This report discusses and analyses four models for constitutional court appointments, with a particular emphasis on how effectively those models foster a sense of political investment on the part of multiple political actors. The four models are: (1) the legislative supermajority model; (2) the judicial council model; (3) the judicial-executive model; and (4) the multi-constituency model. The report examines how the four models have been applied in six countries: Germany, South Africa, Egypt, Iraq, Italy and Turkey. The report also compares the qualifications required for appointment to the constitutional court, and the rules for removing constitutional court judges, in these six countries.

This briefing paper sets out international standards for judicial independence and highlights the essential functions of an independent judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Drawing on a combination of both hard and soft sources of international law, the paper reveals a definition of judicial independence that can be met in various legal and constitutional contexts, while allowing courts to protect human rights, secure the rule of law, and ensure the principles of a constitutional democracy. Keywords: Judicial/ Judiciary, Independence of the Judiciary. Example.

This paper is a look at the global trends with respect to constitutional courts. It touches on the following issues: (i) emerging international and regional consensus principles and models (ii) the rationale for creating Constitutional Courts, including the advantages and disadvantages of having such a court (iii) the composition of Constitutional Courts (iv) the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts including: whether the court has preventative or ad hoc judicial review powers, and whether the court has abstract or concrete constitutional control (v) the contribution of Constitutional Courts to judicial independence, including the different relationships that can be crafted between the regular judiciary and the constitutional court (vi) the different types of standing available to bring a case to the Constitutional Court and (vii) the various means to ensure public access to information handled by the Constitutional Court. The paper also touches on the broader picture, discussing the role of constitutional courts within the power structure of a democratic state.

This memorandum considers how to design constitutional courts to be most effective. With reference to examples such as Hungary, Italy, and Russia, the article examines dimensions including jurisdiction, appointment and tenure, and the effect of judicial declarations of unconstitutionality. The article also examines how a carefully designed and properly limited constitutional court can aid the creation of the rule of law, with specific reference to Afghanistan.