis was triggered after an attack by the Armed Forces against a training school for the KIA armed group. The Government offered to resume negotiations mid-month. In the second half of the month the NCCT appointed delegates for the conversations, which include 5 out of the 14 NCCT members and four people from outside the group for the technical support group. The NCCT said that it wanted to have additional international observers, preferably from the Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG), which includes Norway, Switzerland, the UK, the EU, Japan, the U.S. and Australia. At that time the only observers were the United Nations, China and an ASEAN country. At Christmas a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was achieved and there
was talk of adding three more members to the NCCT. The next meeting was scheduled for mid-January 2015.

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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• One of the most controversial issues in the negotiations, and which was provisionally left out of the ceasefire talks, was the integration in the Armed Forces of the insurgency and the Government’s demand that the armed groups provide information on the number of troops, weapons and ammunition under their control. Finally an agreement was reached to integrate most of the armed groups into the Armed Forces.</td>
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<td>• The Government and the insurgents agreed to mention federalism in the draft text of the ceasefire agreement.</td>
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<td>• The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) had proposed a list of third parties that will participate in the signing of the agreement, with observers from the U.S., UK, Japan, China, France and the UN.</td>
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<td>• Negotiations were resumed at the end of the year and an agreement was reached to create a new all-inclusive Federal Army.</td>
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<td>• Ceasefire agreement at the end of the year.</td>
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<td>• Active participation of important businesspeople to facilitate the negotiations.</td>
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<td>• At the end of the year the NCCT said that it wanted to have additional international observers, preferably from the Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG), which includes Norway, Switzerland, the UK, the EU, Japan, the U.S. and Australia.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<td>• Demand by armed groups that the political dialogue take place at the same time as the ceasefire.</td>
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<td>• Initial disagreement in the creation of a new all-inclusive Armed Forces.</td>
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<td>• Government refusal to accept a more inclusive agreement because it did not recognize the small armed groups.</td>
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<td>• Attack carried out by the Armed Forces against a training school of the KIA armed group.</td>
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<td>• Disagreements on the issue of federalism.</td>
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**End result:** possible agreements at the beginning of early 2015.

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<th>Websites of interest</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (<a href="http://www.altsean.org">www.altsean.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (peacebuilding.asia)</td>
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<td>• Birmania (directory.Birmanialife.com)</td>
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<td>• Burma Issues (<a href="http://www.burmaissues.org">www.burmaissues.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Burmanet News (<a href="http://www.burmanet.org/news">www.burmanet.org/news</a>)</td>
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<td>• Centro para el Diálogo Humanitario (<a href="http://www.dhcentre.org">www.dhcentre.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• CNF (<a href="http://www.chinland.org">www.chinland.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Democratic Voice of Burma (<a href="http://www.dvb.no">www.dvb.no</a>)</td>
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<td>• Ethnic Peace Resources Project (<a href="http://www.eprpinformation.org/en">www.eprpinformation.org/en</a>)</td>
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<td>• Insight to Conflict (<a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org">www.insightonconflict.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (<a href="http://www.ipcs.org">www.ipcs.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Irrawaddy (<a href="http://www.irrawaddy.org">www.irrawaddy.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Karen National Union (<a href="http://www.karennationalunion.net">www.karennationalunion.net</a>)</td>
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<td>• Karen News (karennews.org)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Myanmar Peace Center (<a href="http://www.myanmarpeace.org">www.myanmarpeace.org</a>)</td>
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</table>
Main parties involved in the process

**BURMA / MYANMAR**  
**Government**  
President: Thein Sein  
Railway Minister and negotiator: Aung Min

**Myanmar Peace Center**  
Director: Aung Min  
Hla Maung Shwe

**Peace Talk Creation Group**

**Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT)**  
Observers in 2014: UN, China, ASEAN  
(Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong)

**Ethnic Groups**  
- UNFC  
- NCCT

**Observers in 2014:**  
UN, China, ASEAN  
(Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong)

**UN**  
Special Envoy: Vijay Nambiar

**Peace Donor Support Group:**  
Norway, UK, EU, Japan, Switzerland, USA, Australia

**Space of intermediation**
PHILIPPINES

Context of the conflict

Even though the Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, 8% of the population is Muslim. However, in recent decades, armed Muslim groups have emerged, as have communist guerrillas. Despite the two popular revolts in the last twenty years (in 1986 to bring down President F. Marcos, and in 2001, to depose President Estrada), the country is still in the hands of a landowning oligarchy with no intention of resolving the serious structural problems in the country: corruption, a lack of infrastructure, rural underdevelopment, a lack of basic services, serious human rights violations with impunity, etc. The expansion of the communist guerrillas, led by the NPA (the New People’s Army) is linked to the system of land exploitation. The Muslim rebellion, led by the MILF (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front), is related to the socioeconomic discrimination against the southern population, and particularly against the people who live on the island of Mindanao and on the Sulu archipelago. This discrimination has led to regional nationalism, since two-thirds of the country’s Muslims live in this region. The 1990s saw the emergence of a new radical terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, operating primarily in the Sulu archipelago. The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic state in the south of the country. It is accused of being in contact with Al-Qaeda and has not begun any negotiation process with the government.

The NPA was formed in 1969 and is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (the CPP). It is also part of the NDF (the National Democratic Front), which is the umbrella organisation for several groups and acts as the NPA’s political arm and negotiator. The NPA has around 6,000 combatants and is led by J. M. Sison “Joma”, who is exiled in the Netherlands. The NPA distanced itself from the popular revolution of 1986, which led to considerable divisions within the group. As a result, many leaders and combatants abandoned the armed struggle. The MILF was founded in 1978 as a result of a division in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which had been formed in 1969. After several years of negotiations, it reached a peace agreement with the government (the Manila Agreement). Libya initially mediated in this agreement, but it was subsequently replaced by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The agreement obtained autonomy for the southern provinces. The MILF were opposed to this 1996 agreement and demanded Mindanao’s independence. The MILF has around 10,000 combatants. In 2013 they were able to sign a preliminary peace agreement and in 2014 the final agreement was reached.

MILF

Background to the peace process

After rejecting the Manila agreements of 1996, two years later the MILF found support from Libya to start negotiations with the Philippine government, albeit with no results. In 2001, president offered negotiations abroad, suspended military operations and started talks in Malaysia under the auspices of Libya, and reached a ceasefire. Throughout 2004, the government of the Philippines and the MILF also held exploratory talks in Malaysia, which became a facilitating country, in which they agreed to an initial three-point agenda: security, rehabilitation of areas of conflict and protection of the ancestral lands on the island of Mindanao. The MILF gave up on independence but in exchange was demanding formulas of self-government which expressed a greater degree of autonomy in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
In 2008, the government and the MILF declared that they would sign a Memory of Understanding on Ancestral Lands (MOA) in Malaysia, the most controversial aspect of the negotiations in recent years. Both parties also pledged to reach a global peace agreement within the next 15 months that would include the three main points on the negotiating agenda: security, rehabilitation and development, and ancestral lands. In early August, however, as a precautionary measure, the Supreme Court suspended the signing of the MOA hours before the Philippine government and the MILF were getting ready to sign the document in Malaysia. In 2009, the government and the MILF signed the framework agreement on forming an international support group for the negotiation process in Kuala Lumpur; this group would be made up of governments, mainly the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the EU, as well as by international NGOs or eminent individuals. In 2010, while the government was speaking about “reinforced autonomy” which would extend the competences of the Moro people over the zone currently falling with the ARMM, the MILF was advocating the creation of a “Bangsamoro sub-state” which would expand the powers and scope of the current ARMM. In September, the MILF’s chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, declared that his group had formally abandoned its petition for independence for certain regions of Mindanao and that it had given the government a proposal to create a sub-state or an autonomous republic that would have all the competences except foreign affairs, national defence, currency and postal service.

On 15 October 2012, in Manila, the government and the MILF signed a framework agreement to resolve the conflict in Mindanao and to create a new political body, called Bangsamoro, which would replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao after a transition period when the basic law of the new body would be drafted. Later, the new law would be subject to a referendum. If approved, elections would be announced to form a government to replace the Transition Commission. According to both parties, the entire process should be finalised before President Benigno Aquino’s term ends in 2016. In November, the 33rd round of peace negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur came to a conclusion. This round addressed three main issues: the sharing of power, the sharing of wealth and normalisation (a concept referring to disarmament, demobilisation and the reinserction of MILF combatants). Meanwhile, tensions between the MILF and certain MNLF factions (especially the one led by Nur Misuari) rose markedly after the peace agreement was signed. Nur Misuari said the agreement was illegitimate and urged the MILF to join the negotiations between the MNLF and the government to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement. Other senior MNLF officials even threatened to return to war and to resume their demands for independence if the group was marginalised from the peace process.

Furthermore, the MILF urged the MNLF to form a united front around the aspirations of the Moro people. Sheikh Muhammad Muntassir, the chief da’wah officer of the MILF, urged the MNLF’s leaders not to pursue a “selfish” agenda, but to defend the legitimate aspirations of the population. He made this call after the government and the MILF agreed that the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) would act as an observer in the negotiations. In 2010, the OIC already promoted a meeting between the leaders of the MILF and the MNLF in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), which led to the creation of a coordination body. Through various resolutions, the OIC called for cooperation to achieve peace and development for the Moro people.

In January 2013, the MILF said that huge progress had been made in each of the four annexes. In some of them, including in the one on power sharing, nearly total agreement was reached, while in the others, like the one on sharing financial resources and on “normalisation”, the new head of the government’s negotiating team, university Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (who replaced Marvic Leonen in the position, now on the Supreme Court), said that the process to disarm combatants would be gradual. The leader of the MILF, Ebrahim Murad, pointed out that the process would only begin under the government of the new Bangsamoro body and warned that it should include government militias active in the Bangsamoro region. However, the MILF ordered its combatants not to wear uniforms or carry weapons in public places, a measure taken as a show of goodwill by the government. The MILF leader also declared that the IMT, which is
headed by Malaysia and consists of Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway and the EU, could supervise the implementation of a possible peace agreement signed by the parties during the transition stage. Nonetheless, the Third Party Monitoring Team began its work, a group of observers in charge of supervising the implementation of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, signed on 15 October 2012, and its four annexes. In February, the government named the members of the Transition Commission, the body in charge of drafting the basic law of the new political system of Bangsamoro that will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao around 2016 with more powers and financial resources. The Transition Commission will be led by Mohagher Iqbal, member of the MILF, and will consist of eight members appointed by the MILF and seven members chosen by the government. Four women and two Lumad (indigenous people) will participate. In late April, the Transmission Commission, a 15-person body charged with drafting the Bangsamoro Constitution, which is supposed to replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), met for the first time. During the session, agreement was reached on the internal rules of operation and the procedure to establish the working groups, with the participation of external experts on designing constitutions and on strategies of political influence.

The MILF announced its intention to keep the MILF as an Islamic organisation, but also to form a political party during 2013 in order to compete in the 2016 elections once the new Bangsamoro government has replaced the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The government had announced its intention to sign a comprehensive peace agreement with the MILF before July, when Congress would resume activity after the aforementioned elections. However, the fact that the negotiating process did not move forward in the weeks following the elections led to the MILF criticising the government for breaking its word and for the slow pace of the process. Some MILF leaders even declared that they were losing faith in the government. The MNLF said that some MILF commanders were abandoning the group’s party line and enrolling in the MNLF because they thought the peace process was headed for failure. Meanwhile, the government’s negotiating team justified the delays in resuming the peace negotiations due to the consultations it was holding with representatives of both legislative chambers, including those elected in May. In June, the government finally announced that it would resume peace talks with the MILF in July to tackle the three outstanding points before a comprehensive peace agreement can be signed: power sharing, wealth redistribution and a return to normalcy ("normalisation"). One of the members of the government’s negotiating team even said he was confident that the comprehensive agreement could be signed within two months. Finally, the United Nations’ and World Bank’s launch of a three-year programme to provide technical assistance during the transition process in Mindanao is worth mentioning, especially with regard to drafting the new Bangsamoro Basic Law and to supporting the Transition Commission and the government’s and MILF’s negotiating teams.

In late September, after the end of the 40th round of negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government and the armed group MILF announced the inclusion of the Italian religious group Community of Sant’Egidio into the International Contact Group and the beginning of the Independent Commission on Policing’s work in mid-October, which will be led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Commission’s recommendations will be sent to the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which will assess whether or not it will be included in the future Bangsamoro Basic Law. In December, the government and the MILF signed a power-sharing agreement, one of the last issues pending in the negotiations to reach a global peace agreement. With the signing of this agreement, three of the four annexes of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro of late 2012 have been signed, leaving only negotiations over the so-called “normalisation” (which includes demobilisation of the MILF and the creation of a police force for Bangsamoro, the withdrawal of the Philippine Armed Forces from some regions, the eradication of criminal groups and the creation of mechanisms of transitional justice, among other things), issued that were solved in January 2014.
The peace process in 2014

On March 27 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed. The agreement was described as historic because it culminated 17 years of negotiations and should bring to an end more than four decades of armed conflict in Mindanao. The agreement, signed in the presence of 1,000 guests (including Philippine President Benigno Aquino, international dignitaries, the Malaysian facilitator Ab Ghafar Mohammed, members of the MILF, members of parliament and the Philippine government) included the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and its four annexes ("Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing", "Transitional Arrangements and Modalities", "Power Sharing" and "Normalization"), which had been gradually agreed to in talks since the end of 2012. According to the roadmap accepted by both parties, the contents of CAB should become part of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which was being drafted by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission and should have been completed in early April. At the time President Aquino promised to certify this bill as urgent to hasten its enactment. It had been agreed that once the Philippine Parliament approved the Bangsamoro Basic Law, a referendum would be held during the first quarter of 2015 in the areas affected by the accord. Once the new law had been approved the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) would be abolished and the Bangsamoro Transition Authority would be appointed by the president to serve as the interim government until the 2016 elections. The new president and the Legislative Assembly for the new political entity (called Bangsamoro) will be chosen in these elections. This Assembly will elect the Chief Minister of Bangsamoro, who will in turn appoint the cabinet.

The MILF has already announced its intention to become a political party and participate in the elections. According to the CAB the new entity, Bangsamoro, will have an asymmetrical relationship with the central Government. It will guarantee the recognition of the identity of the Moro people and their aspirations for self-government. It will have control of a larger territory and have greater political and financial autonomy than the current ARMM, which had almost no capacity to levy taxes. Bangsamoro will have Islamic courts for the Muslim population, civil courts for non-Muslims and mechanisms and special courts to guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples in the region. In terms of territory, Bangsamoro cover the present ARMM and incorporate the towns of Isabela and Cotabato, 6 municipalities in the province of Lanao del Norte and 39 barangay from the 6 municipalities in Cotabato. Both parties, as well as some representatives from the international community, welcomed the agreement and were confident that the new law, with strong support by both parties, would be approved by a wide margin. However, the parties also acknowledge that there are many outstanding challenges on the road to consolidating peace in Mindanao. According to some analysts the first hurdle in the ongoing peace process could be getting Congress to approve the Bangsamoro Basic Law, especially due to the expected opposition from parliamentarians representing some of the regions that could be incorporated into the new Bangsamoro entity. Furthermore, while it is true that the current president had made a serious commitment to the peace process, some of the decisions for the full implementation of the agreement will be taken by the president that will replace Benigno Aquino. However, the CAB stipulates that both negotiation panels, and a Third Party Monitoring Team composed of national and international institutions, will oversee the full implementation of the agreement until they sign an Exit Agreement in which both parties signal its successful conclusion.

In addition to reactivating the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum, the highlight of the second quarter was the meeting in Hiroshima (Japan) between Philippine President Benigno Aquino and MILF leader Murad Ebrahim. According to some sources the reason for the meeting was the MILF’s concern over the delay in the approval by Congress of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which should have been passed by Congress in June. Shortly after that meeting, which was somewhat reminiscent of the one they both held in Japan in 2011 to unblock and accelerate the peace negotiations, Aquino publicly expressed his commitment that by the beginning of 2015 the Transition Commission would be up and running. The Commission is a Bangsamoro interim body that would govern until May 2016 when the Assembly of Bangsamoro will be elected and a new
government formed, which would coincide with the end of Aquino's mandate. Throughout the
quarter contacts took place between parliamentarians and representatives of the MILF to discuss
the parliamentary proceedings of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The Bangsamoro Transition
Commission, led by the head of the negotiating panel in recent years, had sent the draft law to
Congress in April, as scheduled. Also in April the MILF announced that it had practically
completed the process to formalize the creation of a new party, the United Bangsamoro Justice
Party, with the intention of participating in the elections scheduled for May 2016. According to
the MILF the central committee of the group would play an important role in the party, but noted
that candidates would be chosen through democratic channels and would not be appointed by this
committee.

After several months of discussions and some disagreements between the Government and the
MILF, on September 10, with a considerable delay with respect to the initial roadmap, President
Benigno Aquino urgently sent to Congress the Bangsamoro Basic Law bill for review and
approval. The approval of this law should lead to the establishment of a new entity in Mindanao
(known as Bangsamoro) before the end of the current president’s mandate in mid 2016. Soon
after, a joint committee from both chambers began the process of discussing the bill. This
included appearances by key players in the drafting and implementation of the peace agreement
signed in March by the Government and the MILF. During the hearings the MILF, the
Government and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (the BTC, which drafted the first bill)
stressed that Bangsamoro would continue to be an integral part of the Philippines and respect the
legal supremacy of the Constitution and, therefore, will be under the supervision of the president.
They also noted that the Constitution was flexible enough to allow Bangsamoro to exercise
genuine autonomy. In this regard the Government indicated that during the discussion and
parliamentary approval of the draft law, the Government, the MILF and the BTC would attempt
to speak with one voice.

During the discussion process of the law the opposition of some MPs became evident, but many
analysts said it would have the support of the parliamentary majority and would be approved in
early 2016. However, during the months prior to sending the draft law to Congress there were
some tense moments between the Government and the MILF. In July, for example, tension rose
after the Office of the President submitted its comments and amendments to the draft version of
the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which had been draw up by the BTC and must subsequently be
reviewed by the Government and approved by Parliament. The MILF said that the Government's
position clearly departed from the letter and the spirit of the Comprehensive Agreement on
Bangsamoro signed last March. The group stated that the Administration's version was
unacceptable to the MILF and useless in resolving the historical conflict in Mindanao, and
insisted that issues that had already been agreed upon would not be renegotiated. Meanwhile,
the head of the government negotiating panel said that the draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law sent
by the BTC could contain some issues that contravene the current Constitution. In this sense the
MILF accused Manila of adopting a conservative and restrictive interpretation of the
Constitution, while during the entire negotiating process the Government panel had sustained,
according to the MILF, that it was flexible enough to accommodate all of the provisions of the
peace agreement. Given this impasse the two sides, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, the
International Contact Group and the Government of Malaysia acting as facilitator met in Kuala
Lumpur in early July to address the differences between the Government and the MILF. In early
August the negotiating panels of the MILF and the Government met for 10 days in Davao to
discuss the substantial differences that surfaced in July. In this sense, Benigno Aquino admitted
that difficulties existed in the peace process between the Government and the MILF, but he was
also optimistic about the future of the peace process since the issues being discussed were minor
and did not affect the core issues of the peace agreement reached in March.

Parallel to the discussion of the Bangsamoro Basic Law both parties decided to implement the
provisions of the "Normalization" Annex. Both parties believed that the contents of the agreement
should not be included in the Basic Law and did not require new legislation. Thus, in late
September both panels met to establish the agencies and mechanisms to launch the process. First,
the Joint Committee for Normalization, which will coordinate the overall normalization process and will be headed by a representative from the Government and another from MILF. Second, the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which will propose appropriate mechanisms to address the historical grievances of the Moro people and human rights violations, while simultaneously promoting reconciliation and peace building in the communities affected by the armed conflict. The Commission will be headed by Mo Bleeker (proposed by the Swiss government at the request of the two peace panels) and will have one representative from the Government and one from the MILF. Third, the Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPSC), which will coordinate peace and security teams that will be created in the different communities, will act as an observer during the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the area and the disappearance of private armed groups; finally the Independent Decommissioning Body, which will oversee the disarmament and demobilization of the MILF. It will be made up of four people from the Philippines and three from Brunei (Major Muhammad Aiman Syazwi Bin Haj Abdul Rahin), Turkey (Ambassador Haydar Berk) and Norway (Jan Erik Wilhemsen). The 'decommissioning' and surrender of arms to the IDB by the MILF forces is a program that will run concurrently with the new Bangsamoro Basic Law and the creation of a new police force in the region, which will be part of the Philippine National Police. It will thus not begin to be implemented until 2015. One of the first steps in this process will be that the MILF must provide a list of weapons and fighters. Although the MILF has never revealed the size of its arsenal or the number of combatants, some estimates put it at about 10,000. The disarmament process would be gradual and will depend on the degree of compliance with the commitments in the March 27 peace agreement. The last weapons will be surrendered once all documents of the peace agreement are signed. It will not be necessary to surrender light weapons, but legalized them, since there is a long tradition in the Philippines of carrying handguns.

With the approach of the beginning of the disarmament process, in late September some news reports indicated that a significant faction of the MILF was opposed to demobilization and had begun approaching the BIFF. According to this information, this faction was led by Hashim Salamat, a nephew of the founder of the MILF. However, the leadership of the MILF denied that this was true and stated that the entire group is committed to all aspects of the peace agreement. In October there was a debate in the Philippine Parliament on the bill for the Bangsamoro autonomy aimed at establishing the Bangsamoro entity as part of the peace process. In the context of these discussions the top officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) affirmed their support for the creation of a specific police force for the future entity. The future Bangsamoro police will be under the command of the PNP and its main functions will be public order and security. Some critics had questioned the constitutionality of the future Bangsamoro police. Additionally, to show their support for the establishment of the Bangsamoro entity the mayors of the municipalities in Mindanao issued a statement at a conference organized by the League of Municipalities of the Philippines and they expressed their hope that the region will become a land of peace and opportunities.

At the same time that the new Bangsamoro Basic Law was being debated in Congress the government and MILF negotiating panels set up a Coordination Team for Transition, which will coordinate the transfer of responsibilities from the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, which will govern Bangsamoro from the time the Bangsamoro Basic Law is approved until elections are held in Bangsamoro in 2016. It is estimated that the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority will be operational for about a year. The Coordination Team for Transition will consist of five members from the Central Government and the current ARMM, and five representatives from the MILF. 44 police commandos died at the end of January 2015 in a serious clash with the MILF in a confusing incident that could seriously harm the implementation of the peace agreement.
NPA/NDF

Background to the peace process

With regard to the NPA, it has been negotiating with the government since 1986 via the National Democratic Front (NDF); the negotiations were launched in the Netherlands in 1986. Since 2009, they have been facilitated by Norway, and they seek structural changes on the political, social and economic fronts. In 1992, new talks were held with the government in the Netherlands, at which a four-point agreement was defined, The Hague Joint Declaration on human rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms and disarmament. In 1993, talks were held in Hanoi and again in 1994 in the Netherlands. In 1995 the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) was reached, which granted immunity to around 100 people with ties to the negotiation process. In 1997 a thematic agenda to be negotiated was established, which allowed the negotiating teams to reach a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in 1998. However, this agreement was not validated by the president of the country. In 2004, the government held a meeting in Oslo with NPA delegates, and both parties agreed to establish a joint committee charged with supervising implementation of the human rights agreements. In 2005, the negotiations were broken off, and in 2008 the government and the NDF agreed to meet again and reactivate the joint committee to supervise human rights and international humanitarian law after a three year hiatus. Since then, this committee has met several times. The government and the NDF have expressed their satisfaction with the agreements reached during the first round of formal negotiations held in Oslo between the 15th and 21st of February 2011 with the facilitation of the Norwegian government. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the agreements signed between 1992 and 2004; they established a calendar of meetings of constitutional groups and of signing agreements (the agreement on social and economic reforms, the agreement on political and constitutional reforms, and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities), and they re-established the joint committee to supervise the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). In June, the NDF’s negotiating panel suggested that the round of peace talks scheduled for that same month should be postponed until the government released 17 NDF consultants who, according to the organisation, should be protected under the JASIG.

In May 2012, the NPA and its political wing, the NDF, expressed its willingness to resume peace talks with the government. One of the consultants to the NDF’s negotiating team, Edre Olalía, declared that the NDF had proposed a special track to the government (called the Proposal for Alliance and Peace) aimed at streamlining and complementing the negotiating process that both parties had agreed on in early 2011. Some elements in the NDF’s proposal included strengthening national independence and promoting industrial development, implementing agricultural reform and signing a truce leading to a lasting peace. Olalía also declared that in October the government sent an emissary of President Benigno Aquino to the Netherlands to talk with the leadership of the NDF, for which he expressed some hope that the dialogue could be resumed in the short or medium term. In December, the head of the government’s negotiating team, Alex Padilla, publicly voiced his optimism about the possible resumption and the future of the peace process. Days before, special government representatives met in The Hague (Netherlands) with members of the NDF’s leadership. The governmental delegation was led by the President’s political advisor Ronald Llamas, while the NDF’s delegation was headed by the leader and founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison. The meeting was facilitated by Norwegian Ambassador Ture Lundh. During the meeting, the NDF said that both parties had agreed to talk about agricultural reform, development, industrialisation, democracy, human rights, national independence and peace.

During 2013 there was no major progress. The talks scheduled for February, which had to be hosted by the Norwegian Government, did not take place because an NDF consultant, Kennedy Bangibang, was arrested. For its part, the NDF accused the Government of boycotting what was
supposed to be a historic meeting between the leader of the communist movement, José Maria Sison, and President Benigno Aquino, because it refused to release the NDF consultants and had not complied with its plan for a simultaneous, unilateral and indefinite ceasefire. According to the Government the NDF had imposed unacceptable conditions. In the second quarter the peace process continued at a standstill after the Government decided that the formal negotiations with the NDF, which had been suspended since February 2011, had concluded. The so-called special track, that both parties had agreed to in an attempt to restart the stalled dialog, had also been at a standstill since early 2013. Thus, in June the person that had until then been the head of the government negotiating panel with the NDF, Alex Padilla, was appointed by the Government as president of PhilHealth, a public company in the health sector. Manila stated that the appointment did not mean that the Government was no longer interested in negotiations with the NDF. In this sense, both President Benigno Aquino and the presidential advisor for the peace process, Teresita Quintos-Deles, said that they were working on a new approach to try to resolve the conflict through dialogue, but to date no additional details were provided.

During the third quarter some encouraging events took place, such as demonstrations in favour of resuming the peace talks, several statements by the Government saying it was willing to resume the talks if certain conditions were met, or confirmation by the facilitator of the talks, the Norwegian ambassador Ture Lundh, that the peace process had not ended and it could be restarted during President Benigno Aquino’s current mandate, which ends in 2016. In September the head of the government negotiating panel, Alex Padilla, said he was willing to resume the negotiating process if the NDF, in addition to having a clear agenda to negotiate the end of violence and facilitate a peace agreement, showed signs of goodwill and sincerity. Padilla also defended the need for a new negotiating framework to restart the talks. Sometime later, about mid-month, Padilla stated his willingness to recommend the release of some NDF consultants, but always according to the laws of the country. The special track was proposed by the NDF to speed up the progress of the peace talks, and would take place in parallel to the official conversations between the negotiating panels of the Government and the NDF. This proposal included the creation of a national Committee for National Unity, Peace and Development to carry out a program of land reform, rural development and industrialization. The implementation of this agreement would open the possibility of signing a ceasefire agreement. However, both the formal negotiations and the special track were unsuccessful.

The peace process in 2014

In the first few months of the year the peace process between the Philippine government and the NDF continued at a standstill, although some statements were issued which indicated a possible resumption of peace talks. The Government and President Benigno Aquino himself declared on several occasions during the quarter that restarting the peace talks depended largely on the willingness of the NDF to negotiate. The presidential advisor for the peace process, Teresita Quintos Deles, declared the Government’s willingness to overcome the impasse that has bogged down the peace process for months if both parties agreed a time-bound and clear doable agenda. On the occasion of the signing of the peace agreement between Manila and the MILF, Deles and other members of the Government and the Armed Forces urged the NPA to fight for its goals through political channels and mechanisms. For its part, one of the top NDF leaders in exile, Luis Jalandoni, expressed the group’s willingness to hold informal discussions or consultations with the Government in May. The head of the government negotiating panel, Alex Padilla, accused the NDF accepting the dialogue only after the arrest became public of the two main leaders of the CPP and the NPA in the field, Benito Tiamzon and his wife Wilma Austria. According to some analysts the arrest of two leaders significantly weakened the NPA’s position and the group may feel more predisposed to resume the dialogue process. In response to these accusations Jalandoni stated that his proposal to hold informal talks in May had been decided in a meeting in Maraki City in February. The Norwegian Government expressed its willingness to offer its services at any time to resume the peace process and facilitate the dialogue between the two sides. Several analysts believed that restarting the peace process could be feasible if conversations or informal...
consultations were held to discuss the mutual accusations and disagreements that have occurred in recent months.

In the second quarter there were no significant contacts between the parties or gestures or statements that would indicate that the peace talks would resume. In fact, the NDF regretted that the Government considered finalized both the official talks and the so-called “special track” that had been established in parallel to the official negotiations to unblock the peace process as something that had come to an end. In addition, the NDF regretted not having received official notification of the supposed termination of the negotiations and accused the presidential adviser for the peace process, Teresita Quintos Deles, of lying when she stated that together with the Government of Norway, the facilitator of the peace talks, it had been decided that the talks were over. According to the NDF, the Government’s new approach was to continue the process through “local peace talks”, with the aim of getting the NPA to surrender. In this sense, the NDF issued a document with a number of proposals for restarting talks (including a six-month timeframe to complete the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms, one of the four topics from the agenda accepted by the parties in the early nineties) and suggested an informal meeting between the two, with the facilitation of Norway, to resume peace talks. The group also proposed that preparations for the meeting could be ironed out in informal discussions or consultations in Oslo during the last week of May. The NDF also denied that the deadlock or the end of the negotiation process was due to its demand that the Government free 14 of its “consultants”, which according to the NDF were covered by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees signed in 1995. For its part, the head of the government negotiating panel, Alex Padilla, said that the Government had never left the negotiating table, but was simply waiting for the NDF to show its willingness to negotiate with political will. Padilla showed his willingness to listen to any initiative from the church or civil society to bring the two sides closer together, but he also accused the NDF’s proposal for resuming peace talks as insincere because it made the announcement directly to the media without notifying or consulting the Philippine and Norwegian Governments. Moreover, Padilla said that some of the points mentioned by the NDF were not even part of the official negotiation agenda. Previously, Padilla had also accused the NDF of expressing its willingness to dialogue only after the arrest in late March of the two main leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the NPA on the ground, Benito Tiamzon and his wife Wilma Austria. Meanwhile, Teresita Quintos Deles accused the NDF of focusing more on procedural than substantive matters and concentrating its efforts on the release of political consultants.

In the third quarter, both the Presidential Office for the Peace Process and the head of the government negotiating panel, Alex Padilla, said that the Government remained open to resuming negotiations if there was a will by the NDF to design a clear and time-limited calendar and to achieve concrete agreements that allow the current levels of violence to be reduced or eliminated. In early August the Government also welcomed the release by the NPA of four police officers who had been abducted in the province of Surigao del Norte. The NPA and the Armed Forces agreed to suspend offensive military actions for five days so that the police officers could be released. The government publicly acknowledged that this gesture by the NPA was a confidence-building measure and that it could be important in restarting the peace process. The Norwegian Government, meanwhile, changed its team in the negotiations with the NDF, with Elisabeth Slattum taking over as head. She and Espen Lindbaeck, deputy director of the Peace and Reconciliation Section of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, participated in the round of negotiations held on October 18 in Utrecht (Netherlands). In this round the NDF said that the agreements signed in previous years needed to be ratified.

In December important developments took place. First, the leader of the NDFP, Jose Maria Sisón “Joma”, said that the negotiations could begin again in mid-January 2015, after Pope Francis’ visit to the Philippines. The talks could take place in Oslo or even Hanoi (Vietnam), which would give a more Asian “varnish” to the negotiations, although he reiterated the ‘precondition’ that the group’s detained "consultants" must be released. Sisón also insisted that he thought it was impossible to reach an agreement with the current conservative Government, something he had
also said regarding previous governments. At the same time, however, Sisón said the two sides could agree on the issue of social and economic reform, as well as on the ceasefire. The Philippine Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, Teresita Deles, said in turn that she had received many requests to resume the peace process with the NDF and to do so using other methodologies. The negotiations were stalled because the Government had not yet agreed to the demand of the NDF to release 30 people who, according to the NDF, were part of its group of "consultants", including one couple accused of being leaders of the NPA guerrilla group. The NDF was very interested in getting this couple released to participate in negotiations. In this regard, and for the first time, advisor Teresita Deles said that the release of these people could be linked to progress in the negotiation process. Sisón, however, made it clear that it would not be possible to reach a peace agreement by 2016, when the current presidential term ends. He accused the Government of being too conservative and unable to accept any economic, political and social agreements, and the resulting ceasefire. Meanwhile, Deles reiterated that the negotiations could not continue as they had in the past after 20 years of failed attempts. She also said that the old list of NDF "consultants" should be updated, the "alias" eliminated, and the JASIG agreement should be revised to bring it up to date. At the end of the year the Government stated that it would probably change the team that is negotiating with the NDF and replace Alex Padilla. This initially pleased the NDF, since the group believed that Padilla was seeking the rendition of the NDF and not an agreement. Some sources said that the NDF was also very interested in a rehabilitation program for the region affected by typhoon "Yolanda" in 2013. It was rumoured that retired Gen. Emmanuel Bautista could replace Padilla as chief negotiator for the talks with the NDF. Meanwhile, the Philippine Government appointed former Congressman Hernani Braganza as an "emissary" with the group. Braganza visited a NDF camp where he met with Fidel Agcaoli, a prominent member of the Front's negotiating panel. The group declared a 13-day ceasefire in Surigao del Norte until January 19, in addition to the 10-day ceasefire declared earlier for the entire national territory, provided that the Armed Forces and the police do not launch offensive actions. The Philippine Armed Forces had already declared a ceasefire for Christmas and for Pope Francis' visit to the Philippines in January. The Government stated that if an agreement were reached to resume talks and both parties show political will, chances were good that a meeting between the president and Sisón could take place, just as the NDF leader had requested on several occasions. At the end of the year the Philippine Government had not yet named the new person who would head the negotiations with the NDF. The head of this organization, José María Sisón, said that negotiations could resume in 2015.

MNLF

Background to the peace process

With regard to the MNLF, which reached a peace agreement with the government in 1996, in 2007 it reached significant agreements on the application of all the provisions in the 1996 agreement in which it set up five working groups: Sharia and the legal system, security forces, natural resources and economic development, political system and representation, and education. Since 1996, there have been negotiations to implement the agreements signed that year. In May 2010, the government and the MNLF signed a memorandum of understanding in Tripoli, Libya, in order to solve the issues that had been standing in the way of full implementation of the peace agreement reached in 1996. In November 2011, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), through its Committee for Peace in the South Philippines, started contacts with the government and the MNLF to resolve the three pending issues in the negotiations in order to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement, which had also been facilitated by the OIC. The three aspects on which no agreement had yet been reached were the division of strategic minerals, the establishment of a provisional government (according to the MNLF, the government did not implement the establishment of a transitional mechanism as called for in the 1996 agreement) and holding a plebiscite to expand the territorial base of the ARMM.
In June 2012, the Philippine government and the MNLF created a 42-point list of agreement during the tripartite review of the 1996 accord, in which the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also participated. However, after the framework agreement between the government and the MILF was unveiled, the leader and founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, declared that the agreement was illegal and could lead to the resumption of armed conflict in Mindanao. In October, during the third round of informal talks held in Davao, the MILF and the MNLF agreed on the creation of a unity committee and an ad hoc joint secretariat to discuss aspects concerning both of them and to promote a joint agenda.

In July 2013 the MNLF announced that negotiations with the Government to fully implement the peace agreement of 1996 were resuming. The talks began again shortly after the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which had already acted to facilitate the 1996 agreement, urge the Government of the Philippines to synchronize and harmonize the negotiations with the MNLF and the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement signed in 2012 between Manila and the MILF. The MNLF declared that it did not see any conflict between the two negotiating frameworks because both were trying to solve the problems of the Moro people, but warned that if an agreement with the Philippine Government is not reached it would ask the OIC to raise the issue at the United Nations.

Serious clashes in September between the Philippine Armed Forces and the MNLF faction led by Nur Misuari interrupted the peace negotiations and brought them what could probably be called a complete halt. The talks had been at a standstill en recent quarters due to Nur Misuari’s opposition to the negotiation process between the Government and the MILF. Manila had informed the Indonesian Government on several occasions of its intention to bring to a close the process of revising the 1996 peace agreement and to launch the implementation phase of the different agreements that had been signed since the beginning of the process in 2007. According to the Government, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation’s Peace Committee for Southern Philippines shared this diagnosis.

**The peace process in 2014**

Although there were some gestures by the Government and some of the MNLF factions to try to bring their positions closer together and rebuild confidence, in the first quarter no significant meetings were held and relations between the two sides continued to be marked by several factors: the MNLF attack on Zamboanga City in September 2013, the fact that most of the MNLF opposed the peace process between the Government and the MILF, and the competition that existed between different factions of the group in an attempt to gain control of the national and international representation of the MNLF. The Government remained firm in its position of wanting to close down the review process of the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement, which in recent years has been facilitated by the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). According to Manila the OIC shared its view that the items on the agenda had already been addressed and resolved. In mid-February, after a meeting with a representative of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), a spokesman for the faction of the MNLF led by Nur Misuari agreed to travel to Jakarta to attend the formal closure of the negotiating process. However, the Government stated that the OIC has always determined who represents the MNLF, alluding to the participation of Misuari in the meeting. Meanwhile, Muslimin Sema (former mayor of Cotabato and leader of one of the main factions of the MNLF), proposed the creation of a quadripartite council with representatives from the Government, the OIC, the MNLF and the MILF to bring to a close the review of the implementation the 1996 agreement and harmonize the agreement with the one recently signed by the Government and the MILF. According to Sema this proposal tied into the OIC proposal to link and harmonize both agreements. In addition, Sema was very critical of the Government (for not fully implementing the 1996 agreement and then ignoring it in the peace talks with the MILF) and also of the contents of the recent agreement with the MILF (since the territory it recognizes is significantly less than the 13 provinces included in the 1996 accord).
Another of the most important events during the first quarter was the announcement by a faction of the MNLF that Nur Misuari had been dismissed as chairman of the MNLF Central Committee. The Vice President, Abul Khayr Alonto, one of the founders of the MNLF and former president of the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao had been designated as his successor. According to Alonto, this decision had been supported by 33 of the 39 founders of the MNLF who remain alive (another 51 have died), by the majority of party members and even by the OIC. According Alonto, Misuari’s latest decisions (such as his involvement in the Sabah incident or the Zamboanga siege) had discredited him to occupy the maximum responsibility of the MNLF. In one of his first statements Alonto said that the MNLF would support the adoption of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in a referendum, he called for the unity of the Moro people, he announced his readiness to accept an amendment to the Constitution if it were necessary to accommodate the recent agreement between the Government and the MILF and he expressed his commitment to defend the positions of the MNLF in a peaceful and democratic manner. However, a few days after the announcement, Misuari sent a message to the OIC, the EU and the UN stating that he was the leader and founder of the MNLF. Similarly, a spokesman for Misuari said he was unaware of the decision to proclaim Alonto as president of the MNLF; he accused the Government of trying to divide the Moro people and harshly criticized Alonto of collusion with the Philippine government to guarantee himself positions of power in the future new Bangsamoro entity. He also denied that Alonto had the support of the OIC and stated that the organization’s new secretary general had even met recently with Nur Misuari. Finally, the Government made public that it had invited 20 representatives from the three factions of the MNLF (led by Misuari, Alonto and Sema) to attend the peace agreement signing ceremony between the Government and the MILF.

The highlight of the second quarter was the reunification of three of the four factions of the MNLF under the leadership of the group’s founder, Nur Misuari, who was wanted for his alleged role in the spiral of violence that took place in the city of Zamboanga in late 2013. The reunification of three factions (one led by Misuari, one by Habib Mudjahab Hashim from the MNLF Islamic Council, and one by Muslimin Sema, former mayor of Cotabato, on behalf of the so-called ’Committee of 15′) was held in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) in mid-June and was sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which held its 41st Council of Foreign Ministers a few days later. Besides agreeing to reunification and recognizing Misuari as leader, the three factions also agreed to reject the comprehensive peace agreement signed in March between the Government and the MILF. In this sense, the only faction of the MNLF that did not share this opinion and had expressed explicit support for the peace agreement between the Government and the MILF was the one led by Abul Khayr Alonto, one of the founders of the MNLF. Alonto is a former president of the Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and vice chairman of the Central Committee of the MNLF until his recent unilateral appointment as president when he replaced Misuari. The position of the three MNLF factions generally coincided with the official view made public by the OIC several days later at the end of the conference. Thus, the OIC considered that the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro did not sufficiently recognize or take into account the previous agreements between the Philippine government and the MILF, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. In this sense, the OIC called on the MILF, the Government and the MNLF to work together to achieve greater linkage and integration between these three agreements since, according to the OIC, they contain similar and fully compatible goals.

Also of note was the agreement, in Jeddah, under the auspices of the OIC, between the MNLF and the MILF to revive the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum, a body created in 2010 but thus far practically inoperative due to a series of differences between the two groups. According to the OIC, this agreement should be the basis for creating a national front to allow the implementation of the recent Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro closely linked to the previous agreements 1976 and 1996. Both the MNLF and the MILF recognized the need for such a Forum to achieve the reunification of the MNLF, rapprochement and reconciliation between the two groups, and a common position with regard to the OIC’s call to integrate the MILF and MNLF peace
agreements under the Bangsamoro Basic Law which was being discussed in Congress. During the years before the agreement between the MNLF and the MILF, there had been numerous meetings between the Secretary General of the OIC and the top leaders of both groups, as well as between MNLF and MILF representatives. Analysts agreed that the OIC had dedicated much of its efforts to achieving the maximum possible agreement and coherence among the different organizations that claim to represent the Moro people. In another note, during the OIC summit held in Saudi Arabia the mandate was renewed for the Peace Committee for Southern Philippines, with Egypt taking the rotating chairmanship.

With regard to the OIC’s lack of recognition of the Global Agreement on Bangsamoro and the call to integrate the different peace agreements, the Government said it was open to including in the Bangsamoro Basic Law the most important aspects of the 1976 and 1996 accords. However, it refused to consider one of the main points in both agreements – holding a referendum in the 13 provinces of Mindanao to approve or reject their inclusion in the future Bangsamoro region since it believed that this commitment had already been fulfilled in the 2001 referendum. In addition, the Government said that the MNLF had been invited to participate in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (responsible for drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law) and the group had declined, apart from the fact that the current draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law already included many of the MNLF’s demands. In this regard, the Government urged the MNLF to actively participate in the legislative process of approving the law.

The MNLF announced in late September that a meeting of the Bangsamoro Coordination Forum (BCF) would be held so that the MILF and MNLF could discuss their differences and try to reconcile their positions with regard to the agreement and the peace process between the Government and the MILF. The BCF was created in June at the request of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, which facilitated both the 1996 peace agreement between the Government and the MNLF and the subsequent meetings between both parties to fully implement the agreement. On several occasions the OIC said it was concerned that the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro signed in March between the Government and the MILF did not include the fundamental aspects of the 1996 peace agreement and the current demands and concerns of the MNLF. Thus, in the meeting scheduled for mid-October the representative of the Egyptian Government, who was then the Chairman of the OIC’s Committee for Peace in Southern Philippines, would also participate, as well as representatives from Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, Libya, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Brunei and Saudi Arabia. The leader of the largest MNLF faction, Muslimin Sema, said that 90% of what is known as the “42-consensus point” reached by the Government and the MNLF in the process of reviewing the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement were already in the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro and in the draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The Department of Justice rejected the suspension of the arrest warrants that had been issued for the founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, as well as the leader of the BIFF, Ameril Umbra Kato, so they could participate in hearings and discussions that were taking place in Congress on the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Misuari had been a fugitive from justice since late 2013 when he allegedly orchestrated the siege of the city of Zamboanga, in which dozens of people died and thousands of homes were destroyed. In early September the Government said it had deployed additional troops and had designed a special security plan in Zamboanga City after rumours began to circulate that some MNLF fighters were planning to attack the city again. However, some of the group’s leaders categorically denied the rumours and stated that Misuari was currently busy trying to avoid the arrest warrant and was unable to direct the political and armed actions of the MNLF.

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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<td>• On March 27 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed. The agreement was described as historic because it culminated 17 years of negotiations with the MILF and should bring to an end more than four decades of armed conflict in Mindanao.</td>
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<td>• A referendum will be held in the areas affected by the agreement with the MILF and</td>
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once the new law has been endorsed the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will be abolished and Bangsamoro Transitional Authority will be created.

- A meeting was held in Hiroshima (Japan) between Philippine President Benigno Aquino and the leader of the MILF, Murad Ebrahim.
- The MILF announced that it had practically completed the process to formalize the creation of a new party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, with the intention of participating in the elections scheduled for May 2016.
- The Government and the MILF decided to implement the provisions of the “normalization” Annex which included creating a Joint Committee for Normalization, a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and an Independent Decommissioning Body for the surrender of weapons.
- One of the top NDF leaders in exile, Luis Jalandoni, said the group was willing to hold informal discussions or consultations with the Government in May, but the group later stated that the new approach that the Government wanted to use to continue the process, "local peace talks", was aimed at getting the NPA to surrender. At the end of the year the NDF stated that it was willing to return to the negotiating table in January 2015, but it also said that it was impossible to reach a final agreement with the current government. Both the Philippine Government and Norway in its role as a facilitator, changed their negotiating teams, and the Government said it wanted to change the methodology used in the negotiation. The NDF said that the agreements signed in previous years needed to be ratified. The possibilities were high that a meeting could be held between the president and Sisón.
- Nur Misuari was dismissed as chairman of the Central Committee of the MNLF and the then vice president, Abul Khayr Alonto, was appointed in his place. Alonto said that the MNLF would support the adoption of the Bangsamoro Basic law in a referendum. Months later, however, three of the four MNLF factions came together under the sole leadership of the group's founder, Nur Misuari.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Government delay in approving the Bangsamoro Basic Law.
- Half way through the year the Presidential Office presented several amendments to the Law, which the MILF rejected.
- The possible existence of a MILF faction that was against disarmament.
- The Government finalized the "special track" of negotiations with the NDF.
- The Government accused the NDF of launching proposals in the media rather than making them directly to the Government's negotiating panel.
- The NDF said it was impossible to reach a peace agreement with the current Government because it was too conservative.
- Internal divisions and struggles existed to lead the MNLF.
- The MNLF criticized the Government for ignoring the group during the negotiations with the MILF.
- The different approaches of the MNLF and the MILF.

**End result:** possible new negotiations with the NDF in 2015, and difficulties to negotiate with the MNLF.

### Websites of interest

- Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (peacebuilding.asia)
- Centro para el Diálogo Humanitario (www.hdcentre.org)
- MILF (www.luwaran.com)
- MNLF (mnifnet.com)
- NDF (www.ndfp.net)
- NPA (www.philippinerevolution.org)
- OCI (www.oic-oci.org)
- Oficina Presidencial para el Proceso de Paz (www.opapp.gov.ph)
Main parties involved in the process

PHILIPPINES Government
President: Benigno S Aquino

USA

Auxiliary Civilian

Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process:
- Teresita Deles
- Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (MILF)
- A. Padilla (NDF)

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

OIC, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

Indonesia
Qatar

EU

Malaysia
- Ab Ghafar Mohammed
- Ceasefire observers (IMT)
  - Malaysia, Brunei, Japan, Indonesia, Norway, EU

UK/Northern Ireland

The Netherlands

Norway
- T. Lundh
- E. Slattum

Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform (PEPP)

International Group Supporting the Negotiations:
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Asia Foundation, Muhammadiyah, Conciliation Resources, Community of Sant'Egidio, Japan, United Kingdom, Turkey

="Special track"

MNLF
(Murad Ebrahim)
(M. Iqbal)
(Jun Mantawil)

MILF
(Nur Misauri)

NPA/NDF
(J Mª Sison)
(Louis Jalandoni)

Space of intermediation
THAILAND (south)

Context of the conflict

The insurgence in southern Thailand is centred in the regions of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. The region of Pattani (or Patani in Malay), which borders on Malaysia, is populated by Muslims (Islam reached the region in the 15th century), while Buddhists are the majority in the rest of Thailand. The Kingdom of Siam exercised sovereignty over this region since the 16th century, until the British colonial administration forced the king of Siam to transfer the sovereignty of his land to the United Kingdom in 1909, with the exception of Pattani, which remained under Siamese dominion. During the 20th century, the region was progressively Thailandised, although it has conserved its different religion (Islam) and its own language (Yawi). In 1939, Siam changed its name to Thailand. The region of Pattani is one of the poorest in the country. Even though at least 80% of the population is Muslim, 90% of the public administration positions, including the police and the army, are held by Buddhists. The conflict with the southern regions is linked to the country’s centralism and the fact that the representatives in the south receive no recognition. Thus, a significant part of society is demanding a "National Dialogue", similar to other countries.

In 1968 the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was founded by Bira Kotanila, exiled in Syria and it has also been led by K. Abdul Rahman, an armed faction named PULA, whose purpose was to achieve independence in the region of Pattani, offering continuity to the struggles of the ancient Malay sultanates occupied by Siam (currently Thailand). The PULO has its overseas office in Sweden. It embarked on an active period of guerrilla activities between 1976 and 1981, after which it entered into a long period of decline due to military repression, the amnesties granted by the Thai government and the hurdles placed by Malaysia for the PULO rearguard to act on its soil. In 1989, PULO and three other organisations (Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), founded in 1960; the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) and the Mujahideen Pattani (GMIP), founded in 1986), joined together in an umbrella organisation called Bersatu or the Council of the Muslim People of Patani. In 1995, the PULO suffered from dissidence, and the New PULO was created, which also joined Bersatu. At present PULO has three factions. In 2001, there was another outburst of activities by these separatist groups, with several massacres in the ensuing years, especially in 2004, resulting in a total of 3,000 deaths since then.

Background to the peace process

The attempts to negotiate with insurgent groups in the south of the country have been thwarted several times by the anonymity of many of their leaders. In 2004, however, the government contacted Wan A. Kadir Che Man, one of the Bersatu leaders exiled in Malaysia, who had expressed his willingness to engage in negotiations with the government on some type of autonomy for the region. However, the attempt did not meet with much success due to Wan A. Kadir’s inability to stop the ongoing violence. Later, several Bersatu leaders, such as its spokesperson, K. Makhota, expressed their interest in undertaking a negotiating process similar to the one that was taking place in Indonesia (Aceh) and the Philippines (Mindanao) to reach either autonomy or the status of “special administrative region” as held by the island of Phuket, also located in the south of Thailand.

In early 2005, the Thai government created the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), initially led by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun. The goal of the NRC was to achieve peace in the south of the country. Mid-year, the NRC submitted a report in which it
recommended introducing Islamic law in the region, accepting Yawi as a working language in the region, establishing a disarmed peacekeeping force and setting up a strategic administrative centre for peace in the southern provinces. In mid-September, however, a faction of the Thai army perpetrated a coup that brought down the prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, when he was in New York. The coup leaders gathered together in the self-proclaimed Council for Political Reform and were legitimised by the king, Bhumidol Aduyadej. According to its authors, the non-violent coup was prompted by the need to put an end to the climate of government corruption and the social division that were being created amongst the Thai people. The goal of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Sonthi Boonyarataglin, was to embark on talks with the separatist rebel leaders in the south of the country. In October, he confirmed that representatives of several armed opposition groups operating in the south, including the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Bersatu, had got in touch with the armed forces with the intention of starting talks, which it agreed to. He also underscored the fact that these were talks, not negotiations, while also acknowledging the need for a political dialogue to put an end to the conflict. These declarations were issued after the prime minister appointed by the military coup masterminds, Surayud Chulanot, had set resolution to the conflict in the south of the country as one of his top priorities and had apologised for the excesses committed by the state. Before the coup, the current prime minister and the armed forces and the NRC had all publicly expressed their preference for a negotiated solution, in clear opposition to the posture of the deposed prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, who had opted for a police strategy that triggered an escalation in the violence. However, by 16th September, the armed forces that had perpetrated the coup had already issued a truce “signal” via their Security Centre when holding a peace seminar in the central mosque of Yala (south). Likewise, the new government expressed its intention to reinstate the politicians who achieved stability in the region before the arrival of T. Shinawatra, and they also reinstated the South Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a civilian body that had been dissolved by the previous government. One of the most prominent opposition groups, the PULO, was pleased by the recent changes.

Within this new context, and due to its heavy influence over the Pattani people, Malaysia suggested that it intermediate in the conflict under terms to be defined by Thailand. In October, it launched several messages along these lines, although many analysts pointed out that any future negotiations should be held in another country, such as Singapore. In any event, in mid-October the new Thai prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, visited Malaysia to study how the two countries could work together. A PULO spokesperson stated that the preconditions for opening up negotiations were that they be facilitated by a third party, that the delegation representing the insurgent movements was regarded as official by the Thai government, and that immunity must be ensured for the members of this delegation. The Thai media also reported that several informal meetings had already been held in several different European cities between members of the Thai government and the Muslims from the south. According to the Malaysian national news agency, these groups had agreed to withdraw their demands for independence in exchange for amnesty, economic development for the region and fostering the use of the Malay language in schools. However, and in spite of the political climate in the country, civilian murders and confirmations between the security forces and armed opposition groups continued. This could be due to the lack of authority over militants in Thailand by the leaders exiled to Malaysia who were prepared to negotiate, given that most of these belong to a previous generation.

The government declared that it was examining the possibility of including certain elements of Sharia law into the three southern province with Muslim majorities as part of its conflict management strategy in the south of the country. Midway through April 2007, the Prime Minister, Surayud Chulanont, publicly declared his willingness to offer amnesty to the members of the secessionist armed groups operating in the south of the country. He also refused the military aid offered by the US government to manage the conflict as it was regarded as an internal matter that the government viewed itself as capable resolving. The Thai government held exploratory talks with the insurgency in Geneva and Stockholm. The head of international affairs of the PULO, Kasturi Mahkota, lives in Stockholm. After the new government was formed, early in the
year the Minister of the Interior declared that it was considering granting a certain degree of autonomy to the southern provinces with a Muslim majority, although he did not outline any specific measure. The minister also declared that the autonomous Chinese region of Xinjiang, which also has a Muslim majority, might serve as a model.

In late May 2009, the Vice Prime Minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, declared that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 insurgents active in southern Thailand and that the solution to the conflict could not solely entail military and police repression; rather what was required is a rise in development and quality of life in the southern provinces. From 2004 until May 2009, more than 8,900 incidents of violence had been recorded, in which 3,471 people had died and 5,470 had been injured. In turn, the head of the armed forces refused to start talks with the armed groups and stated that the government’s approach to handling the conflict consisted of promoting economic, social, cultural and educational development in the region. After serious clashes in recent months, a visit by representatives from the United Nations and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to learn firsthand about the situation in the south of the country led the government to deny both organisations permission to help resolve the conflict, as the local media had claimed. In late October, the Thai Prime Minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, cautiously supported the suggestion made by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, to grant the southern Thai provinces a degree of autonomy as part of a strategy to put an end to the escalation in violence in the region. The attacks and violent acts continued in the meantime. Likewise, the vice president of the armed opposition group PULO, Kasturi Mahkota, expressed his support for a dialogue with the government on some kind of autonomy for the southern part of the country with the mediation of a third party (which might be Malaysia, according to several sources).

The most important event during 2013 was the rapprochement that took place between the Government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional armed group (BRN). In March the Government of Thailand and the BRN launched exploratory peace talks with the Malaysian Government acting as facilitator for the first time. According to a joint statement both sides agreed to the terms of reference for the dialogue, exchanged information, and laid the foundation to generate sufficient mutual trust to reduce the levels of violence and resolve the conflict affecting the south. The government delegation was headed by the Secretary General of Thailand’s National Security Council, Paradorn Pattanatabut, while the insurgent group was represented by Ustaz Hassan Taib. According to some sources the BRN had proposed the withdrawal of troops from the south, an amnesty for insurgents and the creation of a special southern administrative area, but the Government wanted to focus the discussions on reducing violence.

In late April the second round of peace talks was held. The day before they began in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) the BRN released a video with five demands for the Thai government. These included appointing the Government of Malaysia as a mediator (and not a facilitator), the presence in the talks of representatives from ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as observers, the release of all of the insurgents under arrest and the withdrawal of all pending charges against them, and the consideration of the group as a national liberation movement. In the video, the insurgent group also mentioned that it would continue its struggle to get rid of colonial domination and oppression, and its desire to create a separate state for the Pattani nation. Some analysts believed that the Government would not be able to accept the BRN demands and that the statement could be considered part of a strategy to end the negotiations, while others felt that the extreme demands were just part of the BRN’s negotiating strategy. Bangkok gave the BRN a month to show that it represented and had control over the insurgency and reduce the number of violent attacks. During the month of April the Government stated it was convinced that more insurgents wanted to join the peace talks. Furthermore, the Government of Indonesia ruled out its involvement in the peace process, even though it had played a small role in the past and some stakeholders had requested its participation.

At the end of the third round of negotiations, on 14 June the BRN made public what it would demand in exchange for declaring a ceasefire during Ramadan, which began on July 10. The demand that received the greatest political and media attention was that the Armed Forces
should retreat to their military bases. Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung had already clearly ruled out that possibility because the BRN could not control the actions of its members out in the field and the state should guarantee security in the south. Paradorn Pattanatabut said he would wait until he officially received the BRN proposals from the Malaysian mediator before making any public statement about the demands. However, he stated that the Thai government must respond to the demands of the entire population of southern Thailand and not only those of a particular group. The rebel representative, Hassan Taib, urged patience and said that the end of the bloody insurgency could take years, but that negotiations were the only way for the Government to guarantee peace.

Although during the third quarter no rounds of formal talks were held between the Government and the armed opposition group BRN, both parties were at all times in contact with each other and they even agreed to a reduction in violence during the month of Ramadan. In mid-July, and after intense pressure by the Malaysian Government and an appeal from over 640 Imams from the south urging the parties to move forward in the peace process, the facilitator of the talks announced that both sides had reached a “common understanding” (which later became known as the Ramadan Peace Initiative) to reduce levels of violence in the south for 40 days, including Ramadan, which this year was from July 10 to August 18. Also in July the Government of Indonesia stated it was willing to participate in the peace process if the Government of Thailand so requested. In this regard, the Foreign Minister stated that his country would not necessarily be directly involved in the peace talks, but it would share Indonesia’s experience in resolving conflicts, such as the one in Aceh. For its part, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also expressed its full support for the ongoing negotiations, but made no reference to one of the demands made public by the BRN: participation of the OIC as an observer in the peace negotiations.

In early August the BRN released a video in which it announced that it was suspending its participation in the peace negotiations because the Government was not addressing any of its demands. In October it was announced that two other armed groups (the PULO and the BIPP) had stated their willingness to participate in the peace process and that several meetings had even been held between the Government and the PULO leadership in Sweden, where many of the group's leaders are living in exile. Meanwhile, in early October the BRN informed Malaysia, which was acting as facilitator, that it was replacing its representatives in the peace negotiations, but details or reasons for the change were not made public. The Government announced its intention to resume the dialogue with the BRN armed opposition group in November, after having said in mid-October that it was indefinitely postponing the peace talks. In early December, the Government dissolved Parliament in response to the widespread protests in the country that demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister.

**The peace process in 2014**

The new authorities that took power after the coup in late May stated they wished to resume peace talks with the BRN with facilitation by the Government of Malaysia. The talks had been on hold for several months, in part due to the country's political crisis and also because of the investigation that led to the dismissal of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. According to some sources the strategy of the military authorities would focus on encouraging combatants to defect and surrender and to minimize or ignore the demands for greater autonomy or even independence. Moreover, in June the National Council for Peace and Order, the body that governed the country under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, announced a major restructuring of the institutions responsible for channelling and resolving the conflict in southern Thailand. Following this reform the Armed Forces will have clear control over any future peace negotiations, and over the bureaucratic and institutional apparatus. In recent years important discrepancies had been detected between the civilian and military institutions that contended with the armed conflict, as well as between the policies planned by the central Government and their implementation in the south. Three of the institutions that had previously
been in charge of the Government’s response to the armed conflict and those most affected by the restructuring announced by the Junta were the National Security Council, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre and the Internal Security Operations Command. Some human rights organizations expressed concern over the new role that the Armed Forces could play in managing the conflict.

The 5 points proposed by the BRN.

1. The Government must recognize the BRN as the representative of the Pattani people and as a liberation movement, and not a separatist movement. Liberation means the right to freedom to practice religious activities.
2. The status of Malaysia in the peace process should be changed from facilitator to mediator. If this is accepted by the Government the BRN promises that it will stop attacks on security forces.
3. In future peace negotiations representatives from ASEAN countries, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation and NGOs should be allowed to attend as observers.
4. The Government must recognize the status of Pattani and the sovereignty of the Pattani Malay people, who should have the right to self-determination in order to manage their territory as a special administrative region within the Constitution of Thailand.
5. All suspects arrested for security reasons should be released. If this request is accepted the BRN is willing to lay down its arms.

During the third quarter the military junta (officially known as the National Council for Peace and Order, NCPO) stated on several occasions that it was willing to resume peace talks and that the resolution of the conflict in the south had become a major national priority. In response to these statements some leaders of the BRN (the group that had participated in the peace negotiations beginning in February 2013 and that had come to a standstill at the end of the year) said that the dialogue should be restarted. During the quarter the NCPO was establishing the legal and institutional framework for resuming the dialogue, such as the formation of a new negotiating panel that will include people with military, academic and legal backgrounds; the creation of four working groups to devise measures to resolve the situation in the south; a formal request to the Government of Malaysia to continue to facilitate the peace talks or the creation within the Armed Forces of a commission to handle the peace negotiations and an executive committee, led by the Prime Minister, in charge of designing public policies for the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Analysts stated that in general the Armed Forces would have a much more prominent role in the future peace negotiations than they had been given during the peace process initiated by Yanglick Shinawatra’s previous Administration. Moreover, on some occasions the Government stated that to ensure the viability of the negotiating process the number of armed groups in the dialogue should be expanded and as far as possible organizations and local communities should participate in the peace process. In this regard, the military junta stated in August that Malaysia had identified and brought to the negotiating table the individuals and organizations with a real capacity to have an influence on the levels of violence in southern Thailand and shape the strategic decisions made by the insurgency.

In November, before his trip to Thailand, numerous civil society organizations called on the U.S. president to support the peace process since military action against ethnic groups was on the rise. These organizations also said they were in favour of creating a federal State. In December Thailand and Malaysia agreed that Malaysia, which in 2015 would assume the chairmanship of ASEAN, would continue to act as facilitator, under the leadership of Datuk Seri Admad Zamzamin Hashim, and following three principles: an end to violence, the representation of all parties, and the joint agreement on the demands that would be submitted to the Thai Government, which in turn decided to break down the future negotiations into three different committees: one specifically for the political level, guided directly by the prime minister, another to run the negotiations and a third working group to coordinate the local level. The head of the Thai negotiating team will be the general Aksara Kerdpol. The negotiating panel will consist of a
maximum of 15 members from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, the National Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and the Army. Government sources said that the negotiating panel would also have local government officials, relevant academic people and specialist in peace. Six or seven subcommittees were also planned to address issues such as security at the local level, social and cultural issues, and foreign affairs.

Furthermore, the Government stated that some of the BRN demands were unacceptable. The peace process will be divided into three phases: the discussions and efforts to foster communication and trust; an agreement on a code of conduct to reduce confrontation; and third, a 'roadmap' for resolving the conflict using peaceful means. The talks will be confidential, as in the eighties, until a final agreement is reached, and the smallest number of people possible will participate in them. Since September 2014 four meetings have been held in Malaysia. The Thai Government also considered the idea of holding "informal" meetings with each of the armed groups to gain a better understanding of their abilities and skills. The talks would focus on operations by the militants and the rules of engagement, while political issues would be kept separate as part of official and formal negotiating process ("Track I"). A BRN source said that since their group was not participating in the formal negotiating process, its leaders had not ruled out the idea of joining the unofficial talks and seeking more international support. The Government, meanwhile, asked the armed groups to consolidate the demands of all of the armed groups so that it was not working only with those from the BRN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• A significant part of society called for a &quot;National Dialogue&quot;, similar to other countries.</td>
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<td>• The groups from the south agreed to drop their demand for independence in exchange for autonomy.</td>
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<td>• The strategy of the military authorities would focus on encouraging combatants to defect and surrender and to minimize or ignore the demands for greater autonomy or even independence.</td>
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<td>• The Armed Forces will have clear control over the course of any peace negotiations.</td>
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<td>• The Government stated that it wanted to expand the number of armed groups in the dialogue and, where possible, include in the peace process local organizations and communities.</td>
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<td>• At the end of the year the Government proposed a new negotiating framework, with three panels and three phases: the discussions and efforts to foster communication and trust; an agreement on a code of conduct to reduce confrontation; and third, a &quot;roadmap&quot; for resolving the conflict by peaceful means.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<td>• The military’s strategy of encouraging desertions.</td>
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<td>• Lack of consolidation of the armed groups’ demands.</td>
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**End result:** military control of the negotiations, which generated distrust.

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<td>• Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives (peacebuilding.asia/tag/thai-peace-talks/)</td>
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<td>• Asia Times (<a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia.html">www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia.html</a>)</td>
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<td>• Bangkok Post (<a href="http://www.bangkokpost.com">www.bangkokpost.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• Global Times (<a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx">www.globaltimes.cn/WORLD/AsiaPacific.aspx</a>)</td>
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<td>• Gobierno de Tailandia (<a href="http://www.thaigov.go.th/en.html">www.thaigov.go.th/en.html</a>)</td>
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<td>• Insight on Conflict (<a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/thailand">www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/thailand</a>)</td>
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<td>• International Crisis Group (<a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org">www.crisisgroup.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Khabar Southeast Asia (khabarsoutheastasia.com)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• National Reconciliation Commission (<a href="http://www.ncr.or.th">www.ncr.or.th</a>)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Main parties involved in the process

**THAILAND**

- **Government**
  - Prime Minister: Yingluck Shinawatra
  - Orayuth Chan-o-cha
  - Negotiators: Paradorn Pattanatabut, General Aksara Kerdpol, Banpot Phunpian

**Malaysia**
- (Aksara Kerdpol)
- Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim
- Indonesia
- OIC
- Sweden
- Payap University’s Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace
- Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
- The Inter-religious Council for Peace

**Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)**
- (Ustaz Hassan Taib)
- BIPP
- PULO
- Kasturi Mahkota

**Sweden**

**China**

*Space of intermediation*
EUROPE

a) South Eastern Europe

CYPRUS

Context of the conflict

Colonised by many different cultures throughout its history, the island of Cyprus (9,250 sq. km - not much larger than the Spanish Basque Country) came under British administrative authority in 1878. The first revolts in favour of union with Greece took place in 1931, and in the 1950s they were led by archbishop Makarios. The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 with Makarios as president (a post he held until 1973, three years before his death) and a constitution that strove to balance the interests of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island. Enforcement of the constitution however encountered several setbacks, leading to a series of institutional crises, especially at the end of 1963, which culminated in a meeting of the UN Security Council in the wake of Greece's complaints about Turkey's aggression. As a result, in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was set up, with 2,400 troops at first and 930 currently. This force is entrusted with performing the functions of good offices and creating trust-building measures. From the start, these forces laid down 180 km long ceasefire lines spanning the island, as well as a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the clashing forces. This zone has been the site for meetings between the two communities as well as monthly meetings by representatives of political parties organised by the Slovakian embassy.

In July 1974 a coup d'état was staged by Greek-Cypriots and Greeks in favour of union with Greece, which was followed by occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. Since then the island has remained divided into two homogeneous communities. In August 1974 a ceasefire came into effect. Throughout almost all these years, Turkey has kept a contingent of 30,000 soldiers in the occupied zone on the island. In addition, the United Kingdom keeps two military bases under British sovereignty on the island. In 2004 Cyprus (as an island) became a member of the European Union, although enforcement of the bulk of EU laws was suspended for the northern part of the island.

Background to the peace process

The Cypriots have been negotiating an agreement that would allow them to resolve the division of the island for over 35 years, and this has come largely in the hands of different UN secretary generals. Between 1977 and 1979, both communities discussed bicomunal, bizonal and federal formulas without any of them actually coming to fruition. In the 1990s, federal and confederal approaches were once again discussed, although no agreement was ever reached on each community's proportion in their participation in the institutions. In view of the stalemate, in 1992 the new secretary of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, presented yet another plan based once again on the principles of creating a bizonal, bicomunal territory, which yet again irritated the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. In consequence, Boutros-Ghali decided to change tack and began to promote a milder strategy based on trust-building measures, which included a reduction of troops, a decrease in restrictions for people to communicate with each other and similar measures. In November and December 2001, new direct talks were held after a four-year hiatus under the auspices of the UN. In November, the UN Secretary General proposed that a
confederal state be created, made up of two cantons and a shared government. This would definitively become the UN Peace Plan, which has been revised on three occasions, the latest version being the one from February 2003. The plan was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leader, but it was supported by the Turkish leader Erdogan.

In July 2006, after holding a meeting sponsored by the UN’s Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders agreed to start a process of technical negotiations on the issues that were affecting the daily lives of the citizens of both communities, and to simultaneously address substantive issues in order to reach a comprehensive agreement for the future of the island. They also agreed to a list of principles, including the commitment to unify Cyprus based on a bizonal and bicommunal federation, as well as political equality, as recommended in the UN Security Council resolutions. In mid-August 2009, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader concluded the first phase of direct negotiations to resolve the conflict on the island. The direct talks, which began on the 3rd of September 2008, included discussions on six chapters: governability and power-sharing; issues linked to the EU; security and guarantees; territory; property and economic affairs; and the writing up of the matters agreed to and in dispute. In mid-September, the Greek-Cypriot president and the Turkish-Cypriot leader started the second phase in the direct talks to resolve the conflict on the island, with a new meeting under UN mediation. The leaders of the two communities met for the first time since the trilateral encounter with the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in late January 2011. At this meeting, the leaders address issues regarding the EU and economic matters. At the next meeting, they were scheduled to discuss governability and power-sharing, as well as the EU and property. The UN Secretary General stated in July that the leaders of the two communities on the island had accepted his proposal to strengthen the UN’s role in the peace talks.

In April 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon informed the leaders of both communities of Cyprus that not enough progress had been made in the negotiating process to be able to organise the desired international conference on the reunification of the island. His views were shared by his Special Advisor to Cyprus, Alexander Downer, who said that talks had stalled with regard to the sharing of executive power under the federal framework, as well as the issue of private property lost during the conflict. In the third quarter, direct peace talks were paralysed pending the Greek Cypriot elections of 2013, although dialogue between the parties was keep alive through meetings held by their technical committees.

During 2013 no significant progress was made in the attempts to resolve the conflict. Elections in February and Cyprus’ severe economic crisis slowed down even more the negotiating process on the island. The candidate of the conservative party Democratic Union, Nicos Anastasiades, won the presidential election with 57% of votes in the second round. After a deadlock that had lasted for months, efforts were launched in the second quarter to restart the dialogue. Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu met at a dinner organized by the UN envoy to Cyprus, Alexander Downer, on May 30. It was the first meeting between the two leaders since Eroğlu’s election in February, but both sides denied that it was a political meeting or a step towards relaunching the negotiating process. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with the President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, in late September during the UN General Assembly. At the meeting they discussed issues related to the progress made in preparing for the resumption of talks. In turn, Ban Ki-moon praised Anastasiades for his role in managing the island’s financial and economic crisis.

### The peace process in 2014

Early in the year the peace process on the divided island of Cyprus was restarted after being on hold for 18 months due to the fact that Cyprus was holding the rotating presidency of the EU, as well as the economic crisis on the island. The process was relaunched four months behind schedule in a meeting on February 11 between the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and the
Turkish Cypriot Derviş Eroğlu, under the auspices of the UN as mediator in the process. The leaders issued a seven-point joint statement of basic principles and in line with the process and principles followed to date. First, the statement said that the status quo was unacceptable and if it continued the consequences for both communities would be negative. Second, the leaders expressed their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner. In addition, all of the unresolved core issues will be on the negotiating table and will be discussed interdependently with the aim of reaching an agreement as soon as possible. Third, the statement notes that the settlement will be based on a united Cyprus, with a model of bi-communal and bi-zonal federation with political equality, single citizenship and a single international legal personality. Fourth, the agreement states that the federation should be the result of a solution approved in separate simultaneous referenda. Fifth, the negotiations are based on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Sixth, the appointed representatives are fully empowered to discuss any issue at any time and the leaders of the two communities will meet as often as necessary. Finally, the sides will seek to create a positive climate to ensure the talks succeed.

The renewal of the talks was welcomed by international actors such as the U.S. and the EU. Turkey also expressed its support. Still, scepticism was visible in several media organizations and in analyses with regard to the real short-term possibilities this new phase will have to achieve an agreement. At the same time, an analysis published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) indicated that this new phase was largely an attempt to revive the 2008-2012 peace talks. Still, ICG did note that the Greek Cypriots seemed to be more in favour of giving greater powers to the communities within a federal solution; a direct channel of communication with Turkey and Greece; a greater U.S. role in the process due to the increasingly important role the eastern Mediterranean is taking on in the energy field, among others. Following the February 11 meeting the chief negotiators from both communities held formal meetings with the Greek and Turkish governments in late February. Moreover, as part of the preparations for his departure from office, the UN Special Advisor to Secretary General on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, held meetings in March with the Secretary General and advisers.

The leaders of both communities agreed on May 22 to expedite the negotiating process and hold at least two meetings each month. In his report published in early July on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon encouraged leaders to sustain the momentum of the process, build on existing agreements and intensify efforts to achieve a global solution. He also highlighted as positive innovative step taken by the sides to engage in visits of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiators to Greece and Turkey respectively. In addition, the Secretary General called on the parties to explore confidence-building measures. In any case, no tangible progress was reported for the meetings held during the second quarter and mutual accusations and criticisms were exchanged between the sides. Ban Ki-moon urged them to keep the rhetoric of accusations to a minimum. The Turkish Cypriots accused the Greek Cypriots of being unwilling to compromise and reach an agreement, while the Greek Cypriot leader said that the process would remain at an impasse if the Turkish Cypriot side did not agree to address all of the core issues. Furthermore, in April the UNDP organized a trip to South Africa for the negotiators to study the South African experience. At the civil society level the interreligious dialogue continued to make progress, while business leaders from both communities also met in June in Nicosia. In a statement released after the creation of the Nicosia Economic Forum they declared their support for the continuation of negotiations and pledged to promote inter-community initiatives from the private sector.

In early July the UN secretary general urged leaders to step up their efforts to achieve a solution to the conflict. Nevertheless, there was no progress in the July or August rounds. Conversely, in September the parties agreed to move to a phase of "structured negotiations" where they would address the differences that existed on key unresolved issues. That was the result of the September 17 meeting between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders and the new UN special advisor to the Secretary General, the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide. At that meeting the parties assessed the status quo, they agreed that the negotiating teams...
had completed presenting their proposals on all issues, they reaffirmed their commitment to a negotiating process aimed at achieving results as soon as possible and they agreed to increase the pace of meetings and meet at least twice a month. Prior to that meeting Barth stated that since the talks had been restarted in February they had not progressed as expected. In an initiative at the citizens' level, representatives from the chambers of commerce from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as from Greece and Turkey, agreed in mid-September to set up a joint arbitration centre that will deal with trade disputes, which the press saw as a step forward in the efforts by non-governmental actors towards reconciliation and improved relations on the island.

In October the president of the Greek Cypriot community, Nicos Anastasiades, suspended his participation in the negotiations after a Turkish seismic survey ship began exploring for gas in waters that are part of Cyprus' exclusive economic zone, which is under dispute by the two communities. Nicosia's Government had already granted exploration licenses to several foreign multinationals. In late November Turkey proposed to create a joint committee with the Greek Cypriots, to protect the rights of both communities to use the natural resources of the island and create a joint venture to carry out surveys. The U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, who was visiting Turkey, said that tensions needed to be de-escalated and that both parties should return to the negotiating table.

In December the United Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, proposed to open a parallel ('second track') of negotiation and create an advisory panel to study the best way to technically resolve the gas dispute. The proposal was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Prime Minister visited Turkey to meet with his Turkish counterpart and, among other things, try to resolve the gas exploration issue, which had become an economic and geopolitical problem because the reserves discovered were of such magnitude that Cyprus could be a competitor of Algeria. Both leaders concluded that they should jointly use the natural resources. Greece had obtained support from Israel and Egypt. Some analysts said that the most reasonable solution would be to transport the gas to Turkey, but the Turkish Government stated that it would only be possible once the Cyprus conflict is resolved. At the end of December Turkey decided to withdraw the ship that had triggered the dispute, which would make it possible to resume negotiations in January 2015, although the Turks said that Greece should participate without preconditions. In January 2015 the UN envoy said that he was concerned that the process was moving in the wrong direction.

### Most significant events of the year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>The prime ministers of Turkey and Greece came to the conclusion that they should jointly</td>
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</table>
use the natural resources of Cyprus.

### Reasons crisis during the year
- Influence of the economic crisis in Cyprus on the negotiations.
- Temporary break in the negotiations due to differences over oil exploitation rights in the area.

**End result:** negotiations may be possible resumed at the beginning of 2015.

### Websites of interest
- Cyprus Mail (Cyprus-mail.com)
- FES Cyprus Newsletter (www.fescyprus.org/media/newsletter)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- ONU (www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc) (/www.uncyprustalks.org)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- Plan de Paz de la ONU (www.cyprus-un-plan.org)
- PPIO Cyprus Centre (Cyprus.prio.org)
- Todays Zaman (www.todayszanaman.com)
- UN Cyprus Talks (www.uncyprustalks.org)
- UNFICYP (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp)
- UN Security Council (www.un.org)
- www.cyprus-conflict.net

### Main parties involved in the process

**Greek Cypriot Community**
- Nicos Anastasiades
  - Negotiator: Andreas Mavroyiannis

**Turkish Cypriot Community**
- Derviş Eroğlu (Mehmet Ali Talat)
  - Negotiators: Osman Ertug, Ergun Olgun

**UN**
- Special Rep: Taye-Brook Zerihoun
- Special Advisor: (Alexander Downer) Espen Barth Eide
- Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs: Lynn Pascoe

**UNFICYP**

**Space of intermediation**
- France
- UK
- USA
- GREECE
  - Pres.: K Papoulias
  - PM: Antonis Samaras
- TURKEY
  - Presid.: RT Erdogan
  - PM: A. Davutoglu

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Quebec City, October 15, 2015


KOSOVO

Context of the conflict

A former Ottoman possession, from the 14th to early 20th century, Kosovo was re-conquered by the Serbs in 1913 as it regarded this land as the cradle of the Serbian nation. The Serbs colonised the region for several years, while the Kosovar elite emigrated to Turkey. In 1945, Tito founded the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which was made up of six republics, one of them Serbia, which in turn had two autonomous provinces, one of which was Kosovo (or Kosove in Albanian). Kosovo was mainly populated by Albanian Muslims. Two-thirds of the Albanian people living in the former Yugoslavia reside in Kosovo, a small territory measuring 10,900 km2 that has higher unemployment rates and is considerably more economically backward than the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1966 the local population withstood systematic political repression, until in 1968 Tito allowed an autonomous university in the Albanian language to be created in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. This measure was followed by other decisions that expanded the rights of the Albanian population. In 1981 there were serious clashes between the Albanian and Serbian communities, which were the harbingers of the harsh conflict that was to emerge years later. In 1990, as a reaction to the surge of nationalism in several Yugoslav republics, Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomous status, dissolved the parliament and the Albanian government, and undertook a process of repression in the region. This only served to further spur several republics to distance themselves from Serbia, which in turn gave rise to a series of armed conflicts starting in 1991, first with Slovenia, and later with Croatia and Bosnia. These conflicts came to an end with the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, after numerous resolutions by the UN Security Council and military intervention by NATO.

In 1991 the clandestine authorities of Kosovo organised a referendum, and virtually the entire population voted in favour of sovereignty. The following year, clandestine elections were held in which Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was proclaimed President of Kosovo. Thus began a non-violent strategy of confrontation with Serbia and the creation of parallel structures. Serbia’s reaction was to militarise the region by sending 20,000 soldiers and police officers there, in addition to the ultra-nationalistic paramilitary forces that inspired terror among the Albanian populace. In 1997, shortly after the 1995 Dayton Agreements, which did not mention Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) emerged, with broad support from the Albanian Diaspora (around 400,000 people) living in Switzerland, Germany and the United States, and with rearguard bases in northern Albania. The goal of the UCK was to achieve independence for Kosovo. In 1998, when the UCK controlled around 40% of Kosovar territory, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic launched a major military operation in Kosovo in which over 1,500 people died and many people were forced to become refugees (around 800,000) and were displaced from their homes (500,000). This Serbian operation was followed by a NATO military action that led to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops, Albanian attacks on Serb civilians, and the deployment of NATO troops.

In 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved a proclamation of independence for the hitherto Serbian province. In August 2010, the International Court of Justice, the UN’s legal body, issued a non-binding ruling that the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
Background to the peace process

In 2006, several rounds of negotiations were started between the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo to debate the status of the latter province. The Serbian Parliament unanimously approved a new constitution which claimed its sovereignty over Kosovo, reaffirming Serbia's position against the option of independence as a solution to Kosovo's status. In the early days of January 2007, the United Nations Special Envoy for the process on the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, submitted his proposal on the ultimate status to the countries in the Contact Group before it was forwarded to the Security Council to be discussed in April. The plan, which was regarded as independence under international supervision, stated that Kosovo would have its own constitution and state symbols (flag and anthem) as well as its own army, but only with light weapons, and the ability to sign international agreements. Martti Ahtisaari's proposal was initially rejected by Serbia and supported by Kosovo and the EU.

In mid-February 2008, the Parliament of Kosovo unanimously approved the proclamation of independence of what until then had been a province of Serbia. In early April, the Kosovo Parliament approved the new constitution which stipulated that Kosovo was a parliamentary, secular and democratic republic and that it considered Kosovo a sovereign, indivisible state. In a non-binding opinion, the International Court of Justice, the UN's legal body, declared in August 2010 that Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244. With this ruling, approved by ten votes in favour and four against, the court responded to the question submitted by the General Assembly at the behest of Serbia. However, the text did not weigh in on whether or not Kosovo had the right to secede. In March 2011, negotiations got underway between Kosovo and Serbia under the aegis of the EU to address, at least in the first phase, issues that were affecting the daily lives of the people. The dialogue was expected to focus on three areas: the rule of law, freedom of movement and regional cooperation. Ever since the negotiation process had gotten underway, Serbia and Kosovo had reached agreements on trade, freedom of movement, property registration and mutual recognition of university degrees.

In February 2012, Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement related to Kosovo's representation in regional forums. According to the agreement, Kosovo will participate in the forums under the name of “Kosovo” and with a footnote in the documents referring to UN Resolution 1244 as well as the non-binding ruling of the International Court of Justice. Alongside these developments, both parties also agreed on a technical protocol for implementing the pact on Integrated Border Management (IBM). In May, Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement related to holding Serbian legislative and presidential elections in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the Pristina government said it was ready to address the past and reconcile with Serbia, but urged Serbia to apologise for the crimes committed before and during the Kosovo War. The Kosovar government authorised the creation of a national working group that will deal with the subject of transitional justice and reconciliation. According to the government, the body will be formed by all stakeholders involved, including the families of missing persons, war veterans and political prisoner associations. In the third quarter, both parties accused each other of not fulfilling the agreements reached as part of the talks still mediated by the EU since March 2011, which then resulted in formal agreements on freedom of movement, the mutual recognition of university degrees, representation in regional forums and border management. Despite the mutual accusations of breaching the agreements, at the UN General Assembly both parties pledged to continue with the technical dialogue mediated by the EU and aimed at normalising relations between both territories. In December, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement to begin to implement the pact on Integrated Border Management that was signed in 2011. Meanwhile, Serbia and Kosovo also reached an agreement for goods aimed for the Serb-majority northern part of Kosovo to enter Kosovo duty-free.

In January 2013, in the fourth round of the negotiation process, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached an interim agreement on the collection of customs duties, which will be
earmarked for towards the development of northern Kosovo. According to European sources the
taxes collected would be put in a fund under the auspices of the EU, but there was no agreement
on other technical details. Another step towards improving relations was the meeting that took
place in early February, for the first time since the unilateral declaration of independence of
Kosovo in 2008, of the Serbian and Kosovo presidents, Tomislav Nikolic and Atifete Jahjaga
respectively. The meeting was described as positive by both and they pledged to continue the
dialogue process. The meeting was followed by the fifth round of talks at the end of the month
between the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, in which the parties agreed to work together
to overcome the parallel institutions of the Serbian areas of Kosovo as well as progress towards
the establishment of an association of municipalities with a Serb majority, although the parties
differed in their interpretation of the agreement. In the second quarter, progress continued in the
dialogue and culminated in a key agreement in April for the normalization of relations. It
included a solution for the Serbian areas of Kosovo. The 15-point accord recognized the authority
of Pristina in the entire territory of Kosovo and contemplated the decentralization of power in
Serb areas; the dismantling of the parallel political and judicial structures; the creation of the
post of Police Commander for those areas which would be a person from the Serbian community,
proposed by the decentralized authorities and appointed by Pristina; and the establishment of a
permanent division of the Appellate Court in northern Kosovo, which would be composed of a
majority of Kosovo Serb judges, in addition to others issues. The agreement was ratified by the
Serbian and Kosovo parliaments, despite protests by some groups in Kosovo, both Serbs and
Albanians.

The May agreement established a roadmap for the normalization of relations and included five
areas: legislative changes, the association of Serbian municipalities, the police, the courts and
elections. According to Thaçi, the second part of the plan referred to the creation of a community
of Serbian municipalities. Progress in the dialogue came in late June shortly before the EU
summit where it would be decided whether or not to begin negotiations with Serbia for accession
and with Kosovo for association with the EU. In the third quarter progress was made in the
dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo with the implementation of measures from the agreement
reached by the parties in April to normalize relations. As a result, Serbia dismantled local
government bodies in four Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo: Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zvecan
and Zubin Potok. These bodies operated outside of the control of the Kosovo Government with the
political and financial support of Serbia. Police points, police stations and courts were also
dismantled. At the same time, and only after several previous disputes, Serbia and Kosovo
approved solutions to disagreements with regard to the November 3 local elections in Kosovo,
which would be the first held under the control of Kosovo in areas with a Serbian majority.
According to the agreement the ballots would not have the symbols of Kosovo. In the round of
talks held at the end of August a final agreement on telecommunications and energy was not
achieved, and a statement was issued saying that more consultations were required. In this round
that there was again no agreement on the ballot issue, but this was resolved by a subsequent
decision by the Central Electoral Committee to print them without symbols. Moreover, the Deputy
Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hajredin Kuci, said that the Kosovo Government was preparing a
strategy to take over the responsibilities of the EU EULEX mission once it finishes its mandate in
June 2014. In October the prime ministers of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, and Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi,
met in Brussels (Belgium) in a meeting that was considered historical. The encounter was
facilitated by the EU and the high representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, was
present.

The prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo, Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaçi, reached an agreement
on important issues regarding the Police in areas with a Serb-majority in Kosovo during the 19th
round of negotiations facilitated by the EU. Both sides agreed that a person of Serbian origin
would be in command of the police in the northern part of Kosovo. Conversely, the leaders of
Serbia and Kosovo failed to reach an agreement in the round that took place on December 13,
which examined the issue of the judiciary in northern Kosovo. Dačić said the meeting failed due
to the Kosovo Government’s ‘unacceptable’ demand that the court in Mitrovica have jurisdiction
over Albanian municipalities. According to Dačić that would mean the assimilation of four Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo.

The peace process in 2014

In the first few months of the year the process of negotiations facilitated by the EU continued. Three meetings were held in Brussels (January, February and March) between the prime ministers of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, and Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, with the participation of the EU high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. At the January meeting, the parties discussed the situation created after the local elections in November 2013 and plans to repeat the elections in North Mitrovica. They also discussed the Serbian parliamentary elections that would be held in March. The rest of the quarter the talks focused mainly on the judiciary issues included in the agreement of April 2013. However, it was not possible to settle on a package of measures on the judiciary during the meeting in late March. Ashton said that the fact that the parties had practically concluded discussions on this matter was a positive step and noted that the remaining adjustments would be finalized in the next round. Meanwhile, one of the Prime Minister’s political consultants, Bekim Collaku, blamed Serbia for the delay in integrating the Serbian judicial authorities in northern Kosovo within the justice system for the rest of Kosovo. According to Collaku the April agreement contemplated that the integration should be finalized by the end of 2013. Moreover, in his report published in late January Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that significant progress had been made in the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, but he stressed that the talks should continue. He highlighted that an increased level of mutual confidence and direct communication between the parties were essential elements for this progress. In this January report the Secretary General noted that 150 Serb policemen had completed the recruitment and transition process to the Kosovo Police Service and another 100 agents were expected to complete the process that month. The Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, said in early January on a visit to a Serb Orthodox monastery in Gracanica (Kosovo) that Serbia wants peace and negotiations with Kosovo no matter how difficult or painful it may be for both parties.

After the meeting between the parties that took place in late March with EU facilitation, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, said that the parties had almost finished the discussions on the package of judiciary measures and that the remaining adjustments would be finalized during the next round. The parties had agreed to meet again soon. However, during the second quarter the situation in Kosovo was marked by internal tensions that led to early elections. In April the Kosovo government passed a bill to extend the presence and mandate of the EU mission in Kosovo, including the Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) in response to a request by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton. In the June elections Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won the legislative elections, in which there was a low turnout. Thaçi’s election program envisaged the creation of an army with 5,000 soldiers and 3,000 reservists for a country with a population of 1.8 million people and borders with Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. The Western countries that contribute funds to Kosovo and recognize its independence were reluctant to support the creation of a Kosovar army for fear of the reaction by Serbia and the more than 100,000 Kosovo Serbs living in the country.

In the third quarter the process was affected by the uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Kosovo. In the context of the political impasse caused by the lack of a new government since the June elections, the opposition parties (LDK, AAK and Nisma) agreed that as part of a possible new scenario, which included a government formed by their coalition, that the opposition group Vetevendosje (Self-determination) could take charge of leading the dialogue with Serbia. Vetevendosje stated that it would support the opposition coalition only if the dialogue with Serbia was brought to an end, and demanded that Belgrade must recognize the independence of Kosovo before relations with Serbia could be normalized. In any case, the quarter ended without a solution to the political crisis. The faceoff between the PDK, acting as a caretaker government,
and the opposition coalition was prolonging the lack of a new Administration. With regard to the
dialogue, there were talks in late July between Serbia and Kosovo, with EU facilitation, over the
crisis triggered in Mitrovica by the construction of a square in the northern zone (with a Serbian
majority) that replaced an older square and previous barricades. The Albanian population
considered that the square continued to be an obstacle to freedom of movement. In turn the
Albanian population erected memorials in honour of the former KLA armed group. The parties
reportedly reached an agreement at the meeting, but Serbia and Kosovo subsequently offered
different interpretations of the pact. The representative in the negotiations for Kosovo and Deputy
Prime Minister, Edita Tahiri, said that the agreement meant that both sides should remove
barriers and barricades on the bridge and the vicinity. The head of the Serbian government’s
Office of Kosovo, Marko Djuric, said that the agreement was that EU experts would analyze the
situation on the bridge, but that nothing would be taken down until a final solution was reached.
Moreover, in late August Tahiri said that plans were being drawn up for the construction of the
new facilities for the joint border checkpoints. The construction of the six joint checkpoints was
discussed at a meeting in early September. The establishment of joint border posts had been
approved in December 2011.

In December the new Kosovo administration, with the participation of the two main parties in the
country, received the endorsement of the national Parliament, which finally ended the
institutional deadlock caused by the inability to reach an agreement to form a government after
the June 8 elections. The new Cabinet, with a total of 19 ministries, received the support of 73
MPs, while 38 voted against and two abstained. The formation of the Government headed by
Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, leader of the Democratic League (LDK), was made possible after a
deal was closed with the Democratic Party (KDP) lead by Hashim Thaçi, the outgoing head of
government. According to the agreement Thaçi would assume the duties of Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister and would be president of Kosovo in 2016 when the term of the current
president, Atifete Jahjaga, ends.

In 2015 Serbia will assume the presidency of the OSCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>EULEX (<a href="http://www.eulaex-kosovo.eu">www.eulaex-kosovo.eu</a>)</td>
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</table>
Main parties involved in the process

**SERBIA**
President: Tomislav Niklic
Prime Minister: Ivica Dacic
Negotiator: Borko Stefanovic

**KOSOVO**
President: Atifete Jahjaga
Prime Minister: Isa Mustapha
DPM: Hashim Thaci
Negotiator: Edita Tahin

**NATO**
KFOR
UNMIK (J Rücker)

**OSCE**
(Werner Almhafer)
Mission in Kosovo

**UN**
UN Spec. Rep. (L. Zannier)

**KLA**
(Faik Fazliu)

**Troika**
Russia (A. Bocan Harchenco)
USA (Frank Wisner)
EU (Wolfgang Ischinger)

**EU**
EULEX
Special Representative: Peter Felth

**Croatia**
Bulgaria
Hungary

**Diplomatic Academies of Kosovo and Vienna**

**Space of intermediation**
MOLDOVA (Transnistria)

Context of the conflict

Although internationally the region of Transdniestria is considered to be part of the Republic of Moldova (an independent country since the beginning of 1992), most of its inhabitants (predominantly Slavs) have considered themselves to be independent from the Republic since September 1990, when the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of Transdniestria declared its independence and established its capital in Tiraspol, with its own currency, constitution, parliament, flag and media. Most of the population is declared Christian. Several studies indicate that there are high levels of corruption, censorship and organised crime in the region.

Situated between the Dniester and Nistre rivers, this region was under the control of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the 16th century to the end of the 18th century, when it was handed over to Imperial Russia. After the Russian Revolution at the beginning of the 20th century, the region became autonomous under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although during World War II it was annexed by Romania. Later its inhabitants were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan for having collaborated with the German army and its Russian allies. Later, as a result of the Paris Peace Treaties, it was made part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. Since 1956, the 14th Soviet army has remained in the area to control the enormous military arsenals deployed there, this being one of the reasons for the conflict in Moldova.

The conflict broke out as a result of the August 1989 proclamation declaring Moldovan (written in the Roman alphabet) to be the official language of the country (compared with the Cyrillic alphabet used by a large part of the population in Transdniestria), and negotiations began for reunification with Romania (before the fall of Ceaucescu in December). This move was rejected by the people of Transdniestria, who proclaimed independence the following year, creating paramilitary corps for its defence (the ‘workers’ detachments’ which would later become the Republican Guard). The war, which did not last long, began in early 1992 and resulted in some 1,500 dead and 100,000 refugees. Shortly afterwards, in July, a ceasefire agreement was signed, the presence of the Soviet army in the area was made official and a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up to supervise the ceasefire in the Security Zone, as well as the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF), made up of delegations from Russia, Moldova and Transdniestria. Since 1994, the OSCE Mission in Moldova has formed part of the JCC as an observer. In December 2006, there was a referendum which overwhelmingly ratified the independence of Transdniestria, which aspired to join Russia (the majority of the population speaks Russian) and which had been blocked by the Republic of Moldova since the beginning of the armed conflict. The region, which represents only between 12% and 15% of Moldova, nevertheless produces 35% of the GDP, holds the greatest industrial wealth of Moldova (40%) and produces 90% of the electricity. This has caused significant economic tensions, among other reasons because of the region’s capacity to cut off the electricity supply to Moldova. Since 1991, the president of the region of Transdniestria has been Igor Smirnov, who renewed his mandate in the 2006 elections with 82% of the vote.

Background to the peace process

In March 1992, the chancellors of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine met in Helsinki and agreed to principles to peacefully resolve the conflict. They also created consultation mechanisms in order to coordinate their efforts. A few months later, they held several discussions within the

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4 The region is also called Transniester, Transnitsria or Pridnestrovia (in Russian).
CIS to deploy a peace-keeping force in Moldova. In July of that same year, an agreement was
signed in Moscow between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation for a peaceful
solution to the conflict, which in addition to a ceasefire also agreed to create a demilitarised
security zone stretching 10 km on either side of the Dniester River.

Since February 1993, the OSCE has been the body charged with the negotiations to find a
solution to the conflict through a mission in Moldova headquartered in its capital, Chisianu. The
purpose of this mission is to define the status of Transdniestrria through dialogue among the
clashing parties. According to the OSCE, the key issues in the conflict are language, Moldova's
pretensions of unifying with Romania, the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestrria and the
definition of the status of this region. Since autumn 2005, the EU and the USA have joined the
OSCE’s efforts as observers. In April 2008, the presidents of Moldova and the self-proclaimed
Republic of Transdniestrria met for the first time in seven years and agreed to spearhead trust-
building measures that would, in turn, allow the negotiations, which had been stopped for two
years, to resume. Moldova has usually stated its support for talks in their 5+2 format (Moldova,
Transdniestrria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, with the USA and EU as observers), while
Transdniestrria has preferred the 2+1 format (Moldova, Transdniestrria and Russia). In March
2011, the government of Moldova created a new structure dedicated to the conflict in
Transdniestrria, the Reintegration Commission, whose mission is to promote and coordinate the
application of a shared policy by all Moldovan institutions in the sphere of reintegration. In July,
the Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Firat and the leader of Transdniestrria, Igor Smirnov, met
in the capital of the pro-independence region, Tiraspol, at a football match in what was described
as another round of football diplomacy. In December, the first official meeting was held as part of
the formal negotiations to resolve the conflict in Transdniestrria in the 5+2 format, after these
negotiations had been suspended for almost six years.

The second round of negotiations in 5+2 format took place in February 2012, which had been
restarted in late 2011 after six years of deadlock. Held in the Irish capital, Dublin, the meeting
came in a context of optimism and some rapprochement between the parties and was preceded by
a series of measures taken by Transdniestrria since the new leader of the region, Yevgeny
Shevchuk, came to power. These measures, which were welcomed by Moldova, included lifting all
taxes on Moldovan goods entering the region, simplifying customs and border procedures and
allowing two Moldovan television stations to broadcast in Transdniestrria. In April, Moldova and
Transdniestrria reached an agreement on the main principles and procedures for maintaining
negotiations, including the frequency of the meetings and some items on the agenda of future
rounds of negotiations, the role of the working groups in strengthening confidence-building
measures and the possibilities of consolidating the results of the negotiations. The agenda that
would be followed in the negotiating process was subdivided into various dimensions: social and
economic issues, humanitarian and human rights issues, security and political arrangement of the
conflict. In June, the leaders of Moldova and Transdniestrria agreed to re-establish all transport
corridors between both regions, including the rehabilitation of a bridge over the Dniester River. In
September, a new round of talks was held in Vienna between Carpay, Shtanski and mediators and
observers that ended with agreements to intensify talks over human rights and to establish a joint
forum for dialogue with civil society and the media in both regions. This new meeting also focused
on education.

Representatives from Moldova and the region of Transnistria met in mid-February 2013 in Lviv
(Ukraine) as part of the negotiating process and under the 5 + 2 format (Moldova and
Transnistria, as parties to the conflict; Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators, and the U.S.
and the EU as observers). The leader of the de facto independent region, Yevgeny Shevchuk,
rejected a proposed 1 + 1 meeting with the Moldovan president during the 5 + 2 meeting in
Lviv. According to Shevchuk the conditions were not right to discuss the status of Transnistria in
the negotiating process. In addition to the difficulties of the negotiating process itself, a political
crisis erupted in Moldova with the resignation of the Government after a vote of no confidence
passed by Parliament. The motion was proposed by the opposition Communist Party that had
formerly held power and was based on allegations of corruption by the Administration. Moldova
and Transnistria held a new round of 5 + 2 talks in Odessa (Ukraine) in late May. The parties agreed to a new confidence building measure: to dismantle an aerial ropeway cable that had gone unused for more than a decade to avoid risks to the towns it passes over (Rybnitsa and Rezina); and they discussed several issues including freedom of movement and removal of radioactive waste. In early June the President of Transnistria approved a decree that unilaterally delimited the borders of the breakaway region, and on paper incorporated some areas currently under the jurisdiction of Moldova, which added tension to the context of dialogue.

In late July, an agreement was reached on a joint action plan for the preservation of natural resources. The accord was achieved by the group of experts on agriculture and environmental issues that, like the rest of the joint expert groups in the negotiating process, was established in 2008. Furthermore, the prime minister of Moldova, Iure Leanca, and the leader of Transnistria, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, met in the capital of Transnistria, Tiraspol, on September 23. At the meeting the two leaders signed an agreement that extended the decision to reopen rail freight service through Transnistria. In turn, in a new round of the 5 + 2 negotiations in early October the parties discussed in detail freedom of movement issues. Thus, the two sides stressed the importance of simplifying the administrative obstacles to the movement of people between the two sides, which would improve the welfare of communities and would increase mutual confidence.

The peace process in 2014

In the first few months of the year the negotiating process moved along with some limited progress, although it was negatively affected by the uncertainty caused by the impact of the crisis in Ukraine. In that sense, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transnistrian Settlement Process, Ambassador Radojko Bogojevic, who took office in January for a term that would last during the 2014 Swiss and 2015 Serbian presidencies, said in March that events in the region should not affect the peace process. The dialogue process did indeed continue during the quarter. In January Bogojevic held separate meetings with the main political actors in the capitals of Moldova and Transnistria, Chisinau and Tiraspol respectively, and stressed the constructive attitude of the parties and the emphasis on achieving practical solutions to issues affecting both populations and to build confidence. In February the first round for 2014 of the 5 + 2 talks was held (Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, as well as U.S. and EU as observers). Again the Special Representative welcomed the constructive climate. As a result of that meeting the parties signed a protocol on free movement that had been launched the previous year. The Special Representative held new rounds of separate contacts with the local stakeholders in March. Finally, the new 5 + 2 round scheduled for April 10-11 was postponed.

During the first quarter Bogojevic said that one of the priorities of the Swiss presidency was to improve the lives of both populations. One of the most pressing issues was education, which according to the Special Representative was an issue that should be depoliticized. The issue has recently received greater media attention in a context in which schools were under pressure in Transnistria for teaching in Moldovan (a language virtually identical to Romanian). At the same time, he stated that another goal was to work to unblock the discussions on the status of Transnistria.

The parties held a new round of 5 + 2 talks (Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, with the U.S. and EU as observers) in early June, after the initial meetings planned for early April were delayed. The OSCE special representative of the president, Radojko Bogojevic, said that holding the meeting, in spite of the difficult political and security context in the region, was a positive sign and that he appreciated the constructive approach and willingness of the parties to continue to search for a solution to the conflict. The issues addressed included the implementation of previous agreements (for example, dismantling the Rybnitsa-Rezina aerial ropeway cable) as well as matters of freedom of movement, goods and services, the situation of farmers in the Dubassary region, cooperation between law enforcement bodies and the situation of schools operated by Moldova in Transnistria that were teaching in the Latin script. With regards
to this issue, the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Astrid Thors, said she was concerned over the fact that the parties may not reach an agreement before the start of the school year, given the distance separating the conflicting parties. Despite the round held in June, the next round scheduled for mid-July was cancelled and postponed to the beginning of September. The OSCE regretted the delay, but urged the parties to maintain frequent and substantive contacts at both the political level and in the workgroups.

The negotiating round in May was held despite the growing tension at the time, when the Government of Moldova put its border forces on alert because of the deteriorating security situation in Ukraine. In addition, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Alexander Vershbow, said that Moldova was facing increased pressure from the conflict in Ukraine and urged Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Moldova. The visit to the region in May by the Special Representative of Russia to Transnistria was criticized by the Moldovan Government because they were not informed. Tension also rose after the signing in June of an association agreement between Moldova and the EU. The accord was strongly criticized by Russia, which warned Moldova of possible consequences as the divide between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic powers (U.S., EU, NATO) and its former Soviet allies (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) continues to grow, especially after the events in the Ukraine conflict.

The dialogue in the third quarter suffered because the new rounds of talks were delayed twice and due to the impact of the deteriorating relations between the West and Russia. The negotiating process continued and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transnistrian Settlement Process, Radojko Bogojevic, held separate meetings with the parties during a visit to the region that ended in early July. Bogojevic met with Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration and chief negotiator in the process, Eugen Carpov, in Chisinau; and with the Transnistrian chief negotiator Nina Shtanski in Tiraspol. However, the joint round of 5 + 2 talks scheduled for July 17 and 18 was delayed to September 11 and 12 and that month it was delayed once again. During the quarter Bogojevic repeatedly regretted that the negotiations had been postponed although he was encouraged by the clear commitment of the parties to continue the dialogue. The Special Representative urged the two sides to continue with direct contacts to achieve the maximum possible progress on specific issues that affect the entire population. The delays in the negotiation process coincided with a deterioration of relations between Moldova and Russia. The signing of the association agreement between Moldova and the EU in early July was followed by a series of retaliatory measures by Russia, including a ban on imports of several Moldovan products. Russia also criticized the agreement saying it was a violation of the rights of the people of Transnistria. Moldova also announced in July that it would participate for the first time in the NATO summit in September. In July Transnistria and Russia signed several cooperation agreements in the areas of the economy, trade, transport, agriculture and science. Internal tensions also surfaced during this period. Transnistria put its security forces on alert in August because of an alleged military threat from Moldova and Ukraine, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Moldova once again demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from Transnistria.

In the parliamentary elections held in Moldova at the end of November the three pro-EU parties won 44% of the vote and the pro-Russia parties received 39%. The turnout was just under 56%. Some analysts said that the Moldovan population was tired of corruption, the lack of judicial reform, the privatization of transport and the economic crisis. Moldova also became part of the geostrategic rivalry between Brussels and Moscow. In 2013 Moldova signed an association agreement with the EU, which angered Moscow. Also of note was the proposal made by the Moldovan Foreign Minister, Natalia Gherman, during the 21st OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers to change the format of the peacekeeping mission in Transnistria, currently controlled by Russia, and make it a mission under international mandate. In turn, the Russian foreign minister announced that if Moldova lost its neutral status Russia would begin the process to recognize Transnistria. The Socialist Party, meanwhile, proposed a federation to resolve the conflict. At the end of the year the Finnish organization Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)
organized several talks in Moscow and Brussels with senior experts and the political parties in conflict.

<table>
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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The parties signed a protocol on freedom of movement.</td>
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<td>• The Government of Moldova put its border forces on alert because of the deteriorating security situation in Ukraine.</td>
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<td>• Tension climbed in June after an association agreement was signed between Moldova and the EU, which was strongly criticized by Russia.</td>
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<th>Reasons crisis during the year</th>
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<td>• Impact of the conflict in Ukraine and the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia</td>
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<td>• Pressure on schools in Transnistria that taught in the Moldovan language.</td>
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<td>• Delays in the rounds of negotiation.</td>
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<td>• Criticism from Moldova for not having been informed of a visit by the Russian representative to Transnistria.</td>
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<td>• Retaliation by Russia after the association agreement between Moldova and the EU.</td>
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<td>• The possibility that the U.S. could install a military base near the Romanian capital.</td>
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<td>• Fear that Moldova could lose its neutrality.</td>
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<td>• Fear of the unification of Moldova with Romania.</td>
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End result: unresolved.

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<th>Websites of interest</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Al Monitor (<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com">www.al-monitor.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• Crisis Management Initiative (<a href="http://www.cmi.fi">www.cmi.fi</a>)</td>
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<td>• EU Neighbourhood Infor Centre (<a href="http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/news">www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/news</a>)</td>
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<td>• Eurasia (<a href="http://www.eurasia.net.org">www.eurasia.net.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• Moldova Azi (www azi.md/en)</td>
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<td>• OSCE (<a href="http://www.osce.org/Moldova">www.osce.org/Moldova</a>)</td>
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<td>• Parlamento de Transdniestria (<a href="http://www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng">www.vspmr.org/?Lang=Eng</a>)</td>
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<td>• Pridnestrovie (<a href="http://www.pridnestrovie.net">www.pridnestrovie.net</a>)</td>
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Main parties involved in the process

MOLDOVA
President: Vlad Filat
Prime Minister: Iure Leanca

Ukraine

Romania

TRANSDNISTRIA
President: Yevgeny Shevchuk
Foreign Minister: Vladimir Yastrebchak
Negotiator: Nina Shtanski

Russia
Special Representative: Dmitry Rogozin

5+2 format:
Moldova, Transdnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine + USA, EU

Committee of Experts

Committee of Experts

Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF):
Russia, Moldova, Transdniestria

EU, USA (observers)

Reintegration Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for Conflict Resolution (Victor Osipov)
Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration (Eugen Carpov)

Space of intermediation

Finland - CMI

OSCE
Radojko Bogojevic
TURKEY (PKK)

Context of the conflict

Kurdistan, with a population of 33 million, most of whom are Muslims, and a total area measuring 550,000 sq. km, is divided amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. It is regarded as the most populous stateless nation in the world. Over 20 million Kurds inhabit Turkish territory. Their origins go back to the 18th century. In the Middle Ages the Kurds lived in relative freedom, and during the Ottoman Empire they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. With the fall of this empire, and as a result of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, their land was divided amongst several different states. Shortly thereafter, Kurdistan’s immense oil wealth was discovered, especially in the part inside Iraq. In 1924 Atatürk proclaimed Turkey’s independence. From that year until 1938 there were fourteen uprisings by the Kurdish people.

There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) since 1984, with a total of 40,000 deaths, most of them Kurds. The PKK was created in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Òcalan (“Apo”). In subsequent years the PKK abandoned its goal of winning independence for Kurdistan and agreed to seek formulas for autonomy for each territory. It is largely financed by donations from the vast Kurdish diaspora around the world, especially in Europe and the United States. It has also received aid from the Greek-Cypriot community. The Kurds have support organisations in several different countries, such as the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) with headquarters in London and offices in the United States. The USA is also home to the KNCA, the Washington Kurdish Institute and the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN). In the past, the PKK also received periodic support from Iran and Syria. It has around 6,000 combatants. In 1995 the PKK created the exiled Kurdish parliament, with headquarters in Europe.

In 1987 the Turkish government decreed an exceptional status for eleven Kurdish provinces. President Turgut Òzal (1989-1993) began peace efforts by creating a Ministry for Human Rights and promising the Kurdish people a certain degree of autonomy and the freedom to speak their own language. However, Òzal’s death and the renewed outbreak of PKK offensives put an end to the prospects of a negotiated solution. Since 1995, despite several unilateral ceasefires by the PKK, the government has continued its brutal fight against this group, destroying thousands of towns, displacing around two million Kurds and creating Kurdish militias charged with putting down the PKK and its support bases. In the 1995 offensive, the Turkish government deployed 35,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region. After a serious political crisis between Turkey and Syria in October 1998, the latter country withdrew its support of the PKK and forced Òcalan to leave Damascus, where he had lived for years. In February 1999 Òcalan was captured in Kenya by the Turkish secret services and was later sentenced to death, although this ruling was commuted in 2002. With the wane in the PKK’s activities in 2000, the Turkish government began tentative reforms to ease the restrictions on the Kurdish culture.

The Kurdish conflict, just like the one in Cyprus, has been conditioned or influenced by Turkey’s negotiations to join the EU. In 1998 the European Commission approved a document stating that a civilian, not military, solution must be found to the situation in southeast Turkey. Both the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (since 1995) have issued declarations to the same effect. In addition, the International Socialist has a Working Group on the Kurdish Question (SIMEC), headed by the Swede Conny Frederiksson, who is also the advisor to a civilian platform that studies the Kurdish question as part of the relations between Turkey and the EU. In November 2002 the moderate, pro-European Islamists in the Party for Justice and Development
(PJD) won the elections with an absolute majority, and their leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, succeeded in being appointed Prime Minister in March 2003 after the sentence preventing him from holding this post was lifted. In view of the invasion and later conflict in Iraq, where much of the Kurdish community lives, the new Turkish government sealed an alliance with Iran and Syria to prevent the Kurdish autonomy already existing in northern Iraq from becoming the start of independence for all Kurdish territories. This move has unquestionably hindered partial agreements with the Kurds from being reached, in this case with those living on Turkish soil.

In 2004 a new armed group appeared, called the Taybazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, abbreviated TAK), apparently with no ties to the PKK or perhaps made up of dissidents from the PKK. This group is pursuing independence for Turkish Kurdistan, and it was added to the EU’s terrorist lists in late 2006. In 2005 the Democratic Society Movement (DTP) was founded, a pro-Kurdish party regarded as the successor of the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), which was founded in 1997 and was the continuation of a party that was banned because of its ties to the PKK. The DTH has mayors in 55 towns in southeast Turkey, mainly inhabited by Kurds. Its leaders include Leyla Zana, who was imprisoned for three years for having spoken Kurdish in the Turkish parliament. The party is jointly led by Nurettin Demirtas.

Secret talks have been taking place over the last few years between the Turkish government and the leader of the PKK, Öcalan, which received a special boost in 2013. In 2014 formal negotiations were launched.

**Background to the peace process**

The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire several times (1993, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2009 and 2010), but without this being reciprocated by the Turkish armed forces, and without it serving as a spur to start a negotiation process. The year after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested, in February 2000 the PKK announced the end of its armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy, but the Turkish army rejected the unilateral ceasefire. In April 2002, the PKK once again gave up its claims for the independence of Turkish Kurdistan and its armed struggle at its 8th Congress, at which the party changed its name to KADEK (Congress of Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), or Kongra-Çel. This party was still presided over by Öcalan, who was imprisoned and at that time condemned to death. The Turkish Minister of Defence stated that he would continue to view the PKK as a terrorist organisation and that he would ignore the unilateral ceasefires. In 2005, the PKK created the Koma Komalen Kurdistan (KKK) as a platform to promote the federal process in Kurdistan. In the second half of November 2009, the government presented to Parliament the first specific measures in its democratisation initiative to resolve the Kurdish question, as a continuation of the Parliamentary discussion started in early November. This involved several short-term advances in cultural, political and social issues. In mid-December, the Constitutional Court declared the pro-Kurdish party DTP illegal because of its presumed ties with the PKK, which cast doubt on the government’s plan to undertake reforms and motivated the PKK to interpret it as a declaration of war.

In July 2010, the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayilan, proposed the disarmament of the PKK in exchange for political and cultural rights for the Kurdish people. Karayilan stated that he was ready to disarm under United Nations supervision if Turkey accepted a ceasefire and fulfilled certain conditions. In May 2011, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* stated that Turkey had been holding talks with Qandil (in reference to the PKK troops based in the mountains of Qandil, Iraq). *Milliyet* cited comments from the co-president of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtas, in which he claimed that Turkey had been in touch not only with the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, currently imprisoned in Imrali, but with Qandil as well. The talks held in 2006 and 2007 were followed by the talks in 2008 with the three areas of the PKK (Öcalan in Imrali, the leaders in Qandil and representatives in Europe) with the support of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, according to *Milliyet*. In July, the leader of the PKK stated that an agreement had been reached with the state delegation, with which it had been
engaged in contacts on the establishment of a Peace Council to achieve a solution to the Kurdish conflict. A recording leaked to the press in September revealed talks between a Turkish intelligence service (MIT) officer and senior PKK officials in Oslo. The leaked talks had taken place in 2010, had reached the level of negotiations, and had continued until mid-2011. The PKK’s demands had been accepted by the government, although not formalised. They included issues like education in the native language, constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish identity, self-governance, democratic autonomy (a term which the Kurdish movement often uses), and house arrest for Öcalan. The government could not sign a document like that, but it could implement some of its aspects. In late September, in a context of tension in Turkey due to the surge in violence by the PKK, the Turkish Prime Minister himself, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that the negotiations had reached a stalemate and that the struggle against the PKK would continue until the group laid down its weapons.

In June 2012, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, submitted a proposal to make progress in solving the Kurdish conflict through the Turkish Parliament. In the third quarter, some limited progress was made related to prospects for resolution, despite the seriously deteriorated atmosphere in terms of security. In late September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that it would be possible to hold new negotiations with the PKK, and even with its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan. In November, following the end of a hunger strike undertaken by around 700 Kurdish prisoners, Erdogan said that he was not opposed to resuming formal talks with the PKK. Erdogan also said that the Turkish intelligence services (MIT) could meet with the leader of the PKK.

In 2013, for the first time in many years the Turkish Government and the PKK, through its leader A. Öcalan, reached a series of agreements in a process where both sides made concessions, which pointed to positive prospects. The talks were set up between representatives of the Turkish intelligence services and Öcalan in Imrali prison, where he has been since 1999. Some public statements were issued by government officials and the Kurdish movement on their positions and interests and most of them focused on the end of violence, but discrepancies existed with regard to the steps, pace and guarantees needed to achieve peace. According to some sources the group could begin to disarm in the spring. The second visit to Öcalan in February was made by the MP and president of the BDP, Pervin Buldan, and the BDP MPs Sirri Sureyya and Altan Tan. In a message that was considered historic and transmitted through the BDP during Newroz, Öcalan called for a farewell to arms and for the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkish soil, without specifying a timetable. Other steps were also taken such as the approval of a law allowing Kurdish to be used by the defence in the courts. In turn, during the second quarter the Government worked on the creation of a committee of “Wise persons” to contribute to the peace process. According to the Turkish press, Öcalan and the BDP were also involved in the preparation of this group. The make-up of the commission was made public in early April. It included 63 personalities from various fields and political views and was divided into seven subgroups, one for each of the seven geographical regions of Turkey. In the spring, as planned, PKK forces began their withdrawal from Turkey to northern Iraq. In early April, on the eve of Öcalan’s birthday, a BDP delegation went to see Öcalan once again. The visit was authorized by the Government.

Moreover, in parallel to the talks between the Government and the PKK leader, during the month of May the ‘wise persons’ commission was launched and included scholars, journalists, artists and representatives from the civil society. Also in May, a parliamentary committee was created to oversee the conflict resolution process. The group included ten members from the ruling AKP party and one from the BDP. The two other groups with parliamentary representation, the Kemalist party, CPH, and the MHP Turkish ultranationalist party, said that they would not participate in the new commission. In July and August the process was negatively affected by accusations on both sides that the other party was not moving forward, which led to significant setbacks and statements by the Kurds that the process was over. The Government, in turn, announced that in September it would present a new democratization plan, but its launch was delayed. Meanwhile, in mid-September two representatives from the pro-Kurdish BDP party, co-chairman Selahattin Demirtas and the MP Pervin Buldan, met with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan,
the tenth parliamentary visit authorized by the Government since the beginning of dialogue. After
the visit the BDP transmitted a message from Öcalan saying that a new format was needed, that
the process should move from the current dialogue to a new stage of substantive negotiations. On
September 30 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan presented the democratization plan, which
included a debate on the election threshold, which could be reduced from the current 10% to 5%,
eliminated or kept as is; the authorization of education in Kurdish in private but not public
schools; the authorization to use Kurdish and other languages other than Turkish in political
propaganda; lifting of the ban on toponyms in languages other than Turkish; additional broad
changes that would affect other political and social dynamics in Turkey in general, and not only
the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish nationalist movement, including the BDP party, criticized the
reform plan for being insufficient and said that the Government had not consulted other groups
during its development. The Kurdish organization KCK –with PKK participation– denounced on
October 1 that the Government was not seeking a solution to the conflict, but had brought it to a
standstill, and that it was only interested in winning the upcoming elections, with local and
presidential elections on the ballot in Turkey for 2014. A few days later BDP co-chairman
Selahattin Demirtas said that the Government had in effect ended the peace process. According to
Demirtas the reform plan was not part of the dialogue process, which had been based since the
beginning on mutual dialogue, but sought instead to benefit the ruling AKP party. Demirtas said
that no dialogue was taking place. The co-chairman of the KCK, an umbrella body for Kurdish
nationalist movement organizations, Cemil Bayik, said in late October that the dialogue process
between the Government and the leader of the KCK/PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, had come to an end
and blamed the Turkish Administration for not responding to Kurdish demands.

The process was given new momentum in November with new gestures by the two sides. The
Government authorized a new visit by a delegation of Kurdish politicians to the PKK leader that
has been in prison since 1999, Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation included BDP parliamentarians
Idris Baluken and Pervin Buldan, in addition to the vice president of the new HDP Kurdish
political party and ally of the BDP, Sirri Süreyya Önder. According to Önder, Öcalan had said
that the current peace talks were insufficient, the format was flawed and a legal framework was
needed. Öcalan's brother, Mehmet, had also visited the PKK leader and highlighted Öcalan's
willingness to move into a negotiation phase to overcome the current fragility of the process, but
that it must have a legal basis. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the President
of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Massoud Barzani, visited Diyarbakir, the symbolic Kurdish capital
city in Turkey, where they made a call to support the peace process. During the trip Erdogan
visited the local city council where he met with several Kurdish politicians. However, despite these
gestures the dialogue process remained fragile for several reasons: Turkey was in a pre-election
phase, the regional rivalry between Öcalan and Barzani, and the influence of the civil war in
Syria. Indeed, the Kurdish group in Syria linked to the PKK, the PYD, announced in November
that it was launching the creation of a provisional autonomous administration in the areas under
their control. This was met with criticism by Turkey, the Kurdish government in northern Iraq and
Syrian Kurdish groups close to Barzani.

The peace process in 2014

The dialogue between Turkey and the PKK continued to be active in the early months of the year,
after it was launched in December 2013, but it remained fragile and was at somewhat of a
standstill in the context of pre-election tension. During the first quarter the PKK leadership,
including its supreme leader Abdullah Öcalan, in prison since 1999, warned repeatedly that the
process could derail if further steps were not taken after the local elections on March 30. There
were additional monthly meetings between Öcalan and Kurdish MPs, who act as intermediaries
between Öcalan and the high level Kurdish political-military cadres, with bases in northern Iraq.
After the February meeting three requirements from Öcalan regarding the process were made
public: the implementation of a legal framework for the negotiations (the Turkish Government
prefers use the term "settlement process" instead of "peace process"), the creation of observer
bodies and a permanent commission to oversee the negotiations. Subsequently, as part of
celebrations of the Kurdish New Year (March 21) and one year after his historic appeal for a farewell to arms, Öcalan issued a new message calling for a renewed push in the process of dialogue after the March 30 elections. According to Öcalan, the dialogue had continued, which showed the willingness and realism of the parties, but he also criticized the delaying tactics used by the Government and demanded negotiations based on a legal framework. At the same time the KCK (the political-military structure that brings together all of the different actors in the Kurdish movement) said in March that the Government was no longer an interlocutor in the peace process given the lack of response to appeals made by the Kurds and urged the people themselves to resolve the problems and promote the democratization of the country. In this regard, some analysts said the KCK might be getting ready to declare an autonomous regime in the Kurdish region of Turkey if the crisis in the country led to greater instability. Moreover, despite the fact that the parties were frustrated by how the process was going, there were some positive steps such as the release in March of all of Öcalan's lawyers, who had been imprisoned since November 2011 as part of the mass arrests of Kurdish politicians, activists and professionals. During the quarter other people were set free, including five members of the pro-Kurdish party BDP, who were put on trial for their alleged involvement with the KCK.

The dialogue between Turkey and the PKK received a significant boost in late June when the Government presented a bill that sought to give legal guarantees to those members of the Administration involved in the dialogue. It also authorized the Government to take action in the political, cultural, legal and socio-economic spheres, in addition to the steps necessary to facilitate the return of the PKK combatants to society and their reintegration. The PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, welcomed the initiative and said it was a historic advance. Moreover, according to Öcalan the dialogue should be conducted in a transparent and legal manner and the public should be informed. The bill was presented before the presidential elections in August, the first direct elections in the country, and some quarters believed it was an attempt by the ruling AKP party to gain Kurdish support. In any case, the Kurdish movement decided to compete in the elections with its own candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, while the AKP announced on July 1, as predicted, that the current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, would finally run for president; in a context where he had already reached the maximum number of terms permitted in office as prime minister. In turn, the Kemalist opposition party, CHP, and the MHP Turkish ultra-nationalists decided to run under a common candidate, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. The new impetus to the peace talks that the future law sought to set in motion came after a period of fragility and growing complexity, partly due to the deteriorating situation of the Kurds in Syria, whose main political and military reference—the PYD and the YPG—has ties the PKK in Turkey.

During the second quarter the talks had remained active, with regular meetings between the representatives of the HDP pro-Kurdish party and Öcalan -in prison since 1999. In the press release after these meetings Öcalan had repeatedly demanded a legal framework that would provide guarantees for the talks. The bill presented in Parliament was supposedly in response to those demands. Öcalan also called for legislation that would open the door to regional autonomy. In April the Turkish Parliament passed -and the Turkish President signed- a law that gave the security services (MIT) greater power and immunity, which was interpreted in some quarters as a step towards providing the legal basis for negotiations with the PKK. However, the KCK—the entity that brings together the PKK and the Kurdish nationalist movement—criticized the law and said it could lead to more repression. Furthermore, in June the PKK demanded direct meetings between Öcalan and the PKK because the visits by Kurdish members of parliament were not enough. On the 26th of that same month the Turkish government submitted to Parliament a bill that attempted to guarantee the peace talks with the PKK. The bill included legal guarantees for the members of the Administration involved in the peace process. The leader of the PKK, A. Öcalan, said that the initiative was a historic step forward. Also in June, a group of intellectuals and Turkish MPs visited the Philippines, Germany, Northern Ireland and South Africa to get a first hand look at their experiences in peace processes. The trips were organized by the British entity the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI).
The dialogue between Turkey and the PKK moved forward early in the third quarter, but it was affected negatively during the rest of the period by mutual accusations and the deteriorating situation of the Kurdish areas in Syria. In early July the Parliament and the Turkish president passed a law proposed by the Government to give the talks a new impetus by providing a framework of legal guarantees for the process, which was considered a positive step by both sides. The law gave immunity to members of the Administration participating in the dialogue, authorized the Government to take steps in the cultural, socioeconomic, political, legal and psychological spheres, and to adopt measures that would facilitate the return and reintegration of PKK combatants. The main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, and the Kurdish movement, including PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, welcomed the move. In turn, the meetings related to the dialogue process continued between representatives of the Kurdish movement and Öcalan, as well as between representatives of the State and the PKK leader, in prison since 1999. Thus, on August 15, after the August elections, the Chief of Turkey’s intelligence community, Hakan Fidan, met with Öcalan to tell the PKK leader that Erdogan as the new Turkish president was willing to continue the dialogue process. On the same day, after Öcalan met with the delegation of Kurdish parliamentarians from the HDP (the co-chairs of the parliamentary group, Pervin Buldan and Idris Baluken, and MP Sirri Sürreyya Önder), he stated that the armed conflict was coming to an end and that historical events were on the horizon. Halfway through that month Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay stated that the Government was preparing a roadmap that would be shared with the institutions and with its Kurdish counterparts. He also said that he was in favour of direct talks with the political and military leadership of the PKK when necessary. Atalay also said that a group to oversee the dialogue process could be set up. In recent years the process had been conducted through direct contact by the intelligence services with the imprisoned PKK leader, Öcalan, in what was called the ‘Imrali table’ in reference to the name of the prison. In the second half of 2014, however, both parties agreed to begin formal negotiations. The government negotiating team would be led by Muhammed Dervisoglu, Undersecretary of Public Safety and collaborator of the director of National Intelligence, Hakan Fidan, who until then had been in charge of talking to Öcalan in prison. On the Kurdish side, Öcalan would be chief negotiator together with several MPs from the HDP and several other important figures. Öcalan’s goal would be to discuss his ‘roadmap’ before the parliamentary elections were held in June 2015, which might not necessarily be in the Government’s interest. He also suggested that the United States should mediate, even though the Turkish Government has always refused to permit external mediation.

Nevertheless, in July it was becoming clear that the dialogue process and the Kurdish conflict were both being jeopardized by the slow pace of the process and the distrust that existed between the parties caused by each others position regarding the advances of the ISIS jihadist group in the Kurdish areas of Syria. Thus, in July the co-chairman of the KCK (the umbrella organization bringing together the Kurdish political, social and armed followers of Öcalan, including the PKK) and Syrian Kurdish leaders accused sectors of the Turkish State of arming, sheltering and training the Islamist combatants involved in attacks in July against the Kurdish stronghold of Kobane. The Kurdish accusations against Turkey were repeated in subsequent months, while at the same time the situation in the Kurdish areas of Syria deteriorated. In these areas the Kurdish political leadership was in the hands of the PYD party and the YPG militias, linked to the PKK. The situation in the Kurdish areas of Syria deteriorated significantly in September when ISIS laid siege to Kobane. In this context, the PKK accused Turkey of slowing down the peace process and of collaborating with ISIS, as well as blocking the passage of Kurdish fighters from Turkey to Syria to stop the advance of ISIS. The highest level organ of the KCK announced at the end of September that it was bringing to an end the no-conflict period due to Turkey’s lack of response in the peace process and its support of ISIS. The KCK also rejected Turkey’s insistence on the withdrawal of PKK guerrillas from Turkish territory. Earlier that month Öcalan had stated that dialogue continued, but he was very critical of the Government. Moreover, he had also asked for the urgent establishment of a secretariat, a ‘democratic’ delegation and an oversight committee.

After a pro-Kurdish delegation visited the political-military leaders of the PKK in northern Iraq and Öcalan on 21 October, he was more optimistic and said there was hope of resolving the
conflict and that the process of dialogue had entered a new phase since October 15. Meanwhile, the ruling AKP party announced that the Government was about to complete a roadmap to end the conflict and the details were being shared with the Kurdish party. According to AKP spokesman Besir Atalay, new rounds of dialogue would begin soon and further meetings would be held. The AKP said that it was sincere about the process. Öcalan meanwhile said that brave political moves, determination and trust are needed. In late November, Öcalan said that a major democratic solution could be reached in 4 or 5 months. He also said that it was important to have a "reinforced ceasefire" and an Observation Committee to monitor the truce during the new phase of negotiations. Several academics and Kurdish politicians said that it would be a good idea in future negotiations to have a "third eye," a "reference delegation", an 'observation committee' or something similar. This suggestion was not backed by the Government, which believes in the principle that the process must be domestic.

In December the Turkish Government and the Kurdish representatives picked up the pace of contacts and meetings in order to reinforce the dialogue process. Thus, in late December the pro-Kurdish HDP party said it had continued discussions with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, with the political-military cadres in the bases in northern Iraq, and with the Turkish Government, and the conclusion was that no obstacles existed to move into a phase of substantive negotiations. Also at the end of the month the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, Yalçın Akdoğan, said the process continued with strong political will and determination and that the negotiations had intensified to find a solution based on trust and good faith. The delegation of Kurdish representatives from the HDP visited Öcalan on November 30 and December 17 in an expanded format, from three to four members, and which included the co-president of the Kurdish civil platform DTK, Hatip Dicle. After the November meeting it was reported that Öcalan had submitting a draft negotiation framework that the HDP would have to discuss with the Government, internally in the party and with Kandil. Subsequently the discussions would supposedly be opened to other public sectors. The document, "Peace and Democratic Negotiation Process Draft" included several sections, including methodology, philosophy, agenda and action plan. The KCK—the umbrella organization that brings together the guerrillas, political parties and civil organizations of the Kurdish nationalist movement said that it fully accepted the document and was ready to implement it if the State also accepted it. The KCK also stated that better conditions were needed for Öcalan, including mechanisms that would allow direct communication between Öcalan and the organization. After initially stating that the document included recognition of autonomy, the HDP later said after it was rejected by the Government that it contained issues related to the democratization of local administrations. In a statement at the end of the month after a meeting with Akdoğan, the Kurdish delegation said that the dialogue process had been through several problematic and fragile moments, and that there had been many causes, but it was mainly due to the two parties’ lack of negotiating experience. The statement also said that progress had been made since the October crisis, that the talks would have more depth and be more frequent and results-oriented, and that the timetable would begin "as soon as possible". Moreover, the group would avoid sharing certain issues with the media until the talks were in a more advanced stage. Furthermore, according to reports in the Turkish press, the supposed new phase in the dialogue will include meetings between Öcalan, the Kurdish delegation and the committees established under the umbrella organization of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Safety. The co-chairman of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas, said the official dialogue could begin in early January. Meanwhile, some analysts said the AKP was trying to buy time before the 2015 general elections. On a trip to Russia Demirtas said that Russia should become more involved in the Kurdish issue.

### Most significant events of the year

- Öcalan made three demands regarding the process: the implementation of a legal framework for the talks, the creation of observer bodies and a permanent commission to oversee the negotiations.
- The Government introduced a bill that sought to give legal guarantees to the members of the administration involved in the dialogue process. It also authorized the Government
to take action in the political, cultural, legal and socio-economic spheres, in addition to the steps necessary to facilitate the reintegration of PKK combatants and their return to society.

- There was a lack of trust between the parties due to the positions maintained regarding the advance of the ISIS jihadist group in Kurdish areas of Syria.
- The ruling party, the AKP, announced that the Government was about to complete a roadmap to end the conflict and the details were being shared with the Kurdish party.
- In late November the PKK leader, A. Öcalan, said that a major democratic solution was possible in 4 or 5 months.
- At the end of the year Öcalan submitted a draft negotiating framework, which included sections on methodology, philosophy, agenda and an action plan.

### Reasons crisis during the year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delay tactics by the Government with regard to the negotiation.</td>
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<td>Interference of the Turkish elections in the summer of 2015.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact caused by the delicate situation of the Kurds in Syria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allegations by the PKK of the alleged support Turkey was providing to ISIS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problems with public order.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both parties’ lack of negotiating experience.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**End result:** Prospects of beginning formal negotiations with a new methodology.

### Websites of interest

- Eurasia (www.eurasianet.org)
- EUTCC (www.eutcc.org)
- Firat: en.firatnews.com
- Info-Türk (www.info-turk.be)
- International Peace and Reconciliation Initiative (IPRI) (www.ipr-initiative.com)
- Kurdish Human Rights Project (www.khrp.org)
- Kurdish Info (www.kurdish-info.eu)
- Kurdish Media (www.kurdmedia.com)
- Kurdistan National Congress (www.kongrakurdistan.org)
- Todays Zaman (www todayszaman.com)
- Turkish Daily News (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr)
- Washington Kurdish Institute (www.kurd.org)
- www.freedom-for-ocalan.com
UKRAINE

Context of the conflict

In the nineteenth century most of Ukraine was integrated into the Russian Empire, and the rest full under Austro-Hungarian control. After a period of wars and several attempts to gain independence, in 1922 Ukraine became one of the founding republics of the Soviet Union. The territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was enlarged toward the west shortly before and after World War II and again in 1954 with the transfer of Crimea, which became part of the Ukrainian SSR. Ukraine gained its independence after the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. After independence, Ukraine declared itself a neutral country. The country maintained a limited military alliance with Russia and other CIS countries and a partnership with NATO since 1994. It inherited a large military apparatus from the USSR, but it significantly reduced its conventional arsenal, and the nuclear weapons were given to Russia. In the 2000s the Government was leaning towards NATO and greater cooperation with the alliance was established with the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in 2002. It was later agreed that the issue of joining NATO should be decided in the future by way of a national referendum.

In 2004 the pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential elections. The results triggered public demonstration in support of the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, who wanted to challenge the results and staged a peaceful revolution that brought Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko to power and forced Yanukovych into the opposition. However, in 2006 Yanukovych became prime minister once again until the 2007 elections to the Ukrainian Parliament brought Tymoshenko back as prime minister. On February 25, 2010 Yanukovych once again became the president of Ukraine, but beginning in late 2012 the country went through a critical period between the Government and protesters who did not accept the change of political model that was approved following Yanukovych’s re-election, a model that was more presidential and equally corrupt. On November 21, 2013 President Yanukovych suspended the signing of the Association and the Free Trade Agreements with the European Union, which triggered a wave of permanent demonstrations and riots, known as Euromaidan, that was launched by supporters of strengthening ties with the EU. In mid January 2014 the Government approved a new law criminalizing protests and placed limits on basic rights. This sparked clashes with the police and culminated in the dismissal of the Ukrainian president, who sought refuge in Russia. This led to a clash between the easternmost pro-Russian provinces and the western ones, which were a mix of different groups in favour of joining the EU (including nationalists on the extreme right). The fighting caused over 2,600 deaths until August 2014, and a million displaced persons.

The Donbass region represents 15% of the population of Ukraine, 16% of GDP, 25% of the industrial production and 27% of the exports. Both Ukraine and Western Europe depend heavily on Soviet gas and there are no alternatives in the mid-term. Ukraine paid 11 billion dollars for Russian gas in 2013 and received $ 3 billion in fees for the pipeline that crosses its territory to Western Europe. Ukraine also depends on Russia for remittances, about 3% of GDP, from the numerous emigrants living in that country. The Ukraine conflict should be resolved so that both sides gain, not through a military victory by one of the sides. This means being flexible and getting the support of the populations for the final compromise solution, which must respect the national identities, languages, national affirmations and civil and cultural rights.

The conflict has taken place against a backdrop of internal struggles for political and economic power, the rivalry between regional political and economic institutions (such as the Association
Agreement with the EU), the strategic value of Crimea for Russia since it is home to its main naval base, and Russia’s wish to control the Russian-speaking space and promote the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some analysts also suggested that the Russian proposal to create a free trade zone between the EU and the Customs Union by 2020 could be an opportunity, and they also believed that Ukraine should refrain from joining NATO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports of heavy weapons to Ukraine, 2008-2013</th>
<th>Ukraine military spending, 2009-2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in millions of dollars)</td>
<td>(in millions of dollars, constant prices of 2011) % GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: SIPRI Database, November 2014.

The military expenditures for 2015 are an estimate provided by the President of Ukraine.

The peace process in 2014

In January the EU’s head of Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, visited Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, in an attempt to facilitate a solution to the crisis, and Russia warned the EU not to get involved in local issues. In February the Ukrainian government and the opposition reached an agreement facilitated by a European delegation (Germany, France, Poland). The accord was backed by Russia and ratified by the Ukrainian parliament, and included provisions for a unity government, the restoration of the 2004 Constitution, constitutional reform and early elections at the end of the year. Shortly after it was decided that elections would be held in May. After many protests, the MPs from Crimea dismissed the Local Government and approved a resolution to hold a referendum in May to expand its autonomy. In the meantime Russian military forces in uniforms without markings began occupying some areas and institutions in Crimea, which was finally annexed to Russia following a referendum that was rejected by Ukraine and later by the UN General Assembly. In March Crimea and Russia signed a treaty making Crimea a republic of the Russian Federation and Sevastopol a federal city. Russia maintains a major naval fleet in the Black Sea, which is a passageway to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Faced with this fait accompli, considered illegal by most of the international community, Washington and Brussels announced economic sanctions against Russia. Faced with this fait accompli, Washington and Brussels announced economic sanctions to Russia and, in a military move that harked back to the Cold War, NATO deployed troops in several of the former Soviet states as a deterrent. The United States pledged 730 million euros in investments to increase military exercises, training, equipment and the presence of American troops in Central and Eastern European countries, without considering that Russia could see the plan as either a threat to its security or a provocation. At the same time, the Russian speaking majority in the eastern regions of Ukraine created self-defence groups and a popular movement that defied Kiev. In April the Donetsk region created the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic. In the middle of this month, the U.S., the EU, Russia Foreign Affairs Ministers and the interim government of Ukraine reached an agreement that included the following stipulations: all illegal groups must disarm, all seized building and public squares must be evacuated, a Constitution will be drafted with greater powers for the regions and the OSCE will oversee the implementation. As the tension mounted the U.S. and the EU announced new sanctions against Russia in late April.

The U.S. reported in late May that Russia had withdrawn most of its troops from the border with Ukraine. Several European countries feared that if Moscow made good on its threat to cut gas supplies it could have an impact on energy security, given their dependence on Russian gas. In parallel, the authorities of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk held referendums on self-rule
and the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of independence. The votes were not authorized by Kiev and no independent observers were present. On May 25 Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko won the Ukraine presidential elections, which could not be held in several constituencies in the East. The Russian president said that any agreement between Ukraine and the EU would result in restrictions on Ukrainian imports, especially gas.

In early June the OSCE appointed Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini as its representative in Ukraine. She replaced Wolfgang Ischinger, also a Swiss diplomat, who held the position for only one month. The appointment was welcomed by Russia because the expert negotiator was very knowledgeable about the region. At about the same time the G7 held a summit in Brussels and for the first time in 17 years Russia was not invited. During the meeting the group threatened Putin with more sanctions. However, Putin was invited to the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Normandy landings. On June 20, after two phone calls to President Putin, Poroshenko announced a peace plan ("Steps towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in the Ukrainian regions of the East") to reach a settlement on the conflict. The plan included a unilateral ceasefire by the Ukrainians until June 27, the disarmament of the rebels, the creation of a 10 Kms. "buffer zone" on the Russian border, early parliamentary and local elections in the regions, the return to normal activity by the local government bodies occupied by pro-Russian troops, a constitutional amendment to decentralize power (although he rejected a federal system), consultation with local leaders regarding who should be appointed governor (but he did not offer the regions the right to choose their own administrative leaders) and a guarantee that Russian could be spoken in the Eastern regions. He also announced an amnesty for the combatants who had not committed violent crimes and the establishment of humanitarian corridors so that they could go to Russia. Poroshenko also said that Crimea would once again come under Ukrainian sovereignty. Putin accepted the peace plan and ceasefire proposed by Poroshenko, and he refused to recognize the independence of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, but he pressed Ukraine to become a federation with local leaders and the right to create their own laws and establish independent trade relations with nations like Russia. He also discussed the peace plan with President Obama. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that the plan lacked a proposal to start a dialogue and it was a departure from the Geneva plan signed on April 17. On June 25 the pro-Russian separatists agreed to participate in peace talks. At Russian initiative the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly set up in June a Contact Group for Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, the OSCE and Russia, although in some of the meetings representatives from eastern Ukraine also participated.

In the second half of July the EU established an Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), a civilian mission with an initial budget of 2.6 million euros for the first phase (until November) and a two-year mandate. The mission was lead by Kalman Mizsei. From 19 to 20 July the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), from Finland, organized in Austria a high-level meeting with experts on Ukraine. The participants included members of the Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) and independent intellectuals. The nation building experiences in Northern Ireland and Finland were analysed. The meeting was funded by the Government of Ireland and the Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation from Finland. In mid-August the German
Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, met in Berlin with his counterparts from Russia, Sergei Lavrov, and Ukraine, Pavlo Klimkin, to negotiate a new lasting ceasefire and effective border controls. At the end of the month when the conflict had claimed more than 2,000 lives and had produced 360,000 refugees, the Government of Finland, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and IMEMO Moscow, brought together in a meeting near the Finnish capital a group of six American and seven Russian analysts, diplomats and academics to develop a 24-point proposal to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. This included a verifiable ceasefire, the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Mission, the withdrawal of all military forces in the east, a limit to the concentration of military forces near the border, the creation of confidence-building measures, humanitarian assistance, amnesty for fighters not involved in war crimes, the preservation of economic relations between Russia and Ukraine, the protection of the Russian language and cultural tradition in eastern Ukraine, the protection of ethnic minorities in Crimea, and the maintenance of the non-bloc status of Ukraine.

In a statement to the newspaper El País on September 1, the leader of the pro-Russian movement in Sevastopol, Alexei Chaly, said that to end the war the country Novoróssia (New Russia) should be created with borders that would be drawn based on the results of referenda in various regions of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin urged Kiev to grant eastern Ukraine a degree of autonomy that would take into account the interests of Russian speakers. Putin called for a federal model for Ukraine (which was also backed by several German and Austrian politicians) that would provide to the regions a significant amount of autonomy both in terms of language and the management of their finances. On the political front they should have the right to elect their own officials, including the governors. By then, the number of displaced persons or refugees had reached one million, and pro Russian forces had recovered and were regaining lost ground. Poroshenko repeated that his country had opted for a unitary state, in which there was no federalism, and demanded that the rebels surrender, distancing himself from a possible agreement before the parliamentary elections of October 26, in which Poroshenko would present his own party so that he did not have to depend on other political forces. The only thing that seemed possible at the time was to agree to a ceasefire. On September 2 it looked like the presidents of Ukraine and Russia had agreed on this point, but immediately after Moscow said that Russia was not part of the conflict and that the ceasefire should be negotiated with the rebels in eastern Ukraine. However, Putin outlined a seven-point peace plan and said it was necessary to stop all offensive operations, end artillery and missile strikes on cities, international monitoring of the ceasefire, the exchange of prisoners, the creation of humanitarian corridors and make it possible to repair damaged infrastructures.

Following a telephone conversation between Poroshenko and Putin, on September 5 the central Government in Kiev and Eastern separatist groups signed in Minsk (Belarus) a 12-point protocol for peace that included a ceasefire, which in the first few days was only partially observed. It is important to note that in the ranks fighting for the Ukrainian government there were irregular volunteer forces that were acting on their own. The agreement included several points from the June 20 proposal; the exchange of prisoners; withdrawal of artillery near cities; the creation of humanitarian corridors; all illegal armed formations, weapons, and fighters and mercenaries must abandon the territory (this last point caused the most serious misgivings among the eastern rebels, who said that the armed militias were needed to monitor public order) and a "safety zone in the border regions" must be created; early local elections; the implementation of an economic program for the restoration of Donbas (mining and industrial region of southeastern Ukraine); and guarantees for the personal safety of the participants in the negotiations, which included the former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma (president from 1994 and 2005) as the representative of the Government of Ukraine, the leaders of the rebel provinces, the ambassador of the Kremlin in Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, and the OSCE Representative, Heidi Tagliavini. President Poroshenko said that under the Protocol he was willing to decentralize power in Ukraine, to grant a degree of economic independence to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (the leaders of these regions want to maintain close economic ties with Russia and with the Customs Union), to ensure that they can use the Russian language and protect their cultural traditions, and to consult with local authorities before appointing governors.
On September 16 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that granted three years of autonomy to the regions in the East, as well as a partial amnesty and the commitment to guarantee the use of the Russian language. The law conferred a special status to the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, it effectively legalized the armed rebel groups, and it permitted the rebel areas to establish economic relations with the neighbouring Russian provinces. According to the President of Ukraine the condition for this agreement was that within one month the candidates for amnesty must lay down their arms, vacate public buildings and free the hostages in their power. The law also included local elections to be held on December 7 to decide who would be their representatives when dealing with the central Government. The election date was subsequently delayed. At the same time, the Parliament of Ukraine ratified the association agreement with the EU, although it excluded the economic section, which was suspended until 2016. On September 21 Ukraine and the rebels signed an agreement to create a 30-kilometre demilitarized zone where each side would pull back its heavy weaponry at least 15 kms. Both sides agreed to clear the security zone if all mines and to prohibit placing any new landmines. A no-fly zone for military aircraft, including drones, was created and all foreign armed groups would have to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. The OSCE deployed observers along the Russian-Ukrainian border to guarantee the application of the agreement. Finally, the two sides decided to postpone the discussion on the law for self-government. From 15 to 22 September the Finnish organization CMI brought together in the Ukrainian city of Kiev members of political parties and the Ukrainian civil society, including people from the eastern part of the country, to prevent the escalation of the conflict. A few days later there was a meeting in Vienna of negotiators and mediators from several regional and international organizations, invited by the CMI and the co-directors of the OSCE Group of Friends of Mediation (Finland, Turkey and Switzerland).

**UKRAINE: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR DIPLOMACY**

Vicenç Fisas
November 2014

This week a new international meeting will take place in Minsk (Belarus), with the participation of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and representatives from eastern Ukraine, in an attempt to reach a new peace agreement, or at least to prolong the recent ceasefire and allow time for diplomacy to play a key role in finding a solution that is acceptable to all parties. It will not be easy for various reasons: the rapid militarization of the conflict, the annexation of Crimea imposed by Russia without a previous political agreement, the determination of the current Government of Ukraine to join NATO (which is symbolic and unacceptable for Moscow, and has been wisely discouraged by the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius), and the military response by all of the actors, playing the Cold War game with displays of deterrent military muscle, military manoeuvres and air incursions in border areas, arms purchases, etc. Interestingly, at the same time diplomatic efforts have intensified, especially since September, with several proposals by the different players (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, Germany, etc.), which contain, in my view, the key to a reasonable solution to the armed conflict. Meanwhile, the death toll has risen to significant heights, the displaced and refugee populations are at daunting levels, respect has been lost for the OSCE, which has to fulfil a perhaps incompatible dual role (as an observer of the fighting and participant in the good offices and intermediation, with the help of an experienced diplomat, Heidi Tailgating). And what I find most risky in the immediate future is the loss of confidence between the great powers (the low profile taken by the United States in this conflict is astonishing), the risk that NATO is no longer a deterrent, and the return to old (in)security schemes in Europe.

We need all of the actors to make an effort to consider the disaster that is brewing. A disaster where no one will win and everyone will lose, not everything, but some very important things. And as I said, the pieces of the solution do not need to be invented from scratch. They have been haphazardly put on the table, and now the puzzle must be put together with the involvement of absolutely all of the stakeholders. That is a basic premise in conflict resolution, whether we like it or not. In other words, the population from the two provinces that form the Donbass region should have the right to speak out and the "intermediate political architecture" that meets their cultural and political needs must be
created. Moreover, although it may only be rhetoric, the Russian Foreign Minister has repeatedly said that his country does not want to replace the word of the people of Donbass and it will not accept negotiations without their participation. That said, it is clear that given the military support provided by Moscow, either openly or covertly, to the military actors in Donbas, Russia should have a role in the search for a solution since it is part of the problem and therefore must be in the negotiations. In the same way, the new European Union 'minister' of Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, who has been very reasonable up to now, has to have a voice in the peace process, along with members of the Contact Group. Germany, with Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier in the lead, must also be included because of its economic and political influence in Europe, and François Hollande has recently offered his good offices to reduce tension.

In June the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament) discussed draft legislation to amend the constitution and provide for a decentralization of power, although not a federal regime. On the 20th of that same month a proposal was presented that included exchanging prisoners, pulling back artillery from around cities, opening humanitarian corridors, withdrawing illegal armed forces, creating a 'security zone' in the border regions, holding local elections, and creating an economic program for Donbas. At that time making Russian an official state language was not accepted, but the important thing here is that it could be a co-official language in Donbas. In the same way more thought must be given to the proposal that it should be compatible for Ukraine to have future relations with the EU and also take part in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. When we talk about 'conflict transformation' we refer to the concept of 'paradoxical thinking', which means that it must be possible to be in two or more states at once, like having multiple identities, but in international relations there is too much fear to experiment in this field, which could however resolve many conflicts.

In September Putin proposed a seven-point plan, the central government in Kiev and the separatists signed a 12-point protocol that included a ceasefire. Halfway through the month the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that granted three years of autonomy to the regions in the East, as well as a partial amnesty and the commitment to guarantee the use of the Russian language. Days later Ukraine and the rebels agreed to create a 30 km. wide demilitarized zone and to demine the area. Although these diplomatic plans and confidence-building measures do contain some elements for a solution, in recent weeks threatening rhetoric has resurfaced, and Russia has even begun to play its gas exports card as a deterrent, which may have a boomerang effect. Everyone must use its influence to apply pressure on the Government of Ukraine and the combatants from Donbass to make them see they will not receive any more support or promises in the future if the fighting continues. The ceasefire is crucial, the observers from the OSCE must be respected, and everyone must sit down and agree on a reasonable, gradual and demilitarized political solution that needs to foster a return to respect for international law. European security must be based on trust and cooperation, and never on military threats or occupation of a territory by a variety of armed groups and external interests. Under this commitment it will be possible to find a good solution to a conflict that may have been inevitable, but that never should have degenerated into armed conflict.

Tension and violence continued in October, and Ukraine held parliamentary elections. The pro-EU parties, headed by the President's party, the Petro Poroshenko bloc, and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk's Popular Front, held the leading positions in the preliminary results, pending the final count (50% of the 450 seats were elected by closed party lists and 50% to candidates elected in single-member constituencies under a first-past-the-post system). Russia recognized the results of the elections, which took place without any incidents, but could not be held in areas under rebel control in Donetsk and Lugansk. Also in October the presidents of Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement at a meeting in Milan (Italy) over the supply of Soviet gas to Ukraine. In early November elections were held in the Donbass and the pro-Russians won by a clear margin, but the vote was not recognized internationally. Moscow said that it "respected" the results. The turnout was 85% in the province of Donetsk and 68.7% in Lugansk. Subsequently a government with 16 ministers was formed. It must be noted that despite the military support provided, Russia did not formally recognize the self-proclaimed republics in RPD (Donetsk) and RPL (Lugansk), but said it respected the election results. The meeting of the Contact Group for Ukraine, scheduled for early October 2014 as part of the session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, was moved to
February 2015 because the U.S., Poland and Ukraine said that they would not attend the meeting.

The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine made a proposal, at the request of the president, to abolish the concessions made under the fragile dialogue that led to the signing of some agreements in September. The Ukrainian Government introduced two bills, one to end the special status granted to the areas controlled by the separatists and another that revoked the amnesty. In mid-November the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, urged Ukraine to fulfill the Minsk agreements that had been signed in September since they “could provide a basis on which to stand”. He then travelled to Moscow to see if Russia would also accept the September agreements, which included a ceasefire and a line of separation between the two sides. Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of not complying with the ceasefire. The OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier acknowledged that the OSCE monitoring mission was having serious problems moving around. Meanwhile, the Ukraine Defence Minister, Stepan Poltorak, said it was necessary to prepare for military action against “terrorism” from the East. His department signed contracts to purchase weapons for 50 million euros. At the same time, two former Ukrainian presidents (Leonid Kravchuk and Viktor Yushchenko) issued a joint statement demanding an end to the dialogue with the rebels, given the failure of negotiations held to date and the Russian stance of continuing to supply arms. Another former president, Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), represented the current president of Ukraine in the negotiations. In mid-November the EU Council reiterated its support for the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum, signed in September, as a first step towards a reasonable solution to the crisis. The Council noted the need to intensify the political and economic reforms in Ukraine, including constitutional reform, decentralization, judicial reform, law enforcement, the fight against corruption and ensuring respect for human rights of the country’s minorities. The Council considers the elections held in the region of Donbass to be illegitimate, but encouraged new elections be held in this area under Ukrainian law. It underlined the need to intensify the talks within the framework of the Contact Group with the support of the OSCE, and celebrated the provisional application of the Agreement of November 1 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. That same day President Putin said that peace was possible, but that no one was complying with the commitments accepted in the September agreements. The German Chancellor, meanwhile, said the new sanctions against Russia would not help resolve the crisis in Ukraine.

Furthermore, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers the new head of foreign policy for the EU, Federica Mogherini, said that the dialogue with Russia should be relaunched. In the second half of November Russia and Germany were particularly active in seeking commitments, after a meeting in Moscow between the foreign ministers of both countries. This forced Kiev and the separatists to sign an agreement, which meant accommodating the interests of both parties within one common state. The Ukrainian Government, however, refused to accept the pro-independence groups as interlocutors, and said it preferred a direct dialogue with Moscow. The Ukrainian Government also began to say that it wished to negotiate in a location other than Minsk since Belarus was an ally of Russia, and there was speculation that a trilateral forum could be held between Poland, France and Germany. Later in the month, however, the President of Ukraine proposed replacing the Minsk format with a Geneva format (Ukraine, EU, U.S. and Russia), which excluded talks with eastern rebel groups and would have left Russia alone. Germany’s Foreign Minister, Steinmeier, said representatives of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia and its economic allies) could hold a first round of meetings on equal footing to improve their relationship. Putin, meanwhile, said that these organizations linking Russia and its post-Soviet allies were fully compatible with the goals of strengthening relations between Russia and the EU. In this context of rapprochement, the Ukrainian prime minister said on November 17 that if Putin had the political will to stop the war the Ukrainian Government was prepared to continue negotiations and proposing direct negotiations with Russia on neutral ground, which apparently had the support of the U.S. and the EU. Heidi Tagliavini said once again that the only path to peace was to recover the September agreements. Meanwhile, Moscow continued to put pressure on Kiev to negotiate with the pro-Russian factions, which the Ukrainian Government
rejected, since it considered them to be mercenaries and a direct negotiation would recognize them as equals.

The November G-20 summit in Australia was critical of Moscow, and new sanctions were approved, which visibly annoyed President Putin, who was accompanied to Australia by a major part of his military fleet. At least the Foreign Minister of France, Laurent Fabius, countered that he was concerned about Ukraine’s desire to join NATO, a possibility that would always be seen as a threat by Russia, which prefers a neutral Ukraine. Around the same time the Ukrainian prime minister declared that the September agreements were still able to achieve peace in Ukraine. At the end of the month many proposals and diplomatic initiatives were launched. The vice president of the Parliament of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk proposed new wording for the September Minsk Protocol and called for an urgent meeting of the Minsk Contact Group. The German foreign minister visited Moscow to talk with his counterpart. Germany was probably the country that made the greatest efforts to rapprochement with Moscow, at least until December. Both ministers were in favour of exchanging prisoners of war, dismantling illegal military and mercenary groups, an amnesty for fighters and the start of a national dialogue, in which the safety of participants would be guaranteed. In addition OSCE observers would monitor the borders with Russia and Kiev would take steps to ensure the economic revival of Donbas. Russia indicated once again that it would respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as long as the Donbass region was granted a special legal status and the possibility of reaching a federal structure was not rejected. The U.S. vice president, Joe Biden, visited Kiev after seven months. Days later he attended the OSCE summit, where he held talks with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the beginning of December Ukraine and the pro-Russian factions agreed to a ceasefire beginning the 5th of the month, and to pull back heavy weapons from December 6 onwards. Subsequently it was agreed that the new truce would begin on the 9th, with the mediation of Russia and the OSCE, causing a further one-week delay. On the 5th the Ukrainian President declared a “day of silence” in eastern Ukraine. Using a “carrot and stick” approach, Russia shelved the project to build a pipeline that was crucial for southern Europe, called “South Stream”, because of the “unconstructive” position of the European Commission. Moscow chose Turkey as alternative in addition to lowering the price of gas to this country. The NATO foreign ministers, meanwhile, backed Ukraine and “strongly condemned Russia’s continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine”, leaving aside their ability to act as a mediator. The ministers agreed to create four trust funds to modernize the Ukrainian Armed Forces. NATO launched into a classical military deterrence approach and approved the creation of a rapid reaction force in 2015, which will have about 4,000 soldiers and will be able to deploy in just a few days. The project was headed by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. The U.S. Secretary of State took the opportunity to ask its European allies to increase their military spending and the crisis in Ukraine thus became not only a frustrated attempt at peace diplomacy, but it also revived the old militarism, although in the OSCE meeting in Basel (Switzerland) on December 4 it was agreed that “there was no military solution to the crisis.” Canada also sent a ship with $11 million of non-lethal military equipment to Ukraine. Canada had previously provided $ 55 million in aid to Ukraine for the election process.

On December 6, in Paris, in a meeting with President Putin French President François Hollande offered to act as a mediator and said that it was necessary to begin a process of detente, verbal de escalation and limit movements in Ukraine. Hollande had the impression that Russia was seeking a way out given the damage the sanctions were causing. The same day, the President of Ukraine met with OSCE Special Representative Heidi Tagliavini. On the 9th the Contact Group summit with the pro-Russian rebels could not be held, but the ceasefire planned for that day was honoured. Between 10 and 12 December the coordinator of the OSCE in Ukraine met with the Odessa Oblast State Administration and the Odessa Regional Mediation Group to share international peace experiences that could be applied to Ukraine. Experts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Israel, Norway and the UK participated, and funding was provided by Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Norway and Japan.
On December 24 the last meeting of the year took place in Minsk (Belarus) between the parties in conflict. It focused on the withdrawal of troops, humanitarian assistance, exchange of prisoners, pulling back heavy weapons and ending the blockade on the Donbass region. When the meeting concluded no agreements had been reached, except to exchange prisoners. Another meeting was planned before the end of the year, but it was canceled at the last minute. The possibility of continuing the negotiations under the so called Normandy format, with the participation of Merkel, Putin and Hollande, was not rejected. On the following day the Ukraine Government reaffirmed its wish to join NATO and thus drop its official status of neutrality. Sources from the organization had warned, however, that this would not be possible until the conflict was resolved.

On December 26 President Putin signed a new military doctrine that considered the advance by NATO and the deployment in Europe of the U.S. missile defence system as one of the main threats to the national security. A crucial meeting of the Contact Group that was scheduled to take place at the end of the year in Minsk was postponed until mid-January 2015, and accusations of ceasefire violations were exchanged. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian separatists did exchange prisoners of war (150 government soldiers for 222 fighters from Donetsk). It was hoped that the Ukrainian President, the Russian President, the German Chancellor and the French President would participate in the January meeting. The Ukrainian president announced on the last day of the year that he would also try to get Obama to attend the meeting, which could be held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan.

In 2015 Serbia will assume the presidency of the OSCE. The Serbian Government said that its priority would be the Ukrainian conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Russian military forces in uniforms without markings began occupying some areas and institutions in Crimea, which was finally annexed to Russia following a referendum that was rejected by Ukraine and later by the UN General Assembly.</td>
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<td>• On May 25 the Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko won the presidential elections in Ukraine.</td>
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<td>• On June 20, after two phone calls to President Putin, Poroshenko announced a peace plan (&quot;Steps towards a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Ukrainian regions of the East&quot;). Putin accepted the peace plan and ceasefire proposed by Poroshenko, and he refused to recognize the independence of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, but he pressed Ukraine to become a federation with local leaders and the right to create their own laws and establish independent trade relations with nations like Russia.</td>
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<td>• Following a telephone conversation between Poroshenko and Putin, on September 5 the central Government in Kiev and Eastern separatist groups signed in Minsk (Belarus) a 12-point protocol for peace that included a ceasefire, which in the first few days was only partially observed.</td>
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<td>• The Parliament of Ukraine ratified the Association Agreement with the EU, although the economic piece was excluded and put on hold until 2016.</td>
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<td>• The Ukrainian Government refused to accept the pro-independence groups as interlocutors, and said it preferred a direct dialogue with Moscow.</td>
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<td>• At the end of the year the Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian separatists exchanged prisoners of war.</td>
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<td>Reasons crisis during the year</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Struggles for political and economic power.</td>
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<td>• Rivalry between political and economic institutions on the regional level.</td>
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<td>• Russian occupation of Crimea, due to its strategic and military value.</td>
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<td>• Opposition to Russia’s plan to group together the Russian-speaking areas.</td>
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<td>• The Ukrainian Government’s wish join NATO.</td>
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<td>• Early militarization of the conflict, despite diplomatic initiatives.</td>
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<td>• Presence of mercenaries and irregular forces.</td>
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<td>• Policy sanctions on Russia and Crimea.</td>
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<td>• Military manoeuvres by both sides.</td>
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<td>• Return to Cold War rhetoric and threats.</td>
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<td>• Insecurity in the supply of Russian gas.</td>
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<td>• Rejection of federal system by the Ukrainian Government.</td>
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<td>• Non-recognition of elections in eastern Ukraine.</td>
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<td>• Cancellation by the Government of Ukraine of concessions and commitments made earlier to the east.</td>
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<td>• Covert supply of arms to the eastern rebels by Russia.</td>
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<td>• Mutual accusations of violating the ceasefire.</td>
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<td>• Ukraine’s decision to drop its status of neutrality.</td>
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<td>• President Putin signed a new military doctrine that considered the NATO advance as one of the main national security threats.</td>
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**End result:** unresolved.

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<th>Websites of interest</th>
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<td>• BBC (<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world/europe">www.bbc.com/news/world/europe</a>)</td>
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<td>• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (carnegieendowment.org/regions)</td>
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<td>• El País (elpais.com)</td>
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<td>• InfoFax Ukraine (en.interfax.com.ua)</td>
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<td>• New York Times (<a href="http://www.nytimes.com">www.nytimes.com</a>)</td>
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<td>• OSCE (<a href="http://www.osce.org">www.osce.org</a>)</td>
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<td>• The New Cold War (newcoldwar.org)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• UKranie Presidency (<a href="http://www.president.gov.ua">www.president.gov.ua</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The New Cold War (newcoldwar.org)</td>
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</table>
Main parties involved in the process

**USA**

**EU**

**NATO**

**UKRAINE**

- **Government**
  - President: Petro Poroshenko
  - PM: P. Yatseniuk
  - FAM: Pável Klimkin
  - Defence Minister: Stepán Poltorak

- **OSCE**
  - SG: L. Zanniér (Heidi Tagliantini)

- **Contact Group:**
  - Russian Ambassador in Kiev: Mijáil Zurábov, OSCE Ambassador (Heidi Tagliantini), Ukraine: L. Kuchma

- **EU**
  - (Catherine Ashton)
  - Federica Mogherini
  - EUAM Ukraine: Kalman Mizsei

- **Germany:**
  - Angela Merkel
  - FAM: F.W. Steinmeier
  - Finland (CM1)
  - France: F. Hollande

**Russia**

- Pres. V. Putin
  - FAM: S. Lavrov

**Crimea peninsula**

**Eastern provinces (Donbas):**

- Donetsk (RPD)
  - (A. Borodáis)
  - (D. Pushilin)
  - (A. Zajárchenko)

- Lugansk (RPL)
  - (I. Plotniski)
  - (V. Bolóov)

**Space of intermediation**

- Polonia
- militias

- Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazajstan)
b) Caucasus

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN (Nagorno-Karabakh)

Context of the conflict

In 1988, after a long period under the Soviet regime, a conflict arose in Nagorno-Karabakh (an enclave with an Armenian majority in the southwest of the country), when the local assembly voted to be administered by Armenia, and the Azerbaijan authorities rejected this decision. The tension over this conflict escalated, with open warfare eventually breaking out between 1991 and 1994. More than 30,000 people died in this war, and one million people were displaced. A ceasefire was signed in 1994, and peace negotiations have been under way since then. The negotiations address two main points: the enclave’s status and the return of territories occupied by the Armenian army. Currently, the construction of an oil pipeline running between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, at a cost of 2.9 billion dollars, is playing an important role in the peace process. The company British Petroleum has enormous influence over Azerbaijan, an oil-rich country. In recent years, both countries have substantially increased their military spending. According to the 2014 BICC Militarization Index, Armenia was ranked third and Azerbaijan tenth. Despite the many meetings held between both countries, no progress has been made so far.

Background to the peace process

The attempts to reach a peace agreement in the past decade have been channelled through the mediation of the Minsk Group of the OSCE, which was created in 1992. This group is co-led by France, Russia and the USA, and it includes the following participants: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its strategy is to reinforce the economic cooperation between the latter two countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In July 1999, the OSCE approved the installation of an office in Erevan (Armenia), which has been operating since February 2000 and conducts political, economic, environmental and humanitarian activities. It operates independently of the Minsk Group. The president of Azerbaijan has often been highly critical of the OSCE’s mediation and the role of the UN. What is more, he has always opposed participation by any representative of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations. Since 1999 the Minsk Group has promoted meetings between the presidents of the two countries and their foreign ministers. The negotiations are confidential.

In December 2006, the self-proclaimed independent republic of Nagorno-Karabakh approved a constitution in a referendum which described the region as a sovereign, democratic and social state with powers over the territory currently controlled by the separatist government, although it did not address issues like citizenship or the thorny question of the return of Azeri refugees in a region with an ethnic Armenian majority. In the second half of January 2010, the presidents of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, met with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in Sochi (Russia) and reached a verbal agreement on the preamble of the latest version of the basic principles for resolving the conflict. This document envisioned a process
carried out in phases instead of a “package solution”. The steps to follow would be the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azeri districts of Agdam, Fizuli, Djebrail, Zangelan and Gubadli, which border on Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as from 13 towns in the occupied district of Lachin; the restoration of communications; and a donor conference to be held to raise funds for rehabilitation, as well as the deployment of peace observers to ensure the safety of the displaced persons as they return home. In the second phase, according to Mammadyarov, the Armenian forces would withdraw from Lachin and Kalbajar, which would be followed by the return of the Azeri population to Nagorno-Karabakh. After that, a decision would be taken on the status of the territory inside Azerbaijan, without this affecting its territorial integrity. Likewise, the proposal contained in the “Madrid Principles” includes a referendum with participation by the people who used to live in Nagorno-Karabakh before the war, the securing of a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh, the return of the refugees to their homelands and the aid of international forces. In March 2011, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev, respectively, held a tripartite meeting with the president of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, in the Russian city of Sochi. After the meeting, they issued a communiqué in which they stated their intention to resolve all the controversies peacefully.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, purchases, orders and plans to purchase arms by both Armenia and Azerbaijan could increase the risk of a conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan has significantly increased its volume of arms imports (especially from Israel, South Africa and Turkey) and Armenia has announced plans to purchase more advanced weapons systems, specifically from Russia.

Relations between both countries deteriorated in the third quarter of 2012, partly due to the tension linked to Azerbaijan’s pardon of an Azeri officer accused of killing an Armenian officer in 2004, which also affected the negotiating process. As in previous months, no progress was made during this period, and even the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Araz Azimov, described the negotiations as “suspended”. According to Azimov, regular meetings were held with the Minsk Group mediating body at different levels, but no negotiations took place in which specific issues were addressed with a concrete timetable. In turn, according to the Azerbaijani agency APA, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev affirmed that the negotiating group had worked for twenty years and had still achieved no results. According to Aliyev, neither the conditions of peace nor war could go on forever. Thus, he accused Armenia of shoring up the status quo and of refusing to withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, the Minsk Group expressed its concern about the lack of tangible progress in the process. The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan met separately with the Minsk Group representatives. In October, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian accused Azerbaijan of preparing for war in Nagorno-Karabakh and denounced that the Azerbaijani government had been acquiring arms in preparation for a new conflict.

The process continued without any significant progress in the first few months of 2013. The foreign ministers from both countries, Elmar Mammadyarov and Edward Nalbandian, respectively, met in late January in Paris. A statement by the Minsk Group reported that the parties had expressed their support for the peaceful resolution of the conflict and their determination to continue with the negotiations. Subsequently, the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group met separately with both foreign ministers on March 2 and 3 respectively. In May the co-chairs of the Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met separately with the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and, in a subsequent trip, with the respective presidents, also separately.

The co-chairs of the OSCE’s international mediating body, the Minsk Group, met on several occasions during the third quarter with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyarov, respectively. In one of these meetings, in early July, the heads of the foreign ministries expressed their commitment to the goals outlined in the June meetings to reduce tension between the two sides and create the necessary conditions for a high-level meeting at the end the year. With the talks at a standstill the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, met in mid-November in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, the first meeting held since January 2012. Since 2010 the talks have been deadlocked, with no agreement between the parties on the so-called Basic Principles –proposed by the OSCE in 2005 and partially reformulated over the years–, which would be the basis for negotiating a final agreement. The principles include withdrawal of Armenia from the occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, right of return of the displaced population, eventual decision on the final status through a binding expression of will and international guarantees of security. Even so, the November meeting between the presidents was a show of their support, at least formally, for diplomatic negotiations, in a context of frequent warnings regarding the risks in the region.

The peace process in 2014

The process continued without any progress in the first few months of the year and was affected by the growing number of incidents near the ceasefire line and the chronic difficulties that have plagued the process for years. The formal process mechanisms continued to be active, such as regular meetings of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group –the mediating body in the peace process which is co-chaired by the U.S., France and Russia with the foreign ministers from Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, and Armenia, Edward Nalbandian, and the presence of the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Andrzej Kasprzyk. After one of these meetings at the end of January the ministers expressed their willingness to continue working towards a negotiated solution to the conflict. The co-chairs of the Minsk Group also met separately with the presidents of both countries, the Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian, in their respective capitals during a trip by the co-mediators that also included consultations with the foreign and defence ministries. The co-chairs of the Minsk Group stated that the negotiations needed to continue at the highest level, as agreed at the Vienna meeting of the presidents in November 2013, and progress on substantive issues was essential. The mediators continued to meet with the Foreign Ministers in Paris and Moscow in late February and early March and additional separate consultations with both presidents also took place. There was a commitment by the two sides to a new ministerial-level meeting in April to prepare for a new presidential summit in the near future. In addition, the U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, James Warlick, published on social networks that Aliyev and Sargsyan had spoken during the Hague Nuclear Security Summit in late March, but there was no official comments from Azerbaijan or Armenia.

In early April, the co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group (France, Russia, USA) and Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, and Armenia, Edward Nalbandian. At the meeting the parties discussed the possibility of organizing a meeting between the presidents of both countries. Additionally, the co-mediators stressed that urgent measures were needed to reduce tension in the region and to move forward on the core issues of the negotiation process. Furthermore, on the twentieth anniversary of the cease-fire that ended the armed conflict in 1994, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group issued a joint statement celebrating the cease-fire, but warned that the parties had shown little willingness to seize the opportunities to make progress in the peace process. The co-mediators reiterated their commitment to a solution based on the principles of the non-use of force or the threat of force, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and territorial integrity. The settlement of the conflict should include, as emphasized by the co-mediators, the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and self-governance, a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a legally-binding expression of will, the right of all internally-displaced persons and refugees to return, and international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation. In their statement the co-mediators appealed to the renewal of the dialogue from last November.
In late July 71 Armenians and 14 Azerbaijanis were killed in the fighting on the contact line with Nagorno-Karabakh. The OSCE requested an urgent meeting of the heads of state of the two countries, who met in the Russian city of Sochi. The meeting helped reduce the tension in the area. In the third quarter it became increasingly urgent to make progress in the dialogue, at a standstill in recent years, given the deteriorating situation and the escalation of violence, although there were few advances during the quarter. A rise in the number of incidents and violations of the ceasefire led the OSCE’s Minsk Group and other international actors, including the UN Secretary General, to call for an end to violence, show restraint and adhere to the ceasefire of 1994. In July the Minsk Group held the usual separate meetings with the respective foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyyarov. In July the co-chairs of the mediating body reviewed possible confidence-building measures and people-to-people programs with the conflicting parties. In August they urged the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents to resume peace negotiations as soon as possible. In the context of escalating incidents in August, Russian President Vladimir Putin organized a joint meeting with the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev. After the meeting, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that the meeting had been a success and that the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders had reaffirmed their commitment to dialogue. However, the media reported that there had been no specific results. With regard to the format of the meeting, which took place outside of the negotiating process mediated by the Minsk Group, Putin expressed respect for all of the international negotiation formats, but added that the close relations between Russia and the conflicting parties facilitated a meeting like this. Also in parallel to the official negotiating process, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry met in early September with the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents during a NATO summit.

Furthermore, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group said in mid-September that the situation around the so-called Line of Contact had been stabilized, following an escalation in the violence at the end of July and beginning of August.

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, met in late October in Paris at a meeting organized by the French president, François Hollande, to lay down the foundation for talks. Hollande first met separately with each of them and afterward a joint meeting was held between the three leaders. The co-chairs of the mediation organization, the OSCE Minsk Group, also attended the meeting. No official statement was issued after the encounter, although the media reported that Hollande had urged the parties in conflict to show political will to achieve a solution to the disputes and indicated that the situation could not continue as is. This was the third meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in three months, following the meeting set up by Russian President Vladimir Putin in August in Sochi (Russia) and the one organized by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during the September NATO summit in Wales. The increase in the number of meetings coincided with growing concern regarding the fragile security situation caused by violence over the summer. However, no information was provided on the results of the encounter, which is consistent with the deadlock that has existed in the peace process in recent years. In the second half of December the leaders of the member countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan approved a resolution in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, based on international law and the UN Charter.

By 2015 Azerbaijan plans $5 billion in military spending, which will be 18% of its total budget. It imports weapons from Turkey, Israel, Russia and the United States.
Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

- U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met in early September with the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents during a NATO summit.
- The presidents of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, spoke at the end of October in Paris, at a meeting organized by the French president. The co-chairs of the mediation organization, the OSCE Minsk Group, also attended.

**Reasons crisis during the year**

- Rise in the number of incidents and clashes along the ceasefire line.
- Increased rearmament and militarization of the two countries.

**Final result:** tensions declined.

**Websites of interest**

- Caucas Edition (caucasuedition.net)
- Caucasus Research Resource Centers (www.crrccenters.org)
- Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org)
- EPNK (www.epnk.org)
- Eurasia (www.eurasia.org)
- Gobierno de Armenia (www.gov.am/en)
- Gobierno de Azerbaiyán (www.azerbaijan.az/portal.index_e.html?lang=en)
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- Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.ipwpr.net)
- International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- (http://karabakhinfo.com/es) (pro-Azerbaiyán)
- OSCE (www.osce.org/yereban) (www.osce.org/baku)
- Peace Building & Conflict Resolution (www.peacebuilding.am/eng)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
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- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org)
GEORGIA (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)

Context of the conflict

There has been a conflict in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, in the northeast of the country, since the summer 1992. The conflict began after the local government made several attempts to separate from the Republic of Georgia, and confrontations were caused by the deployment of 2,000 Georgian soldiers, which led to 6,000 deaths. In September 1992, a ceasefire was signed. The Russian Federation was involved in this agreement. The following year, the United Nations peace mission UNOMIG was created to monitor this agreement, and in May 1994, the Moscow ceasefire and separation of forces agreements were signed. In 1999 there was a referendum in Abkhazia, after which it declared itself independent. The former President of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze, promised on several occasions "to broaden Abkhazia's powers" of self-government, as long as it formed an integral part of Georgia. In recent years, Russia has kept 3,000 soldiers on the border as a CIS peace force. In November 1999 Russia and Georgia agreed that Russia would close two of its four military bases in Georgia. More than 20 years after the ceasefire, the situation remains deadlocked, with Abkhazia enjoying de facto independence.

In 1992 the autonomous region of South Ossetia was created in Georgia, two years before the former USSR created the autonomous Republic of North Ossetia. In 1990 South Ossetia declared itself a sovereign republic. This led the Georgian parliament to declare a state of emergency in the territory and withdraw the status of autonomous region. All of these factors led to confrontations, until a Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peace force brought about a ceasefire in 1992. The conflict resumed in May 2004, when the President of South Ossetia threatened to use force against any threat from Georgia. Days later, South Ossetia withdrew from the international commission which was monitoring the peace agreement. This measure was followed by clashes between the Georgian armed forces and South Ossetia's armed groups. South Ossetia's authorities intended to join North Ossetia and thus become a part of the Russian Federation. In 2008, after military clashes between Georgia and Russia, this region cut off all links with Georgia and proclaimed its independence.

Background to the peace process

The OSCE has had a mission in Georgia since December 1992, with the general headquarters in Tbilisi and the goal of promoting peace negotiations in the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission also supported the UN’s peace efforts. The mission’s mandate is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to assist in the development of the democratic institutions. Since December 1999, the mandate also includes keeping watch over the border between Russian and Georgia. In 1992, the “Agreement of Principles between Georgia and Russia to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict” was signed, which included a ceasefire and the creation of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) made up of representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. This commission has never been warmly received by Georgia, which considers itself a minority before it. In the first half of November 2006, South Ossetia supported the independence of the territory in a referendum, which was not internationally recognised, with more than 90% of the 50,000 voters in favour of secession, and the re-election of the president of the region, E. Kokoity, who cited the independence of South Ossetia and integration with Russia as his political priorities.
The stagnation in the Abkhazia process can be described as a “dynamic process of non-peace”, since there is no progress on the key issues: the return of 200,000 Georgian refugees, the ultimate status of Abkhazia and the economic future of the republic. In April 2008, the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, announced a new peace plan to resolve the conflict with Abkhazia, which offered the territory what the Georgian leader called “unlimited autonomy” within Georgia and which included the creation of the post of vice president, to be occupied by an Abkhaz representative. The peace proposal was rejected by the Abkhaz leaders. In the same year (2008) the International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), which has ties to GPPAC, suggested launching talks using citizen or second track diplomacy based on confidence building measures developed in what was initially called the "Istanbul process", and later the "Geneva process".

Since 2008, talks between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia have been held in Geneva on security in the southern Caucasus, with the mediation of the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, and with participation by the USA, which has an incident prevention and response mechanism. The "Geneva process" has two working groups: one on security on the ground, including the issue of non-use of force, and a second group on humanitarian issues, with an emphasis on the refugee population. On the 3rd of July 2010, the government of Georgia approved an action plan to implement the objectives contained in the “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation”, which set forth the guidelines that the government should follow in its relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The government of Georgia’s strategy was rejected several times by the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a speech before the European Parliament in November, the president of Georgia, Dmitry Saakashvili, announced Georgia’s unilateral commitment not to use force to restore control over its territory. According to Saakashvili, Georgia would use peaceful means and would retain the right to defend itself only in the event of new attacks and invasion of the Georgian territory under Georgia’s control. In recent years, Russia had demanded that Georgia sign agreements not to use force with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia defended the need for a non-aggression pact with Russia, which it regarded as the main actor in the conflict. In the more recent years, Russia had come to defend unilateral declarations not to use force, although it had discarded the possibility of adopting a measure of this kind itself, as it was asking Georgia to do. In December, the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia announced their willingness to pledge not to use force, claiming that they would not use force against Georgia, its people, its territory or its armed forces. In March 2011, Russia stressed that it was not a party in the conflict, so it saw no reason for it to sign a commitment not to use force, while it still asked Georgia to sign this kind of agreement with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also in December, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia asked that the discussions on international security arrangements be removed from the agenda of the Geneva negotiations, one of the key issues that until then had been linked to the question of the non-use of force, a controversial topic and frequently the subject of arguments in the process.

In February 2012, Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze accused Russia of trying to put an end to the Geneva talks by reducing the frequency of the rounds and rejecting key discussions within both working groups that make up the negotiating format: the group on security issues and the group on humanitarian issues. According to Georgia, in the first group Russia explicitly rejected addressing security arrangements and said it would not commit to the use of force because it did not consider itself a party to the conflict, whereas Georgia had already adopted a unilateral commitment in that regard. In April, the former head of the security committee of the region, Leonid Tibilov, took over as the new President of South Ossetia after his second-round election victory that gave him 54.12% of the vote against special envoy for human rights David Sanakoev, who carried 42.65%. In June, the 20th round of the Geneva negotiating process was held and no progress was made. The Abkhazian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Chirikba, said that the format of the process had to be changed and that it currently limited effective decision-making, although he did not specify in detail what he wanted to change. In October, as part of its programme aimed at conflict resolution, the entering government stressed public diplomacy, joint
economic and business projects and promoting contacts between the populations on both sides of the border. According to the programme, resolving the conflict depends on constructing democratic institutions and fixing socioeconomic problems in Georgia in order to convince the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the advantages of living in a unified state. In November, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Chirikba said that the government was ready to sign an agreement on the non-use of force with Georgia as long as the format of the Geneva negotiations changed the status Abkhazian participation to that of a “delegation”. Meanwhile, the 22nd round of negotiations on the conflict in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was held in Geneva, the first round for the new Georgian government after the elections in October. The head of Georgia’s negotiating team, Deputy Foreign Minister Nikozi Vashakidze (who is staying on as Deputy Foreign Minister, although he now combines those duties with his leadership of the negotiations), acknowledged some progress related to the first of the two working groups that structure the negotiations, the one devoted to security issues, where steps were taken to prepare a draft on the non-use of force. However, according to the Georgian representative, the second group, focused on the humanitarian dimension of the conflict, was hampered by the attitudes and positions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, which attempted to discuss possible changes to the format of the process instead of specific proposals on humanitarian issues in Georgia.

The negotiation moved along without any clear progress during the first months of 2013. The Georgian Minister for Reintegration said that the continuation of the Geneva talks was a priority for his government. Georgia was not against discussing the attempts by Abkhazia and South Ossetia to change the format, but the change could not be a goal in itself. It had to help achieve results. He also warned about Russia’s attempts to downgrade the role of the process. Beyond the negotiating process and within the framework of the close relations between Russia and the elites of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in March Russian President Vladimir Putin met in the Russian capital with the leader of Abkhazia, Alexander Ankvab to discuss cooperation issues. The meeting was criticized by Georgia. Moreover, Georgia and Russia continued the rapprochement that began after the change in the Georgian government. Thus, representatives from both sides met in early March. In the period from April to June Abkhazia continued to refuse to participate in the regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). This position has been maintained since April 2012 and Abkhazia said that it would be revoked only after the chief of the EU mission, who they considered persona non grata, was replaced. Nevertheless, other dialogue mechanisms between the parties were active with facilitation by the EU, such as a 24-hour hotline, and participation in discussions of the Geneva process, which brings together representatives from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Georgia, Russia and international facilitators (EU, OSCE, UN). Georgia and Russia showed their willingness to normalize relations, although Russia insisted that its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was irreversible. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Abkhaz leader, Alexander Ankvab, in late September, after the Russians had reduced somewhat the budget earmarked to provide support to the region. Moreover, Georgia reaffirmed its commitment to promote a regional policy based on restoring people-to-people interaction, community connection programs and public diplomacy, as keys to moving towards a political settlement for both conflicts.

In the third quarter the Government of South Ossetia stated that the policy of the new Administration was not very different from its predecessors. South Ossetia criticized Georgia for not being willing to recognize the existing reality, in reference to the independence of the region. According to the Ossetian authorities, Georgia should sign an agreement on the non-use of force with South Ossetia and begin to delimit the border between South Ossetia and Georgia. Moreover, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism continued to be in force through several meetings, including one in July and one in September and an ad hoc meeting in August. Delegations from Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia celebrated the 26th round of negotiations of the so-called Geneva Dialogue on December 18 under co-chairmanship of the OSCE, the UN and the EU, but an agreement was not reached on the non-use of force. Moreover, the Georgian president, Giorgi Margvelashvili, said in late December that the Association
Agreement with the EU, approved at the November European summit and further steps toward Europe will help solve problematic issues with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The peace process in 2014

The negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the presence of Russia and mediation by the UN, the OSCE and the EU, as well as U.S. presence continued without progress in the first months of the year, although Russia called the climate pragmatic. The parties held an additional meeting on March 26, in a context of greater stability on the ground. Even so the mediators said they were concerned over the installation of fences and other obstacles near the border lines and alleged violations of airspace. According to a representative of the EU in the talks, the situation in Ukraine was in the minds of all parties, although they focused on the core issues of the negotiations. The main Georgian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani, said that the crisis in Ukraine highlighted the need for a Russian commitment to the principle of non-use of force, similar to the unilateral pledge made by Georgia in 2010. In relation to the non-use of force, the co-mediators stated that some progress was made during the expert drafting session to prepare a joint text on non-use of force. Also the main Russian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, said it was possible to make a little progress. However, generally speaking the parties maintained the positions that they had held to date: Russia says that it is not a party to the conflict and that it will therefore reject making any unilateral commitment not to use force; Georgia is sceptical of the joint text and is in favour of a reciprocal measure by Russia, similar to what Tbilisi committed to in 2010. Moreover, the bilateral Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism continued to be suspended between Georgia and Abkhazia. In contrast, Georgia and South Ossetia continued to use that line of communication to prevent security incidents.

Finally, with regard to relations between Georgia and Russia –marked by the rupture of diplomatic relations since the 2008 war, but moving toward a certain rapprochement since the change of the Georgian government, Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili said they would study the statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding his possible willingness to meet with the president of Georgia if he wanted. Margvelashvili also emphasized the role of the ongoing bilateral dialogue between the Special representative of Georgia’s Prime Minister for relations with Russia, Zurab Abashidze, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, which focused on areas such as trade and contacts. According to the president, the dialogue also serves to diminish tensions and to lay the foundation for discussions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In parallel, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili also stated that the threat posed by Russia to Georgia should not be overestimated, while Georgia had reduced its dependence on trade with Russia in a context in which, according Garibashvili, its pro-European stance did not conflict with developing a constructive policy towards Russia. In any case, during the first trimester Georgia reiterated that the country’s territorial integrity was a red line for the Government and the normalization of relations with Russia would not occur in detriment of that principle.

In June the political and social crisis that began in May in the region of Abkhazia ended with the resignation in early June of President Alexander Ankvab and Prime Minister Leonid Lakerbaia. They stepped down after talks mediated by Russia broke down between the Government and the so-called Coordinating Council, an umbrella group of opposition parties that was against issuing Abkhazian passports to the Georgian population in Abkhazia. Also the second quarter saw the continuation of the so-called Geneva Talks, co-chaired by the UN, the OSCE and the EU and with the participation of Russia as well as the U.S. as observer, although the round at the end of June was considered a setback. The delegations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia left the meeting of the working group dealing with humanitarian issues and demanded that the question of the displaced Georgian population be taken off the negotiating agenda. Nevertheless, they participated in the group again in later rounds and the subject had not been completely eliminated. Abkhazia and South Ossetia claimed that the Georgian government had politicized the issue with the non-
binding annual resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly calling for the return of ethnic Georgian population that had been forcibly displaced from both regions during the war. Russia agreed with Abkhazia and South Ossetia that the subject should be excluded from the negotiating agenda. The co-facilitators of the process said they were concerned over the interruption of the working group and stated that they would continue with consultations to find mutually acceptable solutions. On several occasions since the beginning of the talks in 2008 some parties have abandoned rounds of negotiations. The next round of talks was scheduled for October.

When Abkhazia and South Ossetia abandoned the round of negotiation in June after demanding that the issue of the displaced population be taken off the agenda of Working Group II (which addresses humanitarian issues), they repeated their demand during the third quarter. During the June round the international mediators had asked the parties to avoid the politicization of humanitarian issues. The Georgian government reiterated that the issue of the displaced population was a major concern for Georgia. The government also stressed that it sought to normalize relations with Russia, but not at the expense of Georgia’s sovereignty and independence.

Specifically, in late September Abkhazia demanded changes in the format and agenda of the Geneva negotiations and continued to say that it was in favour of continuing the dialogue. Moreover, after the change of regime in Abkhazia, the Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Paata Zakareishvili, said that the elections in Abkhazia—which were not recognized by Georgia or the international community, except for Russia—do not change the situation and that in any case, Georgia is willing to talk to any leader of the Abkhaz society. The next round (the 29th) of the Geneva negotiations were held in early October, during which the refugee problem was not discussed. With regard to specific issues for South Ossetia, during the quarter the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) continued to be active, although in the case of Abkhazia it had been inactive for months due to disagreements between Abkhazia and the EU. Thus, IPRM meetings were held on July 1 and 30 and on September 19. These meetings were used to address issues affecting the local population, such as access to grazing land during the summer, the situation of people under arrest, the whereabouts of missing persons and the impact that the construction of fences and other obstacles was having on the population on both sides of the border.

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<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The parties maintained the positions that they had held to date: Russia considers that it is not a party to the conflict and thus rejects making any unilateral commitment not to use force; Georgia is wary of any joint positions and is in favour of Russia making a gesture similar to the one Tbilisi made back in 2010.</td>
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<td>• In June the political and social crisis that began in May in the region of Abkhazia ended with the resignation in early June of President Alexander Ankvab and Prime Minister Leonid Lakerbaia.</td>
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<td>• In October the internal political tension in Abkhazia and suspicion between Georgia and Russia were on the rise following the Russian proposal &quot;Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Alliance and Integration&quot;, which sought even closer relations between Russia and Abkhazia and was interpreted by Georgia as an attempt at annexation. The Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, launched a proposal that included a status of autonomous republics for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The regions would be autonomous, but within a &quot;united and independent&quot; Georgia. In November, Russia and Abkhazia signed a 'strategic partnership', which meant a greater reliance of Abkhazia on Russia.</td>
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Ossetian leader Leonid Tibilov said he had asked Moscow to consider the possibility of a full accession of South Ossetia to Russia.

### Reasons crisis during the year

- Violations of airspace.
- Political and social crisis in Abkhazia.
- Abkhazia and South Ossetia's demand that the issue of displaced persons be removed from the negotiation agenda.
- Request by Abkhazia to change the format and agenda of negotiations.
- Disputes between Abkhazia and the EU regarding the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
- Mistrust between Georgia and Russia over the signing of a treaty between Russia and Abkhazia, which increased Abkhazia's dependence.
- Russia's refusal to sign a commitment not to use force.

**End result:** Unresolved.

### Websites of interest

- AlertNet (www.alertnet.org)
- Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (www.cipdd.org)
- Berghof Foundation (www.berghof-foundation.org)
- Caucasian Knot (eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru)
- Caucaz Europenews (www.caucaz.com)
- Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org)
- Civil Georgia (www.civil.ge/eng)
- Eurasia (www.eurasianet.org)
- Georgia Today (www.georgiatoday.ge)
- Gobierno de Georgia (www.government.gov.ge)
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.iwpr.net)
- International Alert (www.international-alert.org)
- International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (www.iccn.ge)
- International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org)
- Istambul Process (www.istambulprocess.org)
- Media News (www.medianews.ge)
- Ministerio de Reconciliación e Igualdad Cívica, de Georgia (www.smr.gov.ge)
- OSCE Mission to Georgia (www.osce.org/georgia)
- Parlamento de Georgia (www.parliament.ge)
- Partners-Georgia (www.partners.ge)
- PILPG (www.publiinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/negotiations/index.html)
- Presidencia de Georgia (www.president.gov.ge)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
- Swiss Peace (www.swisspeace.org)
- UNAG online Magazine (www.civil.ge)
- UN Association of Georgia (www.una.ge)
- UNOMIG (www.unomig.org)
Main parties involved in the process

**GEORGIA**

- Government
  - President: Bidzina Ivanishvili
  - Negotiator and Deputy Foreign Minister: Davit Zalkaliani
  - Reconciliation Minister: Paata Zakareishvili
  - Deputy Minister to Reconciliation: Ktevan Tsikhelashvili

**Geneva Process:**
- UN, OSCE, EU, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia

**Abkhazia**
- President: Alexander Ankvab

**South Ossetia**
- President: Leonid Tibilov

**Russia**
- Vladislav Surkov

**Space of intermediation**
- ICCN

**Special Representative of the EU:**
- Toivo Klaar

**Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM):**
- (Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and the EU)
ISRAEL – PALESTINE

Context of the conflict

The roots of the conflict date back to the end of World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This led the Palestinian territory to be put under UK administration under the Mandate System adopted by the League of Nations. This mandate lasted from 1922 to 1947. During this time, many Jews immigrated to Palestine, particularly at the time of the Nazi persecution in the 1930s. In 1947 the UK passed the problem on to the United Nations. In the same year, the UN's Resolution 181 declared that the territory under British mandate would be divided into two states with no territorial continuity. This division was never wholly implemented. The partition of the Holy Land by the United Nations and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 were the main factors that sparked the current conflict. Shortly after the British left the area, Israel occupied 77% of Palestinian territory and a large part of Jerusalem. Zionist paramilitary groups massacred many Palestinians and drove some 800,000 Palestinians into exile. There were five wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982) before the present conflict. The PLO was founded in 1959, and soon afterwards Yasser Arafat became its leader. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, establishing a security ring around Israel, intensifying the Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and triggering a second exodus of Palestinians (half a million). In 1974 the UN General Assembly granted observer status to the PLO. In 1982 Israel invaded the Lebanon, leading to a large-scale massacre in the Palestine refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, and leading to the expulsion of Arafat in 1983, who went into exile in Tunisia. In 1987 the desperation of the occupied Palestinian population led to the first "Intifada" (1987-1992), at the same time that Arafat began gestures at bridging the gap with the United States, convinced that it was the only country capable of putting pressure on Israel. The second Intifada began in September 2000. Since then, more than 5,500 people have died, 80% of them Palestinians. In 2002, Israel began to build a wall to separate the two communities, thus spurring increasing criticism from the international community.

Background to the peace process

In the past two decades, countless initiatives have been undertaken to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine, with no results. Israel is demanding full security guarantees, while Palestine is asking for the return of refugees, sharing the capital of Jerusalem and an end to the Jewish settlements in its territory. In 1990, the first secret negotiations got underway in Oslo, which led to the signing of the first agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Washington. In essence, the principles contained in the Oslo Agreement are the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the Palestinians' right to self-governance in these zones through the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian government would last five years on an interim basis, during which period its status would be renegotiated (starting in May 1996). The issues on Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security and the precise borders were not addressed. The interim self-governance would take place in phases. Two years earlier, in 1991, the Madrid Conference was held, which was guided by the principle of exchanging “peace for territories”. At this conference, the bases for future bilateral negotiations were laid. In 1995, the so-called “Barcelona Process” was launched to stimulate cooperation among all the countries in the region.
the Mediterranean, including Israel. In 1995, too, the Oslo II process got underway, which called for a zone under Palestinian control, a zone with a mixed administration and another zone controlled by Israel, with motorways that would join the zones under Israeli control. In 1998, this process was totally paralysed.

In 2002, with the conflict in a state of wholesale deterioration, the number of peace initiatives multiplied, including the creation of the International Working Group for Palestinian Reform, the actions of the Diplomatic Quartet (USA, Russia, EU and UN), and most notably, the Quartet’s “Roadmap” or peace plan dating from December 2002, which contained three stages that would conclude with the creation of an independent Palestinian state in 2005. In 2005, the conflict between Israel and Palestine took a qualitative leap after the death of Yasser Arafat, the election victory of M. Abbas in the Palestinian presidential elections and the subsequent opening of direct talks with the government of Israel. Throughout 2006, the thorny peace process between Israel and Palestine was initially marked by the victory of the group Hamas in the January elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and by the subsequent international block of the new Islamist government. In 2007, the peace conference held in Annapolis (Maryland, USA) ended, the first peace talks held between the Palestinian National authority (PNA) and Israel in seven years. The conference defined the beginning of talks based on the Roadmap, which would start on the 12th of December with biweekly meetings of the negotiation teams led by the joint steering committee. Likewise, the communiqué stated that there was agreement to discuss all the fundamental issues, without exception, in an attempt to create an independent Palestinian state. The fundamental issues agreed upon, known as the “final status”, were the future of Jerusalem, the borders, water, refugees and the settlements.

During the first week of May 2010, the resumption of indirect talks between the Israelis and Palestinians was announced in an attempt to make headway in the peace process. The round of talks ended without any signs of progress, and with no date to continue the dialogue, which should have spread over the ensuing four months and address key issues, such as Jerusalem and the status of the refugees. The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, met in Washington on the 2nd of September in a new round of direct talks between the parties, the first in 20 months. Abbas had demanded a total cessation of colony building, including in Jerusalem, as a step prior to talks, but he ended up giving in to the intense international pressures, and Washington announced, at least officially, that the restoration of contacts came “with no conditions”. Netanyahu’s priorities were security, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (the refugees could only return to a Palestinian state) and an end to the conflict, without the possibility of admitting further claims in the future. In January 2011, the Qatari television channel Al-Jazeera and the British newspaper The Guardian started to divulge more than 1,600 internal documents on the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis during the past decade, in which they revealed that the Palestinian negotiators offered Israel sovereignty over most of Jerusalem. The Palestinian representatives gave up the right for the refugees to return, and they accepted instead the return of a symbolic number of between 5,000 and 10,000 of them. The Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, stated that Israel was willing to make “painful” concessions and to hand over some territories, but it stressed that it would not return to the 1967 borders. What is more, he stressed that Jerusalem would not be divided, that the issue of the Palestinian refugees could only be resolved outside Israel’s borders and that a future Palestinian state must be completely demilitarised. The Israeli prime minister also discarded the possibility of negotiating with Hamas. In September, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, submitted a request to the United Nations to recognise and accept Palestine as a full member of the organisation in the midst of open opposition from the USA and Israel. With regard to the talks between the Palestinian groups, in April 2011 Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement that put an end to the profound gulf between the Palestinian factions since 2007.
At the beginning of January the first direct encounter since September 2010 between senior officials from both parties took place in a meeting held in Jordan between Israeli representative Yitzhak Molcho and Palestinian representative Saeb Erekat. There was no progress during the meeting, according to press reports, but Jordanian sources did say that the Israelis had promised to study a Palestinian proposal on borders and security issues. In June, press reports revealed that in recent months representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel had held meetings in an attempt to find formulas to revive the peace process. In October EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton visited the region in order to restart the Middle East peace process. During her trip Ashton condemned Israel's decision to build nearly 800 new homes in the settlement of Gilo, which Israel considers part of Greater Jerusalem.

On November 2012, Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement in Cairo that had four main points. First, a commitment by Israel to cease all hostilities against Gaza by sea, land and air, including incursions targeting individuals. In turn, all of the Palestinian factions committed to halting hostilities against Israel, including rocket and border attacks. Third, 24 hours after the start of the ceasefire the two sides would begin talks to allow the opening of the border crossings to Gaza and allow the free movement of persons and goods. Finally, Egypt received assurances from both sides that they would respect the accord and that they would look into any incidents that could be considered a violation of the agreement.

The January 2013 elections in Israel led to the formation of a new government, led once again by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu. The Former Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, from the Hatnua party, was one of the few politicians during the election campaign that highlighted the need to restart the talks with the Palestinians. Livni took over as Minister of Justice in the new coalition government headed by Netanyahu and was appointed as chief negotiator in any future contacts with the Palestinian authorities. Livni had led the negotiations with the PA during Ehud Olmert's government. The first quarter of 2013 was also marked by the first visit by U.S. president Barack Obama to Israel and the West Bank. The leader did not unveil a peace plan or a specific initiative to resume the negotiations between the two sides, but urged the Palestinians and the Israelis to give talks a chance and advocated a two-state solution. During his visit to Ramallah, Obama asked the PA to drop preconditions for dialogue. During the second quarter the U.S. Secretary State, John Kerry, continued his tour of the region and held a series of meetings with leaders from Palestine, Israel and other countries in the region to revive the peace talks. Kerry announced a 4 billion USD plan to revive the Palestinian economy. The U.S. leader called on Israel to avoid the construction of new settlements, although he did not explicitly mention stopping the construction of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Meanwhile, the Arab League modified one element of its proposal for peace in the Middle East known as the Arab Initiative and drafted in 2002. It accepted the possibility of swapping land with Israel during the definition of the borders of the new Palestinian state. Kerry praised the Arab League for this new proposal and the Israeli negotiator, Tzipi Livni, said that this approach increased the possibility of negotiations. However, in an indirect allusion to the initiative, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the Palestinians’ problem was not territorial, but their refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. During the third quarter, and after a three-year impasse in the peace negotiations, Israeli and Palestinian delegates resumed direct talks under the auspices of the United States. The Israeli Justice Minister and chief negotiator, Tzipi Livni, and the leader of the Palestinian negotiating team, Saeb Erekat, agreed on a framework for negotiations following a meeting with U.S. mediators in Washington in late July. A nine-month deadline was set to conclude the dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of State stressed that a two-state solution was the only feasible way to end the dispute and appointed Martin Indyk as the U.S. special envoy for the talks. The first formal meeting between the parties took place in mid-August in Jerusalem. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet also approved a bill to hold a referendum on any peace agreement with the Palestinians. Some sectors of the Likud warned Netanyahu that he would have no place in the party if he decided to sign an agreement with the PA and some of Netanyahu’s cabinet ministers stated that they were against any agreement that might lead to handing territory over to the Palestinians. In November Secretary of State John
Kerry visited the region again to try to consolidate the peace talks between Israel and Palestine. The delegations met twenty times in three months. Kerry pushed for an agreement based on a two-state solution. A few days later the Palestinian negotiators resigned from their post to protest against the continued colonization by Israel. The Palestinian president did not accept their resignation.

The peace process in 2014

During the first quarter the deadlock in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel intensified, despite diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and visits to the area by the Secretary of State, John Kerry. The diplomat tried to get the parties to move ahead with a framework agreement on key issues in the negotiations with the aim of reaching an initial consensus before April 29, the deadline set for talks. According to information that reached the press, the key points of this agreement of principles consisted of security issues, acceptance of 1967 borders, Jerusalem as a shared capital, and the issue of Israel as a Jewish state. In a public statement Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas insisted that the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state was unviable and stressed that neither Egypt nor Jordan which in the past had signed peace agreements with Israel were forced to comply with a condition of this kind. In an interview with The New York Times the Palestinian president was open to deploying NATO troops in a future Palestinian state that would be demilitarized and only have a police force. The NATO mission would be responsible for preventing possible terrorist attacks or arms trafficking. According to Abbas, these troops could remain for an indefinite period in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem. Additionally, Abbas agreed that Israel could keep troops in the West Bank for a period of five years and that its settlements in the occupied territories could be dismantled in a similar timeframe. However, the Israeli government insisted on maintaining control over the withdrawal of its forces from the occupied territories and, in particular, it stressed that it would maintain a military presence in the Jordan Valley. Hamas also rejected the possibility of a NATO presence in the Palestinian territories.

Given the difficulties in reaching a framework agreement between the PA and Israel, diplomatic sources said that the deadline for negotiations could be extended beyond April 29. However, towards the end of the quarter the difficulty of the negotiations became more evident because of Israel’s insistence on maintaining its policy of building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and its refusal to release a fourth group of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, a measure that had been agreed to from the beginning of the talks with the PA. In this context, the PA decided to continue with its strategy of gaining international recognition for Palestine and began a process of joining various international treaties in a move that sparked outright rejection by Israel.

During the second quarter the contacts between Palestinians and Israelis under the auspices of the U.S. government were suspended after nine months of attempts at dialogue. After the Palestinian organizations Hamas and Fatah announced a reconciliation agreement and the formation of a consensus government composed of technocrats, Israel decided in April to suspend the talks with the Palestinian Authority (PA), which had been immersed in a profound crisis since the end of March. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government decided against releasing a group of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel, which was part of the deal that had made it possible to resume the dialogue with the PA. In addition, the Israeli government announced new plans to expand the settlements in the occupied territories. In response the PA began the process of adhering to more than a dozen international treaties as a way to bolster the foreign recognition of Palestine. In this context, the Secretary of State focused all of his efforts on reaching an agreement between the parties to extend the April 24 deadline to conclude the talks. However, after the announcement of the agreement between Hamas and Fatah, Israel suspended the contacts and insisted that it would not hold talks with an Administration that had the support of the Islamist group. Netanyahu’s government maintained this position, while the UN, the EU and the U.S. recognized the new Palestinian government, which was sworn into office in June, and said that they were willing to
work with it. The new government was made up of technocrats committed to the non-use of violence, recognition of Israel and respect for previous agreements, the three key principles required by the Middle East Quartet. Of note during the quarter was the visit by Pope Francisco to Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories. The pontiff called for steps to promote the end of violence and achieve peace in the region.

In July there was a major escalation of the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Hamas launched missiles and Israel launched a large-scale bombing campaign that completely destroyed some neighbourhoods and towns. The final toll was 2,600 Palestinians and 64 Israeli soldiers dead. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry travelled to the area to try to negotiate a truce. At the end of the month Egypt temporarily gave up trying to mediate with Hamas, while Turkey and Qatar tried to act as intermediaries. At the end of August Israel and Hamas agreed to an indefinite cease-fire after a 50-day offensive in Gaza. The agreement brokered by Egypt was based on lifting the siege on Gaza and immediately opening the main border crossings with Israel. The southern border of Gaza would be controlled by Palestinian government staff. The fishermen from Gaza could also fish up to six miles offshore. A month later negotiations would begin to rebuild the airport and the port of Gaza, and to release hundreds of prisoners.

During the third quarter the Israeli-Palestinian conflict deteriorated as a result of the Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip and rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel. In this period, there were several failed attempts to reach an agreement for a ceasefire. An Egyptian proposal was rejected by Hamas, while an approach put forward by Qatar was rejected by Israel. Although agreements were reached for several truces, they were not respected and violence continued. Finally, on August 26 Hamas and Israel accepted a long-term truce that was brokered by Cairo, which also included a commitment by Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza. However, the most complicated matters were postponed for further discussion as part of the negotiations between the two sides. Thus, issues such as the release of Palestinian prisoners and the construction of an airport or port in Gaza and the Israeli demand to convert the Palestinian territory in a demilitarized zone, were left for future discussions. Negotiations between Hamas and Israel resumed in the form of indirect contacts in late September in Cairo. Similarly, during the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York, the president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, stated that the Security Council should pressure Israel and set a deadline for the withdrawal from the Palestinian occupied territories. However, Abbas did not specify what the deadline should be. Additionally, the PA again warned that if the blockade in the negotiations with Israel continued Palestine would seek to join various UN agencies and the International Criminal Court.

Jordan, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, introduced a draft resolution in mid-December on behalf of Palestine and the Arab countries that established a one-year period to conclude peace negotiations with Israel that fulfils the vision of two “democratic and prosperous states” and set 2017 as the deadline for completing the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. France, United Kingdom and Germany worked on an alternative text that does not establish time limits for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, but does allow the peace process to be resumed. The text submitted by the Palestinians was toned down with respect to the one presented in October, after President Mahmoud Abbas told the UN General Assembly that it was time to fast track Palestinian statehood. In this document November 2016 was set as the deadline for “the full withdrawal of Israel from all of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967” including the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he would not accept any demand or deadline for reaching a peace agreement in the region in response to attempts by the Palestinian leadership to end the Israeli occupation in two years with the support of the UN Security Council. At the end of the year the Security Council voted and the measure was rejected. There were eight votes in favour of the resolution (Russia, China, France, Argentina, Chad, Chile, Jordan and Luxembourg) and two against (the U.S. and Australia), while five countries abstained (UK, Lithuania, South Korea, Rwanda and Nigeria). The resolution required nine votes to pass, which would have forced the U.S. to use its veto. The U.S. Government underlined that its vote against the measure should not be interpreted as support for
the status quo, but as a sign of Washington’s conviction that the conflict should be resolved at the negotiating table.

Moreover, the European Parliament (EP) joined the movement to recognize Palestine in a joint resolution presented by the major political groups which received 498 votes in favour, 111 against and 88 abstentions. The text said, "We support in principle recognition of Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution, and believe these should go hand in hand with the development of peace talks," and encouraged the head of European diplomacy, Federica Mogherini, to facilitate a common EU position to this end. This initiative comes after other similar actions taken by other States and international organizations in recent months. 135 of the 193 countries in the UN had recognized the Palestinian state by the end of the year. In parallel Secretary of State John Kerry held meetings in Europe with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, representatives from Palestine and the Arab League, and with his French, British and German counterparts. Mahmud Abbas threatened to end cooperation with Israel if the UN rejected the resolution on the Palestinian state. The President of the PNA made the remarks during a visit to Algeria. Abbas said he was willing to dissolve the Palestinian Authority and let Israel directly manage the millions of people in the Occupied Territories. At the end of the year the president of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, signed Palestine’s application to join the International Criminal Court, plus a request to join 22 other international organizations. The U.S. and Israel threatened Palestine with economic sanctions for taking this step.

As for the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, despite the differences between the two formations with regard to the negotiations with Israel, the media reported that contacts had been secretly resumed at the beginning of the year. According to Palestinian media outlets, leaders from both groups had held several meetings during the quarter, with at least one in Doha (Qatar). In July the two formations reached a reconciliation agreement, which led to the failure of talks between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian National Authority. In September the two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, announced an agreement that would allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) to return to Gaza, after seven years under the control of the Islamist group. The pact was announced at the end of the month after two days of talks in Cairo, and assumed that officials from the unity government led by President Mahmoud Abbas would take over responsibility for the administration of Gaza. In the past other agreements between Hamas and Fatah have failed. During the first half of the year both groups had agreed to create a unity government and Hamas had formally announced its release of Gaza in early June, but Abbas accused the Islamist group of maintaining a de facto parallel government. Hamas, in turn, denounced that the PA had refused to pay the salaries of 45,000 employees that had been hired by the Islamist group in Gaza. The agreement was ultimately derailed by the growing conflict with Israel. It was hoped the agreement signed on this occasion would facilitate the reconstruction of Gaza after seven weeks of war with Israel and would provide relief caused by the blockage imposed on the territory. However, doubts remained over whether Hamas, which controlled the police force in Gaza, would surrender control of security in the territory. The agreement did not provide details on what would be done with the military wing of the Islamist group. Sources close to the negotiations revealed that the PA would manage the border crossings with Israel and Egypt. Some questions were also raised regarding how the agreement would handle Hamas’ relations with Egypt. Following the agreement between the Palestinian factions it was hoped that the Palestinian authorities would resume negotiations with Israel, which could result in a definitive ceasefire in Gaza. A study by the PA estimated that it would cost 7.8 billion dollars to rebuild Gaza after the conflict with Israel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most significant events of the year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian president said he was open to deploying NATO troops in a future Palestinian state, which would be demilitarized and only have a police force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas agreed that Israel could keep troops in the West Bank for a period of five years and that its settlements in the occupied territories could be dismantled in a similar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
timeframe.

- During the second quarter the contacts between Palestinians and Israelis under the auspices of the U.S. Government were suspended after nine months of attempts at dialogue.
- During the third quarter the Israeli-Palestinian conflict deteriorated as a result of the Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip and rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel. On August 26 Hamas and Israel accepted a long-term truce that was brokered by Cairo, which also included a commitment by Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza.
- Negotiations between Hamas and Israel resumed in the form of indirect contacts in late September in Cairo.
- In September, the two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, announced an agreement that would allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) to return to Gaza, after seven years under the control of the Islamist group.
- Jordan, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, introduced a draft resolution on behalf of Palestine and the Arab countries that established a one-year period to conclude peace negotiations with Israel that fulfils the vision of two "democratic and prosperous states" and set 2017 as the deadline for completing the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. The United States vetoed the proposal at the end of the year.
- At the end of the year Palestine acceded to the International Criminal Court.

**Reasons crisis during the year**

- Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state
- Hamas' rejection of the possible presence of NATO troops in Palestinian territory.
- Israeli policy of building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
- Opposition by Israel to Palestine's accession to various international treaties.
- The release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel does not take place.
- Conflict escalation in the Gaza Strip.
- Presentation of a draft resolution to the UN Security Council on behalf of Palestine to revive negotiations with Israel. The United States vetoed the proposal.
- Refusal by Israel to negotiate with Palestine.
- Threats against Palestine for signing its accession to the International Criminal Court.

**End result:** unresolved.

**Websites of interest**

- Al Monitor (www.al-monitor.com)
- Alternative Information Center (www.alternativenews.org)
- BBC (news.bbc.co./2/hi/middle-east/default.stm)
- Haaretz (www.haaretz.com)
- Incore (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries)
- Insight to Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org)
- Interpeace (www.interpeace.org)
- IPCRI (www.ipcri.org)
- Middle East Research and Information Project (www.merip.org)
- Mideast Web (www.mideastweb.org)
- Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Israel (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa)
- Mundo Árabe (www.mundoarabe.org)
- PLO Negotiation Affairs Department (www.nad-plo.org/index.php)
- Reliefweb (www.reliefweb.int)
Main parties involved in the process

**PLO**
- President: M. Abbas
- Negotiators: Saeb Erekat, Ahmed Qureia

**Fatah Gov.**
- Prime Minister: S. Fayyad

**Hamas in Gaza**
- Prime Minister: I. Haniya

**UN**
- Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) (Robert Serry)

**Negotiation Affairs Department**
- (Saeb Erekat)

**Diplomatic Quartet**
- UN, EU, USA, Russia

**Arab League**
- (Follow-up Committee)
- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Qatar

**ISRAEL Government**
- President: Shimon Peres
- Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu
- Head of negotiating team: Tzip Livni
- Minister of Defence and negotiator: Ehud Barak

**USA**
- President: Barack Obama
- Secretary of State: John Kerry
- Special Envoy: Martin Indyk

**Space of intermediation**
APPENDIX
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Armed group</th>
<th>Most recent cycle of talks analyzed</th>
<th>Number of rounds</th>
<th>Average frequency of rounds</th>
<th>Cities or countries where the talks are held</th>
<th>Residence of the armed group’s negotiators</th>
<th>Mediation Country or Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>12/2012 – 12/2014</td>
<td>3 in November 2014</td>
<td>dispersed</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance)</td>
<td>MFDC</td>
<td>4/2012 – 12/2012</td>
<td>5 (minimum)</td>
<td>Every 6 months</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau, Dakar (Senegal), Rome (Italy), (Senegal) (Guinea-Bissau)</td>
<td>Community of Sant’ Egidio</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>JEM (Beziker)</td>
<td>10/2012 – 10/2013</td>
<td>5 (minimum)</td>
<td>Every 2 months</td>
<td>Darfur (Egypt)</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>JEM (Ibrahim)</td>
<td>4/2014 – 12/2014</td>
<td>6 (minimum)</td>
<td>Every 1.3 months</td>
<td>Paris (France), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>Paris (France)</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Kordofan and Blue Nile)</td>
<td>SPLM-N</td>
<td>12/2013 – 12/2014</td>
<td>4 (minimum)</td>
<td>Every 3 months</td>
<td>Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Khartoum (Sudan)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>SPLA-ID</td>
<td>1/2014 – 12/2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Every 1.5 months</td>
<td>Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Asmara (Tanzania)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>IGAD CMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan-South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>9/2012 – 12/2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Every 2.6 months</td>
<td>Khartoum (Sudan), Juba (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Sudan, South Sudan</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>Polisario Front</td>
<td>8/2009 – 9/2012</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Every 3.7 months</td>
<td>New York (U.S.), Morocco</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>9/2012 – 12/2014</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Every 0.9 months</td>
<td>Havana (Cuba)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Norway - Cuba Quarantors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>12/2005 – 8/2007</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Every 2.5 months</td>
<td>Havana (Cuba)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Norway, Spain, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Nagaland)</td>
<td>NSCN-NM</td>
<td>1997 – 12/2014</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Every 2.5 months</td>
<td>Amsterdam, Thailand, New Delhi (India)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>UNFC</td>
<td>1/2013 – 12/2014</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Every 2.9 months</td>
<td>Myanmar/Burma, Thailand</td>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>12/2009 – 12/2014</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Every 1.7 months</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>2/2011 – 12/2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Every 11 months</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>BRN</td>
<td>3/2013 – 12/2014</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Every 3 months</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>(It is not an armed conflict)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>In May 2014 the two communities decided to meet every 15 days</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>(There is no armed group)</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (Transnistria)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(It is not an armed conflict)</td>
<td>12/2011 – 12/2014</td>
<td>Every 4.5 months</td>
<td>Dublin (Ireland), Lviv (Ukraine), Odessa (Ukraine), Tiraspol (Transnistria)</td>
<td>(There is no armed group)</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia–Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td>(It is not an armed conflict)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The two presidents met three times in three months</td>
<td>(There is no armed group)</td>
<td>Minsk Group (France, Russia, U.S.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(It is not an armed conflict)</td>
<td>2008-2014</td>
<td>Every 2.4 months</td>
<td>Geneva</td>
<td>(There is no armed group)</td>
<td>UN, OSCE, EU, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 2. Facilitation in 2014 of the conflicts analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Facilitators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance)</td>
<td>Community of Sant’ Egidio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (ONLF)</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (National Dialogue)</td>
<td>AU, Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>AU, Chad, Berghof Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)</td>
<td>AU (Thabo Mbeki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan-South Sudan</td>
<td>AU (Thabo Mbeki), UN (Francis Mading Deng)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>AU, IGAD (Seyoum Mesfin), Tanzania, CMI (Itonde Kakoma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Gabon (Denis Sassou-Nguesso), International Contact Group, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo (FDLR)</td>
<td>Uganda, Community of Sant’ Egidio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>UN (Bernardino León), Algeria, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>UN (Christopher Ross)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (FARC)</td>
<td>Norway, Cuba (guarantors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (ELN)</td>
<td>Ecuador, Brazil, Norway (guarantors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Qatar, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Assam)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Manipur)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Nagaland)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema Islam-Sami, Jamat-i-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (MILF)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (MNLF)</td>
<td>Indonesia, OIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (NPA)</td>
<td>Norway (Ture Lundh, Elisabeth Slattum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (south)</td>
<td>Malaysia (Aksara Kerdpol, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin Hashmin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma / Myanmar</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>UN (Alexander Downer, Espen Barth Eide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Troika (Russia, USA, EU), UN (L. Zannier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>OSCE (Radojko Bogojevic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>OSCE (Heidi Tagliavini), Contact Group (Russia, OSCE, Ukraine), Germany, France, EU (Federica Mogherini)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia-Azerbaijan</td>
<td>OSCE Minsk Group (France, Russia and USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>UN, OSCE, EU, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td>USA, Egypt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3. Tell me what it was like... The mirrors of peace

Even though all the conflicts and their respective peace processes or negotiations are different, there tend to be certain aspects in each of them that explain why they attract attention, such as their methodology, objectives or other reasons. This table illustrates the processes in which the actors, either governmental or armed, have studied, observed or travelled to other regions to find out firsthand how their process unfolded, creating interesting mirrors where inspiration can be found for dealing with their own difficulties.
Annex 4. EXAMPLES OF LEADERS OF ARMED GROUPS THAT WERE RELEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

- In 2008, the spokesmen of the ELN Colombian guerrilla group, "Francisco Galán" and "Felipe Torres", prisoners in Colombia, were allowed to attend a peace meeting in the city of Mainz (Germany). In 2000 both guerrilla fighters were also allowed to attend a meeting in Geneva, and in 2002 a meeting in Cuba, the so-called 'Peace Summit' with Fidel Castro.
- In September 2005 Colombian President Alvaro Uribe authorized the release of ELN spokesman Francisco Galán, for a period of three months, in order to move forward in discussions with all sectors of the Colombian civil society, and in response to a popular initiative, which was also approved by the ELN.

- In 2006 the Government of Colombia authorized commander 'Juan Carlos Cuéllar', from the ELN and imprisoned since 2004, to participate in the peace negotiations that were taking place in Havana. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-nuevo-eleno/81562-3

- In 2007, in the region of the Niger Delta in Nigeria, the MEND armed group declared a three-month truce and the Government responded by releasing Dokubo-Asari, the leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force armed group, which was one of the demands made by the group to start talks.

- Also in Nigeria in 2009, after a major operation in May by the Joint Task Force against the main bases of the different armed groups with ties to the MEND, President Yar'Adua offered an amnesty on June 25 to all those who laid down their arms. The MEND accepted the proposal and declared an indefinite ceasefire in October, while its top leaders initiated talks with the Government. As a show of trust the MEND leader, Okah, was released.

- In Casamance (Senegal), the leader of the MFCD armed group, Agustine Diamacoune, was freed in 1997 and the following year he proposed a new ceasefire. In 1999 there was a historic meeting in the capital of Gambia between Senegalese President Abdou Diouf and Father Diamacoune, ushering in the so-called "Banjul process" which ended in a ceasefire.

- In South Africa, Mandela negotiated from prison until the government announced in 1990 that it was legalizing political organizations and releasing imprisoned political leaders. After that Mandela was released and the negotiations continued outside the prison.

- In Sudan, the historic Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) that had split away from President Omar al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP), has been imprisoned several times and later released to move the peace talks forward. Al-Turabi has been in all of the peace processes in Sudan.

- In South Sudan there have been several cases. One of them is Peter Abdelrahman Sule, leader of the opposition group the United Democratic Front Party, who was released in August 2014 and subsequently took part in peace negotiations.

- In Mindanao (Philippines), the leader of the MNLF armed group, Nur Misuari, was released in 2008 from house arrest so he could participate in talks in Uganda and Saudi Arabia on the full implementation of the 1996 peace agreement. Below are a few links with information on the subject.

- In Assam (India), in June 2010 the Government released several leaders of the ULFA guerrilla group, including the Chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, Deputy Commander in Chief Raju Barua, on bail on condition that he not leave the State of Assam, Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi, Central Publicity Secretary Mitthinga Daimary, Cultural Secretary Pranati Deka, and ideologue Bhimkanta Buragohain, to pave the way for peace talks with the group.
- In 2013 the Indian Government released guerrilla leader NDFB (RD) Ranjam Daimary on bail to facilitate his participation in negotiations with the Government.

- In the third quarter of 2012, the Government of Manipur (India) signed Memorandums of Understanding with three armed opposition groups, the KCP-N, the KNLF and the KRP. The memorandums committed the rebel organizations to disarm and start peace negotiations. Different media sources said that the signing of these agreements was triggered by the release of Lanheiba Meitei, the leader of the KCP-N who had been arrested in 2011.

- In Pakistan, in September 2013 the Government released a prominent Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, to facilitate the peace process in Afghanistan. In 2012 Pakistan had already freed other Taliban leaders for the same reason.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Boko Haram)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2144 – 2146 – 2174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2142 – 2158 – 2182 – 2184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2148 – 2155 – 2156 – 2173 – 2179 – 2187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2134 – 2149 – 2181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2136 – 2141 – 2147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>2152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2145 – 2182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan (Kashmir)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma / Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (south)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2135 – 2168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (PKK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia-Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (Transnistria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Daguestan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel - Siria</td>
<td>2163 - 2192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2139 – 2165 – 2101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bold armed conflict are identified
### Annex 6. Managing the past in recent peace agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of peace agreement</th>
<th>Initiatives</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Delay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Creating a Truth Commission and subsequent general amnesty</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Creating a Historical Clarification Commission</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creating an International Commission against Impunity</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Creating a National Reconciliation Commission which approved a law on mutual pardon and a draft amnesty law</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Creating a Consultative Group on the Past, which has not found the support to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the existence of a Special Court for Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Amnesty after the peace agreement and later creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Aceh)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The peace agreement granted amnesty to the members of the GAM and called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be set up, which has not yet been done.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>In 2009, there was a verbal commitment to create a Commission on Disappeared Persons and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The peace agreement contained provisional immunity for the FNL members and its transformation into a political party. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be created.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Creation of a Truth, Justice and Reparation Commission.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>A Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up.</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) created the Justice Committee and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Parliament created a Truth, Justice and Reparation Commission.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo (M23)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Creation of a National Reconciliation Commission.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (MILF)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>A Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission will be created.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7. Peace processes in recent years

This appendix summarises the peace processes that have taken place in 13 countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Angola, South Africa, Liberia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Burundi, Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal and Philippines (MILF). It encompasses processes begun between 1984 (El Salvador) and 2014 (Philippines), which lasted between four years in Nepal and 21 years in Northern Ireland. The majority had mediators (four by the United Nations), and as for the underlying causes, four were the democratisation of the country, five were political power-sharing and four were self-governance. In two of the processes (Guatemala and South Africa), there was widespread participation by society, while the remaining processes were conducted in a more pyramidal fashion. Once the agreements were reached, an amnesty for combatants was called in all the countries, although Truth Commissions were created in only some of them. All the opposition groups that fought in the conflict ended up holding positions of responsibility in the new governments that emerged after the peace agreements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Negotiation period</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>Underlying cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1984-1994</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Democratisation of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1985-1996</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Democratisation of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1987-2008</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Self-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1988-2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Portugal, Russia, USA</td>
<td>Political power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Democratisation of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990-2003</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Political power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Political power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1994-2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Political power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>1998-2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Self-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1998-2008</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tanzania, South Africa</td>
<td>Political power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (Aceh)</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CDH Finland</td>
<td>Self-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Democratisation of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (MILF)</td>
<td>2001-2014</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Self-governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reasons for engaging in negotiations and starting the peace processes were diverse, but in all cases the people’s weariness with war and desire for peace were crucial. In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the regional context favourable to talks (Contadora Group) played a key role, as it did in Tajikistan. In Guatemala, the presidential elections that fostered a change in the political scene were influential, while in Northern Ireland and South Africa the economic need to achieve peace was an important factor. In Tajikistan and South Africa, the fact that the guerrillas no longer had a safe rearguard was a determining factor. External pressure exerted an influence in South Africa, Angola, southern Sudan and Burundi. The humanitarian crisis was the trigger in southern Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh); in the latter country, a natural catastrophe, the tsunami, catalysed the process. Finally, in Nepal, popular demonstrations against the monarchy paved the way for the negotiations that led to the definitive peace agreement.
The process in El Salvador

A civil war broke out in 1980 which led to the death of 75,000 people, as the FMLN guerrillas clashed with the country's repressive militaristic government. In 1983, the Security Council approved a resolution in which it stated its support for the peace-building activities of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), which had embarked on a series of consultations in five Central American countries. Between 1984 and 1987, the first four exploratory dialogue encounters were held, to no avail, between the government and FMLN representatives. These talks were mediated by the archbishop of El Salvador, Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas. At the last meeting, the Nunciature Round in October 1987, a communiqué was issued that expressed the desire to reach a ceasefire and to back the decisions taken by the Contadora Group. This was a stage in which both parties' positions matured and became more flexible. The Esquipulas Process gained prominence in 1986, which used the efforts of the Contadora Group and was joined by the Support Group (Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) with the backing of the OAS and the UN. Between 1987 and 1990, the Central American presidents called for a negotiated political solution.

In September 1989, the Secretary General of the United Nations conducted his first good offices spurred by a request by President Cristiani and the FMLN made in Mexico. The Secretary General appointed Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto his special representative. The agreement signed in Mexico between the government and the FMLN included a decision to embark on a dialogue process with the purpose of putting an end to the armed conflict. However, in November, the FMLN launched a general offensive to demonstrate its strength. The offensive was contained by the armed forces, leading both parties to reach the conclusion that they were militarily tied.

In April 1990, a dialogue meeting was held in Geneva sponsored by the United Nations and in the presence of the Secretary General. At this meeting, an agreement was signed that laid down a series of rules to be followed in the negotiation process and stated both parties' desire to reach a negotiated, political solution. The goals were to end the armed conflict via political means, to promote the country's democratisation, to ensure unlimited respect for human rights and to reunify Salvadoran society. In May of the same year, a meeting was held in Caracas where a general negotiating agenda and calendar were drawn up. The process was divided into two phases: in the first, political agreements would be reached in areas that enabled the armed conflict to come to an end; and in the second, the guarantees and conditions needed for the FMLN to rejoin the country's civil, institutional and political life would be set forth. In July, the San José Agreement (Costa Rica) was reached, which outlined both parties’ commitment to respect human rights and called for a UN verification mission (the future ONUSAL) before reaching a ceasefire.

In April 1991, an agreement was reached in Mexico City in which the negotiations on land tenancy were considered closed and constitutional reforms on judicial, military, electoral and human rights matters were included. The Truth Commission was created to investigate the serious violent deeds that had taken place since 1980; the commission received more than 22,000 grievances. In May, UN Security Council Resolution 693 was approved, which stipulated the formation of a United Nations Observers’ Mission for El Salvador, whose initial mandate was to verify compliance with the San José Human Rights Agreements. Later, its mandate would be expanded. The mission had a three-fold organisation: a human rights division, a military division and police observers. In September, the UN Secretary General intervened directly by seating the parties in New York (New York Agreement) at a summit at which they agreed to the minimum security guarantees for a ceasefire. These guarantees were later verified by the nascent National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), made up of all the political forces in the country. In December, final negotiations were held at the UN headquarters in New York, and on the 31st of this same month an agreement was reached.

In January 1992, a general amnesty was declared and the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed, which led to a change in the armed forces (elimination of officers involved in the dirty war.
and reduction in troops), the creation of the National Civil Police force, the dissolution of the military intelligence services, the elimination of the paramilitary corps, a change in the judicial system, the defence of human rights, the creation of a Truth Commission, changes in the electoral system, the transformation of the FMLN into a political party, the adoption of economic and social measures and the expansion of the ONUSAL mandate (Military and Police Division). February witnessed a cessation of the armed clash and the start of demobilisation. In December, the FMLN was legalised as a political party, and the next day, the definitive end to the conflict was officially celebrated.

There were several determining factors in reaching the agreements: the Salvadoran people’s desire for peace, changes in civil law, the de-legitimisation of the armed forces, the murder of six Jesuit priests, the military standoff between the armed forces and the FMLN, more flexible positions, United Nations mediation, the efforts of friendly countries (Spain, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), the positive role played by the Catholic Church and the National Reconciliation Commission, the new geopolitical scene (end of the Soviet empire, defeat of the Sandinistas), pressure from the United States late in the game and the influence of the Contadora Group. The process lasted ten years.

The process in Guatemala

Just like many peace processes, the one in Guatemala needed many years, more than one decade, to transform the earliest contacts into the agreement signed in 1996. The origins date back to 1983, when Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formed the Contadora Group with the purpose of stimulating democratic changes in Central America and generating, in little time, regional pressure in favour of peace in the region. The Contadora Group is an example of how an external factor can become a driving force in creating an atmosphere that is friendly to dialogue and negotiation, to such an extent that these processes would not have existed in Guatemala, nor in El Salvador and Nicaragua, without this initiative.

Furthermore, the regional pressure dovetailed with the first steps towards civility taken inside the country shortly thereafter. Guatemala had been enmeshed in years of conflict and militarisation, and it was not until 1984 that Guatemalan military officers gave the first signs of agreeing to transfer power to civilian hands. These signs materialised in the 1985 presidential elections, which Vinicio Cerezo won. He became the president who launched the much-awaited transition to democracy after years of military dictatorship. Cerezo was also the first to make overtures to the guerrillas, specifically in Spain at the headquarters of the Guatemalan embassy, in an initial exploration of the URNG guerrilla’s willingness to embark on a negotiation process. Even though the right conditions were not in place at that time, the encounter was decisive for starting a maturation process which would bear fruit years later. In any event, without the courage to take this first step and in the absence of Cerezo’s vision of the future, peace would never have been achieved in Guatemala.

In 1986 and 1987, there was yet another regional push with the Esquipulas I and II Agreements, with the slogan “peace for democracy”. The upshot of these meetings was the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala, which in the ensuing years would play a prominent role in achieving peace. In parallel, pro-peace social and religious groups also blossomed. They would end up being the hallmark of Guatemala’s experience: the decisive contribution of its civil society in a scope of involvement rarely seen in peace processes. At that time, the contribution by a single person, the U.S. Lutheran pastor Paul Wee, was also crucial. Wee was the former Secretary General of the Lutheran World Federation whose good offices fostered the earliest encounters between the URNG and the military. While in South Africa the human factor is discussed in reference to the decisive contribution by Nelson Mandela, the history of Guatemala must pay tribute to the crucial figure of Paul Wee, as without his efforts the process would have taken another pace and a different course. Paul Wee fostered the creation of a favourable atmosphere, which paved the way for the Grand National Dialogue called in 1989.
In 1990, an extremely important process got underway that was dubbed the “Oslo Consultations”, as the first meeting between the URNG and the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was held in that city, which enshrined Norway as one of the most active countries in peace diplomacy. That encounter ushered in a series of meetings between CNR delegates and the URNG in different countries: in El Escorial, Spain, with the presence of the political parties; in Ottawa, Canada, with the business sector; in Quito, Ecuador, with the religious groups; in Metepec, Mexico, with representation of the people and trade unions; and finally in Atlixco, Mexico, with the representatives of educational organisations, small business owners and university colleges. These meetings laid the groundwork for the start of direct negotiations between the URN and the government in 1991. These negotiations lasted five years. President Serrano, who replaced Cerezo, launched the Total Peace initiative, which made it possible to sign an agreement in Mexico in April with an eleven-point negotiation agenda. The main items included strengthening civil society and the role of the army, indigenous peoples, constitutional reform and the election system, resettling the displaced population, socioeconomic conditions and agricultural reform. A second round of negotiations was held in Querétaro, Mexico, in July, at which the principles for the democratisation of the country were discussed. As can be seen, much of Guatemala’s process was conducted outside the country.

In 1993, under the presidency of Ramiro de León, institutional reforms were undertaken in Guatemala and the National Reconciliation Commission was disbanded. However, a permanent peace fund was created to give the people a voice, and at the end of the year, more formal negotiations were launched with the URNG after several “ecumenical encounters” organised by pastor Paul Wee. The following year, negotiation rounds were held in Mexico, and UN mediation got underway with the Framework Agreement for Resumption of the Negotiation Process; this entailed a series of rounds that lasted until the final agreement, signed in 1996. The figure of “friendly countries” was launched, which included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States and Venezuela. These countries provided diplomatic and economic support to the project. The United Nations created MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala), whose mandate lasted until 2004. In March, the important Global Agreement on Human Rights was signed by the government and the URNG. It is worth noting that this agreement was signed without a ceasefire, that is, in the midst of the hostilities, but with the purpose of “humanising” the war. It was agreed to ask that a Standing Civil Society Assembly be created, which started in April of that year and lasted until 1996. Its mandate was to debate the underlying issues addressed in the bilateral negotiations. With the ASC, Guatemala’s process provided a hugely enriching model of citizen participation, as it is one of the processes in which civil society had the most chances to influence the negotiating table under an operating scheme in which ten delegates were appointed for each social sector represented. These delegates were charged with adopting “least common denominator” proposals to be brought to the negotiating table.

Finally, a peace agreement was signed in 1996 that put an end to 36 years of armed conflict. It consisted of 13 agreements and 300 commitments, not all of which were fulfilled, partly because they were overly ambitious and partly because a referendum which was supposed to ratify some of them failed to pass in 1999. Thus, the process in Guatemala is criticised for having overly high aspirations, which sheds light on the dilemma of which is better: a less ambitious but more realistic agreement, or the opposite. In any event, the agreement put an end to the armed violence and enabled an International Commission against Impunity to be created years later in 2007.

The process in Northern Ireland

The peace process in Northern Ireland lasted a little over a decade. Its immediate origins date back to the mid-1980s, when the atmosphere was conducive to peace, either because of weariness with war, contagion from other processes, the economic need to achieve peace, support from the new US administration or the people’s fervent desire for peace. In 1987, the first secret talks were launched between John Hume, leader of Northern Ireland’s Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the British government. Eleven years later, Hume was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for his contributions to peace in Northern Ireland. In 1990, the channel of communication was opened with the leaders of Sinn Féin, and in December 1993 the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, which accepted Northern Ireland’s right to self-determination and pledged to facilitate an agreement with the Irish people, as well as allowing Sinn Féin to join the political dialogue. This led the IRA to declare a ceasefire in 1994, which lasted until February 2006. In January 2005, the loyalist paramilitary groups declared a ceasefire, and in November of the same year, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, travelled to Northern Ireland, which amounted to an enormous boost to the peace process.

In June 1996, inclusive multi-party negotiations were held, initially without Sinn Féin, with the mediation of former US Senator George Mitchell. These negotiations operated under the principle of “sufficient consensus”, that is, the decisions were taken by simple majority, as long as the main parties participated. Decision-making also included what was called “parallel consent”, in which a majority of both nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants was needed. The negotiations were conducted under the principle that “nothing was agreed until everything was agreed”; that is, the partial agreements would not be valid until everything had been agreed to. Under former Senator Mitchell’s mediation, it was stipulated that only peaceful and political means would be used in the process. This was called the “Mitchell principles”. At this time, the British Minister for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, demonstrated her courage by visiting prisons to meet with prisoners from the IRA and protestant paramilitary groups with the purpose of convincing them to take part in the peace process. In 1997, the IRA declared a second truce, which allowed Sinn Féin to rejoin the multi-party talks. Finally, a peace agreement called the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed in April 1998. This agreement called for police reform, reform of the institutions of Northern Ireland, the formation of a British-Irish Ministerial Council, a North South Ministerial Council and a Human Rights Commission. Seven years later, in 2005, the IRA gave up its armed struggle. In 2007, a government shared between Catholics and Protestants was started, and the IRA was officially, permanently disbanded in 2008. Reconciliation will take many years and the wounds will probably not be fully healed for another generation, but at least headway can be made in the absence of attacks.

The process in Angola

The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and lasted 26 years, causing half a million deaths. It pitted the government forces of the MPLA, who received support from the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc countries, against the rebel forces of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi and initially supported by the United States, South Africa, Zaire and other African governments. The first attempt at negotiations came in December 1988, when an agreement was forcibly signed in New York; however, it did not address the causes of the conflict or entail an interruption in foreign interference. The first important official agreements (the Bicesse Agreement in May 1991 and the Lusaka Agreement in November 1994), both reached under the auspices of the international community, did not manage to put a halt to the military clashes, while the third one, the Luena Memorandum from 2002, in which the international community hardly played a role, enabled a cessation of hostilities to be reached and put an end to the war.

The official negotiations began in Portugal in 1900 under the auspices of the Troika made up of Portugal, the USSR and the United States. This led the MPLA to agree to turn Angola into a multi-party state. In May 1991, the Bicesse Agreement was signed in Portugal with mediation by the government of that country in the presence of President Dos Santos and Savimbi. This agreement stipulated that elections had to be held with UNITA’s participation and United Nations supervision, although neither of the sides had given up its aspirations to achieve a military victory. A second UN mission was set up in Angola (UNAVEM II) with the mission of observing and verifying the disarmament process and backing the creation of a single new national army. In the meantime, the non-military social and political forces were left on the sidelines of the process. The MPLA won the elections, which were called too hastily in September
1992, and UNITA declared them fraudulent; as a result, the hostilities resumed without UNAVEM II unable to do anything. The United States stopped supporting UNITA and recognised the government of Angola, leading the UN to open sanctions against UNITA, which in October 1993 was forced to recognise the Bicesse Agreement and resume the talks. For one year, in the midst of combats that substantially curtailed UNITA's capacities, both parties held a dialogue mediated by the United Nations Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the troika. This led to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, which stipulated that UNITA had to disarm in exchange for participating in the National Unity and Reconciliation Government. UNITA, however, did not disarm and continued to exploit the diamond resources in an effort to continue the war, which led the Security Council to step up its sanctions against UNITA in June 1998. Under the Lusaka Protocol, both parties had to conclude the electoral process under UN supervision, in addition to a cessation of hostilities, the cantonment of UNITA troops and disarmament. In February 1995, the United Nations Mission UNAVEM III was created with the mission of helping the government of Angola and UNITA restore peace and achieve national reconciliation on the basis of the Bicesse and Lusaka Agreements. Savimbi met with President Mandela in May 1995, and shortly thereafter the MPLA offered Savimbi the Vice Presidency of the country. In March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos reached an agreement to form a coalition government. When the UNAVEM III mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created with a contingent of 1,500 troops, but in 1999 the Angolan government, which felt militarily strong enough to defeat UNITA, asked for it to be closed, so it moved from Luanda to New York. The permanent truce between the MPLA and UNITA was only reached in 2002 when the leader of the latter, Jonas Savimbi, was murdered from several gunshots on the 22nd of February, which allowed a ceasefire to be reached with the new leader, the Secretary General of UNITA, Paulo Lukamba, and a National Unity Government to be formed. UNITA abandoned its armed struggle and became a political party. It officially demobilised in August 2002. The peace agreement became official in the Luena Memorandum dating from April 2002. The negotiation process had lasted 14 years.

The process in South Africa

The process in South Africa, which lasted less time, also emerged as the result of a nurturing atmosphere. In the late 1980s, South Africa was experiencing governability problems. There was a great deal of outside pressure regarding the policy of apartheid, the country was suffering from a major economic crisis and Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) was losing outside support as the result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire. In 1989, all of these factors conspired in favour of negotiations, which the recently appointed President De Klerk would transform into major reforms. De Klerk opened up secret negotiations with Mandela, who was now the mastermind of a process that would shake the world and become a benchmark for other countries seeking a model of transition to democracy and reconciliation. Mandela used his extraordinary powers of persuasion to earn the trust and respect of his opponents and turn the secret talks into formal negotiations. He was released in 1990, at the same time that all the political groups were legalised and the transitional period got underway. In March of the following year, the churches called a peace conference, which was warmly welcomed by the business community. Indeed the business sector became one of the most fervent in its support of change, to such an extent that a consultative business movement was created. In April, President De Klerk announced a peace summit, and shortly thereafter a Civil Facilitating Commission and a National Peace Convention were created. From then on, a parallel process unfolded: first, the National Peace Accord was launched from 1991 to 1994 as the instrument of citizen participation, and secondly the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was orchestrated, made up of five working groups, along with the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) as a formal negotiation mechanism between the government and the political parties, including the ANC.

The instrument for citizen participation, the National Peace Accord, worked with two kinds of structures: a National Peace Commission (made up of 60 people) and a National Peace
Secretariat (made up of seven people), as well as regional and local structures. The latter were made up of 11 regional peace commissions (with representatives from political parties, business, trade unions, local authorities, police, local commissions and other sectors), 260 local peace commissions (which reflected the composition of each community and reported to the regional commissions) and 15,000 peace monitors. This civic structure, which bears deep-down similarities to the Civil Society Assembly in Guatemala, debated the issues on the negotiation agenda for three years until general elections were held in 1994. Nelson Mandela won, and a transition government was sworn in, which gave rise to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated until 1999. In December 1996, the new constitution was approved, ushering in the new South Africa of the 21st century, full of challenges yet free of apartheid. All of this was thanks to the courage and mass appeal of President Mandela, the miraculous “human factor” in South Africa, a process which, along with its charismatic leader, has given the world a participatory model with a unique experience of reconciliation, in which forgiveness was conditioned upon revelation of the truth. The peace process lasted five years.

The process in Liberia

In 1980, Samuel Doe took power after the popular uprising. The civil war got underway in 1989, when Charles Taylor left Doe’s government and met with a group of rebels from the NPFL in the Ivory Coast and attacked the capital. The UN responded to this in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook several initiatives to resolve the conflict, including the intervention of a regional ceasefire observer force (ECOMOG), which became an opposition faction in the conflict. Taylor was supported by Libya. Another dissident, Johnson, captured and killed Doe in 1990. ECOMOG declared an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as the President and with Johnson’s support. In 1992, ULIMO, made up of Doe sympathisers, started a guerrilla war. The Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to facilitate talks between ECOWAS and the conflicting parties. A coalition government was formed in 1993. With mediation by ECOWAS, a peace agreement was reached in Cotonu (Benin), after which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established with the goal of consolidating the ceasefire. The next year, it was impossible for elections to be held due to skirmishes, but several complementary peace agreements were negotiated to join the Cotonu Agreements. In August 1995, after numerous negotiations and a dozen failed peace agreements, the Abuja (Nigeria) Agreement was signed, which included the leaders of the clashing factions in a transitional government and required the disarmament of the guerrillas for the elections.

In 1997, Taylor formed the National Patriotic Party and won the elections. He was elected President and promoted a policy of reconciliation and national unity. Even though the main militias had been dissolved in order to become political organisations, rebel groups continued operating from Sierra Leone and Guinea, giving rise to a second civil war. UNOMIL ended its mandate, and the United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL), which managed to reach an agreement with the rebel groups to share power in the country. In 1999, ECOMOG withdrew from the country. In 2000, groups opposed to Taylor were formed, such as LURD (with support from Guinea), which began a war financed by diamond resources. In February 2000, a meeting sponsored by the King of Morocco was held in Rabat, in which the heads of state of the Mano River Union countries participated. At this meeting, the leaders pledged to resolve their differences and agreed to set up a Joint Security Committee on a sub-regional level. However, the dialogue process was suspended when President Taylor decided not to attend the September meeting, alleging concerns over his personal safety. Days later, a ten-member International Contact Group on Liberia was set up in New York under the joint presidency of ECOWAS and the EU with the purpose of securing greater participation by the international community in the efforts to resolve the crisis.
In early 2003 MODEL was formed with the support of the Ivory Coast; this group opposed Taylor and fought alongside LURD. By May, both rebel groups had seized control of two-thirds of the country and were threatening to take the capital, so the government and the rebels were forced to negotiate an agreement to put an end to the civil war. In June, negotiations were held among all the parties participated in Accra under the sponsorship of Ghana and ECOWAS facilitation. Taylor said that he was willing to resign if this would contribute to achieving peace. Days later, a ceasefire agreement was signed, which was violated by LURD several times. In July, spurred by intensified combats and in view of the threat of a humanitarian crisis, the Secretary General decided to appoint Jacques Paul from the USA his Special Representative for Liberia with the mandate to support the incipient transition agreements. He also proposed that international troops be deployed and that the UNOL be closed. In early August, the Security Council authorised the establishment of a multinational force, and due to pressure from the USA, UN and EU, Taylor resigned because of his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone and harassment from LURD. On the 18th of August, the Accra Agreement was signed by the government, LURD, MODEL and the political parties as part of the ECOWAS peace process. The militias disarmed and a National Transitional Government was instated until the 2005 elections. The peace agreement also stipulated an amnesty and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Through this agreement, the parties asked the United Nations to deploy a 15,000-member force in Liberia (UNMIL) to support the National Transitional Government and ensure implementation of the agreement. The war ended in October when the United Nations and the US military intervened and banished Taylor to Nigeria. He was later transferred to The Hague to be tried by the International Criminal Court. The conflict, which lasted 14 years, had taken 250,000 lives and left one million displaced persons. The negotiations lasted 13 years.

The process in Tajikistan

In 1992, one year after Tajikistan proclaimed its independence from the USSR, a civil war broke out which led to 50,000 deaths. In May, the Tajik opposition, an informal coalition of Islamic groups and other forces, took power after two months of demonstrations. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), led by Abdulllo Nuri, took refuge in Afghanistan after being defeated in December.

In September of that same year, the first United Nations exploratory mission was conducted based on an appeal from President Rakhmonov to the UN Secretary General. A second United Nations exploratory mission was held in November, with the active participation of four countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. In April, Ismat Kittani was appointed the Secretary General’s special envoy. In January 1993, Kittani was replaced by Ramiro Piriz-Ballón. In March 1993, the “non-official inter-Tajik dialogue” got underway when seven individuals from different factions in the war gathered round the same table in Moscow. The talks continued after a peace agreement was signed in 1997, and they exerted some influence on the outcome of events. In September 1993, the CIS Council of Ministers deployed collective peace forces, made up of contingents from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The hostilities had waned considerably.

In April 1994, the first round of negotiations was held in Moscow with an inclusive agenda (political agreement, the problem of refugees and consolidation of the state). In June, a second round of negotiations was held in Teheran with participation by the OECD as an observer. In September, a consultative meeting took place in Teheran, where a provisional ceasefire agreement was signed, prepared by the United Nations teams. At that meeting, the Russian and Iranian chancellors played a prominent role in convincing the UTO. In October, the third round of talks was held in Islamabad with participation by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as an observer. This round concluded with a protocol that set up a joint commission to supervise the ceasefire. In December, the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) was created with the mission of supervising the situation and backing regional peace initiatives.
In May 1995, the fourth round of talks was held in Almaty with an agreement to exchange prisoners and repatriate refugees. The UTO submitted a proposal for a transition government, which was rejected by the government. In July and August, the United Nations team flew between Dushanbe and Kabul five times to hold “consultative negotiations” between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the UTO, Nuri. In August, President Rakhmonov and Nuri signed a Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, which became the roadmap and stipulated that a “continuous round” of negotiations be held. In November, the first phase in the continuous round was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, where the discussion topics included how to integrate representatives from the opposition into the government and representatives from the opposite military units into the armed forces. In July 1996, the third phase in the continuous rounds was held in Asjabab, Turkmenistan, and Ramiro Piriz-Ballón was replaced by the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Gerd Merrem. In December, Rakhmonov and Nuri met in Afghanistan and agreed to a cessation of hostilities.

In January 1997, the Protocol on Refugees was signed in Teheran with key participation by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati. From January to May, rounds of talks were held in Teheran, Moscow, Meshed (Iran) and Bishkek, in which both parties agreed to the modalities of the DDR, the integration of the armed forces, the legalisation of the Islamic Renaissance Party and a 30% share in the power structure for UTO representatives. The Protocol on Political Affairs was signed in the Bishkek round with the good offices of the President of Kyrgyzstan. In March, the Protocol on Military Affairs was signed, which enabled the CIS armed forces to accompany the units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) from Afghanistan to the gathering zones supervised by UNMOT. The Russian Foreign Minister, Primakov, played a key role in this process. Finally, on the 27th of June, the General Peace Agreement was signed at the Kremlin. In July, the first meeting of the National Reconciliation Commission was held in Moscow, which approved a mutual forgiveness law and a draft amnesty law that was approved days later by the Parliament. In November, a donor conference was held in Vienna, where 96 million dollars were pledged. The Security Council extended UNMOT’s mandate and changed its mission so it could cooperate with the National Reconciliation Commission, supervise the DDR and coordinate the United Nations’ assistance during the transitional period. In 1999, peaceful elections were held and Rakhmonov was re-elected president. The peace process lasted five years.

There were several keys factors in the negotiations: weariness of war; Russia’s and Iran’s interest in peace (the last few rounds were held in the capitals of both countries); the moderating influence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the Tajik opposition; the advance of the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the loss of the rearguard for the Tajik opposition); the fundamental role played by the United Nations and its Department of Political Affairs; the skilful handling of the process by the friendly countries; the Security Council’s clear mandate; the adept coordination of the four CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia); the participation of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan as observers; the role of the OSCE and the OIC, who were allies in the process and guarantors of the peace agreement; the negotiations, which were not interrupted despite the surrounding conflict and noncompliance with the ceasefire (the negotiations were part of the war strategy); the leadership of the Tajik President Rakhmonov, the Tajik opposition leader, Nuri, who took the helm of their respective delegations seven times; the confidentiality of the process; the usual format of consultations between the leaders of the delegations and the United Nations mediators, who always wrote the first drafts, which were accepted 95% of the time; and the existence of the “non-official inter-Tajik dialogue”, which bore a positive influence on the course of the negotiations.

The process in Sierra Leone

A civil war broke out in 1991 in which 75,000 people died. It was triggered by a rebellion against President Momoh led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with Foday Sankoh at the
helm. Momoh was defeated the next year in a military coup. Captain Strasser became the
President, and the RUF issued new demands, leading the conflict to continue. In October, the
RUF took control of the diamond mines, which also prolonged the conflict.

In 1994, President Strasser asked for the good offices of the UN Secretary General to encourage
the RUF to negotiate with the government. The Secretary General sent a civil servant to try to
forge contacts with the RUF, but to no avail. In view of this development, the Secretary General
appointed Berhanu Dinka his Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, with the mission of engaging in
contacts with the RUF. In 1995, the UN, ECOSAP and the OAU tried to negotiate a solution,
and in December of the same year the international British organisation Alert helped to set up a
meeting between the UN and the RUF in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). In March 1996, presidential
elections were held and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected. The RUF did not participate and
forged ahead with the conflict, but on the 25th of March the outgoing government and the RUF
signed a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed to hold negotiations with a view to solving the
conflict. These negotiations were held with mediation by Ivory Coast, the United Nations, the
OAU and the Commonwealth. In April, Kabbah and Sankoh met face-to-face in the Ivory Coast;
they agreed to a ceasefire and to set up working groups. The OAU decided to get more actively
involved and appointed a special envoy. The negotiations ended with the signing of the Abidjan
Agreement in November, which initially put an end to the conflict. The agreement called for
amnesty, the conversion of the RUF into a political party and a disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR) process. The agreement also called for electoral, judicial and police reform.
Between December 1996 and January 1997, an evaluation group sent by the UN Secretary
General visited Sierra Leone, and on the 3rd of January this group managed to meet with the
leader of the RUF.

In March 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria, and in May of the same year, Paul Koroma led
a military coup with the support of the RUF. He created the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council,
with which he fought the ECOWOM (Military Observer Group) troops in the country. In October,
talks were held in Conakry and a peace plan was signed that called for a cessation of hostilities,
an ECOWOM verification mechanism, the DDR, immunity for participants in the coup, the return
of Sankoh and the reinstatement of President Kabbah’s constitutional government. In February
1998, in response to a joint attack by the RUF and the army of the junta, ECOWOM launched a
military attack that led to the dissolution of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. President
Kabbah once again occupied his post and appointed a new government. The United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMISIL) was also created. Foday Sankoh, who had been
arrested, issued a call for surrender, but the skirmishes continued, partly due to Liberia’s support
of RUF members.

In 1999, new negotiations were held between the government and the rebels. In May, the Lomé
Convention was signed and a dialogue got underway between the government and the RUF. The
government transported Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé with a promise of amnesty. The
government of Togo facilitated the negotiations. A ceasefire was declared and the prisoners of
war were released. The main provisions in the agreement were the transformation of the RUF into
a political party, the establishment of a national unity government, the granting of the vice
presidency to Sankah, the establishment of a Council of Notables and Religious Leaders to act as
mediators, an amnesty, the scheduling of elections, the start of a DDR and a restructuring of the
armed forces, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the gradual
withdrawal of ECOWOM forces. It was agreed that Togo, the United Nations, the OAU and the
Commonwealth would serve as the guarantors of the agreement. In October, Sankah and Koroma
returned to Freetown and UNAMISIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) was created to
fulfil the Lomé Convention. In November, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja, which
called for UNAMISIL to perform a supervisory function and for the DDR to immediately resume.
This agreement triggered divisions within the RUF.

In May 2000, 500 UN troops were kidnapped by the RUF, which prompted a British military
intervention, the disbandment of the RUF and the arrest of Sankoh. However, in November the
Abuja I Accord was signed, which declared a ceasefire supervised by UNAMSIL and the handover of weapons by the RUF, as well as DDR programme and the restructuring of the armed forces. Given the fact that the fighting continued, in 2001 the Guinean troops conducted an offensive against the RUF. However, in May the Abuja II Accords setting out a DDR programme were signed between the RUF and the government. The war finally came to an end in January 2002. Sankoh died in prison. The peace process, with all its ups and downs and incidents of non-compliance, lasted eight years.

The process in southern Sudan

The start of the conflict dates back to 1983, when the armed opposition group SPLA from the south of the country rebelled against the Sudanese armed forces, which were opposed to independence for the south of the country, which the SPLA was advocating. The conflict led to the death of more than one million people. The first explorations were conducted in 1988, and the following year the government and the SLPA signed a tentative Declaration of Principles of IGAD, the mediator, to hold a referendum on self-determination in the south of the country. In July 2002, a theoretical agreement was reached under the auspices of IGAD, which established autonomy in the south before a referendum was held in 2011. The first direct meeting between the President of Sudan and the SPLA leader also took place. Between 2002 and 2004, several rounds of negotiations were held in Kenya, in which headway was made on an extensive agenda of issues. These rounds made it possible for a definitive peace agreement to be reached on the 5th of January 2005, in which the north and south would keep separate armed forces, a joint force would be created for the more disputed areas, autonomy would be set for six years, a referendum on self-determination would be held in 2011, the oil profits would be equitably split and a National Unity Government would be formed, with one vice presidency set aside for the SLPA. Likewise, it was agreed not to apply Islamic law in the south of the country and that each territory would have its own flag. The process lasted a total of 13 years, and seven went by before a peace agreement was signed.

The process in Burundi

The start of the conflict in Burundi dates back to 1983, when the country’s Hutu prime minister was assassinated, triggering a cycle of violence that led to the death of 300,000 people. The first peace talks did not start until five years later, in 1998, in Tanzania. They were initially facilitated by the president of that country, Nyerere, and later by Nelson Mandela. In August 2000, the Arusha Agreement was signed with the participation of 17 political parties and the majority of Hutu organisations in the country, which led to the formation of the first transition government. Between 2002 and 2003, agreements were signed with two other major groups, the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which left pending the agreement with just a single group, the FNL, whose leader, Agathon Rwasa, did not sign a peace agreement until six years later.

The first negotiations with Rwasa’s FNL were held between 2002 and 2004 in Gabon, Tanzania, Switzerland, Kenya, the Netherlands and South Africa, although they were fruitless. In 2004, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created with the mandate to help to implement the efforts to restore peace and reconciliation. Its mandate lasted until 2006, when a General Ceasefire Agreement was signed with the FNL in September in Tanzania, which along with South Africa was a mediator in the conflict. This agreement stipulated the following: a) rectification of the ethnic question, already identified as one of the causes of the conflict; b) provisional immunity for FNL members and its transformation into a political party; c) the repatriation of refugees and the return of the displaced population; and d) a revision of the composition of the security and defence forces. In October of the same year, a United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was created, which took over the baton from the ONUB with the mandate of supporting the government in its efforts on behalf of peace and stability.
Finally, in December 2008 a peace agreement was signed with the FNL, with the presence of the South African mediator, Charles Nqakula. The next step was political power-sharing, with 33 posts set aside for the FNL and the launch of the group’s disarmament. The process had lasted ten years.

The process in Indonesia (Aceh)

The conflict in Indonesia (Aceh) started in 1976, when the armed opposition group GAM claimed independence for Aceh. The conflict led to the death of 15,000 people. The earliest talks were held in 2000 with the facilitation of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, headquartered in Geneva. These talks led to the signing of a Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. However, both parties were still clashing because they were unwilling to give up armed activity. Another influential factor was that Timor-Leste had just won independence and the Indonesian army was unwilling to lose another region. The second round of negotiations was held in May 2002, also in Geneva, and the third in May 2003 in Tokyo. However, the GAM was insisting on independence for Aceh, an option that was rejected outright by the government. As a result, martial law was instated and the hostilities resumed. Yet during this same period, a 46-year-old Finnish financial consultant, Juha Christensen, managed to keep up discreet contacts with the clashing parties, which would come to be of vital importance to the future of the negotiations.

A tsunami hit in December 2004, leading to the death of 170,000 people in the region, which was devastated. This natural catastrophe, which required the government to open up Aceh to the international community, totally altered the situation and triggered reactions that helped spur the resumption of the negotiations. The first contacts occurred in January 2005 with the mediation of the Crisis Management Initiative, driven by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Several noteworthy events took place within the space of a few months: a bilateral truce, a meeting in Sweden with GAM exiles, the withdrawal of the arrest warrant against GAM leaders and a change in GAM criteria, as it ceased to demand independence and instead agreed to advanced autonomy. Thus, a special autonomy was negotiated, and the facilitator set a deadline for reaching an agreement (summer). Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding between the GAM and the government was signed in August 2006, which put an end to 30 years of conflict. The agreement was based on the end of hostilities and the disarmament of the GAM, the withdrawal of the military and police forces, amnesty for GAM members and their participation in politics, as well as the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In December of the same year, the GAM candidate was proclaimed governor of the region of Aceh. The peace process, in all its stages, lasted five years.

The process in Nepal

The conflict got underway in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), a Maoist guerrilla force, opposed the forces of the Nepalese monarchy. The conflict led to 10,000 deaths. In 2002, the first secret talks were held and a tentative and temporary bilateral ceasefire was reached. The next year, formal talks were held, but to no avail. In November 2005, the CPN reached an alliance with seven Nepalese parties, pledging to establish a democracy, respect human rights, call UN-supervised elections and embark on a UN-supervised disarmament. One year later, in June 2006, an agreement was reached between the government and the CPN, and in November the peace agreement was signed that put an end to ten years of conflict. This agreement was comprised of the following points: 1) to implement the 12-point agreement reached on the 22nd of November 2005 between the CPN and the seven political parties, as well as the ceasefire code of conduct signed by the government and the CPN on the 22nd of May 2006; 2) to conduct their respective activities peacefully and mindful of the commitments of a multi-party government system, civil liberties, the fundamental rights, human rights, freedom of the press, the rule of law and the democratic norms and values; 3) to ask the United Nations to assist in managing the armed forces and weapons of both parties, as well as to observe the impartial elections for the Constituent Assembly; 4) to guarantee the democratic rights
established by the grassroots movement in 1990 and 2006, based on the commitments expressed in the 12-point agreement, in the preamble of the ceasefire code of conduct and in the draft of an interim constitution, and consequently to set up an interim government, set a date for the election of a Constituent Assembly and dissolve the congress and the Maoist government through an alternative agreement based on consensus; 5) to deem that these issues are of national importance and must be fulfilled based on understanding; 6) to guarantee that the fundamental rights of the Nepalese people are part of the process of creating a new constitution, without their being influenced by fear, threats or violence. International observation and monitoring will be needed for the elections; and 7) to restructure the state gradually in order to resolve the problems associate with class, race, region and gender, through elections for a Constituent Assembly. This includes a commitment to transform the ceasefire into lasting peace and to resolve problems through dialogue, with special attention to democracy, peace, prosperity, progress, independence, the sovereignty of the country and self-esteem. In 2008, Nepal ceased to be a monarchy and became a democratic federal republic. In accordance with the peace agreement, the United Nations will supervise the cantonment and reintegration of the Maoist forces, while the government will restructure its armed forces. The peace process lasted four years.

The process in the Philippines (MILF)

The MILF was founded in 1978 as a spin-off of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), created in 1969. After several years of negotiations the group reached a peace agreement with the Government (Manila Agreement), with initial mediation by Libya, and subsequent efforts by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The agreement granted autonomy to the southern provinces. However, negotiations continue to implement the Manila Agreement. The 10,000-strong MILF was against this 1996 agreement and had demanded Mindanao's independence, but eventually settled for an advanced autonomy. In 2013 they were able to sign a preliminary peace agreement and in 2014 the final agreement was reached.

In 2001 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo offered to hold negotiations abroad, military operations were suspended and talks began in Malaysia under the auspices of Libya, which led to a ceasefire. Throughout 2004 the Philippine Government and the MILF also held exploratory meetings in Malaysia, which became the facilitator. They agreed on an initial 3-point agenda: security, rehabilitation of the areas in conflict and protection of the ancestral domain of the island of Mindanao. The MILF gave up their independence, but at the time it demanded a form of self-government that provided for greater autonomy in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 2008, the Government and the MILF declared in Malaysia that they would sign the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA), the most controversial negotiation issue in recent years. Both parties also committed to reaching a comprehensive peace agreement in the next 15 months that would include the three main points of the negotiating agenda: security, rehabilitation and development, and ancestral domains. However, at the beginning of August, hours before the Philippine Government and the MILF were ready to sign the agreement in Malaysia, the Supreme Court temporarily suspended the signing of the MOA. In 2009 the Government and the MILF signed in Kuala Lumpur a framework agreement for the creation of an international support group for the negotiation process, which would be composed of governments, mainly the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the EU, in addition to international NGOs and eminent personalities. In September 2010 the MILF chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, said his group had formally abandoned its request for independence for certain regions of Mindanao and had made a proposal to the Government to create a sub-state or autonomous republic which would have power over all areas except foreign affairs, national defence, currency and postage.

On October 15, 2012 the Government and the MILF signed a framework agreement in Manila to resolve the conflict in Mindanao and to create a new political entity called Bangsamoro. The new entity would replace the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao after a transitional
period in which the Bangsamoro basic law would be drawn up. Subsequently, the new law would have to be ratified in a referendum and, if approved, elections for the formation of a government would be held to replace the Transition Commission. On March 27, 2014 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed. The agreement was described as historic because it culminated 13 years of negotiations and brought to an end more than four decades of armed conflict in Mindanao.

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### Appendix 8. Websites of interest

- Alertnet ([www.alertnet.org](http://www.alertnet.org))
- Armed Conflict Database ([acd.iiss.org](http://acd.iiss.org))
- Armed Conflict Location and Even Data Project ([www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com))
- Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives ([peacebuilding.asia](http://peacebuilding.asia))
- Berghof Research Center ([www.berghof-foundation.org](http://www.berghof-foundation.org))
- Center of Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding ([graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp.html](http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp.html))
- Center for Humanitarian Dialogue ([www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org))
- CICDM ([www.cidcm.umd.es](http://www.cidcm.umd.es))
- Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme ([www.clingendael.nl](http://www.clingendael.nl))
- Conciliation Resources ([www.c-r.org](http://www.c-r.org))
- Conflictbarometer ([hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer](http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer))
- Crisis Management Initiative ([www.cmi.fi](http://www.cmi.fi))
- Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford ([www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace))
- Dialogue Advisory Group ([www.dialogueadvisorygroup.com](http://www.dialogueadvisorygroup.com))
- Escola de Cultura de Pau ([escholapau.uab.cat](http://escholapau.uab.cat))
- European Centre for Conflict Prevention ([www.haguejusticeportal.net](http://www.haguejusticeportal.net))
- European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue ([www.themediateur.eu](http://www.themediateur.eu))
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- Geneva Call ([www.genevacall.org](http://www.genevacall.org))
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- German Working Group on Development and Peace ([www.frient.de](http://www.frient.de))
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- Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict ([www.gppac.org](http://www.gppac.org))
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- International Alert ([www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org))
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- International Peace Academy ([www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org))
- IPI Global Observatory ([theglobalobservatory.org/tag/peace-processes](http://theglobalobservatory.org/tag/peace-processes))
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- Mediation Support Network ([mediationsupportnetwork.net](http://mediationsupportnetwork.net))
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The Autonomous University of Barcelona’s Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) was created in 1999 for the purpose of organising a variety of academic and research activities related to the culture of peace, conflict analysis, prevention and transformation; the promotion of human rights and monitoring and intervention in the peace process.

It is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

The Escola de Cultura de Pau’s main activities include:

- The post-graduate diploma in the Culture of Peace (208 classroom hours)
- Elective subjects: “Culture of peace and conflict management” and “Peace education and education in conflict”
- The Peace Processes Programme, which monitors and analyses different countries with peace processes or formalised negotiations underway, as well as countries with negotiations still in the exploratory phase. It includes awareness-raising initiatives to facilitate dialogue amongst the stakeholders involved.
- The Education for Peace Programme, which strives to promote and develop knowledge, values and skills for peace education.
- The Conflict and Peace-building Programme, which monitors international events related to armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises and the gender dimension in peace-building in order to draft the annual Alert! report, monthly reports and quarterly publications.
This tenth edition of the Yearbook on Peace Processes analyses conflicts in which negotiations are being held to reach a peace agreement, regardless of whether these negotiations are formalised, are in the exploratory phase, are faring well or, to the contrary, are stalled or in the midst of crisis. It also analyses some cases in which negotiations or explorations are partial; that is, they do not include all the armed groups present in the country (such as the case of India, for example). The majority of the negotiations refer to armed conflicts, but we also analyse quite a few contexts in which, despite the fact that there are no considerable armed clashes today, the parties have not reached a permanent agreement that would put an end to the hostilities and conflicts still pending. In that sense, the negotiations make sense in an effort to fend off the start or resurgence of new armed clashes.

Vicenç Fisas is the Director of the School for a Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). He also holds the UNESCO Chair in Peace and Human Rights at the UAB. He has a doctorate in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, won the National Human Rights Aware in 1988, and is the author of over 30 books on conflicts, disarmament and research into peace. Some of his published titles include “Manual de procesos de paz” (Handbook of Peace Processes), “Procesos de paz y negociación en conflictos armados” (Peace Processes and Negotiation in Armed Conflicts), “La paz es posible” (Peace is Possible) and “Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos” (Peace Culture and Conflict Management).